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Abstract 
Given the dual crisis the European Union (EU) faces today in terms of its democratic legitimacy as well as its 
problem-solving capacity, a stronger role for supranational parliamentary arenas such as the European Parliament 
(EP) has been suggested. This suggestion is based on the EP’s supposed capacity of relativising national interests, 
which are frequently considered detrimental to effective European governance, by voting along ideological lines. The 
present dissertation examines the empirical basis for this suggestion. In an increasingly politicised EU, actors are 
asked to justify their decisions while at the same time, such justifications can be strategically used to shape the 
structure of political conflict. The innovative focus of the present dissertation thus lies on the strategic 
communication of the national parties’ representatives, as up-to-date research on conflict in the EP and research on 
the reasons Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) give for their decisions are largely missing. The usage of 
such framing strategies and its consequences for the structure of conflict is outlined first in a “theory of 
territorialisation”. It is argued, that national party delegations carefully weigh their goals of ideology-based policy-
seeking and territorially-bound vote-seeking against each other, using a toolbox of framing strategies in order to 
avoid defection from ideological predilections whenever possible. As a result, conflict in the EP will only be more 
territorial than ideological if the issue at stake is politicised and involves certain, cross-national distributional effects. 
This theoretical framework outlines the micro-level processes in terms of party delegations’ framing strategies much 
more precisely than extant theories, which can be evaluated most exactly by the particular methodological approach 
chosen: A Policy Frame Analysis is conducted on the press releases issued by 34 parties from six Member States in 
the run-up to the 2014 European Elections, focussing on the debate on Europeanised welfare (‘welfare tourism’), the 
2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP). As it is found, only the conflict on CAP Reform is territorialised, just as could be expected based on the 
theory of territorialisation. Even in this case, MEPs appear to represent the variety potential of determinants of 
policy preferences in a highly differentiated manner. As it is thus concluded, the role of certain combinations of issue 
characteristics notwithstanding, the impact of national interests on MEPs’ communication appears to be strongly 
limited indeed. A further shift of competences to the EP might thus improve EU governance in the supposed 
manner, while in order to win support for this shift, it will arguably have to be justified – or framed – in innovative 
ways lacking recently on the part of the supporters of European integration. 
 
Key words: European Parliament – framing – structure of conflict – welfare tourism – CAP – TTIP 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Angesichts der zweifachen Krise der Europäischen Union (EU) bezüglich ihrer demokratischen Legitimation und 
ihrer Problemlösungskapazitäten wurde eine Stärkung der supranationalen parlamentarischen Foren, wie etwa des 
Europäischen Parlaments (EP), angeregt. Dieser Vorschlag basiert auf der dem EP unterstellten Eigenschaft, 
nationale Interessen, welche häufig als Hemmnis für eine effektive europäische Regierungsführung erachtet werden, 
zu relativieren. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die empirische Grundlage dieses Vorschlags. In einer zunehmend 
politisierten EU sind die Akteure verstärkt angehalten, ihre Entscheidungen zu rechtfertigen, können aber solche 
Rechtfertigungen strategisch zur Beeinflussung der Konfliktstruktur nutzen. Ein besonders innovatives Element der 
vorliegenden Dissertation besteht daher im Fokus auf die strategische Kommunikation der Repräsentanten der 
nationalen Parteien, da aktuelle Studien zu Konflikten im EP sowie zu den Gründen, die Mitglieder des 
Europäischen Parlaments (MdEPs) angeben, bisher weitgehend fehlen. Der Gebrauch solcher framing-Strategien und 
seine Folgen für die Konfliktstruktur werden zunächst in einer „Theorie der Territorialisierung“ dargelegt. Es wird 
argumentiert, dass nationale Parteidelegationen ihre Ziele in Form von ideologiebasiertem policy-Streben sowie 
territorial gebundenem Wahlerfolgen sorgsam gegeneinander abwägen, und dabei eine Reihe von framing-Strategien 
nutzen um den endgültigen Bruch mit ideologischen Vorlieben wann immer möglich zu vermeiden. Somit werden 
Konflikte im EP nur dann eher territorial als ideologisch geprägt sein, wenn der betreffende Sachverhalt politisiert ist 
und sichere, länderübergreifende Verteilungseffekte nach sich zieht. Dieser theoretische Rahmen beschreibt die 
Mikro-Ebenen-Prozesse bezüglich der Kommunikationsstrategien der Parteidelegation weitaus präziser als 
bestehende Theorien, und kann durch den speziellen methodischen Ansatz äußerst exakt evaluiert werden. Dieser 
beinhaltet eine Policy Frame Analysis, die auf die Pressemitteilungen von 34 Parteien aus sechs Mitgliedstaaten im 
Vorlauf der Europawahlen 2014 angewandt wird, fokussiert auf die Debatte zur Europäisierung des Sozialstaats 
(‚Sozialtourismus‘), die 2013er Reform der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (GAP) und die Transatlantische Handels- und 
Investitionspartnerschaft (THIP bzw. TTIP). Wie herausgefunden wird, ist nur der Konflikt zur GAP-Reform 
territorialisiert, ganz wie es auf Grundlage der Theorie der Territorialisierung erwartet werden konnte. Tatsächlich 
scheinen die MdEPs die Vielfalt der möglichen Determinanten von policy-Präferenzen äußerst differenziert zu 
repräsentieren. Die Arbeit lässt somit den Schluss zu, dass, ungeachtet der Auswirkung bestimmter Kombinationen 
von Sachverhaltseigenschaften, der Einfluss nationaler Interessen auf die Kommunikation der MdEPs tatsächlich 
stark begrenzt zu sein scheint. Eine weitere Verlagerung von Kompetenzen an da EP könnte daher die 
Regierungsführung der EU in der angenommenen Weise verbessern, während diese Verlagerung wohl auf eine 
innovative Art und Weise begründet – oder ‚geframed‘ – werden müsste, wie sie insbesondere die Befürworter der 
europäischen Integration in jüngerer Zeit haben vermissen lassen, um Zustimmung zu erhalten. 
 
Schlüsselbegriffe: Europäisches Parlament – framing – Konfliktstruktur – Sozialtourismus – GAP - TTIP 
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1. Introduction: National Interests in a Supranational Parliament? 
1 
1. Introduction: National Interests in a Supranational Parliament? 
Under what conditions exactly do Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) express and justify their policy 
preferences in such a way that the resulting structure of conflict in a post-Crisis European Parliament (EP) is 
territorial rather than ideological? In this introductory chapter, I first of all point out that the foregoing question is of 
considerable societal relevance, given calls for increasing the EP’s competences to tackle the EU’s massive crisis of 
legitimacy. As is demonstrated thereafter, however, the extant academic literature on the EP does not provide a solid 
basis for this claim yet: Firstly, in simple empirical terms, the exact conditions of ‘defection’ along territorial rather 
than ideological lines are not entirely clear, even less so given post-Crisis levels of politicisation, while the 
justifications MEPs provide for their decisions have been neglected almost entirely. Secondly, existing theories may 
well have explained the predominance of ideologically structured conflict in general, but rarely provide equally 
detailed accounts of exceptions to the rule. Meanwhile, however, such exceptions might become more relevant, 
given the politicisation of EU politics as well as past and potential further increases in EP competence. Moreover, 
MEPs as actors strategically shaping the direction of debates are either entirely ignored or overrated in terms of their 
framing capacities. This might be because, thirdly, the research design choices made and methods of measurement 
applied so far did not allow for testing theoretical claims on the role of national interests for MEP-to-voter 
communication, as there is a lack of qualitative yet comparative research employing suitable methods of text analysis. 
Before this background, the final section of this chapter provides an outline of a study that should cover the 
respective gap in the academic literature, such that the claims made in the debate on the EU’s legitimacy after the 
Crisis can be based on an empirical footing. 
1.1 Rationales of the study: state of the Union and state of the art 
The state of the Union: Two birds, one stone? 
The so-called ‘Brexit’, the voluntary decision of British voters to terminate their country’s membership of 
the European Union (EU), is the most recent and, arguably, the most obvious sign of the deep crisis of 
legitimacy the EU finds itself in today. While the EU’s ‘input-oriented legitimization’ (cf. Scharpf 1999) 
has already been challenged under the well-known label ‘democratic deficit’ (cf. Follesdal and Hix 2006) 
since the 1990s, since the year 2010 also its ‘output-oriented legitimization (cf. Scharpf 1999) is under 
pressure, as the world’s most prominent example of regional integration seems increasingly unable to 
address internal and external challenges: the so-called ‘Euro crisis’ (henceforth: the Crisis) shook the myth 
of European integration as a key to prosperity and is still not resolved for sure, while it was followed by 
the foreign policy crisis in the Ukraine, the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, as well as by the so-called 
‘refugee crisis’ exposing European disunity in yet another policy domain. Interestingly, in Smisman’s 
(2013) account of the Crisis, the two components of the EU’s crisis of legitimacy appear inextricably 
linked: 
The adoption of a common European response to the economic crisis has proved difficult because 
solidarity among European countries cannot be taken for granted, and political decision-makers tend to 
communicate with their own national electorate and media in terms of defending their national interest. (Smismans 2013, 
351, my emphasis) 
Accordingly, therefore, increasing the EU’s input-oriented legitimization would appear key to re-establish 
its output-oriented legitimization as well. 
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Traditionally, increasing parliamentary competences at the EU-level has been a common 
institutional response to the critics of the EU’s democratic deficit (Chryssochou 2007), and similar calls in 
terms of input-legitimization have been made also in the context of the Crisis (Piketty 2014; Schmidt 
2012). Indeed, according to Frank Schimmelfennig (2015), by creating a eurozone parliament, the issue of 
output-oriented legitimization would be addressed simultaneously, in that – supposedly obstructive – 
national interests would be “relativised”, which in turn would reduce polarisation (ibid.). Noteworthy, 
Schimmelfennig bases this suggestion explicitly on what he refers to as the “experience with the European 
Parliament” (ibid.). The idea of hitting two birds (i.e. increasing both the EU’s input- as well as output-
oriented legitimization) with one stone (i.e. the further strengthening of supranational parliamentary 
institutions) seems quite appealing in principle. Indeed, also within journalistic and political circles, 
‘national egoisms’ are frequently identified as an impediment to solving the various problems the EU faces 
currently, be it again the eurozone crisis (e.g. Radomsky 2015), the crisis in Ukraine (e.g. Stefanini and 
Gurzu 2015) or the refugee crisis (e.g. Breker 2015). Before following Schimmelfennig’s suggestion in 
terms of new or stronger supranational parliaments, at least two caveats should be considered with regard 
to this supposedly easy way out. 
First, with regard to output-oriented legitimization, it would have to be an established fact that 
the EP is more or less immune to the supposedly obstructive territorialisation of conflict, even with regard 
to those kinds of issues often still left to the intergovernmental institutions precisely because of their 
sensitivity in terms of national interests. Second, with regard to input-oriented legitimization, it should be 
noted that a shift of competences to parliamentary arenas can address only what Chryssochou (2007) calls 
the institutional component of the ‘democratic deficit’, but not the socio-psychological one, i.e. the absence of a 
common European identity or ‘demos’. So far, it is also part of the ‘experience’ with the EP, that 
increasing its competence has been met by a simultaneous decrease in turn-out in European elections (cf. 
ibid. 2007). Since, on the one hand, the literature on state- and nation-building would tell us that formal 
national institutions have often preceded national identities (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992), a stronger 
identification with the EU might still follow over time. On the other hand, the same body of literature also 
acknowledges the role of national media in the process of creating ‘imagined communities’ such as nations 
(Anderson 1991), which given the lack of relevant, common European media would seem limited but not 
impossible at the EU-level (Risse 2010). Consequently, one might argue, that the shift towards a 
supranational parliamentary arena can only be socio-psychologically effective insofar as the empowered 
members of such an assembly were able to justify their decisions in a manner analogous to the emerging 
transnational public sphere (cf. Risse 2010). In other words, the arguments they make should be applicable 
in a similar way beyond the confinements of their home member state. In short, it should thus be clarified how 
the Members of the European Parliament behave in the face of national interests, and in particular, how they justify their 
decisions vis-à-vis their national electorates. As is argued in the next subsection, however, this question is not 
sufficiently covered by the extant academic literature. 
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The state of the art: Defining the research gap 
For on the one hand, there is evidence that that European Political Groups (EPGs) are highly cohesive (in 
fact most of it showing that this is increasingly so, with the notable exception of Bowler and McElroy 
2015), such that political conflict in the EP is indeed mainly following ideological rather than national or 
broader territorial lines (Attina 1990; Brzinski 1995; Faas 2003; Hix 1999; Hix, Kreppel, and Noury 2003; 
Hix and Lord 1997; Hix and Noury 2007; Hix, Noury, and Roland 1999; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2002; 
Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Kreppel 2000; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; 
McElroy and Benoit 2011; Noury 2002; Raunio 1996; Ringe 2010). Most studies have further found that 
ideology matters in terms of the traditional Left-Right (L-R) scale primarily and secondarily with regard to 
positions on European integration in general (pro-/anti-EU dimension). This finding has developed into 
something very close to what might be called established knowledge, at least textbook-knowledge (cf. 
Burns 2013), and this is arguably what Schimmelfennig is referring to as “the experience with the 
European Parliament” (see above). In mainly quantitative terms, extant research would thus seem to 
support the idea that national interests in the EP are ‘relativised’. 
On the other hand, it is equally part of the aforementioned textbook-knowledge that 
“occasional instances” of defection (Burns 2013, 167) occur regularly, that is, national party delegations 
disagree with their respective EPG by not voting in the same manner. Noteworthy, national party 
delegations themselves are almost absolutely cohesive (Faas 2003, 854; Thiem 2009). Using various 
definitions and testing it more or less explicitly, scholars usually identify (or just suspect) ‘national 
interests’ as the root cause of defections (Costello and Thomson 2014; Faas 2003; Hix, Noury, and Roland 
2007; Noury 2002; Rasmussen 2008). If this is true, then the general predominance of ideologically 
structured conflict does not imply that the EP or rather its members are immune to national interests. 
Zooming in further on the instances of defection, however, it must be acknowledged that the 
role of national interests in the EP seems to be even more complex. First, Hix et al. argue, that defections 
always occur in a rather circumscribed manner:  
Even if some MEPs vote along national lines in a particular vote, all the other MEPs invariably vote along 
European party lines. Moreover, those MEPs who broke from transnational party lines in some votes will 
vote with their European parties in all other votes on the legislation. (ibid. 2007, 215) 
One could thus argue that even in the presence of national interests leading to defections by national party 
delegations, there never is any instance of what will be referred to throughout this study as complete 
‘territorialisation’ of conflict in the EP, in the sense that ideology would not matter at all and would be 
replaced by nationality as the dominant factor determining the positions of the bulk of MEPs. 
Second, it seems that national interests do not always matter equally. For instance, Hix and 
Noury (2007) show that in the policy domain of migration, national economic interests do not seem to 
matter much. Chen (2015) comes to a similar result with regard to the case of the Anti-Counterfeit Trade 
Agreement (ACTA). In fact, it seems that national interests are at best a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition for defection by individual national party delegations. Faas (2003) demonstrates, for instance, 
that institutional arrangements in terms of candidate selection and electoral laws influence the likelihood 
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of defection. Scholars also observe that national party groups are more likely to defect in order to support 
their national governments (Costello and Thomson 2014), especially for the parties being in control of the 
respective government (Costello and Thomson 2014; Faas 2003; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006). 
Moreover, when elections are approaching, defections become more likely (Lindstädt, Slapin, and Vander 
Wielen 2011). At the same time, new MEPs appear to be socialized into the EP insofar as they seem to 
defect less over time, which was particularly visible with regard to the new MEPs joining after the Eastern 
enlargement (Lindstädt, Slapin, and Wielen, R. J. V. 2012). Finally, Bailer et al. (2009) find that 
characteristics of EPG leaders can positively impact on EPG cohesion (i.e. help to prevent defections), for 
instance, if they are more experienced MEPs. In sum, a number of institutional parameters would seem to 
make defection by national party delegations more or less likely, i.e. they appear to influence the impact of 
national interests on the EP. Nevertheless, knowing which intervening institutional factors influence the 
role of national interests for defection is not very satisfying, unless one also has some systematic account 
of the origin of national interests. 
Third, it further appears that the substance of the policy issue in question plays a role for actor 
alignments in the EP. In general, so-called grand coalitions between the two main party groups, for 
instance, are more likely in the domains of environment and public health, but less common or even 
absent when it comes to economic or social policy issues (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2002; Kreppel 2000; 
Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999). At a more abstract level, two issue characteristics have also been found to 
influence the likelihood of defection in particular. Firstly, a number of scholars establish a relationship 
between the salience that actors (mostly national parties ‘at home’) attach to an issue and the probability of 
defection, in that national party delegations are prone to defection mainly when the issue in question is 
highly salient to them (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Klüver and Spoon 2013; Rasmussen 2008). 
Secondly, it seems that issues involving cross-national distribution foster defection, as is hinted at by 
Noury (2002) as well as Costello and Thomson (2014) and empirically confirmed by Faas (2003) and 
Rasmussen (2008) for agricultural policy and structural policy. What these findings on issue-related 
conditions for defection demonstrate, however, is the need for conceptual clarity, in that both salience and 
distributional effects might or might not be more or less implied in the notion of ‘national interest’. 
Interestingly, the wider literature on conflict in EU politics, be it regarding the Council of the 
EU or the positions of national parties on European integration, exposes a similar degree of complexity as 
is found with regard to conflict in the EP. Within the literature on the Council, for instance, there is not 
even consensus on the general pattern of conflict (cf. Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015): First, some 
scholars come to the rather counterintuitive result that ideology in terms of the classic L-R scale is an even 
better predictor of actor alignments than nationality or at least plays a considerable role (Aspinwall 2002; 
Mattila 2004). Second, however, other scholars do observe territorial patterns in geographical terms of 
North versus South or old versus new Member States (Thomson 2009; Thomson, Boerefijn, and Stokman 
2004) or in terms of net payers versus net recipients of the EU budget (Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 
2015; Zimmer, Schneider, and Dobbins 2005), or even observe a mixed pattern (Hosli, Mattila, and Uriot 
2011). Furthermore, some scholars attribute some role to the type of capitalism and the resulting 
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preference for more or less market regulation (Thomson 2009; Thomson, Boerefijn, and Stokman 2004). 
This overview may not be exhaustive, but it confirms the range of factors that also seem to matter for the 
structure of conflict in the EP as such. 
The extant literature on national party positions on European integration mirrors the main 
finding concerning the structure of conflict in the EP. Not only can parties’ positions on European 
integration be meaningfully captured by classic, ideological scales in terms of Left versus  Right or Green-
Alternative-Libertarian versus Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (GAL-TAN or ‘new politics’ 
dimension) (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002), it is even found that ideology and membership in a 
particular party family is the most important predictor of party positions, in that parties’ views on 
integration resemble much more those of their family members than those of their fellow nationals 
(Arnold, Sapir, and Vries 2012; Hellström 2008; 2009b). Nonetheless, scholars also find a moderating 
influence of broader geographical (Marks and Steenbergen 2004) or even nation-specific factors 
(Hellström 2008; 2009b). An interesting addition from this strand of research is the finding that national 
parties respond to their voters’ preferences on integration (Arnold, Sapir, and Vries 2012; Carrubba 2001). 
Some of these studies further differentiate between integration in the various policy areas and are able 
demonstrate that some ideological dimensions are more important concerning some policy areas than 
others (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2004). However, they do not go into 
more detail than this. In other words, studies on national parties tend to be focused on the question of 
building the European polity rather than on its politics. By contrast, conflict in the EP is precisely about 
substantive decisions, and also the EP as a crisis manager would be concerned first of all with solving 
particular problems rather than necessarily negotiating new treaties with every new problem. In sum, 
therefore, a study that could provide a more structured idea of what conflict in the EP is like might also 
serve as a starting point for further insights into these neighbouring fields shaped by similarly complex 
dynamics. 
Given the complexity of conflict in the EP (and beyond) that results from all the institutional 
and issue-specific factors, the question that increasingly shapes the academic debate is not so much how 
MEPs take positions in general or on one particular issue; rather, the question is under what conditions they 
side either with their fellow nationals or their colleagues from the EPG (cf. Otjes and van der Veer 2016). 
In this respect, it is particularly important to stress that, as Costello and Thomson (2014) note, most of 
what is known about conflict in the EP refers to a situation prior to the Crisis. Thus, the empirical results 
discussed so far cannot display the impact of changes in general conditions such as the generally 
increasing politicisation of the EU (cf. Hooghe and Marks 2012), which arguably was further intensified 
by the Crisis (Blauberger, Puntscher Riekmann, and Wydra 2014). Indeed, the only two studies known to 
the author that at least analyse conflict over policy issues related to the Crisis itself might indicate that 
these changes matter: Braghiroli (2014) finds that membership of the Eurozone is the factor that explains 
voting patterns over economic and monetary issues best, while Otjes and van der Veer (2016) find that in 
terms of ideological dimensions, the classic Left-Right dimension has lost in explanatory power, while the 
pro-/anti-EU dimension is increasingly important for explaining MEPs’ voting behaviour even on those 
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issues that they identify as ‘economic’ ones. Even less so it has been studied, under what conditions 
conflict is territorialised in a post-Crisis European Parliament. 
What Costello and Thomson (2014) further note, however, is that the question how MEPs ‘give 
reasons’ has also been barely investigated so far. Noteworthy, given politicisation, MEPs would actually be 
under an increasing pressure to justify their policy suggestions vis-à-vis their electorates. Moreover, the 
particular way they do so may not only influence the prospects for compromise across borders in the 
short term, but also impact on the EU’s legitimacy in the longer term, if the applicability of justifications is 
territorially limited. Hence, this aspect of conflict in the EP would seem to deserve scholarly attention. 
Paradoxically, it seems that only Proksch and Slapin (2010) have analysed more nuanced forms of 
positioning such as EP debates. They have not, however, considered them as justifications for voting 
decisions, but rather as alternative measurements of policy positions. The precise research question that 
the present study seeks to address, therefore, is the following: Under what conditions exactly do MEPs express 
and justify their policy preferences in such a way that the resulting structure of conflict in a post-Crisis EP is territorial rather 
than ideological? 
Noteworthy, this question has not only been neglected thus far in strictly empirical terms: Of 
the three main strands of theorising conflict in the EP, none appears suitable to address it adequately. 
There is, first, the “Institutional Theory of Behaviour in the European Parliament” (Hix, Raunio, and 
Scully 1999) that underpins most of the empirical literature thus far. It stipulates that MEPs pursue three 
goals, namely policy, re-election and office (here: attractive positions within the EP), while being 
mandated by two principals, namely their respective national party and their EPG (henceforth referred to 
as the 3G2P approach). While it is strongest when it comes to pointing out the institutional factors that 
might influence the decision “to defect or not to defect” (Faas 2003), these factors that might matter 
much less when it comes to explaining the reasons MEPs give for their behaviour, an aspect that is not 
explicitly covered by the theory at all. Moreover, its account concerning the goal of office-seeking within 
the EP is heavily criticised by Nils Ringe (2005; 2010). 
The Perceived Preference Coherence (PPC) approach Ringe has developed in turn, provides 
that due to informational challenges (overload as well as scarcity), MEPs rely on their expert colleagues in 
the legislative committees – from the same national party or at least from the same EPG – for voting 
advice. These experts, in turn, are expected to have an interest for intra-EPG compromise and to use their 
position for strategically setting (mostly ideological) focal points in order to convince their non-expert 
colleagues. While this approach thus at least partly (i.e. within the EP) takes into account the way that 
MEPs give reasons for their policy preferences, it fails to elaborate on the structural limitations of expert 
MEPs’ capacity to shape the structure of conflict actively. As is pointed out in more detail in Chapter 2, 
however, it thus becomes difficult to explain why they would ever defect at all. 
Unlike the 3G2P or PPC approaches, the so-called bicameral approach (Costello and Thomson 
2014) does not primarily aim to account for the predominance of ideological conflict in the EP, but rather 
for the exceptional cases of defection that the present study seeks to explain as well. In doing so, the 
bicameral approach identified the lobbying efforts of national governments as the main source of 
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defection. Yet, Costello and Thomson do not develop an explanation of why MEPs – and those who are 
in domestic opposition in particular – should actually give in to these lobbying efforts, at least not one that 
is independent of the demands of the national party ‘at home’. In this sense, it hence does not offer an 
innovation beyond what one would already expect based on the 3G2P approach. While the precise 
strengths and weaknesses of these approaches are pointed out in more detail in the theoretical chapter of 
this study, it is thus held here that a theoretical account of territorialisation in the EP is needed. 
Such a theory would, of course, not need to be developed from scratch, even if it were not for 
the three approaches specifically developed for the EP. On the one hand, contributions to EU studies 
from the field of International Relations (IR) such as liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993; 1998) 
offer quite precise concepts of how national interests (or preferences) are aggregated and come to 
influence policy-makers. They have been taken up by the more theory-driven works on conflict in the 
Council (Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015), whereas other works on the Council have, albeit not very 
systematically or consistently, made various alternative suggestions for how else nationality might shape 
actor alignments within this particular institution (Aspinwall 2002; Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015; 
Hoyland and Hansen 2014; Mattila 2004; Thomson 2006; 2009; Thomson, Boerefijn, and Stokman 2004; 
Treib 2010).1 On the other hand, contributions drawing on a Comparative Politics tradition explain in 
some more detail how exactly ideological cleavages, involving both ideational as well as structural aspects, 
shape political parties’ positions on European integration (Marks and Wilson 2000). On top of this, 
scholars of EU politics have begun to integrate these two traditions (Marks 2004) and have further started 
to consider the role of politicisation (Hooghe and Marks 2009). The point is, however, that these 
integrative approaches have left behind the solid micro-level conceptions of actors, their goals and their 
strategies for achieving them. 
Reviewing the empirical state of the art it was noted that national interests do not always shape 
conflict in the EP, but that apparently there are complex configurations of conditions that need to be 
present in order for them to matter. The theory to be developed would have to capture this complexity, 
and, in order to test its worth, the respective research design, methods and data would have reflect this 
complexity as well. In this respect, it is worth noting that extant research designs have for the most part 
been quantitative ones, designed to identify the impact of one particular variable (while controlling for 
others), but not interested really in the combinations that lead to the outcome of defection or 
territorialisation. A few other studies have examined, whether national interests matter in a particular case, 
ranging from migration, over the Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement (ACTA) to the so-called Takeover 
Directive (Chen 2015; Hix and Noury 2007; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006; Ringe 2005; 2010), without 
however systematically comparing the case to other cases. Such a systematic comparison that allows for 
the valid operationalisation of the complex conditions that theoretically would seem to shape the structure 
of conflict on the one hand, while on the other hand allowing for some limited generalisation beyond the 
case, is thus lacking so far. Only for the question of party positions of national party positions on 
                                                     
1 This list is not exhaustive, but for another overview see Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider (2015). 
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European integration in general has such a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA, cf. Rihoux and Ragin 
2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012) been applied (Hellström 2009b). 
If the reasons MEPs give are to be taken into account, methodologically it is obviously 
necessary to move beyond the analysis of roll-call votes (RCV) that has been dominating the literature on 
conflict in the EP ever since the 1990s, in spite of heavy critique (Carrubba et al. 2006). Yet, if the goal is 
to study the way MEPs ‘give reasons’, analysing textual data by simply turning words into numbers, as 
Proksch and Slapin (2010) do, may not be sufficient. In the wider literature on party positions on 
European integration, some first promising steps towards the measurement of parties’ framing efforts 
have been made (Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wüest 2010), but would have to be developed further to fit 
the present purpose. Finally, while the analysis of the reasons MEPs give must draw on textual data, the 
only notable analysis of this kind by Proksch and Slapin (2010) in terms of EP debates might suffer from a 
selection bias as well: as the same authors have found, MEPs speaking up in the debates are often those 
who defect and are thus not representative (Slapin and Proksch 2010). Hence, new sources of textual data 
need to be examined, even if these are not as easily accessible and neatly translated into one language as 
EP debates are and thereby defeat common applications of computerised textual analysis. 
In sum, it appears that the research question, under what conditions exactly do MEPs express and justify 
their policy preferences in such a way that the resulting structure of conflict in a post-Crisis EP is territorial rather than 
ideological is neither answered empirically by the extant state of the art, nor are theoretical or 
methodological tools in place that would seem to allow for addressing it in an adequate manner. The next 
section thus provides an overview of how the present study is meant to fill this gap step by step. 
1.2 Outline of the study 
As a basis for the rest of the study, Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework which I refer to as a 
‘theory of territorialisation’. The chapter begins with a more detailed critique of the extant theoretical 
approaches concerning conflict and cohesion in the EP. Next, some key concepts regarding the 
explanandum such as (structure of) conflict, territorialisation and defection are clarified. As it is defined for 
the present study, defection by individual national party delegations constitutes the precondition at the 
micro-level for the macro-level observation of territorialisation of conflict regarding a given issue. 
Consequently, the policy issue and the national party delegation form the unit of analysis at the macro- 
and micro-level, respectively. Next, in order to explain why and how exactly nationality and ideology 
matter for parties in the EP and the eventual structure of conflict, I draw on theories applied to the EU 
coming from the tradition on International Relations, namely Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal 
intergovernmentalism, and from the tradition of Comparative Politics, namely Marks and Wilson ‘cleavage 
approach’ to party positions on European integration, as these traditions are most explicit and precise with 
regard to the respective concepts and causal mechanisms. Before this background, it is then possible to 
evaluate the EU-specific approaches on the structure of conflict, namely what I refer to as the 
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‘distribution model’ of conflict in European politics developed by Gary Marks and the related post-
functional theory developed by Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks. 
The second part of the theory chapter is a refinement of a so far underspecified aspect of the 
latter theory, which moreover can be linked to the deficiencies of Nils Ringe’s PPC approach to conflict in 
the EP in terms of parties’ communication strategies. This is achieved by drawing on the growing 
literature on ‘framing’. As a result of this discussion, it is argued that studying the reasons parties give in 
order to justify their policy preferences is not only worthwhile for its own sake, that is, simply because it 
has not been done so far. Much more importantly, the room for manoeuvre parties have for framing the 
issue in question, which itself is a function of the issue characteristics such as uncertainty, is actually 
causally decisive for understanding defection and hence territorialisation. Before eventually summarising 
these insights and formulating concrete theoretical expectations, the (ir)relevance of institutional 
constraints is discussed extensively with regard to the particular question at hand. 
In Chapter 3, it is pointed out how exactly a qualitative-comparative research design at both 
macro- and micro level can add to the extant knowledge on conflict and cohesion in the EP. After 
elaborating on the need for innovation in terms of research design, methods and data when studying 
conflict in the EP, it is explained how a qualitative-comparative design addresses a different kind of 
question as it is outcome-centred and is meant to account for those configurations of conditions that 
actually lead to the outcome, rather than just individually making it more or less likely. Avoiding quasi-
cultural disputes on the general usefulness or even superiority of QCA, it is argued then that such a design 
simply allows for taking the complex case characteristics involved here into account in a more valid 
manner. This assertion is followed by the selection of cases at both levels, that is, the sample of policy 
issues functioning as cases at the macro-level as well as the sample of parties at the micro-level. Regarding 
the former, I select the debate on Europeanised welfare (better known by the pejorative notion of ‘welfare 
tourism’), the 2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). These issues are chosen because they were heavily discussed in the run-up 
to the 2014 European elections and are commonly thought of as issues of ‘national interest’ in a wider 
sense, which means that salience and politicisation can be held constantly high, as the necessity of this 
condition for defection is fairly well established already. These issues vary, however, with regard to what 
the theoretical chapter identifies as key conditions for defection also, namely the direction of distributional 
effects (intra- or cross-national) and uncertainty. 
The selection of parties is informed, first of all, by the necessity of focussing on a subsample of 
EU Member States only. This necessity partly results from issues of feasibility, as in order to make the best 
of this qualitative-comparative approach, rather detailed knowledge of the countries’ economic interests as 
well as of the party system are needed to an extent that does not allow for covering more or even all EU 
countries. In addition, it must be made sure that the parties within these countries are actually comparable 
in terms of their ideological traditions, otherwise it is not possible to trace certain observations back to an 
ideologically relevant cause. Nevertheless, the selection of countries must still display variation with regard 
to issue-specific patterns such as distributional effects and national traditions such as the type of 
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capitalism prevailing in a country. Hence, the study is focussed on Germany, Austria, the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, France and Italy. At country level, parties are selected so as to cover as many of 
ideological families as possible, while at the same time considering mainly those parties that either where 
present in the EP 2009-2014 or at least could reasonably expect to enter the EP after May 2014. 
Moreover, the sample of parties explicitly excludes strictly regional and regionalist parties, since these 
parties clearly have constituency concerns that do not correspond necessarily to the broader national 
interest. 
The rest of the chapter then explains the choice of Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) as the method 
of measurement, the decision in favour of press releases as data as well as the process of collecting these. 
Most obviously, given the role attributed to framing strategies in the theoretical chapter, it is rather 
straightforward to then also choose a method designed to analyse framing. More specifically, this method 
has a number of additional advantages for the purposes of this study. For instance, it forces the researcher 
to identify possible lines of argument a priori, which in turn allows for the equally a priori specification of 
the potential focal points (ideological or national) included in the frames. Moreover, the method 
analytically distinguishes between the various dimensions of a frame, thereby also separating the policy 
suggested from its justification. In practice, such a fine-grained distinction is more difficult but not 
impossible, as the generally promising results of a reliability test conducted specifically for the purposes of 
the study demonstrate. Finally, the method avoids some difficulties that might otherwise arise when using 
rather small data sets in terms of texts, and is able to compare lines of argument across languages. The 
latter is a particular asset given that the data chose for the purposes of this study, namely (web-based) 
press releases by national party delegations. Such press releases are chosen as a very direct and explicit, yet 
comparable (unlike speeches, which depend too much on context) means of party communication with 
their electorate. Since they are issued in the respective national languages, the commonly known 
computerised techniques of text analysis would not be suited to directly compare statements across 
countries. 
The empirical Chapters 4, 5, and 6 all follow the same general outline: After a first introduction 
to the substantive issue at hand in terms of the particular area of EU policy, a more detailed elaboration 
regarding the characteristics of the issue as a case is provided. Next, the issue-specific policy frames that 
might be used by the MEPs are identified, forming the basis of the codebooks provided in Annex II. It is 
then possible to formulate observational implications of the theory of territorialisation presented earlier, 
before the results of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) are discussed in terms of the framing strategies they 
uncover. Finally, some case-specific and hence preliminary conclusions are drawn. For the case of 
Europeanised welfare (Chapter 4), the latter include the finding that the theory of territorialisation 
correctly predicted an ideological structure of conflict. Most importantly, the results of the PFA indeed 
allow for the conclusion that uncertainty is the key condition behind this outcome, as the parties mainly 
stress those dimensions of policy frames used for justification rather than actual policy preferences. While 
this case therefore mainly demonstrates the potential of framing, the case of CAP reform (Chapter 5) 
essentially shows its limitations due to structural conditions. Here, the observed territorialised overall 
1. Introduction: National Interests in a Supranational Parliament? 
11 
pattern corresponds to the certainty of cross-national distribution. The final case study on TTIP (Chapter 
6) then illustrates how intra-national distributional effects are reflected in the EP even in policy areas 
traditionally associated with ‘national’ interests. Moreover, it provides a first idea of how certainty might 
be socially constructed. Each case thus supports the theoretical framework developed for the present 
study, even down to the micro-level of individual parties’ framing strategies, minor deviations 
notwithstanding. In addition, however, each case study demonstrates the value of the approach taken: 
This occurs, for instance, by introducing case knowledge at the issue level, which if neglected would lead 
to a misinterpretation of the results. The case studies further uncover the weakness of roll-call vote 
analysis in terms of insufficient differentiation between positions and their often neglected connection to 
the state of negotiations, which calls the all too usual aggregation of votes, across policy areas or even 
across issues, into question. 
In Chapter 7, it is thus concluded that the EP is certainly not immune to national interests. 
Nonetheless, it arguably depicts potential intra-national conflicts more precisely than it occurs in 
intergovernmental institutions, where the claim to represent ‘the’ national interest is underlined by the 
simple fact of holding the respective office. In fact, as MEPs strive to reconcile their various goals, 
territorialisation can only occur if a number of conditions, namely politicisation, cross-national distribution 
and certainty are combined. In short, the study thus demonstrates the potential but also the limitations of 
framing strategies in a post-Crisis European Parliament. In case goal-conflict is unavoidable, MEPs seem 
to decide in favour of vote-seeking. Hence, it is suggested here that a forum shift might not solve the 
EU’s problems in terms of crisis management due to ‘national egoisms’ as such; rather, it must be 
complemented by a change in vote-seeking incentives in the short term and a change in terms of 
identification in the longer term. While in practice, anything resembling supranationalisation – be it in the 
shape of shifting competences to the EP or by creating pan-European lists – would seem difficult to 
achieve politically at the moment, the results of the present study also allow for a further suggestion: 
Those interested in European cooperation or even further integration need to engage in much more 
creative ways of framing the issues of EU politics, rather than leaving this field to their opponents almost 
entirely. 
While thereby the study corresponds to the societal and academic rationales formulated in the 
preceding section and culminating in the research question, the insights gained in the course of this study 
contribute to wider topics and questions as well. First of all, as the study is qualitatively designed, it also 
provides some insights with regard to the substantive policy issues covered and in this sense might be 
interesting also for scholars concerned with the policy-making rather than politics in the EP. It further 
provides comparative information on the political parties analysed in this particular context, and hence 
might be of interest also for scholars of parties and party systems. In addition, the theoretical framework 
developed based on assumptions concerning national political parties as gate-keepers in EU politics in 
general might feed back into research on related topics. For instances, provided that the respective flows 
of information and incentive structures are taken into account, the theory developed might be adapted to 
explain conflict in the Council of the EU. Similarly, for the study of political parties and their goals in 
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terms of policy, office and votes in particular, the EP provides an interesting natural experiment, which in 
this study is carried out at a level very close to the actual causal mechanisms. In addition, it might inform 
the new post-functionalist strain of theorising European integration as to which integrative steps are 
politically feasible under what conditions in the era following the ‘permissive consensus’. Finally, the 
methodological aspects of such a study might feed into the debate on textual analyses, and the question of 
validity and reliability in particular, as it bridges the divide between classic content and discourse analysis.  
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2. A Theory of Territorialisation 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the study, referred to henceforth as the ‘theory of 
territorialisation’ (ToT). Before doing so, however, it is first pointed out in some detail, why exactly the theoretical 
state of the art on conflict in the European Parliament is not suited to actually address the question, under what 
conditions MEPs express and justify their policy preferences in such a way that the resulting structure of conflict is 
territorial rather than ideological: the extant theories are not designed to explain defection, but mainly the usual case 
of high ideological cohesion. They further neglect the consequences of increasing politicisation, the resulting changes 
in vote-seeking incentives and the requirement for giving reasons, remaining mostly silent on MEP-to-voter 
communication. To lay the basis for the ToT, therefore, it is first specified what is understood here as a political 
conflict, when one could speak of an ideological or territorial structure of conflict, territorialisation is defined as the 
result of individual actors’ defection, and national political parties are identified as the unit of analysis at the micro-
level. In order to derive the conditions for defection and territorialisation, I then relate the notions of ideology and 
national interest to the general goals of political parties by referring to extant, more general theories on conflict over 
European integration. Thereafter, I specify further how exactly such general structural conditions can be linked to 
parties’ way of ‘giving reasons’ or ‘framing’ by transferring recent advances in theorizing on party strategies in two-
dimensional policy spaces to conflict in EU politics as defined here. It is argued, that the various framing strategies 
turn MEPs into actors trying to convince voters rather than passive respondents to the latter’s preferences, albeit 
structural conditions limit their room for manoeuvre. Since the resulting theory of territorialisation is developed, at 
that point, with regard to national parties mainly, it is then necessary to discuss in how far the particular institutional 
framework of the EP leads MEPs to act counter to their national parties’ preferences. As it is argued, MEPs neither 
have much incentive for nor much room for what is called ‘agency drift’, so that the theory of territorialisation 
should be applicable to conflict in the EP almost without further caveats. Hence, it is concluded that conflict in the 
EP will be shaped by the issue-specific structural conditions of politicisation, distributional effects, and uncertainty, 
with parties using whatever room for manoeuvre they have under these conditions to avoid defection and hence 
territorialisation as an automatic response goal conflict. Consequently, the structure of conflict in the EP will only be 
territorialised if politicisation is high (which it increasingly is for all EU issues), if distributional effects are cross-
national rather than intra-national and if scope and direction of these effects are certain. 
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2.1 Extant theories on conflict in the EP and their deficits 
When evidence, based on roll-call voting analyses, was growing that conflict in the European Parliament mainly 
evolves along ideological lines (see Chapter 1), this was the puzzle calling for explanation at a theoretical level. As is 
pointed out in some detail in this subsection, this has led to the development of two main strands of theory on the 
conflict in the EP which, while disagreeing in many ways, both fail to account fully for the – so far – exceptional 
cases of defection or even territorialisation, and further are unsuited to explain the way in which parties give reasons 
for their policy preferences. More recently, the so-called ‘bicameral’ theory for defection based on inter-institutional 
relations was developed. As is further argued in due course, however, these inter-institutional factors should be 
better considered as a proxy for national (party) interests, rather than a causal mechanism in their own right. Having 
reviewed these extant theoretical accounts conflict in the EP, I thus call for a theory of territorialisation, founded on 
a micro-level account of defection by national party delegations, taking into account the change in macro-level 
parameters resulting from increasing politicisation of EU politics and suitable for explaining MEPs communication 
strategies. Before concluding the section, it is argued that such a theory need not start from scratch but instead can 
draw not only on the useful elements from theories on the EP, but also from wider theories on parties and conflict 
from Comparative Politics, International Relations and EU studies proper. 
The Three-Goals-Two-Principals (3G2P) approach 
The first strand of theory concerning conflict in the EP was founded by researchers from the European 
Parliamentary Research Group including Simon Hix at the London School of Economics, and was 
subsequently developed further mainly by Hix and his colleagues (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006; Hix, 
Noury, and Roland 2007; Hix, Raunio, and Scully 1999). It seeks to explain the behaviour of MEPs as 
party political actors driven by three kinds of goals, namely policy, office, and re-election, who try to 
achieve these goals within a particular institutional set-up that makes MEPs agents of two principals, 
namely their respective national parties and the European Party Groups they join in the EP. Throughout 
the present study, it is thus referred to as the Three-Goals-Two-Principals (or: 3G2P) theory. 
In the institutional setting of the EP, the goal of ‘policy’ (or policy-seeking) according to 3G2P 
refers to the MEPs personal ideological or policy preferences; ‘office’ (or office-seeking) refers to the 
attainment of attractive positions within the EP such as committee chairs or rapporteur positions; and ‘re-
election’ (also: vote-seeking) refers to the goal of obtaining a seat in EP again at the next European 
election (cf. Hix, Noury, and Roland 1999, 12). A dilemma arises for MEPs inasmuch as the realization of 
these is linked with the two principals in partly contradicting ways: On the one hand, prospects for re-
election are largely dependent on national parties, as European elections are European by name but in 
practice are fought nationally by national parties, who moreover select the candidates in the first place 
(Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006, 495–96). While voters are generally assumed to be largely indifferent to 
EU politics and the EP in particular (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006, 26–28, see also Faas 2003), MEPs 
must hence stay loyal to their respective national parties in order to stand for EP elections again. 
On the other hand, national parties want to cooperate with other national parties in order to 
shape policy while saving transaction costs compared to an issue-by-issue coalition-building. They thus 
form European Political Groups (EPGs), mostly with parties from the same ideological family, as they 
expect to share more preferences with these parties than with their fellow nationals (Hix, Noury, and 
Roland 2006, 495–97). In turn, however, these EPGs control the aforementioned offices within the EP, 
so that in order to achieve their office-seeking goals, MEPs must show loyalty towards their respective 
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EPG (ibid.). Whenever the preferences of the EPG and those of the national party diverge, therefore, 
MEPs would be caught in a goal conflict, so that the following question arises: “when forced to make a 
trade-off between re-election, policy-oriented and office-seeking actions, how will an MEP act?” (Hix, 
Raunio, and Scully 1999, 15). As I point out next, however, this question can only be partly answered by 
means of this theory. 
In fact, in the very first version of this “Institutional Theory of Behaviour in the European 
Parliament” from 1999, Hix et al. formulate no less than ten hypotheses concerning various institutional 
sub-settings (candidate- vs party-centred system, competitive vs consensus system, national and European 
electoral circles, electoral support for integration/ the EP, electoral support for national party, party-
centrism/extremism, government participation, the kind of legislative procedure, participation in the 
Commission) affecting the weighting of the various goals by the MEPs and hence the likelihood of 
defection. This version of the theory, slightly added by Faas (2003) with some further variables on national 
party control over MEPs and variables on Member States’ electoral rules, however, was indeed limited to 
institutional variables and hence failed to formulate indications as to what one might call the root cause of 
defection in terms of national/domestic interests: the latter are mentioned, but not actually defined or 
specified. Later works in the same theoretical tradition then point out that redistribution across national 
borders might induce conflict along territorial lines, but, as policies entailing such redistribution are largely 
missing in the EU or confined to the national level, such territorialisation was unlikely (Hix, Noury, and 
Roland 2007, 59–66). Largely unconstrained by worries over re-election and free to pursue personal 
policy-seeking and even more so office-seeking goals, MEPs would thus largely behave in a cohesive 
manner within their respective EPG, which indeed would explain what has emerged as a kind of empirical 
consensus discussed earlier. 
Given the overall empirical state of the art, the 3G2P theory arguably has proven its value, in 
that it can account for this overall picture rather well. Yet, in how far is this theory helpful with respect to 
the remaining gaps concerning the role of national interests in the EP in terms of territorialisation and 
defection in the post-Crisis era, and what insights does it provide concerning MEPs’ communication 
strategies in this context? In order to address this question, one might start with its post-Crisis aspect, that 
is, one might ask in how far the theory is still up-to-date. As a result of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, for 
instance, the EP is now a full co-legislator regarding some more controversial policies, such as the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (European Commission 2013e), a policy that is highly re-distributive 
(Noury 2002). Indeed, it seems that EPGs are not entirely cohesive in this area (Nissen 2014). Yet, one 
might argue, while the 3G2P theory would expect a generally ideological structure of conflict precisely given 
the rareness of redistributive EU policies, it would still be able to account for such cases in principle as 
they do not challenge its core. 
Another change in EU politics has been its increasing ‘politicisation’ over the years (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2012), probably further enhanced by the Crisis (Blauberger, Puntscher 
Riekmann, and Wydra 2014; Costello and Thomson 2014). If, in this sense, broad masses of citizens 
become interested in EU politics, national parties have an even bigger vote-seeking incentive to exert 
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control over their MEPs. In fact, the ‘two principals’ aspect of the 3G2P theory was criticised on an 
empirical basis even earlier, in that MEPs are said to have but one principal, namely their respective 
national party, to whom they obey whenever asked to (Thiem 2009). In combination with politicisation, 
this might not mean that every issue is equally salient from the beginning, but the salience of EU politics 
for national parties is now generally higher which, as was mentioned, increases the likelihood of defection. 
This further is important insofar as it means that the whole bunch of intervening institutional variables 
making MEPs more or less vote-seeking becomes increasingly irrelevant, as MEPs can expect to be 
monitored much more permanently by their national parties or even directly by the voter. As a 
consequence, vote-seeking considerations should now affect their thinking much more regularly, especially 
since they cannot know for sure which European policies so far going under the radar might be politicised 
along with European integration more generally. 
While the relevance of institutional variables relating to the degree of control by national parties 
and its implications for MEP vote-seeking is generally reduced by increased politicisation, these variables 
might matter even less concerning the way MEPs ‘give reasons’ for their positions, which is another key 
aspect of the remaining empirical gap regarding conflict in the EP to be addressed in the present study: 
When MEPs communicate with their electorate in order to justify their positions, for instance, the 
legislative procedure applied to the issue in question might be less important than it is for voting. More 
important even, in the moment MEPs decide to communicate in this manner, they automatically expose 
themselves to monitoring (by both national parties and voters). In sum, those aspects concerning which 
the 3G2P or “Institutional” theory of behaviour in the EP is most explicit and most developed are 
arguably less important for the purposes of the present study. By contrast, this theory does neither 
provide an explicit account of what exactly national interests are and how they come to influence which 
parties, nor how they are reflected in MEPs’ communication in terms of justification. Noteworthy, this 
does not make the theory wrong or implausible as such. It just means that this theory needs to be, at least, 
elaborated for the present purpose. 
The theory of Perceived Preference Coherence (PPC) 
The second strand of theorizing conflict and cohesion in the EP as formulated by Nils Ringe (Ringe 2005; 
2010) is, however, much harsher in its critique and effectively attacks the very bases of what I have called 
the 3G2P theory here. Ringe finds it theoretically implausible and empirically disproven that EPGs 
actually have much of a carrot or stick for MEPs, so that EPG cohesion could not be explained by the 
office-seeking incentives of MEPs. This is because, for instance, the number of offices that EPGs can 
offer to individual MEPs in exchange for their loyalty is so small that no individual MEP could ever 
expect his or her loyalty to pay off. Likewise, he challenges the idea that cohesion could be due to shared 
policy preferences, as he argues that with regard to most issues, the vast majority of MEPs would not even 
be able to name their preferences clearly, given the fact that issues in EU politics are usually characterised 
by either an information overload or scarcity of information. In addition, he holds that not even national 
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parties usually act as principals of MEPs, but instead very rarely tell MEPs what to do, while the rule 
would be an intense dialogue between the two. 
Instead, Ringe (2010) develops what he calls a Perceived Preferences Coherence (PPC) 
approach. The large degree of ideological cohesion, according to this theory, is the result of processes that 
are endogenous to the EP. At the heart of this process is the aforementioned ‘informational deficit’ in the 
EP. This can only be handled by means of division of labour, he holds: some MEPs specialise in particular 
policy areas and are or become experts. Since an individual MEP can do so only for a limited number of 
policy areas, the vast majority of MEPs will usually be non-experts without any specified preference for a 
given issue. Without having fixed or even specified preferences themselves, the non-experts have to rely 
on a trusted expert MEP, and here is where EPG and national party affiliations matter as a cognitive 
shortcut. Expert MEPs, in turn, come together in the various committees of the EP, where expertise is 
concentrated. These MEPs then negotiate and deliberate among each other, most of all among experts 
from the same EPG, where they try to achieve a compromise position so as to win over most of their 
non-expert colleagues and thus have a chance for influencing policy. In order to convince non-experts, 
expert MEPs have to establish so-called ‘focal points’ that tell others what a certain issue ‘is all about’ and 
that link the issue in question to something non-experts can agree to in general. Mostly, these focal points 
will be linked to the respective party family’s ideology so as to ease compromise within the respective 
EPG. This allows non-experts to perceive of the policy suggested by the expert as corresponding to their 
own preferences (hence Perceived Preference Coherence). In this manner, then, Ringe is able to account 
for the same observed general outcome – namely ideologically structured conflict – via a very different 
route. 
Yet, the question the present study raises is not so much what the general pattern of conflict in 
the EP is or why it is what it is. Instead, the question is under what conditions this usual, ideological 
structure is more or less territorialised, presumably due to ‘national interests’. As however this is not 
Ringe’s main issue of interest, it takes some effort to identify and order his exact predictions regarding this 
aspect. For a start, Ringe (2010) notes:  
Yet, EP politics are not completely de-territorialised; while members of transnational party groups, MEPs 
are also representatives of national constituencies who have to be concerned about the consequences of 
their policy decisions for their member states. (Ringe 2010, 7) 
Hence, he continues, MEPs would trust experts from their national party delegation even more than other 
experts from the same EPG, as they would know that the former would not only share their ideological 
views but also their constituency concerns (ibid.), with ‘constituency’ referring to the respective MEP’s 
nation (ibid., 38-39). As constituency concerns can thus be equated here with national interests, the next 
question then is how exactly these impact on MEP behaviour. 
Not so much unlike earlier approaches, Ringe argues that one mechanism is again vote-seeking, 
a goal for MEPs that cannot be satisfied by the EPGs (ibid., 2010, 28), because, he argues “it is the 
national parties that draw up electoral lists in EP elections” (ibid. 2010, 19). Interestingly, however, this 
does not mean that national parties are the key principals of MEPs; instead Ringe holds: 
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In rare instances, national party delegations receive specific voting instructions from their national 
leadership, but most of the time they act as their own principals while engaging in a continuous exchange 
of views and information with their national party leaderships. (ibid., 2010, 19; see also ibid., 2010, 79). 
Noteworthy, it seems that for constituency concerns to enter MEPs’ minds, pressure from national parties 
is not needed: They might also just themselves care about their electoral fortunes or even be ‘genuine’ 
representatives of their constituencies (ibid., 2010, 94). Whatever the exact way in which national interests 
enter MEPs’ considerations, Ringe notes that they might potentially lead to a situation where MEPs are 
forced to trade-off ideological preferences and constituency concerns (ibid., 2010, 95-96). According to 
Ringe, the potential for the occurrence of such dilemmas is, however, rather low, as due to the range of 
policies made at the EU level, there is little that MEPs could actually distribute to their constituencies in 
terms of tangible benefits (ibid. 2010, 37). In addition, the link between MEPs and voters is not very 
developed, and European policies are usually not very salient in national publics (ibid., 2010, 94). Thus, 
only if a particular issue is indeed exceptionally important for a national party delegation’s constituency 
will they defect from the EPG line at all (ibid., 2010, 60). Implicitly, then, one can identify again the issue-
level conditions of distributional effects and salience here that were also confirmed in the empirical state 
of the art. 
Noteworthy, these remarks on vote-seeking as an incentive for disagreement within EPGs 
constitute (at most) side remarks within Ringe’s work and are repeatedly downplayed as relating only to 
some exceptional cases. What is more, however, they do not sit well with the PPC-model and with its key 
causal mechanism, namely the provision of focal points by expert MEPs (see Ringe 2010, 89–108; Ringe 
2005, 732–34). Providers of focal points, i.e. the expert MEPs with regard to a given issue, are relatively 
free in their choice of focal points, constrained only by the larger policy spaces in which they operate. In 
case of the EP, these are shaped by ideological dimensions in terms of the classic Left-Right and the pro-
/anti-EU dimension, next to nationally-based focal points. By setting a particular focal point, they can 
influence the way in which non-experts interpret the issue in question, without even having to change 
their preferences, by (de-)emphasising particular aspects of the issue. As a consequence, they should have 
considerable power. 
Further, Ringe notes that “without intra-party divisions in committee, a united committee 
working group would be expected to provide only a single focal point (or a cohesive set of focal points) to 
the party’s invested nonexperts” (ibid., 2010, 98). Since focal points relate to either ideology or nationality, 
in these instances they will arguably be of ideological origin. As Ringe holds that experts MEPs have 
numerous incentives to coordinate successfully (ibid., 2010, 40), one should expect that they should 
usually try to set just one such focal point (or a cohesive set of them). The only motive why they would 
not do so, is vote-seeking related to national interests, as was noted in the preceding paragraph. 
It is here, however, that a contradiction between the overall model based on the idea of focal 
points and the way Ringe accounts for the exceptional case of defection emerges: If their non-expert 
colleagues faced with an informational deficit depend on the focal points provided by expert MEPs, why 
would one not assume the same about voters? In a world where objective interests never directly translate 
into policy preferences, as Ringe assumes (ibid. 2010, 5 & 31), such an assumption would seem highly 
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plausible, except maybe with regard to a number of ‘expert voters’. From this perspective, in turn, the 
trade-off between nationally-based vote-seeking and ideology-driven policy-seeking would disappear to 
some extent, as it would be up to the MEPs how to interpret a policy issue. Only if MEPs themselves 
decided to set a nationally-based focal point would defection become a reasonable option. The point is, 
however, that thereby they would deliberately construct a goal conflict for themselves, which does not 
seem plausible. 
This does not mean, of course, that it is impossible to think of any reasons why MEPs might set 
nationally-based focal points: One might question Ringe’s rejection of ‘objective interests’ to the extent 
that at times, it might be more or less obvious how outcome and policy preferences might relate, or that at 
least actors might think they know how they relate. In fact, Ringe’s own operationalisation of ‘national 
interests’, in terms of “different measurements” across his case studies, demonstrates that his theory does 
not provide a uniform conception of national interests that could be actually compared across cases, as the 
examples provided include national economic interests (NB: ‘types of capitalism’, i.e. overlapping in an 
unfortunate manner with regulatory traditions), legal status quo on issues of societal regulation (same sex 
marriage) and national party finance rules (ibid. 2010, 112). Moreover, one might think of dynamics in 
party competition at the national level that induce national party delegations to ‘play the national card’, to 
give another example. Yet, the key point here is that Ringe’s PPC approach does not provide such 
explanations. 
In sum, then, Ringe’s PPC approach might constitute an interesting starting point for filling the 
theoretical gap left by the Hix et al.’s 3G2P theory, insofar as it provides some first ideas on how ideology 
and national interests enter MEPs’ communication in terms of focal points and how the provision of focal 
points is a strategic decision made by MEPs. Unfortunately, however, PPC does neither include a precise 
definition of national interests, nor does it convincingly and consistently explain when exactly (or why at 
all) expert MEPs should decide to favour a nationally-based focal point over an ideological one. In 
addition, the remarks in terms of updates regarding certain parameters such as EP competences, 
politicisation and national party control over MEPs – made already with regard to 3G2P – also apply here. 
The ‘bicameral’ theory 
In contrast to Ringe, who conceives of cohesion in the EP as a result of an essentially endogenous 
processes, the final theoretical perspective on conflict in the EP, which shall be referred to here as the 
‘bicameral’ theory, holds that an important stimulus for defection lies outside the EP, namely in the Council 
of the EU. This approach, developed by Rory Costello and Robert Thomson, is in many ways quite close 
to 3G2P theory, as it considers MEPs as serving the respective two principals (ibid. 2014, 1). It further 
supports the idea of vote-seeking incentives entering MEPs’ considerations via the channel of national 
parties, albeit not exclusively (ibid., 2014, 2-3). It differs not only from 3G2P but also from Ringe’s PPC in 
the sense that it is provides a theoretical perspective specifically designed to explain defection and claims 
to identify “the main determinants” (ibid.) that lead parties to defect or, more precisely, makes defection 
more likely. 
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This determinant, according to Costello and Thomson, consists in the lobbying efforts directed 
towards the MEPs from a given Member State by the respective national government represented in the 
Council (ibid., 2014, 3). Whenever the latter disagree with the position of a national party delegation’s 
EPG, they will have an incentive for pressuring MEPs from their home country. Hence, Costello and 
Thomson postulate: “MEPs in a national delegation are more likely to disagree with their party group 
when their member state in the Council also disagrees with the party group” (ibid.). Noteworthy, the 
incentive for lobbying – and hence MEPs’ likelihood of defection – will increase with a. the salience the 
national government attaches to an issue and b. the degree to which a government is isolated in the 
Council, because even a compromise found within the Council will be relatively far away from its 
individual preferences. They further expect the effects of lobbying to be stronger on MEPs that are 
members of those same national parties that form the government, since these same national parties are 
gate-keepers for candidate selection (ibid., 2014, 3-4). While it provides an explanation focused specifically 
on defections, this theory is yet underdeveloped, as is pointed out in the following. 
The main point concerning which the theory is rather incomplete is the question why parties 
should actually listen to their respective governments in the Council. To be fair, there are some arguments 
presented by Costello and Thomson, but these mostly refer to the national interest or national party 
positions that national party delegations would want to take into account for vote-seeking reasons. What 
they claim, however, is that lobbying by national governments is the actually decisive link. Yet, it does not 
become clear at all from their line of argument, why it would really take the national government in this 
causal chain. This is not to say, of course, that it is impossible to think of any arguments. For instance, in 
combination with Ringe’s PPC theory, one might argue that national governments provide additional focal 
points that non-expert MEPs are guided by; in order to be consistent here, however, one would then also 
have to consider that non-expert MEPs are not equally receptive of all focal points according to Ringe: 
trust in the provider is a precondition for really taking a focal point into account. It is unclear, however, 
why or at least when exactly a non-expert MEP would place more trust in the national government rather 
than expert colleagues from his own EPG – especially when the MEP’s party is not part of the 
government. The bicameral approach to conflict in the EP – at this point – at best constitutes an 
explanation for defection by parties in government, but not an explanation (not even hypothetically) for 
territorialisation defined as defection by a whole national block. 
But even for parties in government, one might want to be sceptical about the effect of lobbying 
by the national party. First, governments in Europe – even in the UK these days – usually consist of party 
coalitions. While the coalition partners might be bound by a coalition agreement in domestic politics, they 
might be free to disagree in the EP nonetheless. Second, in case of the parties directly represented by a 
minister in the Council, this particular minister is not necessarily loyal to the national party line. 
Empirically, in fact, Costello and Thomson’s findings do not even support this aspect of the theory 
completely (ibid., 2014, 8). What is more, however, the national governments’ position as such does not 
constitute a sufficient condition for defection, as in the majority of cases, MEPs still stay with their EPG 
(ibid., 2014, 9). Indeed, Costello and Thomson admit that it would not even take the direct intervention of 
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national actors to explain their results, in that underlying national interests might directly influence MEPs 
(ibid.). Noteworthy, their argument that the effect of the intervening variables of salience and isolation is 
confirmed is rather weak (ibid.), in that the mechanisms underlying the government’s situation might exist 
equally independent of the governments’ lobbying efforts. In sum, unless there is a better theoretical 
account of how exactly the national governments’ lobbying efforts matter, the latter are not more than a 
proxy for ‘national interests’ more generally. In addition to these shortcomings, the bicameral approach 
provides even less of an account of MEP’s own communication in terms of ‘giving reasons’ than Ringe’s 
PPC theory. 
The theoretical gap in brief 
To summarise, what is lacking in the theoretical state of the art is an up-to-date, post-Crisis account of 
conflict in the EP that is a. able to fully account for defection based on clear conceptions of ideology and 
even more so ‘national interests’ as opposed to other national influences and b. suited to explain MEPs’ 
communication with their electorates in terms of the reasons they give, and, while taking MEPs as goal-
driven, active and strategic shapers of debates, is also able to circumscribe the limits of what MEPs can 
achieve in this manner. Noteworthy, the various aspects making up this gap are interlinked: justifications 
(‘giving reasons’) matter much more in a politicised EU, and the degree to which ‘national interests’ 
constitute constraints on policy-seeking partly seems to depend on MEPs capacity to influence voters’ 
preferences by setting focal points. 
This is not to say, of course, that such a theory would have to be built from scratch. While 
certainly the EP-specific theories already provide some valuable components of such a new theory, the 
missing ones can arguably be found in the wider literature. On the one hand, contributions to EU studies 
from the field of International Relations (IR) such as liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993; 1998) 
offer quite precise concepts of how national interests (or preferences) are aggregated and come to 
influence policy-makers to smaller or larger extents. They have been picked up by the more theory-driven 
works on conflict in the Council (Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015), whereas other works on the 
Council have, albeit not very systematically or consistently, made various alternative suggestions for how 
else nationality might shape actor alignments within this particular institution (Aspinwall 2002; Bailer, 
Mattila, and Schneider 2015; Hoyland and Hansen 2014; Mattila 2004; Thomson 2006; 2009; Thomson, 
Boerefijn, and Stokman 2004; Treib 2010).2 On the other hand, contributions drawing on a Comparative 
Politics tradition explain in some more detail how exactly ideological cleavages, involving both ideational 
as well as structural aspects, shape political parties’ positions on European integration (Marks and Wilson 
2000). On top of this, scholars of EU politics have begun to integrate these two traditions (Marks 2004) 
and have further started to consider the role of politicisation (Hooghe and Marks 2009). The point is, 
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however, that these various theoretical arguments still have to be recombined into one consistent whole 
while taking into account the particular features of the EP. 
2.2 The role of ideology and nationality for the structure of conflict in EU politics 
In this section, I first clarify a number of concepts on which the theory to be developed is based. For a start, political 
conflict is defined as incompatibility of preferences on a general rule (policy) concerning a given issue. Accordingly, 
the concept of its ‘structure’ is contrasted with ‘dimensions’ established in the extant literature as issue-specific rather 
than aggregate, and as being either ideological or territorial. National parties are identified next as the appropriate 
level of aggregation within the EP, for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Second, it is argued that the 
persistence of so-called cleavages has led to a situation where policy-seeking and vote-seeking often overlap, since 
the particular sets of ideas correspond to distributional interests of particular core electorates. By transferring 
considerations on party goals to EU politics, it is further possible to provide an up-to-date (i.e. post-Crisis) micro-
level foundation to some of the extant theories on conflict in the EU. Here, the aforementioned overlap of goals can 
be broken up due to national interests in terms of cross-national distributional effects, because votes are tied to a 
particular national territory rather than to similar societal groups across countries. Several extant theories on conflict 
in EU politics further hold that the fact that distributional effects – including those giving rise to potential national 
interests – are not always certain, and that such uncertainty provides ‘leeway’ to political parties for pursuing their 
ideological predilections.  
Territorialisation of conflict as the result of defection by national parties 
If a post-Crisis European Parliament were not able to relativise national interests and hence conflict were 
equally ‘territorialised’ as conflict seems to be in intergovernmental institutions, the forum shift suggested 
by some commentators would not solve the EU’s legitimacy crises in the expected manner. Before 
theoretical expectations regarding the conditions for such ‘territorialisation’ of conflict can even be 
formulated, however, it is necessary to be very clear what exactly is meant by this concept here. For a start, 
one might ask what, really, is a ‘structure of conflict’, and what is it like if it is (not) territorialised? In fact, 
many scholars do not even specify what they understand by the notion of political conflict, even if, such 
as Marks and Steenbergen (2004), they edit a whole book about it. 
By contrast, a definition even of this seemingly basic concept is provided here, because it is 
found helpful for deriving the cornerstones of the theoretical framework to be built. The following 
definition by Claudia Landwehr (2009) was selected, as it indeed would seem to be applicable to the 
context of European policy-making:3 
Individual preferences in non-political choice situations, such as consumer choice, differ from political 
preferences first of all in that they are indexical (cf. Estlund 1990). If A wants x for A and B wants y for 
B, there will be no conflict if x and y are ordinary goods. . . Political preferences, by contrast, need to refer 
to general rules. If A wants to implement x as a general rule, this will have consequences for B, if B is a 
member of the same collective. If A wants x to become a general, binding rule, and B wants y to become such a rule, 
the situation is one of conflict, where, assuming non-dictatorship, neither actor can achieve her goal without 
the co-operation of the other. (Landwehr 2009, 61) 
Unlike other international organisations, the European Union can pass legislation – i.e. general rules –that 
is binding (and enforceable) not just for states, but also for individuals within these states, which is known 
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as direct effect (cf. Chalmers et al. 2006, 365–81). The EP is by now a full co-legislator in most policy 
areas covered by EU legislation (cf. Burns 2013). Thus, it is appropriate here to consider the 
incompatibility of preferences – in the EP and beyond – over a given EU policy as ‘political conflict’. 
Accordingly, when Members of the European Parliament deliberate and decide upon a given 
piece of legislation (x) and do so in diverging ways, this is an observable instance of conflict (albeit not the 
only one), since in this situation, MEP A (apparently) wants x to become a general rule, while MEP B 
does not (because he or she prefers y). In reality, there are of course many MEPs deciding on many 
different policies. Thus, in order to reduce complexity, a large part of the extant literature tries to establish 
certain patterns, for instance in the voting behaviour, of all these MEPs and across various (or even all) 
policy issues in question. They refer to these patterns in various ways, for instance as ‘dimensions of 
politics’ in the EP (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006). As was pointed out in detail in the preceding chapter, 
what most researchers have found so far is that voting patterns correlate strongly with ideological 
dimensions (most notably the Left-Right dimension) as well as that European Political Groups, which in 
turn are formed by ideologically close national parties, are quite cohesive. Hence, it was so far held that 
conflict in the EP is usually ideologically structured and that the main dimension of conflict in the EP is 
the classic L-R dimension. At the same time, it was noted that voting patterns do not always correlate 
equally with ideological dimensions as EPGs are not equally cohesive regarding all kinds of issues. 
It is important here, therefore, to point out exactly what is understood here by the ‘structure of 
conflict’ as opposed to such general ‘dimensions of politics’. For the general dimensions of politics in the 
EP are already known and arguably also adequately accounted for on a theoretical level. The 
aforementioned definition of political conflict, however, refers to one particular disagreement between 
policy preferences over a given public policy, and without pre-empting the following subsections, it can 
already be noted that apparently such concrete policy preferences are issue-dependent. Thus, the concept 
of ‘structure of conflict’ is defined here as the pattern in policy preferences among many actors, but 
regarding one particular policy issue. This concept is thus much less abstract than that of ‘dimensions’ in a 
‘policy space’ (cf. Benoit and Laver 2006). In analogy, what is to be explained in the first place are very 
much substantive policy preferences rather than ‘positions’, as the latter are equally abstract and might also 
refer to aggregations of preferences across various issues. Expressing and justifying such preferences then 
constitutes an act of position taking (e.g. Proksch and Slapin 2010) or positioning. The methodological 
implications of these definitions will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Inasmuch as indeed European Political Groups (EPGs) are formed by ideologically similar 
national political parties, or rather, their respective delegations (McElroy and Benoit 2011), it follows that 
the more cohesive EPGs are, the more ideological the structure of conflict will be, for it means that actors 
adhering to the same ideology have the same or at least similar policy preferences. It was also noted in the 
preceding chapter, however, that there is evidence of ‘defection’ from EPGs by some MEPs or even 
whole national party delegations. In this sense, it seems that ‘defection’ causes the structure of conflict to 
be less ideological. Thus, when the term ‘defection’ is used henceforth in this study, I refer not just to 
divergence from an EPG, but more to behaviour that is not in line with a party’s own ideology. Without 
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prejudice to the more precise considerations concerning the influence of national interests on the 
structure of conflict that are formulated in the following section, it can be noted here that the 
aforementioned extant literature generally assumes defection to be a consequence of ‘national interests’. 
As a matter of fact, while most MEPs share some basic ideological convictions with a larger or 
smaller number of other MEPs, each and every MEP shares a nationality with at least some other MEPs. 
Whether eventually caused by such national interests or not, another easily discernible pattern in the 
constellation of preferences might thence correspond to the various nationalities. Given the nature of 
nation-states forming the EU as territorially defined units, it then would be appropriate to speak of a 
territorial structure of conflict / of a territorially structured conflict. Just like one would still speak of an 
ideologically structured conflict whenever Greens and Socialists preferring policy A stand opposed to 
Conservatives and Liberals preferring policy B, one would equally speak of a territorial structure for 
instance whenever the preferences of actors from one group of states are more similar amongst each other 
than they are to those of one or more other groups. 
From the preceding paragraph it becomes clear that defection – by individual MEPs or national 
party delegations – from the EPG is the micro-level process that leads the overall, macro-level structure of 
conflict to change from ideological to territorial. The more parties defect due to national interests, the 
more territorialised the structure of a given conflict will be. ‘Territorialisation’ thus refers here to the 
degree of the phenomenon, but not necessarily to a temporal trend. On the one hand, the defection of a 
single actor certainly does not change the fact that the structure of conflict would be described better by 
the term ‘ideological’. On the other hand, as is shown later, open defection from the EPG can often only 
be observed for a limited number of parties, since for the others there might not be any contradiction 
between national interest and ideological predilection at all. As a result, it would not be necessary to find 
that all parties defect before one can speak of a territorial structure of conflict in the sense of full-scale 
territorialisation. Instead, simply if it is observed that overall, more actors express preferences similar to 
other actors from their respective home country rather than from their respective party family, then the 
structure of conflict will be deemed ‘territorial’ (or, vice versa, ideological). 
2. A Theory of Territorialisation 
25 
 
Figure 1: Simplified illustration of ideologically structured conflict. Letters denote nationality, numbers ideology. The 
bold line separates actors in favour of EU policy x from those preferring EU policy y. Source: Own compilation. 
 
Figure 2: Simplified illustration of territorially structured conflict. Letters denote nationality, numbers ideology. The 
bold line separates actors in favour of EU policy x from those preferring EU policy y. Source: Own compilation. 
In addition, it should be clarified here, that I use the terms ideological conflict and ideologically structured 
conflict as well as, respectively, territorial (structure of) conflict and territorially structured conflict 
interchangeably. More importantly even, all these terms for me are observational, i.e. they are instances of 
the dependent variable ‘structure of conflict’, but carry no causal implication. Why this is appropriate only 
becomes clear once the exact mechanisms via which ideology and nationality influence actors’ expressed 
policy preferences on EU policy have been spelled out. As a first step into the latter direction, it is 
necessary to get a better idea of who exactly these actors are and what general goals they pursue. 
Above it was argued based on Landwehr’s definition of political conflict, that the structure of 
conflict in the EP consists in the pattern of actor preferences on EU policy. When trying to explain the 
structure of conflict in the EP as either ideological or territorial, an obvious starting point could thus be to 
2. A Theory of Territorialisation 
26 
consider the ways in which ideology and nationality influence the (expressed) policy preferences of its 
individual members. For the purpose of developing a theory of territorialisation, however, I consider 
national party delegations as representatives of national political parties and as very much homogeneous 
actors inasmuch as expressed policy preferences are concerned. This decision is based on five different 
reasons: First of all, it should be mathematically impossible for a conflict to be territorially structured in 
line with the aforementioned definition if only a few individual MEPs defect while the bulk of the national 
party delegation remains loyal to the EPG. Hence, the preferences of individual MEPs are not as such of 
interest here. Second, however, it is also appropriate to consider national party delegations as 
homogeneous actors, since they can be attributed both an ideology and a nationality, the measure is in 
principle still fine-grained enough. In fact, it is empirically found that cohesion within this subset is even 
higher than for the EPGs as a whole (cf. e.g. Thiem 2009). Thirdly, with a view to the contribution made 
with this study, it will be easier for future research to transfer theoretical arguments made here to other 
institutions if the arguments are made with regard to national parties as key actors, since national political 
parties not only control the selection of MEPs but also control the membership of other EU institutions 
(Hix and Lord 1997). Fourthly, vice versa it will be easier to build the present theory of territorialisation 
based on existing theories on political parties in EU politics or on other EU institutions, because partly 
the same or similar mechanisms might be at work within the EP. Fifthly and related, the general goals of 
political parties have been thoroughly theorised already, which is helpful for considering expectations 
regarding the more concrete policy preferences such parties might express. That said, the influence that 
the particular institutional setting of the EP might have on national party delegations is nonetheless 
integrated into the framework later. Based on these reasons, the next step is to discuss how exactly the 
policy preferences expressed national party delegations as members of national political parties are shaped by 
their ideological and territorial backgrounds. 
A national party approach: how ideology and nationality shape the structure of conflict 
In the preceding section, it was established that in order to build a theory of territorialisation in the EP it 
might be helpful to – for a start – consider national party delegations as true and internally coherent 
representatives of national political parties. One of the arguments for doing so was that the general goals 
of national political parties have been thoroughly theorized in the extant literature, which could then be 
put in a relationship with ideology and nationality/national interests, such that expectations for expressed 
policy preferences and their patterns within the EP – i.e. the structure of conflict – could be deduced. In 
their seminal work on goal conflicts faced by political parties, Müller and Strom (1999a) provide a highly 
useful summary of these goals, which further corresponds roughly to the idea of party goals included in 
what I have referred to as the 3G2P theory developed by Hix et al. (1999). Hence, this approach is used 
here to discuss national party goals in some detail. 
Müller and Strom name three such goals: policy-seeking, vote-seeking and office-seeking (ibid. 
1999, 5). Concerning the first of these, they point out:  
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At the heart of the policy-seeking model lies a belief in the reality and significance of the contest over 
public policy decisions that characterizes democracy. Citizens of democracies become politically engaged 
because these choices matter, and they support certain political parties over others because these parties 
make a difference. (Müller and Strom 1999b, 8) 
My own emphasis here is on the general idea that party politicians are active in politics because they want 
to ‘make a difference’. This can mean that they want to change the status quo in a manner that suits them 
better just as it can mean that they want to avoid developments of which they do not approve (ibid. 1999, 
7). Noteworthy, the aforementioned definition of political conflict as incompatibility of preferences over 
public policy arguably fits well with policy-seeking parties. 
Yet, political parties have classically been assumed to “formulate policies in order to win 
elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies” (Downs c 1957, 30-31). In Downs’s 
conception, in fact, parties are even held to be vote-maximisers. The benefits resulting from a maximum 
of votes may be most obvious in two-party systems, but according to Downs even applies where coalition 
governments are the rule (cf. Müller and Strom 1999b, p. 8). To some extent, this vote-seeking perspective 
runs counter to an office-seeking conception of political parties (most prominently represented by Riker 
1962), where parties would be satisfied with any number of votes that provides them with the desired 
control over public office and the attached benefits in forms of private goods for the office holders 
(Müller and Strom 1999b, p. 6). Traditionally, ‘office’ in this sense has been considered as executive office. 
Noteworthy, the 3G2P approach to MEP behaviour (see also Faas 2003; Hix, Raunio, and Scully 1999) 
applies a broader notion of office, for instance with regard to distinguished positions within the legislative 
branch which also yield personal benefits for the office holder.  
Especially with regard to vote-seeking and office-seeking, it becomes clear that party actors 
might sometimes take a certain public stance on a policy issue that does not necessarily reflect their own 
preference over the actual content of public policy, but is merely instrumental. Müller and Strom even 
hold that vote-seeking can only be reasonably thought of in this manner (ibid. 1999, 9). This means that, 
while building a theory of conflict in European politics which is based on the broader goals national 
parties in terms of votes, office and policy, what will be explained and eventually observed are expressed 
or revealed preferences, without claiming that these are the sincere preferences of the respective political 
actors (cf. Benoit and Laver 2006, 15–16). However, since vote-seeking parties will try to suggest policies 
that are as close as possible to the policy preferences of as many voters as possible, preferences revealed 
by parties still have their basis in the actual policy preferences of voters; thus, they reflect a real-world 
conflict. 
The main contribution of Müller and Strom is arguably not the fact that they gave an overview 
of models of party goals, but rather that they recognised that all of these models were parsimonious but 
hence incomplete (ibid. 1999, 11). They hold that all parties are, in principle, policy-seeking, office-seeking 
and vote-seeking and accordingly set out to explore, how parties or, more precisely, party leaders make 
‘hard choices’ when these goals conflict (ibid. 1999, 12). Moreover, they identify three kinds of 
‘determinants’ for the eventual choice aspects, namely party organisation, political institutions, and 
situational aspects (ibid. 1999, 15- 27). All of these determinants arguably find their expression in the 
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context of EU politics generally as well as regarding the particular setting of the EP. For instance, Faas’s 
(2003) analysis mentioned in the introductory chapter partly covers the aspects of party organisation 
(decentralised vs centralised candidate selection) and political institutions (electoral rules). His analysis 
arguably neglects situational aspects, among which one might count also the kind of issue characteristics 
such as salience and distributional effects that were identified by the extant state of the art (see also 
Chapter 1). In contrast to Müller and Strom’s work, however, the aim of the present study is not so much 
to explain the ‘hard choices’ between the various goals as such, but also to explain the result of these 
choices in terms of the structure of conflict as either ideological or territorial. Hence, the next step here is 
first of all to explain how ideology and nationality (in various ways) relate to these goals. To this end, 
definitions of ‘ideology’ and ‘national interest’ are provided first, before using theories on EU politics 
from Comparative Politics and International relations, respectively, for the purpose of establishing the link 
to the different party goals. 
Ideologies can be defined as “collections of ideas with intellectually derivable normative 
implications for behaviour and for how society should be organised” as Hinich and Munger (1994) 
summarise a handful of definitions by other scholars. In more substantial terms, political ideologies can be 
seen as sets of ideas regarding a particular conception of human nature, of social structure, justice, liberty, 
authority, the relation between state and society and the role of the state in the economy (Festenstein and 
Kenny 2005; Ware 1996). In the daily practice of political scientist (including those working on the EP), 
the idea of ideology is often reduced to a rather abstract but measurable ‘position’ on a certain equally 
abstract political dimension, such as the traditional Left-Right scale or the pro-/anti-EU dimension. The 
position on such a scale, usually, is meant to capture the preferences of an actor on a whole bunch of 
policy issues (e.g. Benoit and Laver 2006). The position on such a general scale can then be compared to 
the expressed preferences – equally operationalised as a measurable ‘position’ – on a subset of policies or 
just one individual policy. This is done, for instance, in many of the studies of voting behaviour on MEPs 
cited in Chapter 1 and as such is an absolutely legitimate exercise. Especially for the sections to follow, it is 
important to clarify and remember, however, that what is abstractly measured as a party’s ideological 
position on a given scale is not the ideology itself. Instead, as was just noted, the ideology itself is a set of 
ideas. This set of ideas, as I point out next, then is one possible determinant of expressed policy 
preferences that political scientists eventually measure. 
Edmund Burke has classically defined a political party as “a body of men united, for promoting 
by their joint endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed” 
(Burke quoted in Sartori 2005, 8). This definition of a party may as such be incomplete or even normative 
rather than descriptive (Pomper 1992, 2), but it captures an aspect about parties that has become 
established textbook knowledge: parties are formed by “like-minded citizens to promote their shared 
vision of the common good” (Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 413-414). As should become clear given the 
definitions presented in the preceding paragraph, this vision of the common good shared by the members 
of a party is precisely what is referred to as a party’s ideology. As Volkens and Klingemann put it: 
“Ideologies in this sense represent the core identities of parties and provide blueprints of alternative 
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solutions for current problems of society” (2002, 144). The notion of a ‘blueprint’ makes the link between 
shared beliefs and shared preferences over public policy, at least inasmuch as the members forming a party 
are concerned. Hence there is a clear link between policy-seeking – the strife for implementation of 
particular policies for their own sake, i.e. because they appeal to party members in the first place – and 
ideology, which is the blueprint for preferences for particular policies. 
By contrast, vote- or office-seeking members – i.e. members who in a given situation also have 
to pay attention to these two goals – may be willing to implement policies that are not in line with the 
respective party’s ideology (cf. Müller and Strom 1999b, p. 10). Noteworthy, Müller and Strom seem to 
assume that goal conflict in this sense is the rule: 
Occasionally, party leaders may find themselves in the fortunate situation that the strategies that maximize 
one of their objectives are also the best means to the others. Much more commonly, however, there are 
likely to be trade-offs between their different policy goals, and party leaders find that they have to 
compromise on some goals in order to reach others. (Müller and Strom 1999b, 10) 
However, they do not really provide any theoretical or empirical reasons for this – their case studies, after 
all, have been chosen intentionally as situations of ‘hard choices’. In fact, it seems possible to make a case 
in the opposite direction, at least on theoretical grounds, as there are reasons why ideological purity might 
be compatible with vote-seeking. First, as Downs (c 1957) already argued, ideology allows voters to reduce 
information costs, because if each party has a clear ideological profile, voters do not have to investigate 
for each and every issue, what a party’s position will be. Consequently, as Hinich and Munger (1994) hold, 
parties have an interest in terms vote-seeking in developing a reputation of being ‘credible’. This is 
because, after all, voters can hardly know whether a party will do what it promised before the election 
unless they know by experience that the party is trustworthy and will not change its mind on issues already 
on the agenda and will take predictable positions regarding new issues, which is guaranteed by the internal 
consistency of an ideology. Parties defecting all too readily might thus lose this credibility. Hence, it may 
well be the case that goal conflict is much less common than Müller and Strom assume. 
In addition, however, a further argument concerning the potential for overlap between ideology-
driven policy-seeking and vote-seeking goals should be considered. In line with the work of Kriesi et al. 
(2012), it is based on the idea that political conflicts in Western Europe still largely relate to so-called 
‘cleavages’ as they were conceived first by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). In such a setting, the existing 
ideologies as sets of ideas informing political parties’ policy-seeking goals are further suited to appeal to 
particular sets of voters more or less organised in social classes. In this sense, for instance, the so-called 
class cleavage would consist of a socio-structural basis of a working class opposing a class of capitalists, 
parties that set out to represent each of these groups by suggesting policy solutions based on ideological 
frameworks that fit these groups’ concerns (cf.Grande and Kriesi 2012, 9). Hence, when for instance a 
Socialist party suggests a policy derived from its ideology this would usually be appreciated by the working 
class who then votes for this party. As Grande and Kriesi (2012) note, it may well be that the traditional 
cleavages have been transformed to some extent, but that does not make them disappear. As a result, 
ideologically-driven policy-seeking and vote-seeking would still frequently not be at odds. 
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Indeed, the fact that ideologies have served parties well for navigating through traditional 
domestic politics may be a reason why national parties will not drop all their ideological convictions when 
entering the European arena. This is more or less what Marks and Wilson (2000) forward as an argument 
for applying a cleavage approach to party positions on European integration: 
Most political parties have established constituencies and long-standing agendas that mobilise intense 
commitments on the parts of leaders and activists. Political parties are not empty vessels into which issue 
positions are poured in response to electoral or constituency pressures; rather, they are organizations with 
historically rooted orientations that guide their response to new issues. The range of a political party's 
likely responses to a new issue is therefore a product of the ideologies of party leaders and the 
endogenous constraints of party organization, constituency ties and reputation. In other words, a political 
party has its own 'bounded rationality', that shapes the way in which it comes to terms with new 
challenges and uncertainties. (ibid. 2000, 434) 
Concerning the issue of European integration, the rationality of parties is particularly bounded, according 
to Marks and Wilson, as “their policy positions cannot . . . be predicted as an efficient response to 
electoral incentives” (Marks and Wilson 2000, 435). The reason for this is that for voters, in turn, the issue 
of European integration so far – i.e. around the turn of the century – has been too complex to grasp in 
terms of an accurate cost-benefit calculation, so that “the social bases of support and opposition to 
European integration are indistinct” (Marks and Wilson 2000, 435). Hence, parties continue to use their 
ideological traditions as ‘prisms’ for interpreting European integration (Marks und Wilson 2000, 435). In 
principle, what applies to European integration at large might also apply to individual policy issues raised 
in EU politics and to the respective structures of conflict. The implications of this ‘cleavage approach’ for 
the structure of conflict in EU politics are thus considered next, before discussing its shortcomings, such 
as the fact that it takes vote-seeking to be rather irrelevant in EU politics. 
If parties generally only had to care about their policy-seeking goals, they could well remain true 
to their respective ideology whenever formulating policy preferences in EU politics. Hence, it would seem 
straightforward to find that conflict in the EP is mostly ideologically structured. It is at this point, 
however, that it was important to state that the concept of an ‘ideologically structured conflict’ was mainly 
observational, for even Marks and Wilson would account for some, arguably limited, degree of 
territorialisation. After all, one of the aims of Lipset and Rokkan was to also explain the differences in 
cleavage structures across countries, which in turn are rooted in national historical circumstances. 
Accordingly, also Marks and Wilson distinguish various sub-groups of party families, which are not equally 
supportive of European integration. Thus, insofar as national historical circumstances have shaped an 
individual party’s ideology in a way that is different from the other family members’ ideologies, the 
respective party might even decide to defect. For this to happen, however, the intra-ideological variation 
would have to result in a higher degree of disagreement within the same party family than the respective 
cleavages would within each country. Hence, ideologically structured conflict would still be the rule. 
In a number of ways, the cleavage approach mirrors what Ringe’s (2010) PPC approach 
provides for the particular context of the EP: there, non-expert MEPs are also held reduce uncertainty for 
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themselves by looking for ideological focal points in the respective experts’ accounts of a given policy, 
such that the overall result usually is ideologically structured conflict.4 Like non-expert MEPs, voters 
might equally look for ideological focal points only, and if their usual party of choice manages to provide 
those with regard to EU issues, they will vote for them just like in domestic politics. Indeed, this 
explanation might build a bridge to the second-order conception of European elections, according to 
which voters in European elections make their voting decisions over issues of domestic rather than 
European politics (cf. Reif and Schmitt 1980). It might, however, also share the latter’s main shortcoming, 
namely the failure to account for the fact that EU politics are increasingly politicised, which in turn implies 
that voters actually do have rather clear preferences regarding EU issues (Hooghe and Marks 2012). As a 
consequence, parties would have to suggest policies that not only correspond to their own policy-seeking 
goals, but also satisfy voters’ EU-specific policy preferences. 
If voters’ EU-specific policy preferences always paralleled the domestic cleavages, politicisation 
arguably would not make a difference, as the vote-seeking and policy-seeking goals of national parties 
would largely overlap in EU politics. As a result, intra-ideological variation would indeed the only source 
of defection. The extant literature on the EP, however, generally attributes defection to the presence of 
so-called ‘national interests’. It might be, of course, that this literature has wrongfully made this 
attribution, confusing intra-ideological variation with national interests. But it might also be the case that 
national interests are the cause of goal conflict and thus change parties’ calculus. In order to theoretically 
explore whether and why this is the case, however, it must first be clarified what is to be understood by 
‘national interests’ and then how they might actually matter for national parties’ goals. 
Since national interests are a key concept in the sub-discipline of International Relations (IR), it 
is here that one has to look for a insights first. Classically, Realism has assumed national interests to be 
stable, in that all states would be striving for wealth, security or power and that these preferences would be 
always present and well ordered (cf. Moravcsik 1993, 481). This concept of national interests, however, is 
not suitable for the purposes of this study for three reasons. First of all, it is highly difficult to 
operationalise for a given policy issue because of its vagueness, and without a precise operationalisation 
might lend itself to post-rationalisation. Second, the idea of stability of national interests hinges on the 
conception of political actors in IR as ‘statesmen’, who according to Morgenthau “will distinguish with 
Lincoln between their ‘official duty’, which is to think and act in terms of the national interest and their 
‘personal wish’ which is to see their own moral values and political principles realised throughout the 
world” (Morgenthau, Michelson, and Davis 1973, p. 7). This idea of political actors as statesmen is 
however hard to integrate with the idea of party government, where individual in power would be 
assumed to pursue party goals, arguably biased slightly in the direction of their own benefit (office). Third, 
national interests of this kind would seem to make any kind of intra-national disagreement over the right 
course of EU politics almost obsolete and hence its empirical presence – in the EP in particular – 
                                                     
4 Noteworthy, however, at least the experts are assumed know their concrete policy preferences. This might be 
because Ringe’s approach refers to concrete legislative proposals, rather than European integration as such. 
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inexplicable. In fact, EU studies have hardly been influenced by realism in general, and instead have been 
centred on the debate between neofunctionalist and (liberal) intergovernmentalists. 
However, neofunctionalism (Haas 1977) is not very helpful for the purposes of this study either, 
for it is very much based on the idea that due to the process of European integration, national interests 
increasingly converge and thus does not lend itself really for the study of conflict. By contrast, 
intergovernmentalism, and its ‘liberal’ variant in particular (Moravcsik 1993; 1997; 1998), that this study 
draws on for a discussion of the role of national interests in EU politics. Not only has it been considered 
“one of the – if not the – most influential accounts of the European integration process” (Cini 2007, 109), 
even “a touchstone against which all integration theory is now judged” (ibid.), but its core ideas further 
have been applied successfully in explaining the more day-to-day political conflicts in the Council of the 
EU (Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015). More importantly for the present study, I demonstrate below 
that it only partly displays the kinds of problems pointed out with regard to realism above. 
According to Moravcsik, what governments eventually represent in international negotiations as 
the ‘national interest’ is not fixed, but is the result of a domestic process of preference formation. In this 
process, societal groups articulate their particular interests concerning a given issue vis-à-vis their 
respective national governments. The basis for their own evaluation of the respective issue is formed by 
the distributional effects of the measures under discussion, as “[t]he costs and benefits of policy co-
ordination are often unevenly distributed among and within nations, rendering nearly inevitable a measure 
of international and domestic conflict between winners and losers” (Moravcsik 1993, 486–87). Moravcsik 
further holds that societal groups are not equally successfully in making their voice heard. As he argues: 
Most important among these winners and losers are producers. The systematic political bias in favor of 
existing producer groups and against those, notably consumers, taxpayers, third-country producers, and 
also potential future producers, stems from the former's more intense, certain, and institutionally 
represented organised interests. Producers may exert direct, instrumental pressure on politicians or may 
wield structural power, as when a desire to encourage business investment and growth requires the 
satisfaction of broad business demands. (Moravcsik 1998, 36) 
This producer bias is so strong that, he finds, governments actually never oppose strong producer interest 
groups. In short, from a liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, the national interest is determined by the 
distributional effects a given integrative measure has on the national producers. Thereby, this theory 
provides a clear conception of ‘national interests’ and points to distributional effects as the main 
determinant of the structure of conflict. 
Noteworthy, while governments do what producers want them to do and represent their views 
at the European level as their country’s ‘national interest’, this does not mean that this is the optimal 
policy for the nation as a whole (Moravcsik 1993, 487). This, clearly, stands in sharp contrast to the realist 
idea of ‘statesmen’. Just as the idea of stable national interests in the realist conception rests on the idea of 
government actors as ‘statesmen’, however, the liberal idea of domestic formation of national interests is 
based on a particular idea of government actors as ‘agents’ of societal groups: 
For liberals, the relationship between society and the government is assumed to be one of principal-agent; 
societal principals delegate power to (or otherwise constrain) governmental agents. The primary interest 
of governments is to maintain themselves in office; in democratic societies, this requires the support of a 
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coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies, whose views are transmitted, 
directly or indirectly, through domestic institutions and practices of political representation. Through this 
process emerges the set of national interests or goals that states bring to international negotiations. 
(Moravcsik 1993, 483) 
The exact relationship differs by policy area, since “[d]ifferent policy areas engender characteristic 
distributions of costs and benefits for societal groups, from which follow variations in patterns of 
domestic political mobilization, opportunities for governments to circumvent domestic opposition, and 
motivations for international co-operation” (Moravcsik 1993, 488). Occasionally, however, governmental 
‘agents’ are able to follow their own agenda. He points out two extreme scenarios: On the one hand, if 
producers can know for sure that costs/benefits of a policy will be high, they will strongly pressure the 
government to oppose/support it, leaving not much room for manoeuvre on the part of the government. 
On the other hand, where the exact distributional effects are uncertain or negligible, governments enjoy 
some leeway (Moravcsik 1993, 487–88). So how exactly do governments use such opportunities? 
Moravcsik mainly describes two alternatives, which he derives from alternative explanations of 
European integration and which he both subsumes under the heading of ‘geopolitics’. One alternative, is 
the pursuit of ‘broader’ goals, derived mainly from neo-realism. From this perspective, economic co-
operation will be pursued only as a result of considerations on national security, which also means that 
they often take a longer-term perspective (Moravcsik 1993, 494). The other option for governments is to 
follow the personal, ideological commitments of their leaders, e.g. in terms of more nationalist or federal 
(as pro-integrationist) attitudes (Moravcsik 1998, 27). Importantly, however, according to Moravcsik, both 
of these options would never matter more than economic considerations (Moravcsik 1998, 6–7). 
Especially the latter option is important here, as it is more likely to apply to the kinds of conflict to be 
explained in this study and as it has implications for the structure of conflict as either ideological or 
territorial. 
Indeed, this theory – as it is – might very well allow for deriving hypotheses for the structure of 
conflict, while remaining within the framework of what I have called a national party approach: If national 
parties behaved like national governments as theorised by Moravcsik, the structure of conflict in EU 
politics will generally be territorial, with issue-specific coalitions being defined by the distributional effects 
a policy has for the producers across countries. The reason for this is that for vote- and eventually office-
seeking reasons, parties would be assumed to depend on producer groups’ support. Ideologically 
structured conflict would only be possible whenever there is uncertainty over distributional effects of a 
policy, so that parties are not bound in terms of votes and office by a particular societal mandate and 
instead are free to pursue their policy-seeking goals. Thus it is obviously possible to apply Moravcsik’s 
theory to national parties rather than to governments as well as to policy issues rather than Treaty 
negotiations on integrative measures. 
This transfer, however, is not without flaws, for while the term ‘government’ is easily replaced 
with the term ‘parties’, the calculus might not be exactly the same, even less so in an increasingly 
politicised EU. First, inasmuch as distributional effects are concerned, it is the producer bias assumed by 
Moravcsik that might be questioned. First of all, if the goal of policy-seeking is considered as a goal on 
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equal par with the other goals, one might argue that the members of the various political parties for 
ideological reasons are not equally supportive of producer interests. Parties of the Left – in the sense of 
both the traditional class cleavage or of the ‘new politics’ cleavage – might in fact see it as part of their 
mission to change policy to the advantage of workers or consumers, respectively, and thus often to the 
detriment of producers. By contrast, from Moravcsik’s perspective, it appears that policy-seeking goals are 
only pursued whenever uncertainty leaves the necessary leeway to do so. Admittedly, this would seem 
rational in so far as votes are instrumental to changing policy at all, and for this reason such a ranking is 
assumed also here. 
Yet, even when assuming policy-seeking to be secondary to vote-seeking, the assumption of a 
producer bias applying equally to all parties is problematic. Interestingly, it is again the process of 
increasing politicisation that, while earlier making the pro-ideology biased cleavage approach less plausible, 
now serves to balance the pro-territory biased liberal intergovernmentalism. Given politicisation, not only 
producers, but more or less all citizens (and hence voters) should be increasingly interested and informed 
about EU politics and its distributional consequences. According to Hooghe and Marks, this should 
weaken the producer bias:  
Mass politics trumps interest group politics when both come into play. Interest groups are most effective 
when they have the field to themselves. When the spotlight of politicisation is turned on an issue, when 
political parties and the public are focussed on an issue, interest group lobbying may actually be 
counterproductive. Public debate in the context of elections and referendums pre-empts the efforts of 
small, highly motivated groups to control outcomes. (Hooghe and Marks 2012, 845) 
In line with a liberal view of society, it might often be impossible to equally represent producer groups and 
other societal interests. This will be the especially whenever the costs and benefits of an EU policy are 
unevenly distributed within countries, which indeed also Moravcsik would expect to be the case regularly, 
as was noted above. The difference is, however, that in a politicised EU, parties cannot simply focus on 
pleasing producers. Instead, parties thus have to make a choice about whom to represent, or at least 
whom to represent primarily, as so-called mainstream parties might try not to scare off any societal groups 
completely. In such a situation they are likely to fall back to the old cleavages, such that in fact, vote-
seeking and policy-seeking goals overlap again, which would entail an ideologically structured conflict. In 
other words, in a politicised EU, one would expect that distributional effects would not only shape the 
line of conflict between parties from countries with winning producers versus those with losing producers, 
but would also shape conflict within these countries along existing intra-national cleavages. 
By adapting Moravcsik’s theory for the needs of the present study, one thus arrives at a general 
model that in parts is corresponds to the theoretical framework that Marks (2004) presents in his 
conclusion on an edited volume on European integration and political conflict: he develops a model that, 
as in Moravcsik’s case, largely builds on the role of distributional effects for the structure of conflict. 
However, he explicitly distinguishes intra-national and cross-national distributional effects of a policy. If 
the former prevail regarding a given policy, the respective conflict will be ideological. By contrast, if the 
distributional effects of a policy a primarily inter- or cross-national, the conflict will be territorially 
structured instead. Noteworthy, Marks himself does not go very much into detail with regard to the causal 
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processes behind these expectations. Before the background of the preceding paragraphs of this 
subsection, however, it is possible to elaborate on this point and evaluate the plausibility of the model at 
the same time. 
First of all, one must recall that any party, even in European elections, can only win votes from 
a within its own national electorate. Vote-seeking, thus, is always tied to a particular national territory, as it 
will never as such pay off to please voters from other Member States. Consider now, for instance, an 
individual national party that, for historical reasons, has grown to be the representative of the respective 
domestic producers and has adopted a generally producer-friendly ideology. If then producers in general 
tend to be the losers from a policy envisaged at the EU level, the party in question has a vote-seeking 
incentive to oppose the policy. If the policy is to the advantage of other domestic groups such as 
consumers or workers, it is plausible that the parties mostly representing these groups end up in the 
opposite camp, so that the overall structure will be ideological as usual. However, it might also be the case 
that the envisaged policy only harms the producers of this one country, while it benefits producers of 
other countries. In other words, there is cross-national distribution among producers. In such a situation, 
the party in question might oppose the policy although the producer-friendly counterparts from other 
countries – who given their general producer-friendliness are likely to be part of the same EPG – are in 
favour. Hence, in this situation of goal conflict, the individual party representing the losing producers 
might actually decide to defect in order not to lose votes from its core constituency, thereby skipping its 
own ideological convictions for the time being. 
As was argued in the preceding section, such an individual defection does not imply full-scale 
territorialisation. The latter will only occur if the distributional effects of the policy are, on the whole, 
primarily cross-national. For the other parties from the same country as the individually defecting party 
might not have an incentive to leave their policy-seeking goals behind as long as their own core 
constituency wins from the policy as there is also some considerable intra-national distribution. It must 
now be noted, however, that the vast majority of voters (in most cases more over 90 per cent) tends to 
identify more strongly with their nation than they do with Europe (cf. Risse 2010). Hence, already if the 
other societal groups in the country do not directly lose from the policy, they would consequently prefer 
seeing their own producer groups win. This is why, as soon as cross-national distribution in this sense is 
stronger than the intra-national distributional effects, further territorialisation of conflict is to follow. 
Noteworthy, there also is a minority of citizens who identify more strongly with Europe than with their 
own country, so that any party who counts such as citizens among its core constituency would not follow 
suit in this particular setting. 
Obviously, if a country is on the whole worse off from a policy, for instance because some 
system of cross-country financial transfers is established, all parties in the country losing from the system 
might accordingly have a vote-seeking incentive to oppose such transfer (and vice versa). Inasmuch as it 
entails personal losses for the generally Europhile minority, this should include even parties representing 
the latter. Hence the general assumption (e.g. McKay, 2002; Risse, 2010) that large-scale redistributive 
policies are politically impossible in the EU. Nevertheless, such a system of financial transfers is of course 
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only relevant for actors who actually care about material values. Before this background, it must be noted 
here that Marks’s definition of distributional effects reaches beyond such purely material considerations, in 
that he, first, speaks of distribution of ‘values’ much more generally and second, he points out:  
“Distribution (or allocation) of values involves who is allowed to do what as well as who gets what” (ibid., 
2004, 248). That said, it usually is of course easier to actually operationalise and capture the material 
aspects of distribution, especially in large-N studies. 
What has been achieved then by first discussing liberal intergovernmentalism and then what I 
would call Marks’s ‘distribution model’ is that territorial interests have been made more concrete in terms 
of cross-national distributional effects. In how far these are ‘national’ interests in the full sense of the 
word may vary, of course. Assuming, for instance, that EU legislation on CO2-emissions of cars leaves 
German car producers worse off but leads to a reduction in the future costs of climate change for the rest 
of the EU citizens – including Germans!, parties representing German car producers might of course 
claim to defend ‘the’ national interest and might even defect from their EPG. Nevertheless, 
territorialisation would only result from this if also the other parties perceived a vote-seeking incentive in 
defending the German car industry, which some of them in this case possibly will not. As a result, only if 
‘national interests’ are literally the interests of the nation as a whole will they lead to a complete 
territorialisation of conflict. 
Prior to considering the shortcoming of the distribution model, even in the more elaborate 
version provided here, another insight from Marks and Steenbergen’s (2004) work must be considered. As 
they find, distributional effects as entailed by the implications of a policy for the EU budget, for instance, 
are not the only condition that can lead to a territorial structure of conflict. In addition, the varieties (or 
types) of capitalism found in the Member States also seem to influence the preferences of both parties and 
voters (Marks 2004). Before the background of the theoretical considerations so far, there are two reasons 
why this might be the case. First, in line with the cleavage approach, it might be that the types of 
capitalism have worked as historical forces leading to intra-ideological variation, so that parties and voters 
wanting to reduce uncertainty by means of ideology will be influenced in their preference formation by the 
respective type. Second, inasmuch as, for instance, a certain policy leaves firms rooted in one type of 
capitalism better or worse off than those from another type, there might be indirect cross-national 
distributional effects working in the manner laid out above. The type of capitalism thus constitutes 
another manifestation of how nationality can shape the policy preferences of parties. 
The main problem with Marks’s model is, however, quite apparent before the background of 
the theories discussed prior to this distribution-centred model. As was mentioned above, Moravcsik 
points out that the distributional effects of a policy are not always certain, leaving some leeway to – in his 
framework – national governments for pursuing their ideological predilections in terms of nationalism or 
federalism. As is argued next, the so-called ‘post-functionalist’ theory of European integration (Hooghe 
and Marks 2009) includes some considerations on the role of uncertainty, but needs to be elaborated for 
the present purposes in several ways. 
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This ‘postfunctionalist theory of European integation’ is, in fact, an attempt to come to terms 
with the failures of earlier theories of integration – the already mentioned liberal intergovernmentalism as 
well as neofunctionalism5– to account for failing referenda on European treaty reforms, amongst others. 
These are explained as a consequence of the process of politicisation as the involvement of the broader 
masses of citizens in EU politics. By bringing in these masses, it is argued, there are now actors involved 
who “have neither the knowledge nor the time to figure out their economic interests in relation to 
European integration” (ibid., 2009, 10), and hence they might rely on so-called ‘cues’. 
Political parties, amongst others, might try to provide such cues and might do so along the lines 
of classic notions of Left and Right, but a further cue, according to Hooghe and Marks, is ‘identity’ (ibid, 
10-11). Identity refers to the degree to which a person identifies with his or her nation-state or the EU, 
respectively. Here, it is decisive whether a person disposes of an exclusive or inclusive national identity. 
The former identify with their nation-state only, while the latter identify most with their nation-state, but 
also with some notion of a European community (cf. Risse 2010). This, in turn, is said to influence the 
openness of a person to Euroscepticism (i.e. opposition to European integration) (Hooghe and Marks 
2009, 13). According to Hooghe and Marks, such identities become causally important for the structure of 
conflict “to the extent that an issue has (a) opaque economic implications and (b) transparent communal 
implications that are (c) debated in public forums b (d) mass organizations rather than specialized interest 
groups” (ibid.). This implies that, for identity to become politically relevant, however, identity must be 
used by political parties. 
If parties compete by cueing on identity, Hooghe and Marks point out, the conflict will not 
evolve any longer along the lines of traditional, economic Left and Right, but will evolve along the lines of 
a non-economic left-right dimension, also referred to as green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to 
traditionalism/authority/nationalism (TAN) dimension. On this dimension, right-wing populists and 
nationalists form the TAN pole, as “[t]hey oppose European integration for the same reasons that they 
oppose immigration: it undermines national community” (ibid. 2009, 17). Conservative parties also lean 
more to the TAN pole, whereas Green parties are closest to the GAL pole, and Centre-Left parties sit 
uncomfortably in between (given the economically liberal features of integration). Taking identity into 
account would thus seem to provide additional explanatory potential for the structure of conflict. Another 
part of the post-functionalist theory is concerned with the idea of political elites ‘politicizing’ an issue, 
partly by deciding in which arena it shall be debated and decided upon (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 18–21). 
If, however, the goal is to eventually understand conflict in the European Parliament, these considerations 
are arguably negligible, for issues discussed and decided in the EP have already made it on this particular 
institutions agenda. 
In sum, then, what is gained by including the post-functionalists arguments for the present 
purpose of identifying the conditions for defection and eventual territorialisation? On the hand, there are 
                                                     
5 Neofunctionalism is explicitly not included here, as it is much more based on the idea of shared interests rather 
than conflict. 
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parts included in the theory which, in some sense, seem to provide less additional explanatory potential 
than is claimed by Hooghe and Marks. They claim, for instance, that the inclusion of identity “sharply 
differentiates postfunctionalism from neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism” (ibid., 2009, 
13). Nevertheless, conflict along the GAL-TAN dimension simply constitutes another form of 
ideologically structured conflict, one that, amongst others, becomes particularly relevant for what Hooghe 
and Marks call ‘jurisdictional’ issues, i.e. those issues fulfilling condition (b) in the above list. Apart from 
treaty changes, these issues are arguably less pronounced in EU politics. Moreover, their condition (a) – 
opaqueness of distributional effects – resembles Moravcsik’s considerations on (un)certainty of 
distributional effects, and so does the structure of conflict: ideological, between nationalists (Moravcsik) or 
individuals with exclusive national identities (Hooghe and Marks) versus more federalist actors 
(Moravcsik) or individuals who at least identify somewhat with Europe (Hooghe and Marks). 
On the other hand, however, Moravcsik saw nationalist and federalist ideologies as influencing 
the preferences of governmental elites (under uncertainty only, of course), whereas Hooghe and Marks 
point out the relevance of identity for preferences over integration among the masses of citizens. What is 
more, they further point out that it takes political elites to make use of the possibility to cue citizens along 
the lines of identity, and it is here, probably, that the more interesting part of their contribution lies: they 
recognise that identity as such does not necessarily lead to any policy preferences, but needs to be 
translated by political parties. Thereby, political parties themselves become actors in the sense that they a 
certain range for actively shaping the structure of conflict.  
At this point, various theoretical approaches to the structure of conflict in EU politics have been 
reviewed and put in a relation to each other, including those stemming clearly from Comparative Politics 
or International Relations traditions as well as those meant to reintegrate the two for the purpose of 
understanding the conflict in the particular European setting. What has been achieved thereby was to 
explain how ideology and nationality (including national interests as well as national traditions) might 
shape the expressed policy preferences of national political parties in a post-Crisis EU: namely due to the 
interaction of general party goals and conditions such as politicisation – assumed to be a general feature of 
post-Crisis EU politics, the scope and direction of distributional effects as well as their (un)certainty. As 
was pointed out, the latter condition of uncertainty is considered by various theoretical strands as 
conducive to ideologically structured conflict due to the rhetorical room for manoeuvre it provides the 
political actors with. 
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Figure 3: A theoretical framework for conflict in the EP based on structural constraints. Source: Own compilation. 
To some extent, this latter aspect is in line with Ringe’s (2010) idea about the structure of policy 
preferences in the EP: Ringe assumes that most MEPs do not possess sufficient information or lack the 
expertise to judge the abundant information with regard to most policy issues, i.e. they thus find 
themselves in a situation of uncertainty. For Ringe, however, this state of uncertainty does not apply to a 
number of policy-specific expert MEPs, who provide their colleagues with – mostly ideological, but 
sometimes also national – focal points that serve as informational shortcuts allowing non-experts to make 
a decision. Since experts within an EPG strive to agree on ideological focal points for strategic reasons 
(amongst others, greater cohesion gives them more leverage to actually get their preferred policy adopted), 
the overall structure of conflict would thus be ideological most of the time. Both the condition 
(uncertainty) and outcome (ideological conflict) are thus the same, whether we follow the theoretical 
arguments made in this section based on a national party approach or Ringe’s EP-specific model. 
However, I have criticised in the preceding chapter already that within Ringe’s approach, the 
limitations of expert MEPs’ capacity to shape the structure of conflict – usually towards an ideological 
direction – are not clearly named. Most importantly with regard to the present research question, it did not 
become clear why exactly they would ever give in to national interests such that the structure of conflict 
would be territorialised, given that they seemed to have basically unlimited power to set focal points as 
well as an interest in agreeing on an ideological one. Ringe was thus able to explain the overall pattern of 
conflict in the EP for most issues, but any exception to the rule would be hard to account for. 
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By contrast, the theoretical approaches considered above generally do not seem to assume that 
uncertainty about distributional effects is a constant feature of EU politics. Rather, uncertainty of 
distributional effects appears to apply more to some aspects of integration than to others. Consequently, it 
seems that there are limits to the capacity political parties to actively shape the structure of conflict, for 
when uncertainty does not prevail, they mainly seem to react to stimuli such as distributional effects for 
reasons of vote-seeking. The idea of such issue-related variance in uncertainty becomes highly plausible 
once a number of simple examples is considered. For instance, a permanent system of fiscal transfers 
explicitly designed to redistribute resources from rich to poor Member States, such as it was occasionally 
discussed in the context of the Crisis, would have quite certain distributional effects (at least in the short 
term), in that winners and losers of such a system would be easily identified. By contrast, for most voters 
the exact distributional effects of the EU’s internal market, for instance, remain much more opaque. 
While, given politicisation, this does not mean that they do not form preferences in this respect, political 
parties might indeed have a better chance of not being punished for a particular position on this issue or 
even of shaping voters’ preferences in their turn. Yet, the idea that uncertainty is issue-related rather than 
simply omnipresent would seem to define both the potential and limitations of national parties’ (and, by 
assumption, MEPs’) capacity to actively shape the structure of conflict. 
Obviously, this idea of uncertainty as an issue-related condition can at best form a starting point 
for further elaboration, since neither Moravcsik nor Hooghe and Marks explain exactly why, how and in 
how far actors are able and willing to make effective usage of the alleged ‘leeway’. The link between 
parties’ strategic options in terms of communication and the eventual structure of conflict is thus 
elaborated in more detail in the next section. As is shown thereby, the ways in which parties find 
themselves able ‘give reasons’ is an important element in understanding their choice for defection or 
loyalty in a politicised European Union. 
2.3 Using the ‘leeway’: The potential and limitations of framing in EU politics 
In this section, it is suggested that political parties generally try to actively persuade their voters by giving reasons 
(referred to elsewhere as a ‘Rikerian’ perspective), rather than just passively responding to their preferences shaped in 
turn by structural conditions (‘Rokkanian’ view, respectively). They are assumed to do so by making use of often pre-
existing ‘policy frames’, which can be understood as lines of argument narrowing down the social phenomenon to a 
particular set of norms and values, a problem definition, a causal narrative as well as a corresponding policy 
‘solution’. The actual potential for framing EU policy issues have only been slightly touched upon by the extant 
literature. In this study, therefore, inspired by recent advances in theorizing on party competition in two-dimensional 
policy spaces, four framing strategies at the issue level are suggested and linked to the various combinations of 
structural conditions identified beforehand. It is argued, that without politicisation, certainty or cross-national 
distribution, parties can simply stick to their ideological ‘prism’ in a manner predicted by the cleavage theory. Even if 
these conditions are present but intra-national distribution is at stake as well, a so-called blurring strategy that mixes 
various policy frames but remains predominantly ideologically driven might seem preferable for some parties 
(depending on the exact shape of intra-national distribution) over full-scale defection. Consequently, only if the 
short-term electoral benefits of non-defection will outweigh potential losses in policy-seeking and long-term 
credibility will parties actually defect, which will usually only be the case if their core electorate is directly affected. 
National traditions may ease this step and guide the precise shape of defection (i.e. the choice of the frame), because 
they can generally be assumed to resonate well with the national electorate and reduce the loss of credibility due to 
conspicuously strategic behaviour. The section is concluded by a summary of the overall theoretical framework thus 
far, now including an elaborate micro level component. 
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Giving reasons as framing: Towards a more Rikerian approach to party politics in the EU 
A unifying feature for most of the theoretical considerations discussed in the preceding section has been a 
focus on structure, which is typical for what Rovny (2015) calls the ‘Rokkanian’ tradition of theorising 
party competition (including the structure of conflict). This was advantageous with regard to identifying 
what arguably constitutes a major constrain on parties’ or MEPs’ capacity to set focal points with a view 
to convince others, a feature more or less absent from Ringe’s PPC approach. The latter simply takes 
uncertainty to be an almost omnipresent feature of EP politics, whereas above, it was conceptualised as 
issue-dependent. Noteworthy, however, the post-functionalist theory of European integration slightly 
departs from the Rokkanian tradition, which still clearly dominated Marks’s distribution model, in that – 
within the confines of uncertainty – it conceives of parties as actors of actively shaping the structure of 
conflict, rather than being driven by structural imperatives. It thereby slightly approaches what Rovny 
contrastingly refers to as the ‘Rikerian’ tradition (cf. ibid.), where the structure of conflict is shaped by 
parties’ strategic considerations and, most notably, is actively manipulated by them. 
This tradition is integrated into the present theoretical framework for two reasons. First, the 
aspects of post-functionalism falling into this tradition are yet underspecified in the version presented by 
Hooghe and Marks (2009). Second, given that there is an empirical gap in the extant literature on conflict 
in the EP when it comes to the study of the reasons parties give for their stances on EU policies, this 
strand of literature appears particularly helpful: the fact that parties do give reasons at all for their 
expressed policy preferences is crucial within this tradition, as it is part of the causal chain explaining the 
eventual structure of conflict. What might be called the Rikerian tradition, as a way of thinking about 
political conflict, is the basic idea that by manipulation issue definitions, by adding dimensions of choice, 
and by focusing attention on a particular aspect of a debate, it is actually possible the influence voters’ 
ideal points, or, less abstractly, convince them (Riker 1986; 1996). In other words, parties take on an active 
role, rather than simply responding to pre-existing preferences of voters, and the way they give reasons 
can only be understood by attributing this active role to them. In turn, the structure of conflict will not 
simply refer voters’ preferences, but will reflect the strategic choices available to parties. This is why the 
neglect of theoretical and empirical investigation on ‘giving reasons’ in the EP literature should finally be 
compensated for. It is in this sense, that Riker is seen by some as the pioneer of the expanding literature 
on the influence of ‘framing’ (Riker himself uses the concept of ‘heresthetics’) on the structure of political 
conflict (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008, 442; see also: Daviter 2007). Admittedly, Marks and Hooghe 
take up the concept of ‘framing’ as well as that of ‘cueing’ for explaining how parties can make use of 
uncertainty (2009, 13). Especially with regard to the former, however, there is yet room for further 
elaboration. 
This is because the so-called ‘cues’ might be considered as the more superficial of these two 
mechanisms. They “provide informational shortcuts that may enable voters that tend to be poorly 
informed about political issues to make decisions as if they were well informed”, as Bechtel et al. (2015, 
686) summarise with reference to the works of Lupia and Druckmann. This might mean, for instance, that 
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voters support a certain policy based simply on the fact that they support the actor (or group of actors) 
suggesting it. Hooghe and Marks (2005) argue that national party’s evaluations of European integration 
strongly influence the position on integration within their national electorates, and in their later post-
functional theory point to the potential for using national identity as a cue (ibid., 2009). Within Ringe’s 
(2010) PPC framework, one might also consider the shared membership of an EPG or even national party 
delegation within the European Parliament as a kind of cue that makes MEPs generally more receptive to 
the focal points provided by their fellow nationals. As one variant of this, it can be argued that simply 
claiming to represent the national interest can function as a cue for poorly informed citizens, something 
which national governments are generally assumed to do (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 22). That said, 
depending on which kinds of identities they try to play on – exclusive or inclusive national identity, 
European identity – they might present a given policy as being in the national, the national and European 
or generally European interest, respectively. If however more or less all actors do so, there arguably will be 
competing interpretations of the national interest, so that actors will further be forced to provide the most 
convincing interpretation of the issue at stake. Additionally, politicisation of EU politics also implies that a 
decreasing number of voters is sufficiently uninformed to be guided by cues only. 
Hence, ‘framing’ as a much more sophisticated technique should be more significant and will 
form a core element of the rest of the present study, also because of the way it is defined by Entmann: 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating 
text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation 
and/or treatment recommendation. (ibid., 1993, 52; emphasis in the original) 
Framing, then, is a more precise notion for what has so far been considered here as ‘giving reasons’ or 
justifications (cf. Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wüest 2010, 498) and yet in this definition is directly linked to 
a given policy for which an actor expresses a preference and thereby is linked to the eventual structure of 
conflict. Indeed, it is assumed here that political actors are almost permanently framing issues, as there is a 
general societal expectation that politicians justify their decisions, while at the same time, it seems hardly 
feasible to present an issue in a manner that pays equal attention to all possibly attached values, causes, 
definitions and, most obviously, all possible policy solutions. Rather, political actors are likely to frame 
issues strategically, and, to make the link to Ringe’s PPC approach, provide the right focal points, which 
one might think of as the various elements of a frame, to non-expert colleagues and voters. The question 
thus is, however, how exactly parties in EU politics make their framing decisions, and in particular when 
and how their frames lead the structure of conflict to be ideological or territorial. 
In fact, this study is by no means the first to consider the role of strategic communication in 
terms of ‘cueing’ or ‘framing’ in the EU more generally. Even before developing their post-functionalist 
theory of European integration, Hooghe and Marks (2005) had explored, albeit rather indirectly, the 
influence of the political party positions as providers of cues on public opinion. While focussing on the 
domain of biotechnology policy, Falk Daviter (2007; 2009; 2011) has pointed out in much detail the ways 
in which framing has shaped both the structure of conflict and policy outcomes at the EU level. In 
addition, Mark Rhinard (2010) has examined the Commission’s capacity to shape policy by means of 
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framing even in policy domains that are as entrenched as the Common Agricultural Policy, while others 
have analysed how lobbyists use framing in order to influence policy-makers (Baumgartner and Mahoney 
2008; Klüver, Mahoney, and Opper 2015). This list may not be exhaustive, but in general it appears that 
framing as a tool in party competition at the EU level, be it by national parties directly or via their MEPs, 
has apparently not been studied extensively yet. After all, Daviter (2007; 2009; 2011) mainly seems to 
consider the EP largely as a more or less unitary actor within an inter-institutional conflict. Finally, while 
Helbling et al. (2010) analyse how parties frame European integration, they do so on a rather broad scale, 
with the issues of the European Constitution and Turkish accession serving as examples of deepening and 
widening, respectively. The latter issues, clearly, are about polity, but less about politics. Indeed, when it 
comes to political conflict within the EP, framing as an element of strategic communication by MEPs vis-
à-vis their voters has not been discussed so far. 
Recently, there have been some noteworthy advances in theorising party competition in two-
dimensional policy spaces, with one dimension concerning the classic Left-Right dimension, the other a 
territorial one, in the context of national politics (Elias, Szocsik, and Zuber 2015). They have been 
developed with a view to account for party behaviour in a setting where mainstream parties competing 
along traditional cleavages (and preferring to continue doing so) are confronted with a more or less new 
competitor in the shape of an ethnoregionalist party raising issues that are not traditionally part of the 
older cleavages. Noteworthy, both the strategies of mainstream parties in reacting to these new challenges 
as well as the strategies for the newcomers trying to develop a broader profile are considered (ibid., 2015, 
843–46). It is easy to see the parallels to a politicised EU where, as pointed out by the cleavage approach 
(Marks and Wilson 2000), mainstream parties would as such prefer to continue competition on integration 
issues along the lines of established cleavages but – as I have pointed out in my critique of this approach – 
there is potential also for a territorial dimension. Right-wing populist parties might have pushed this 
dimension in particular, as Hooghe and Marks (2009) note. Indeed, Elias et al. (2015) at one point use 
parties’ positioning on European integration issues as an example of one particular strategy, namely 
‘subsuming’ (ibid., 846). It thus seems promising to discuss in some detail the possible transfers of the 
‘tool box’ (cf. ibid., 840) of strategies available to parties in such a two-dimensional setting to the particular 
setting of EU politics. 
Before doing so in the next subsection, the four strategies as presented by Elias et al. (2015, 
843–46) are briefly introduced here. First, there is the so-called ‘uni-dimensional strategy’, which means 
that parties basically ignore the dimension that for them is secondary. Using examples from the original 
setting of national politics entered by a regionalist party, this would mean that mainstream parties continue 
to position themselves only on the economic Left-Right dimension, whereas their regionalist challengers 
focus only on what in this case is the territorial dimension. Second, there is the so-called blurring strategy, 
where parties take “vague, contradictory, or ambiguous positions” concerning issues that tap on their 
respective secondary dimension, so that they “at least do not deter voters on these issues” (Rovny, 2013, 
5-6, quoted in Elias et al. 2015, 844). Third, parties might engage in ‘subsuming’, in that they frame an 
issue in such a way that it seems to fit into their usual, preferred dimension. They might, for example, talk 
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about an issue of territorial relevance as a more general problem of economic inequality. Fourth, parties 
could adopt a fully two-dimensional strategy, and actually “take clear, distinguishable positions on issues 
that belong to both dimensions” (ibid., 2015, 845). If, for example, an ethno-regionalist party wants to 
attract votes from a wider electorate than those voters who sufficient care about the territorially 
dimension, they need to offer an explicit programme also on economic issues. 
While these four constitute the strategic tool box available to parties within two-dimensional 
policy spaces, this does not imply that they are completely free in choosing their strategies. Indeed, as 
Rovny (2015) concludes, there are structural constraints that need to be taken into account as well. 
According to Rovny, future research should thus be aware of possible deeper social divides pertaining to, 
amongst others, economic inequalities, institutional imperatives, organizational characteristics or political 
issue frames (ibid., 917). Given that the focus of the literature discussed in the preceding section was 
indeed on structural determinants, this study is now in a highly advantageous position: structural 
considerations can be directly integrated when trying to take inspiration from the theoretical framework on 
strategies in two-dimensional spaces to EU politics. 
As for institutional and organisational constraints, especially those that related to the particular 
institutional environment within which MEPs find themselves, I have already noted that these will be 
discussed in some detail in a later section (Section 2.4). The limitations set by what Rovny might mean by 
‘political issue frames’, or ‘policy frames’ as I will refer to them throughout, are considered quite important 
here indeed: also for methodological reasons (see Chapter 3), I assume that actors in EU politics, 
especially outside executive institutions disposing of high administrative capacity, do not constantly 
rhetorically reinvent the wheel, in that most of the time, they choose among a set of pre-existing, policy-
specific frames that they adapt only slightly to the particular question at hand. This assumption seems 
justified insofar as most actors outside the executive do neither have the resources to be overly innovative 
nor do they have a rationale to do so frequently, since focal points included in the frames that are already 
somewhat familiar have a much better chance to resonate with the public. Indeed, it might even be the 
case that they are provided with such frames by societal groups that they are lobbied by and in turn wish 
to represent, or at least engage in exchanges with them. Thus, in the next subsection, it is discussed how 
parties make their choices among existing frames rather than how they come to create new frames 
necessarily. 
Integrating Rokkan and Riker: How communication strategies structure conflict in EU politics 
Before coming to the substantive transfer of the theory on party strategies in two-dimensional spaces 
from national to European politics, an important clarification must be made here so that the structural 
considerations on conflict in EU politics (see Section 2.2) can be integrated with these strategic ones. This 
clarification concerns the fact that the theoretical framework outlined by Elias et al. (2015) mostly refers 
to the two-dimensions of a political space at large, with dimensions constituted of many different issues, 
whereas a. the structure of conflict as defined in Section 2.2 always concerns a particular policy issue and 
b. the structural parameters in terms of distributional effects and uncertainty are considered to be issue-
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related. This also implies that framing efforts discussed here will always concern so-called ‘policy frames’, 
as was briefly mentioned in the preceding subsection. 
Table 1: The four dimensions of a policy frame 
dimension normative constitutive cognitive policy 
function Attach values, judge, 
evaluate 
Label and identify 
something as a 
‘problem’ 
Provide causal 
narratives 
Suggest remedy 
question What sort of values do 
you need in order to 
see this as a problem? 
What is the problem? What has led to the 
problem? 
What should be done 
about the problem? 
Example 
(agricultural 
policy) 
Frame A: 
Food production, food 
safety 
 farming as an end 
in itself 
Frame A: 
Economic uncertainty 
of farming, extreme 
price volatility 
Frame A: 
Farming is special, an 
industry apart that 
cannot be made 
subject to market laws 
because of weather 
conditions and rigidity 
of demand; food 
speculation enhances 
the problem 
Frame A: 
Market intervention; 
safety net for young 
farmers 
Frame B: 
efficiency 
Frame B: 
Market distortions and 
their social cost 
Frame B: 
wrong incentives set 
by subsidies  
Frame B: 
Liberalisation, i.e. 
more market 
orientation, no more 
subsidies (at least cut 
CAP budget) 
 
With Radulova (2011) I define policy frames as consisting of four dimensions, which I illustrate by 
drawing on the example of the so-called Euro crisis (see Table 1). The first is the normative dimension 
which “pertains to the function of the frame to judge and attach values to phenomena from the social 
reality” (ibid. 2011, 43). It can be summarised in the question: “What sort of values do you need in order 
to see this as a problem?” (ibid. 2011, 91). In this sense, for instance, the situation in Greece will not be a 
problem for the other Member States if there is no connection whatsoever – e.g. economic 
interdependences or solidarity – between Greece and the others. Secondly, the constitutive dimension 
“pertains to the function of the frame to label and identify various social phenomena as problems” (ibid. 
2011, 43) and answers the question “What is the problem?“ (ibid. 2011, 90). Thirdly, the cognitive 
dimension “pertains to the function of the frame to narrate about what has led to the problem and thus to 
present social reality in terms of cause-effect relations” (ibid. 2011, 44). Rising interest rates on state bonds 
may be framed as the result of either an irresponsible budgetary policy or financial speculation. Obviously, 
such causal narratives matter for the policies that would appear suitable to remedy the problem. The latter 
constitute the policy dimension (What can be done about the problem?). As Radulova notes, “[p]ublic 
policies are typically based on policy frames that implicitly or explicitly contain the four dimensions” (ibid., 
44). In sum, it should become clear that the four dimensions of a policy frame mirror the aspects of a 
frame as defined above with reference to Entmann (i.e. problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation and/or treatment recommendation). Yet, a policy frame is much more issue-specific and hence 
is different from the kinds of frames studied by, for example, Helbling et al. (2010) as ‘economic’, 
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‘nationalistic’ or ‘cosmopolitan’, which at this level of abstraction might be applied across issues belonging 
to the broad area of ‘European integration’. 
 
Figure 4: The social reality of Common Agricultural Policy as seen through different frames. Source: own 
compilation. 
Another possible hindrance to a one-to-one transfer results from the fact that the concept of a ‘territorial 
dimension’ is not the same as a territorial structure of conflict in the sense defined above. This is not to 
say that there is no comparable territorial dimension, also known as the pro-/anti-EU dimension, in EU 
politics, with Right-wing populist or nationalist parties challenging European integration as such in a 
similar manner as ethno-regionalist parties challenge national unity in the context studied by Elias et al. 
(2015). Nor shall it be denied thereby that these parties competing on this dimension have contributed to 
politicisation as a general game changer in EU politics, in that it requires all parties to take this dimension 
into account. In EU studies, there indeed also is a vivid discussion concerning the question in how far the 
pro-/anti-EU or territorial dimension constitutes a second dimension or in how far it overlaps with the 
traditional, economic Left-Right or at least the GAL-TAN dimension (cf. Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 
2002). Yet, even if one assumes that this is an independent second dimension, I still argue here that a 
party’s position on this dimension is equally informed by its respective ideology and will equally lead to an 
ideologically structured conflict as defined above, namely with parties with more pro-European ideologies 
opposing anti-Europeans both within their own countries and in other countries. 
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By contrast, what is to be explained by the present study, is the choice of a national party to 
defect or not to defect from its ideology, with this micro-level decision potentially leading to a macro-level 
territorialisation of conflict. If they do so, it was argued in the preceding section, they will do so because 
of issue-specific goal conflicts between ideology-driven policy-seeking and territory-based vote-seeking, a 
situation that arises only because of the particular setting of EU politics. To defect would mean resolving 
the goal conflict by deciding in favour of vote-seeking. The point of discussing the four strategies 
identified by Elias et al. for the present study then is not necessarily to transfer these strategies directly, but 
to think about similar kinds strategies that can be applied with a view to avoid defection once a party more 
or less deliberately takes a position on a given issue. 
If the structural constraints in terms of politicisation, distributional effects and uncertainty are 
integrated into the transfer of the framing strategies, it soon becomes clear that, while the four different 
strategies – or their equivalents for the present context of defection and territorialisation – might in 
principle all be available, they are not always equally attractive for national parties in EU politics. Before 
politicisation, parties might not have been under any vote-seeking pressure, even if some competitor 
invoked actual or alleged national interests: as long as nobody cared about EU politics at all and people 
would indeed use European elections as second-order elections only, as claimed by Reiff and Schmitt 
(1980), the equivalent of a ‘uni-dimensional’ strategy would have been to ignore any national interest and 
simply to interpret EU issues from a strictly ideological perspective. In doing so, the party would focus on 
just those aspects of a social phenomenon that can be grasped and made sense of by its own ideology 
without much further ado, e.g. the labour-related aspects of migration in case of a Social Democratic 
party. This behaviour would correspond to the ‘cleavage approach’ discussed earlier (Marks and Wilson 
2000). Parties who, by chance, find themselves in a situation where national interest and ideology overlap 
completely regarding a given issue, can of course stick to this strategy. This also means, that the alternative 
strategies considered next – blurring, subsuming, and defection – are of interest mainly for parties that 
otherwise would be facing some degree of goal conflict, while those parties facing goal convergence in this 
sense can always opt for the default, uni-dimensional ‘prism’ strategy. The structure of conflict, in turn, is 
determined by the choice of those parties who are not in this lucky position. 
As soon as politicisation sets in, simply ignoring national interests in terms of cross-national 
distribution does not seem rational anymore for those national parties facing goal conflict. Empirical 
evidence from national level studies points into a similar direction, as uni-dimensional strategies are only 
observed where there is no regionalist competitor at all (Rovny 2015, 913), which would resemble the EU 
prior to politicisation. Thus, even when distributional effects are intra-national or uncertain, it might 
already constitute a competitive advantage to provide cues in terms of references to national identity or 
alleged national interests. Above I have argued, however, that cueing in this manner might quickly become 
less effective, once competitors react by providing the same cues. 
One could argue, then, that prior to politicisation of EU politics, parties generally enjoyed a lot 
of ‘leeway’. Several of the theories reviewed earlier further argue, that they will do so under uncertainty, 
and could therefore just follow their ideological predilections in what here would be called a ‘uni-
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dimensional’ fashion. Indeed, a uni-dimensional strategy arguably remains viable if the distributional 
effects in relation to a policy issue are cross-national but (yet) highly uncertain.6 In case it seems that a 
policy issue has the potential to redistribute resources across countries, but the winners and losers are not 
yet obvious, there is both room but also demand for speculative predictions. Voters (just as anyone else) 
are then clearly unable to make their decisions simply on the basis of the policy suggestions the various 
parties make, cause they cannot know whether it will eventually benefit them. Hence, they rely partly on 
cues in terms of appeals to nationality7 – which pretty much all parties will provide equally, as was already 
argued, in that everyone will claim that their policy suggestion fits ‘the’ national (in some cases: and 
European) interest. What will make a difference for most voters, therefore, is the line of argument a party 
offers in terms of the other three dimensions of the policy frame: the norms and values parties evoke, the 
way they describe the problem and the causal narratives they present. With politicisation, it might further 
be rational to offer more than one kind of justification in order to convince their voters, as long as these 
do not run diametrically counter to each other (see below on ‘blurring’). 
What policy frames, then, will parties choose (or, less commonly, develop) in such a situation? It 
is the policy frame(s) that fits their respective ideology best. There are several reasons for this. First, 
parties are likely use ideology as a ‘prism’ (cf. Marks and Wilson 2000) to make sense of the situation for 
themselves first of all. Accordingly, they will themselves be most convinced by the policy frame – or 
combinations of elements of frames – closest to their ideology or will even develop a frame on their own 
by drawing on their ideology. Second, doing so implies that the policy frame is in line with their policy-
seeking goals, which is valuable for the party as such. None of these reasons, however, are to deny that, 
especially given politicisation, parties will then also reflect on voters’ preferences in relation to their 
frames. If indeed they use the frame in combination with nationality cues, they can avoid a possible goal 
conflict. After all, an ideology-oriented choice of the policy frame will attract at least attract those voters 
that are generally guided by their own ideological convictions. In addition, an ideologically-oriented frame 
might eventually even convince those voters who have no or only very unspecified ideological 
convictions. Whether this will happen or not is not foreseeable beforehand, so parties might simply opt 
for trial and error. For which distributional effects will eventually materialise or considered as certain by 
the wider public is by definition not foreseeable under uncertainty, nor is it necessarily under parties’ 
control. As a result, uncertainty frees parties from the pressure to defect from their respective ideology 
despite potential cross-national distributional effects. 
In many cases, this will mean that the structure of conflict will hence be ideological under 
uncertainty. There might nevertheless be some intra-party family variation, induced by general intra-
ideological variation (what is Left and Right might vary by degrees across countries) or because a given 
ideology does not clearly relate to any of the available policy frames. In the latter situation, parties are 
                                                     
6 If distributional effects would seem to be intra-national mainly but are yet uncertain, the structure of conflict will be 
ideologically anyway. Hence, this configuration is not discussed here in detail. 
7 Of course, party identification can also work as a cue but is generally in decline, as Dalton and Wattenberg (2002) 
note, and arguably less important for most voters than their nationality.  
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likely to take orientation from national traditions both for themselves as well as because it is likely that the 
respective policy frame includes focal points that sound familiar to voters, which increases the chance of 
the frame resonating well with their voters’ views (cf. Opp 2009, 234–46 concerning frame resonance). 
This might also be why, with regard to some issues such as foreign policy for which classic Left-Right 
ideologies are not that explicit, there can even be a territorial structure of conflict under uncertainty. At 
the same time, it should be noted that most issues are rather explicitly covered by party ideologies, due to 
parties’ general strife to integrate new issues into existing cleavages where possible. 
For illustration purposes, one might think of policy frames as sets bound together by their own 
substantive logic, circumscribed quite literally by the line of argument. A party’s statements, together 
forming a set of its own, can then include arguments that belong to one policy frame or another, or 
several frames. A party using a ‘uni-dimensional strategy’ will then make arguments drawn from one of 
these sets alone, namely the one closest to its own ideology. For instance, given the particular constellation 
of intra-national distributional effects, party ideology and the preferences of their particular core electorate 
(as discussed in detail in Chapter 5), Green parties could simply stick to their ideologically preferred frame 
favouring a ‘greening’ of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) despite the presence of national interests 
(Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Uni-dimensional / ‘prism’ strategy used by Green parties on the Common Agricultural Policy. Source: Own 
compilation. 
The issue-level equivalent of a ‘blurring’ strategy is attractive whenever there is not a full-scale goal 
conflict yet between vote- and policy-seeking. Rather than vote-seeking driving parties to support policy A 
while policy-seeking would point to policy B, the vote-seeking part alone might be ambiguous: some 
voters the party might potentially attract favour policy A, others prefer policy B. This could be the case 
when a policy has (certain) distributional effects within as well as across countries, for instance if some 
producers win from a policy that harms other producers, so that a producer-friendly party is not faced 
with a clear mandate; or producers win from a policy while consumers lose from it, so that a party that is 
producer-friendly but also wants to attract consumers is in a dilemma even for vote-seeking reasons alone; 
or the national interest differs from the national tradition. In such a situation, it makes sense for a party to 
combine statements belonging to various policy frames. Indeed, as in real life most policies will have 
mixed distributional effects in some way or another, blurring in this sense is likely to be used highly 
frequently as well, possibly also in combination with other strategies. 
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While the party might eventually have to make some decisions regarding a policy or at least a 
non-contradictory combination of policies to address the issue in question, a blurring strategy at the issue-
level might more often mean to mix elements of different policy frames on the three dimensions other 
than the policy dimension of a policy frame. Thereby, a party can at least acknowledge the values of some 
voters it leaves behind in terms of policies. For instance, the party could stress that it does care about the 
environment as much as everyone else (normative dimension of a hypothetical pro-consumer frame), but 
that the stricter environmental regulation will only scare producers off to countries with less strict 
regulation so that the stricter regulation policy is to be rejected (cognitive and policy dimension of a 
hypothetical pro-producer frame). Or, using again the CAP as an example, Social Democratic parties from 
net-paying countries might emphasise the frame involving soft forms of market intervention aiming at 
environmental and other public goods, from which their core electorates will benefit, while given the 
national interest they might mention – just as a side remark – that direct payments to farmers should be 
gradually reduced (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Blurring strategy used by Social Democratic parties from net-paying countries regarding the Common 
Agricultural Policy. Source: Own compilation. 
What, then, does ‘blurring’ imply with regard to the structure of conflict? This arguably depends on the 
exact mix of frames a party combines when blurring. On the one hand, a party might combine frames 
that, in their distributional consequences across countries, are rather similar. Thereby, the party would 
simply broaden its electoral support across several societal groups without risking a loss of credibility 
(wide blurring). This will not, however, make the structure of conflict more territorial. On the other hand, 
a party could decide to defect as defined below, but still use some elements of the frame it is supposed to 
refer to for ideological reasons (covering up). In this case, the structure of conflict will still be 
territorialised to the degree that defection is also used by other parties. Most importantly, however, a party 
could ease the pressure to defect by mixing arguments from the frame it prefers for ideological reasons 
with those of a frame that is in line with the national interest (strict blurring). It thereby does not ignore 
the national interest entirely, but does not fully give in to it up to the point of defection either. This makes 
most sense if the ideologically preferable frame is also advantageous in distributional terms for some 
groups constituting a party’s core electorate, but not necessarily for all of them or for the nation as a 
whole. In these instances of mixed distributional effects, then, the possibility of blurring at the party level 
reduces the overall degree of territorialisation. 
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At the issue-level, ‘subsuming’ must mean more than simply to present a new issue from one’s 
own ideological perspective, because this, essentially, is what one would expect a party to do already as a 
default (‘uni-dimensional’ or ‘prism’ strategy). Hence, what is understood by ‘subsuming’ here, is the much 
more demanding and creative act of resolving a potential goal conflict rather actively by re-framing the 
issue in an innovative way. This might mean to set the whole issue in a different context or to just slightly 
adapt elements of certain justifications belonging to other frames in such a way that they can be integrated 
into one’s ideologically preferred frame. Such creative acts are not likely to be the rule, and indeed would 
be almost impossible to predict. Hence, also their impact on the structure of conflict is difficult to predict. 
Yet, simply ignoring this possible tool would leave the framework incomplete. One example could be the 
framing effort by UKIP on the Common Agricultural Policy, who did not simply criticise the CAP as it is 
calling accordingly for re-nationalisation, but further outlined a national agricultural policy including most 
elements of the CAP as envisioned by what is called the ‘multifunctional’ frame (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Subsuming strategy used by UKIP on Common Agricultural Policy. Source: Own compilation. 
Finally, parties might follow a ‘two-dimensional’ strategy (Elias, Szocsik, and Zuber 2015). With reference 
to Robertson, Elias et al. argue that parties are using such a strategy if they “have positions on at least four 
issues ABCD, and their stances on A and B and their stances on C and D correlate, but their stances 
between A and C and between A and D and between B and C do not correlate” (ibid., 2015, 842). Again, 
it must be noted that they are referring to political spaces with two supposedly independent, but still 
ideological dimensions and that for the context of EU politics, it is still debated in how far a potential pro-
/anti-EU dimension is really independent from the traditional L-R dimension, as well as that in either 
case, the structure of conflict will still be ideological rather than territorial (see above). The equivalent of a 
two-dimensional strategy in the present context, however, would imply that the majority of statements 
including a party’s expressed preferences regarding some issue cannot be traced back in any way to its 
respective ideology. In other words, the issue-level EU politics equivalent to a two-dimensional strategy is 
‘defection’. For instance, a Conservative party that, despite its usual pro-market ideology, would call for 
massive market interventions as a part of the Common Agricultural Policy with a view to its national 
interest as well as the interests of parts of its core electorate (farmers), could be considered ‘defecting’ 
(Figure 8). 
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Figure 8: Defection strategy used by a Conservative party from a net-recipient country on CAP. Source: Own 
compilation. 
If now the resulting question, namely when and why parties would use this strategy and defect, is 
discussed, this can be done based on the foundation that has been built up in this chapter. For a start, it is 
clear that defection is not an attractive strategy for issues of very low salience, for issues with mainly intra-
national distributional effects as well as with distributional effects that are highly uncertain: after all, there 
are other strategies that under the aforementioned conditions seem preferable as they avoid a goal conflict 
between vote-seeking and policy-seeking. Indeed, even when cross-national distributional effects are high 
and certain, but coupled with intra-national distribution, there might be overlaps between ideological 
preference and preferable distributional effects at least for a party’s core electorates that make a blurring 
strategy still more attractive than defection along territorial lines. Outright defection will thus be a strategy 
chosen only under a very specific configuration of conditions: Only if there is certain, cross-national 
distribution that runs counter to one’s ideological predilections and not giving in to it would not result in 
direct losses within the core electorate will a party defect. Hence, full-scale territorialisation will only be 
observed if there is no intra-national distribution to distract from the overall ‘national’ interest. 
The foregoing scenario in fact constitutes a more solidly theorised version of earlier speculations 
on the motives for defection. A potential counterargument, however, might be built on the notion of 
‘credibility’. It has been argued, that the strategic room for manoeuvre for parties to change their position 
spontaneously in order to approach the median voter is limited by their overall need for ‘credibility’: only 
if voters perceive of a party as consistently pursuing a general and roughly consistent ideological course 
will they be able to trust the party to stick to its promises once they have been elected into office (Hinich 
and Munger 1994). In fact, this argument could be even stronger when it comes to the reasons parties 
give, since a party that easily replaces one value commitment by another might seem not to actually hold 
any values. Before this background, it may thus be questioned whether parties will really defect concerning 
individual policy issues without difficulty and how they justify policy preferences in such situations. 
It is nonetheless held here that indeed parties will defect in the aforementioned manner and that 
even in their choice of policy frames they will leave ideological considerations behind, for reasons I point 
out in the following. Firstly, it must be noted that parties will defect only given a particular configurations 
of conditions and otherwise will indeed use the strategic tools presented above precisely to avoid 
defection and goal conflict. This means, that with regard to many issues, parties in a post-Crisis EU might 
nevertheless behave in line with their ideology, such that there general credibility is exposed only to a 
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minimal risk. Secondly, given that conflict in EU politics is generally structured by both ideology and 
nationality, it might be an equally important pillar of a national party’s policy to be perceived of as a party 
that consistently represents ‘the’ national interest. Ideologically-driven framing under the conditions 
actually calling for defection might be read as a break with such a reputation that also in the longer term 
arguably might hit parties harder than a temporary deviation from one’s ideological line could. 
One aspect that deserves consideration when talking about electoral punishment for obvious 
strategic movements is the concept of ‘niche parties’. Amongst others, it has been argued by Adams et al. 
(2006) that so-called niche parties are fundamentally different from mainstream parties, in that they react 
differently (i.e. hesitantly) to shifts in public opinion, because they are punished more severely for such 
movements. More specifically in the context of the EP, Jensen and Spoon (2010) have further held that 
niche party MEPs react differently to institutional stimuli such as participation in national governments, as 
in the latter case they will become more pro-EU. At first sight, it might thus be argued that this will 
influence their calculus for defection also. 
There are, however, a number of reasons why these arguments on niche parties might not be as 
relevant here as they might seem. First of all, it must be noted that there are varying definitions of niche 
parties in the literature. On the one hand, in the case of Adams et al., it is based on extreme ideologies or 
“noncentrist niche ideology” (ibid. 2006, 513), which seems somehow tautological, but is meant to include 
Green parties. On the other hand, Jensen and Spoon follow Meguid in referring to parties that focus on 
the ‘new politics’ dimension. It thus seems that ‘nicheness’ generally is rather vaguely defined. Second, in 
the case of Adams et al., strategic movement refers to Left-Right scores in national politics, so that a direct 
transfer of the idea that strategic movements by niche parties are generally punished harshly may not be 
appropriate. This is precisely because of the electoral role of national interests pointed out earlier: a 
movement based on national interests might be judged in a completely different manner than one within 
the context of national politics by the voters. Third, the question is up to which point it makes sense to 
still consider a party a niche party as opposed to a ‘normal’, mainstream party. If, for instance, a party 
manages to get into government, this would seem to demand compromises in terms of office-seeking that 
make such a party more mainstream. Also, if parties considered ‘niche’ according to both definitions such 
as UKIP or the Front National are as successful as they have been in the European elections of 2014, this 
also seems counter-intuitive to the idea that they fill a particular ‘niche’ only. Fourth, inasmuch as the 
participation in government of niche parties as defined by the ‘new politics’ dimension is concerned, it 
might rather be their new role as – for the most part – junior coalition partners that makes a difference, as 
opposed to other parties from other party families who almost never enter government (far Left) or who 
also regularly lead governments (centre Left/Right). Fifth, in this and other ways, the findings of Jensen 
and Spoon might well be very contingent on the period of time covered and of the general developments 
the respective parties went through during this period of time. In sum, therefore, considering each party 
family based on its respective ideology and core electorate should be preferable to the niche party concept 
for the present purpose, without assuming that some of these families are more prone to defect than 
others per se. 
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Once the decision to defect has been made, then, it makes most sense to follow through with 
the reasons a party gives, that is, to make use of the policy frame that by way of arguing would lead to the 
suggested policy. Otherwise, inasmuch as any attention is paid to the reasons parties give under certainty, 
the issue-specific inconsistency is arguably much more easily spotted and exploited by opponents than the 
temporary break with overall ideological convictions. Opponents, in turn, can hardly criticise the reasons 
included in the territorially advantageous policy frame without exposing themselves. If for reasons of 
internal inconsistency – i.e. policy-dimension in line with the national interest, other dimensions 
ideological – a party is not considered credible with regard to the issue at stake anyway, then the sacrifice 
of policy-seeking goals concerning the issue would be made in vain. In sum, while defection as such would 
arguably not be detrimental to a party’s overall credibility, defection on the policy dimension only may 
well be detrimental to a party’s issue-specific credibility. 
In addition, it might be argued that the risk of losing credibility due to defection can be reduced 
in at least two ways. First, parties might decide to defect in the first place and primarily use the frame that 
would suit the respective national interest best while still partly using the ideologically preferred frame, 
applying some kind of back-up blurring strategy, especially in terms of what might be called ‘norms-
dropping’ (“[Norm] is important, but...”). Second, if defection along the lines of a particular national 
interest would coincide with using the frame that corresponds to the prevailing national tradition (e.g. a 
Right-wing party from a state capitalist country in financial difficulty calls for solidarity, deplores market 
failure and demands Eurobonds), such defection is less likely to be perceived as a purely strategic move as 
the national tradition lends some authenticity. In sum, therefore, defection may be attractive only under 
certain conditions, but it would not appear as overly risky in terms of credibility then. 
 
Table 2: Relationship between structural conditions, framing strategies, and resulting structures of conflict 
Structural determinants Strategy Structure of conflict 
politicisation distributional effects certainty 
low intra-/cross-national low/high uni-dimensional (or 
‘prism’) 
(subsuming) 
ideological 
high intra-national low/high uni-dimensional, 
blurring 
(subsuming) 
ideological 
high cross-national low uni-dimensional, 
blurring 
(subsuming) 
ideological 
high mixed high blurring, defection 
(subsuming) 
ideological, 
territorialised 
high cross-national high defection 
(subsuming) 
territorial 
 
Table 2 summarises the theory of territorialisation as developed in this chapter thus far. It is built of an 
up-to-date reconfiguration – especially in terms of increasing politicisation – of structural conditions at the 
macro (i.e. issue) level as mentioned in various strands of extant literature on conflict in EU politics on the 
one hand, and elaborated in terms of party goals and framing strategies to achieve these inspired by the 
2. A Theory of Territorialisation 
55 
literature on party goals and their strategies in two-dimensional spaces on the other hand. Given the latter 
aspect, the predictions for the macro level should become more precise and the causal narrative behind 
them can be more easily evaluated. 
In addition, these additional micro level considerations turn parties from passive respondents 
into much more active shapers of the structure of conflict: While a uni-dimensional, ‘prism’ strategy should 
generally be considered the default option for all parties, some of them sometimes need to consider 
alternative strategies. Noteworthy, even with full territorialisation, of course, some parties are not 
defecting, since for them national interest and ideological predilection overlap per chance. Hence, the 
strategies named in the third column of the table refer to those parties for whom such an overlap does not 
exist. As should have become clear, however, these parties will defect only reluctantly and will make use of 
alternative strategies as long as possible. One of these, namely subsuming, is rather independent of the 
structural conditions mentioned, but due to the elements of creativity that make up this strategy is not 
predictable. 
The remaining question is, in how far this model adequately represents the way in which the 
structure of conflict in EU politics – and in the EP in particular – is actually shaped. After all, so far the 
behaviour of actors in EU politics has been understood as the behaviour of cohesive national parties 
expressing and justifying their preferences on EU policy issues, with these national parties – while 
institutions themselves – acting more or less in an institutionally very underspecified environment. In 
other words, it must be considered next, in how far the particular institutional setting that MEPs face 
leads to a change in their calculus. Thus, it is discussed in the next section, in how far the goals and policy-
specific preferences of MEPs can be expected to diverge from those of national parties discussed here and 
in particular, whether MEPs will defect under the same conditions. 
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2.4 The (ir)relevance of institutional variables: Agency drift, really? 
The theoretical framework developed so far is built to explain the behaviour of national political parties in EU 
politics, without considering, for the most part, the concrete institutional environment(s) within which they are 
operating. In this section, it is discussed in how far national party delegations within the EP can be expected to 
behave in a manner that contrasts with the preferences of their national parties (and hence with the theory 
developed) due to the respective institutional variables. First, it is argued that ideologically rather coherent European 
Political Groups (EPGs) will have very similar goals in terms of policy-seeking as national parties have, and that the 
main source of divergence – intra-EP office-seeking – has been overrated so far, whereas the importance of vote-
seeking as the source of national party influence is increasing. Second, it is pointed out how all theoretical 
perspectives commonly applied to parliamentary committees (informational, partisan, distributional) are compatible 
with the idea of MEPs as true representatives of national parties, with only the first perspective demanding some 
scope conditions (extremely technical might be special). Similarly, the influence of interest groups for non-technical 
issues should be captured by the idea of core electorates. Moreover, it is argued that other EU institutions have little 
room for influencing individual party delegations beyond national parties, noting that governments might have 
informational advantages at times (again, mainly technical issues) due to their administrative back-up while the 
Commission can work as a provider of possible policy frames, among which MEPs may however still choose rather 
freely. Finally, even if MEPs had any incentive to ‘betray’ their national party, it can be expected that in a politicised 
EU, these parties as principals will increasingly make use of the control mechanisms already noted in the literature, 
while in the instance of publicly giving reasons, MEPs expose themselves to ex post control quite clearly. As it is 
concluded, the institutional environment of the EP seems to provide neither reason nor room for agency drift by 
MEPs vis-à-vis their national parties, so that so that the theory of territorialisation as developed here would seem to 
apply as long as scope conditions in terms of electoral rules and the role of technical expertise for some issues are 
taken into account. 
In how far can MEPs be expected to share national party preferences? 
At the core of the theory of territorialisation is the idea that national political parties pursue a set of 
general goals – known as policy, office, and votes – which they try to reconcile inasmuch as possible by 
means of framing strategies, while prioritising vote-seeking if necessary due to structural constraints. It 
must be noted here that the present study is by no means the first to take inspiration from the literature 
on party goals as a starting point for understanding politics within the EP (Faas 2003; Hix, Raunio, and 
Scully 1999; Whitaker 2011). In particular, the literature that I have referred to as the ‘Three Goals, Two 
Principals’ (3G2P)-approach critically builds on this conception of MEP goals. The difference is, however, 
that other scholars tend to apply these ideas directly to the goals of MEPs and to focus on their 
interaction within the institutional environment of EP, rather than structural constraints in the form of 
issue characteristics or strategic options in terms of framing. This means, however, that the 3G2P 
literature can now be used to identify and think again about institutional variables. 
In fact, one goal of national political parties in EU politics has been hardly discussed when 
constructing the theory of territorialisation the preceding sections, namely office-seeking. From the 3G2P 
perspective, however, it constitutes an important goal for MEPs, as they are assumed to strive for 
attractive positions as committee chairs, rapporteurs etc. within the EP (e.g. Hix, Noury, and Roland 
2007). The allocation of these positions, in turn, is controlled by the European Political Groups (EPGs), 
within which the vast majority of MEPs is organised. Hence, the 3G2P approach postulates, an EPG acts 
as one of two principals demanding loyalty from ‘their’ MEPs and can use its power over office allocation 
within the EP as an incentive. Loyalty to the EPGs, which are largely ideologically formed (McElroy and 
Benoit 2011), clearly is the opposite of defection from a party’s ideological conviction. Inasmuch as this 
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aspect of the 3G2P approach holds, MEPs might want to think twice before they defect and in this sense, 
the concrete environment of the EP might influence the structure of conflict. As was already noted, 
however, there are strong theoretical (Ringe 2010) and empirical (Thiem 2009) arguments against the role 
of office-seeking as a goal for MEPs and the role of EPGs as principals, respectively. Therefore, it is not 
assumed here that intra-EP office-seeking constitutes influences MEPs’ decision to defect in a manner 
that contrasts with the theory of territorialisation presented here. 
This does not mean, however, that EPGs would not play any role for MEPs. In fact, they can 
hope to see much more of their policy preferences implemented by cooperating within EPGs. Thus, they 
have a general interest in keeping EPGs functioning, which clearly would not be the case if defections 
were the rule. This also means, however, that loyalty to an EPG is linked mainly to the goal of policy-
seeking, not office-seeking. In other words, there is an institutional link between policy-seeking and 
ideological rather than territorial conflict – which however only reinforces the link between policy-seeking 
and ideology that was established above for national parties in EU politics generally. In sum, while it was 
arguably appropriate to neglect office-seeking in the present context, in terms of policy-seeking there is 
overlap rather than conflict between MEPs and both of their alleged principals. 
This leaves the third goal, namely vote-seeking to be discussed here: in how far can MEPs’ re-
election goal be assumed to coincide with the vote-seeking goal of the respective national parties in 
European elections? With regard to the first question, Faas (2003) notes that national parties are the only 
actors who can select candidates for seats in the EP, while EPGs do not have any control over this 
process (ibid., 2003, 844). Whenever the national party wants its MEPs to defect, therefore, it can in 
principle use its selection power in order to connect its own vote-seeking goal – for as was argued above 
regarding national parties, vote-seeking is usually what is behind defection – with MEPs’ strife for re-
election. In fact, as the chances of re-election of an MEP are generally preconditioned by the electoral 
success of the national party, national parties might often not even actively have to do anything to force 
their MEPs into compliance. It should be noted here further that even the leadership of the EPG might 
not be entirely opposed to occasional defection by some national party delegations: to the contrary, it can 
be argued that they too have an interest in getting those MEPs re-elected who brought them into office in 
the first place (cf. Lindstädt, Slapin, and Vander Wielen 2011, 40). Interestingly, from this perspective 
defection would seem to constitute more of a ‘betrayal’ concerning MEPs’ own ideological beliefs than 
concerning the overall interest of the EPG. 
As a result, once one discards the idea that MEPs are torn between loyalty to their EPG for 
office-seeking reasons and loyalty to the national party for vote-seeking reasons, it becomes much less 
obvious why MEPs would apply a different calculus in terms of weighting votes and policy, with the 
former being instrumental to the latter and hence ranking higher, than the one that was pointed out in 
detail for national parties in EU politics more generally. It would seem that they will be loyal to the EPG 
whenever one would expect the national party to argue ideologically, and would defect from their EPG 
whenever one would expect the national party to switch to a territorially-oriented line of argument. The 
results of the roll call analysis conducted by Thiem (2009) appear to support this argument of national 
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parties as the only principal empirically. Mühlböck’s (2012) contrary finding might rather be due to the 
fact that she takes the voting behaviour of ministers in the Council as true representative of the national 
party, which is hardly any more justified than assuming MEPs to represent the party and ministers to be 
disloyal in the observed instances. 
The EP’s committees – a source of preference divergence between MEPs and national parties? 
Even if it is assumed here that the goals of national parties and ‘their’ MEPs are in principle highly 
compatible and that, unlike a good deal of the literature tended to assume, European Party Groups are not 
likely to influence MEPs in a manner that runs counter to national party goals, this alone does not exclude 
the possibility of agency drift by MEPs. One reason might be that there are institutional structures within 
the EP beyond those formed for obvious political reasons. The central – at least presumably – functional 
institutional structure in the EP consists in its legislative committees. There are, in fact, three main 
theoretical strands of literature that have been developed largely to explain committees in the United 
States Congress, but which have been successfully and repeatedly transferred to the EP (Whitaker 2005; 
Whitaker 2011; Yordanova 2009). As Yordanova notes, these three strands of theory are neither mutually 
exclusive nor easy to merge into one, and should thus be considered simultaneously (ibid., 2009, 261). 
This is what is done in this subsection, while special attention will be given to the consequences of each 
theory for the relationship between national parties and their MEPs. 
It is straightforward here to start with the informational theory of legislative organization 
(Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; 1990; Krehbiel), for as will become clear, this theory is behind Ringe’s (2010) 
PPC approach. Indeed, Yordanova summarises the main argument of the informational theory as follows:  
Because of high uncertainty about the link between policy means and outcomes in a setting without a 
majority party, to acquire information the legislature creates institutional incentives (e.g. strategic 
resources, parliamentary rights and restrictive rules) for committee members to pursue specialization and 
share it sincerely with the chamber. (ibid., 2009, 263). 
Having recognised the obvious resemblance with the basic assumptions of the PPC approach, it follows 
that one would expect similar consequences for the relationship between national parties and MEPs: By 
specializing on particular policies, the respective expert MEPs acquire and informational advantage over 
the rest of the EP as well as vis-à-vis their national parties. Such informational asymmetries are, in fact, 
assumed to be at the root of what is called agency drift in most of the Principal-Agent literature (cf. Blom 
and Vanhoonacker 2014). Indeed, Ringe claims that “positions toward a legislative proposal are the 
product of committee deliberation and negotiation” (ibid., 2010, 55), and Roederer-Rynning has even 
argued that committees influence the way its members frame a policy problem, which may result in 
situations where conflict within the EP also emerges between different committees (ibid. 2015, 333, 346-
349). Clearly, inasmuch as the structure of conflict within the EP is actually the result of entirely 
endogenous processes, it will be difficult to explain conflict in the EP by means of a theory that is based 
on national party goals and does not take committees into account. 
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Nevertheless, it is held here that claims concerning the endogeneity of conflict should be taken 
with a pinch of salt for a number of reasons. First of all, it is important to distinguish the underlying 
structure of conflict from its concrete manifestations at the various stages of the negotiation process. To 
illustrate this, think of the kind of situation that arises during each Ordinary Legislative Procedure, namely 
when the EP has – by majority vote – arrived at a certain policy position and then confronts the Council 
that has arrived at a different position. The point is then, that negotiation has already led to compromises 
within each of these institutions, compromises that might not even be equally supported by all members 
of each institution. To say then that the structure of conflict is inter-institutional would arguably miss out 
on the possibility that there might be an ideological or territorial pattern that spans across both 
institutions. Similarly, just because the compromise agreed within one committee is different from that of 
another one, the underlying structure of conflict can still be ideological or territorial, especially since the 
composition of committees might not be identical party-wise. 
Partly, this is an issue of preference measurement, of course. Consider again the example of the 
agricultural committee (COMAGRI) regarding the latest reform of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), that was also used as an example of conflict between committees above: it becomes clear that as 
soon as one zooms closer to the preferences of the various actors within COMAGRI, that conflict existed 
inside the committee and, to an extent, persisted even after committee votes (Roederer-Rynning 2015, 
346–49). Even Ringe’s (2010) PPC approach, while drawing heavily on the informational theory, would 
acknowledge the possibility of conflict within a committee and of its transfer to the plenary due to the fact 
that non-expert MEPs tend to trust those experts with whom they share a party affiliation. 
Nevertheless, even if committees do not lead to homogeneity of preferences among its 
members, the informational advantage that committee members have over the rest of the EP and over 
their national parties could still allow them to follow their own agenda, rather than that of the national 
party. One might point here again to the overlap in general goals of national parties and their MEPs that 
makes such agency drift less likely, but even if this were not given, the following could still be argued: 
given the issue-related variance in uncertainty, the informational asymmetry may not always be equally 
large. In other words, with regard to some issues, national parties and even citizens may be better 
informed about the consequences of various policy options than they are concerning other issues. Recall 
then that it is precisely this degree of issue-related certainty that in line with the theoretical framework 
presented above constitutes one important and probably necessary condition for national parties to 
consider defection in the first place. As a result, the general informational advantage of committee 
members should not make a difference when it comes to the question of defection. Vice versa, when 
national parties do not even have clear and defined preferences over a given policy themselves, it could 
hardly be argued that an expert MEP developing a potential party position could drift away from its 
principals’ mandate. 
Moreover, according to the second, ‘partisan’ theory on legislative committees (Cox and 
McCubbins 2007), political parties are central actors within parliamentary assemblies who, amongst others, 
have the power to influence committee appointments and can use this power to punish or reward loyal 
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members. In the context of the EP, however, it is important whether the notion of ‘parties’ should be 
transferred to the European Party Groups or the national parties. On the one hand, Yordanova (2009) 
argues that while EPGs and their leaders in particular are the ones would assign committee positions, 
there is little evidence that loyalty is rewarded in these terms. This, however, is exactly what was assumed 
here already (with reference to Ringe, 2010) in the sense that MEPs were considered not to be driven by 
office-seeking within the EP, as they could not expect loyalty to pay off. On the other hand, Whitaker 
(2001; 2011) holds that in fact national parties and national delegation leaders in the EP are involved in 
the assignment of committee positions (increasingly so) and that “the small amount of room for moving 
beyond proportionality in EP committee assignments is used in line with national parties’ priorities” (ibid., 
2011, 125). Whitaker (2005) further shows that by and large, and especially concerning the more 
important, legislative committees, national party delegations manage to guarantee that their representatives 
within a committee are indeed representative of the national delegation as a whole. This second strand of 
theorizing committees as well as the aforementioned empirics would yield even less arguments for but 
instead arguments against the possibility of agency drift by MEPs. 
The implications of the third and final theory, the so-called distributive or distributional theory 
(Shepsle and Weingast 1987), for the present study partly depend again on the exact manner in which the 
theory is transferred from the US context to the EP. Generally, the theory provides that committees are 
staffed depending on the electoral benefits its potential members can hope for, given that membership 
allows for influence over those policies that are central to the a given MEPs’ constituency. While 
Yordanova (2009, 262) argues that there is no electoral connection between MEPs and any territorially 
defined constituency strong enough to allow for a direct transfer of the theory, the view taken here based 
on the increasing politicisation of EU politics would allow for it: the fact that votes can only be won 
within a particular national territory while EU policy issues become increasingly politicised would seem to 
provide the necessary link. Hence, national party delegations would have an interest in being represented 
in those committees that are important in terms of issue-specific national interests. There is some overlap 
here with Whitaker’s (2011) finding that parties strategically choose to staff committees that are of 
particular salience to them, only that here the salience is mainly driven by vote-seeking goals. As long as 
national party delegations are considered collective actors, there is thus no contradiction between the 
assumption of this theory on committees and the idea that MEPs are true representatives of their national 
parties. 
However, it could also be argued that MEPs self-select those committees in order to promote 
interests other than those of the electoral constituency (usually: the nation), that is, special interests 
(Yordanova 2009, 262). As a classic example, scholars tend to refer to COMAGRI, the EP’s agricultural 
committee, which is staffed to 31 per cent by people who have a special interest in agriculture in the sense 
that they themselves are or have been farmers or farmers’ representatives (i.e. union members or leaders) 
(Roederer-Rynning 2015, 339). Inasmuch as committee members with special interests use their influence 
to pursue a personal rather than a party agenda, they at least have an incentive to drift potentially from 
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their principal’s preferences and – inasmuch as they exist (see above) – might abuse informational 
asymmetries for their purpose. 
While not completely implausible, there are nevertheless a number of hurdles that make agency 
drift due to special interests rather unlikely. First of all, the pursuit of special interests which are 
completely at odds with the general policy goals of the party are unlikely insofar as someone who, for 
instance, has special interests given his persona membership of a migrant-friendly NGO is not going to 
join a far-Right party. In other words, there is a self-selection also at an earlier stage, namely for joining a 
certain party and not another. Second, as the partisan theory would stipulate, national parties and their 
delegations within the EP might not want to choose someone as their representative in a committee 
whom they suspect to pursue interests that the party or delegation at large does not agree with. Finally, in 
order to make full use of their committee position, committee members depend on the trust of their 
fellow MEPs. From interviews with MEPs it appears that they can be assured of this trust more generally 
but in the longer run, their fellow MEPs might notice that they have been misguided and react to it 
(Whitaker 2005, 9–10). Hence, I argue, the distributional theory is more relevant with regard to the vote-
seeking goals of the national delegation as a whole rather than with the special interests of individual 
members. Using this latter approach to emphasise the role of national parties might seem unusual at first, 
given that in the US context, one would use this approach to stress the irrelevance of parties. However, 
this is simply due to the particular incentive structure in terms of vote-seeking in both of these settings: in 
the US context, this leads federal parties to be weak indeed, but their component individual members to 
be strong, whereas in the European context, it leads European Party Groups to be weak, but their national 
parties to be strong. 
In sum, none of the three approaches on legislative committees would seem to suggest that the 
theoretical framework developed for national parties in EU politics could not be successfully transferred 
to the EP. From an informational perspective, it would seem that at least the decision to defect is not 
influenced by the committee system, as issue-related certainty is considered a necessary condition for 
defection also under the theory of territorialisation. Moreover, the partisan perspective can be interpreted 
to suggest itself that the goals of national parties shape committees and the behaviour of their members. 
Finally, the distributional theory makes most sense within the EP inasmuch as the vote-seeking goals of 
national parties as a whole are concerned. For the rest of this project, committees are therefore considered 
as important with regard to the division of labour among MEPs, in that indeed non-expert MEPs are 
likely to follow ‘their’ committee member. Indeed, if an issue is of particular importance to a national 
party for either territorial or ideological reasons, they will try to place their own expert within the 
committee or otherwise will not blindly rely on the committee member, even if he or she is part of the 
same EPG. Thus, committees are not expected to be decisive when it comes to the question of defection 
and, thereby, territorialisation, for neither ideological nor territorial conflicts are eliminated due to the 
existence of such expert bodies within the EP. 
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More power, more pressure? Interest group influence on MEPs 
Arguably, the bearers of ‘special interests’ do not wait for one of their members to be elected into the 
European Parliament and to self-select for a committee position. As for instance a kind of handbook for 
industry lobbyists issued by the Federal Association of the German Industry (BDI 2009) shows, lobbyists 
are well aware of the increased power of the EP in general and the influence its committees undeniable 
wield over eventual policy outcomes (not necessarily conflict, though), and hence they address MEPs 
directly (see also: Yordanova 2009, 254). It thus might be asked, in how far lobbyists are able to influence 
MEPs in such a way that they express and justify just those kinds of policy preferences that they, lobbyists, 
want them to while their national parties ‘back home’ would not. 
In order to approach an answer to this question, one might first of all ask another: Why would 
they? According to Heike Klüver (2013), interest groups generally have three goods to offer to decision-
makers, namely information in terms of policy expertise, economic power related to the businesses they 
represent as well as the electoral support of their members. The more of these goods they can offer in 
coalition with like-minded interests, the higher their influence over decision-makers, including MEPs. In 
addition, Klüver argues, lobbying success depends on the issue in question, as both the value of the 
various goods offered by lobbyists to decision-makers depends on issue characteristics, but also the kinds 
of coalitions that can be formed (ibid.). It must thus be discussed next, whether these goods that lobbyists 
can offer constitute a kind of input that makes them express and justify different policy preferences. 
This might be the case, for instance, if parties of the centre Left or even far Left are persuaded 
by lobbyists in a way that their national parties at home could not accept. Rasmussen finds business 
influence to be particularly high, when the policy issue in question is very technical (2015, 368–69), which 
is in line with Klüver’s idea that the influence of lobby groups generally rises with increasing complexity 
(ibid. 2013, 19). Both these scholars agree that for highly technical issues, MEPs depend on the input of 
lobbyists, which the latter might use to their own advantage. This might seem to contradict the idea 
pointed out above that parties might use ideology to reduce uncertainty also for themselves. Arguably, 
some very technical issues might be so specific that the gap to ideologies as general blueprints for policy is 
too difficult to bridge without further input. In line with the theory developed here, however, such 
completely ideology-free issues would likewise be irrelevant to parties in terms of policy-seeking. In 
addition, Rasmussen notes that these technical issues are usually of a very low salience in terms of their 
relevance for the masses of citizens (ibid. 2015, 368–69), and hence, also do not matter for parties in terms 
of vote-seeking. Given their irrelevance to party goals, then, it could hardly be argued that MEPs are 
drifting away from their national party’s mandate when following lobbyists’ advice. 
Noteworthy, Rasmussen also acknowledges that highly technical issues sometimes acquire a 
higher level of salience for a limited amount of time, for instance in case of “a scandal that will evoke anti-
business sentiments” (ibid.) and then, business interests would be much less successful. Behind the 
seemingly unsystematic concept of a ‘scandal’, however, one can identify a change in conditions that are 
very well specified in the theory of territorialisation. First, this is a change in politicisation of the issue, as 
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the concept of a scandal arguably implies that the wider electorate is made aware of the issue and is able to 
articulate its preferences. Second, the articulation of preferences among citizens is facilitated by the fact 
that, at least with regard to the part of the issue that concerns the scandal, there is certainty of 
distributional effects, as it becomes apparent that some actors have been harmed due to the behaviour of 
others – for instance consumers who discover that they are affected by the negative externalities of 
production without being compensated for it. Third, therefore, the direction of these distributional effects 
will be identified and the structure of conflict will evolve in the respective manner, e.g. ideological in case 
of production externalities. In sum, there might be highly technical issues, which, as long as their salience 
is also low, are outside the scope of the theory of territorialisation as developed above, but become 
explicable by the theory of territorialisation as soon as they are politicised. 
In general, therefore, the influence of interest groups on MEPs should be captured very much 
by the theoretical framework developed for this study. After all, from the discussion of Moravcsik’s ideas 
regarding domestic preference formation and their transfer to the positioning of national parties on 
matters of EU politics, it was followed that societal interests will influence the expressed policy 
preferences of national parties for reasons of vote-seeking. Similarly, Klüver argues that MEPs are 
influenced by interest groups depending on their citizen support, as they need a proxy for voters’ 
preferences, as well as depending on their economic power, as a proxy for future economic voting (ibid., 
2013, 40–53). Since Klüver sets out to explain the overall influence of lobbying on, amongst others, the 
EP as a whole without differentiating between individual MEPs, national delegations or party groups, this 
argument does not contradict the idea that MEPs, like their national parties, will have closer ties to some 
interest groups than to others (e.g. Leftist parties would listen more to trade unions than to producer 
groups, Green parties more to environmental NGOs etc.). In addition, there is evidence that MEPs have 
much closer ties to interest groups from their own Member State than to European ones, as Bouwen 
(2004) finds. He argues, that this is the case because MEPs have close ties to their national parties and 
eventually depend on national electorates (ibid., 2004, 491–93), which is precisely what would follow from 
applying the theory of territorialisation to the specific context of the EP. 
MEPs and their inter-institutional contacts 
Following the argument by Costello and Thomson (2014) mentioned earlier, interest groups are not the 
only actors lobbying MEPs: according to them, members of the Council of the EU, i.e. the national 
governments, might also have an interest in lobbying MEPs who are fellow nationals, especially if the 
issue in question is of high salience to the respective government and if the government in question is in a 
very isolated position within the Council in respect to this issue. They also provide some empirical 
evidence for their argument by relating governments’ positions to MEP votes. If indeed MEPs were 
influenced in this manner due to inter-institutional contacts, and if this included that even MEPs from 
opposition parties would give in to the Council’s lobbying efforts while this would be contrary to the 
predictions made for the respective national parties, one might indeed speak of agency drift. The empirical 
evidence provided by other researchers is somewhat contradictory: Hix et al. (2006) find very little 
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evidence of a general influence of the variable ‘government participation’, while Faas (2003) finds 
government participation to increase the likelihood of defection. Mühlböck (2013) finds that in fact, 
Council and EP members belonging to the same national party rarely vote in the same manner, which she 
explains by the ‘consensus culture’ (i.e. the observation that few votes are ever contested openly) in the 
Council and the existence of EPGs. From this perspective, it would seem that Costello and Thomson’s 
analysis is more to the point, since unlike the other studies it does not depend on voting data and thus 
basically controls for the consensus culture. In order to judge, at a theoretical level, why MEPs would give 
in to so such lobbying, the question must again be discussed, what rationales MEPs could possibly have 
for doing so. 
Strikingly, however, the arguments provided by Costello and Thomson all involve pressure from 
MEPs’ national parties (ibid. 2014, 3). If there is no direct link between the national government and 
MEPs that is independent from their common party affiliation, there is a. no reason to assume that parties 
other than those participating in the government might give in to the lobbying so that b. the evidence 
found by Costello and Thomson might just be a matter of correlation, not causation. That said, it is very 
well possible to think of potential direct links, which are discussed in turn.  
First, Saurugger (in Klüver, 2013, p. 42) argues that national governments have better access to 
national lobby groups and the information the latter provide. If MEPs depended on this information, then 
they might be influenced by national governments indeed. However, as was mentioned in the preceding 
subsection, MEPs actually do seem to have quite established contacts with national lobby groups 
themselves, so that they would not need national governments for that. Before this background, it is in 
fact more plausible to expect MEPs from national opposition parties in particular to use direct 
information from such lobbyists in order to accuse the government of failing to represent ‘the’ national 
interest, rather than trusting it blindly. This would serve their party at home as well as it would serve them 
within inter-institutional negotiations. In fact, it seems that one should rather expect MEPs from national 
opposition parties to attack the national government whenever there is room to do so: either because 
there are intra-national distributional effects that might be exploited or because distributional effects are 
still uncertain and thus amenable to strategic framing. 
As Franchino (in Klüver 2013, p. 42) argues, however, national governments can draw also on 
the technical expertise of national ministries, not just on input from lobbyists. Such administrative backup 
is clearly lacking on the part of MEPs. On matters which, for instance, are highly technical in legal terms 
and have no direct ideological component, MEPs might thus indeed rely on their government’s input. As 
with highly technical issues for which MEPs rely on e.g. business lobbyists’ input however, issues of this 
sort are likely to be of low salience in both policy- and vote-seeking terms and thus might indeed be 
outside the scope of the theory of territorialisation as laid out above. In most other instances, however, 
one would expect MEPs to defect in line with national governments’ lobbying pressure only under such 
conditions that would also make their national parties defect from their ideology (politicisation AND 
cross-national distribution AND certainty). 
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Nevertheless, the general discussion of the influence of government participation on MEPs 
points to one further aspect that should be taken into account more generally, albeit it does not involve 
agency drift, namely the influence of participating in a governing coalition. It is thinkable, that a party is 
more likely to defect because of its coalition partner, be it as a signal of government unity to the electorate 
or as a signal to the partner in question. At the same time, it is thinkable that MEPs are freer to behave 
differently from their coalition partner at home precisely because the coalition exists at the national level. 
Which of these scenarios applies more must stay and empirical question. 
In contrast to the Council, the European Commission is generally considered to be most 
influential in its role as an agenda-setter (cf. Egeberg 2007). With regard to the communication strategies 
of MEPs in particular, the role of the Commission as an agenda-setter might be crucial in terms of its 
capacity to act as a ‘frame entrepreneur’ (Rhinard 2010): Unlike MEPs who are more likely to choose 
among existing policy frames – due to their limited resources, the Commission can use the development 
of new frames as a tool to influence the potential for new coalitions and hence policy reform. Amongst 
others, such a new frame might constitute an additional option for justifying their policy preferences. 
Since however one would expect such frames are developed precisely in the agenda-setting phase and with 
a lot of preparation rather than in a spontaneous manner, they are likely to change the structure of conflict 
only in larger intervals. More importantly, the criteria for choosing a certain frame from among the frames 
that exist at a given moment in time remain the same. 
As for the role of ‘the’ EP within the overall constellation of legislative institutions in the EU, it 
must be admitted that this aspect is neglected here. This because the idea that the EP pursues a collective 
institutional interest which shapes MEPs expressed preferences seems hard to integrate into a theory that 
builds on the idea that MEPs have diverging preferences because of their diverging national and 
ideological backgrounds. Indeed, one might also wonder in how far such institutional interests actually 
exist or whether they are not often confused with the compromise the majority of the EP can agree on, or 
with the position of influential MEPs concerning an issue – just like national governments are taken to 
represent ‘the’ national interest by some scholars. Inasmuch as such genuinely institutional interests do 
exist, however, such institutional interests will hardly be captured in terms of actual policy frames, and thus 
might generally constitute a matter of investigation of their own. 
Could national parties control MEPs in case of diverging preferences? 
The preceding subsections have discussed in how far institutional factors related to the setting of the EP 
bear any potential to induce agency drift on the part of MEPs vis-à-vis their national parties as principals. 
While for the most part, it was held that these factors do not have much potential in this respect, or in 
some cases would rather lead MEPs to act in line with their respective national party’s mandate, not all 
possible factors might have been considered, and some of those that have been discussed could not be 
totally denied of having an impact. Hence, a final element in discussing the applicability of the theory of 
territorialisation as developed above to the particular context of the EP is the discussion in how far 
national parties could actively prevent MEPs from pursuing their own, contradicting agenda. 
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In other words, in how far can national parties can assure that ‘their’ MEPs defect whenever 
they want them to – and only then? A first seemingly trivial point to note is that, most of the time, they 
will select only amongst their members. To the extent that parties are indeed formed by people sharing a 
certain worldview, as was argued above, this aspect should not be underestimated. In fact, it can be used 
also as an argument against the view that MEPs adopt a more ‘European’ perspective during their term in 
the EP and thereby become less loyal to their national parties (Rasmussen 2008): after all, they are 
socialised into national parties much earlier and remain members of national parties throughout, such that 
this socialization process is much deeper. Noteworthy, this is not to deny that individual MEPs who are 
newcomers to the EP can ‘learn’ how to build intra-EPG compromise based on ideological focal points 
and thence defect less over time than they do in the very beginning (cf. Rasmussen 2008). 
Apart from selecting only members, national parties discriminate amongst members, for 
instance among MEPs who behaved loyally to the party and those who did not. It must be noted, 
however, that there is some variation in candidate selection process across countries and parties, ranging 
from highly centralised selection by the party leadership to decentralised selection by regional party 
organisations (Faas 2003, 844; Mühlböck 2012, 613–14). Both the preferences as well as the capacity for 
monitoring might vary among such party actors in charge of selection (ibid.). One might argue now that 
nevertheless MEPs would have to convince the national electorate eventually as a precondition for being 
selected, since without votes for the national party, there will be no seats to be distributed. However, some 
caveats must be noted also here that result from another institutional feature, namely variation in electoral 
laws applied at country level, ranging from party-centred to candidate-centred systems. In the latter, the 
candidate MEP enjoys a considerable degree of freedom (cf. Faas 2003, 845-846), arguably even more so 
than a candidate who merely needs the support of a certain regional electorate or selectorate. 
For these features to matter, however, the candidate in question would have to have something 
to offer to, for instance, a particular region that does not concern the country as a whole. It must thus be 
noted also that the impact of these variables impact arguably depends on the policy issue. Moreover, it 
must be noted that although, for instance, the Irish Fianna Fail operates within a Single-Transferable-Vote 
(STV) system, it scores comparatively high on Mühlböck’s measure of control over candidate selection 
(self-reported by MEPs) (ibid., 2012, 614) and indeed defects much more frequently than, for instance, 
Irish Labour operating in the same context in terms of electoral laws (Faas 2003, 855). Last but not least, it 
must be noted that party-centred electoral systems are the rule. In sum, therefore, candidate selection 
procedures and electoral laws should be controlled for in some way or another, but nevertheless their 
overall impact might be limited. 
This is all the more true since these two variables are not the only mechanism of national party 
control over MEPs. In fact, Mühlböck (2012) distinguishes ex ante and ex post control mechanisms, with 
candidate selection constituting out of several ex ante control mechanisms. Influencing the nomination to 
committees that was discussed in the subsection on the role of committee membership constitutes 
another. Yet another one is prior instructions to MEPs, something which Ringe (2010, 211) considers 
more or less completely absent from EP decision-making. Mühlböck also notes: “The overall occurrence 
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of prior instructions shown in the data is rather low” (ibid., 2012, 617). However, two points should be 
noted in this regard. First, with increasing politicisation, all national parties are likely to generally keep a 
closer eye on their MEPs than at the time that the data Mühlböck uses for her study were collected. 
Moreover, it should be noted that already for the 5th EP (1999-2004), it has been found that the number 
of defections rises towards the end of the legislative period, that is, it increases together with the pressure 
that national parties exert on MEPs in line with their own vote-seeking goals Hence, I would like to argue 
that national parties might simply not deem it necessary to always instruct their MEPs on every issue, 
counting instead on the pre-selection of their candidates. Only when an issue is of a high profile and when 
vote-seeking comes to matter most they will intervene.  
As an ex post control mechanism, Mühlböck counts the requirement to report to the national 
party. Here, again, Mühlböck notices considerable variation across parties and countries and the question 
for this paper therefore is, whether the awareness of having to report eventually changes MEPs’ behaviour 
and must thus be controlled for. As however the kind of behaviour of MEPs this study focusses on is the 
way that MEPs give reasons, ex post control is basically implied in the observation: ‘giving reasons’ in 
terms of framing would seem to include public statements or statements directed to the national party at 
the very least. 
Summary 
In sum, it appears that there is generally little reason – in terms of MEPs’ incentives – and little room – 
due to national parties’ control mechanisms – for agency drift. This is not by any means meant as a denial 
of the neo-institutionalists’ claim that “institutions matter” (cf. Hall and Taylor, Rosemary C. R. 1996). 
Rather, in this case, most of the EP’s institutional features discussed here seem to work in a direction that 
reinforces the tendency of MEPs to behave in accordance with national party goals. As a result, the theory 
of territorialisation as developed in the preceding sections would seem to carry considerable explanatory 
potential also within the particular institutional setting of the EP. That is, as long as two kinds of caveats 
are taken into account. First, where the nature of the electoral system, de-centralisation of candidate 
selection and issue characteristics in terms of distributional effects allow for it, agency drift might occur 
due to regional (as in sub-national) incentives. Second, the issue in question should not be overly technical 
in the sense that expertise rests only with special interests or national administrations, for in such 
situations, neither ideology nor national interests would seem to play a role at all. 
This is not to downplay the weight of such issues quantitatively, in that indeed it might be that 
there is a large number of these issues. But those issues that qualitatively are of interest, i.e. those issues 
referred to as ‘high profile’ should be covered by the theory. This limitation would seem appropriate for 
two reasons: First, concerning the societal rationale of the study, the EU’s current crises are arguably not 
due to its incapacity to resolve technical details, but to effectively address much more fundamental societal 
challenges. Second, from an academic perspective, it must be noted that defection does not seem to occur 
on low-profile anyway. The theory of territorialisation as it was developed here thus would still seem as an 
appropriate tool to address both rationales formulated at the start of this paper. 
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Readers familiar with the typical roll-call analyses in EP studies might have noticed the neglect 
of a few further institutional variables, most notably the kind of legislative procedure, which impacts on 
the degree of influence of the EP as well as a consideration of majority requirements. The conscious 
neglect of these variables is however based on the argument that as soon as preferences (and hence 
conflict) are not measured in terms of roll-call votes, these variables lose drastically in importance. 
Noteworthy, this aspect is linked to the more general question of how to measure conflict in the EP 
provided in the next chapter. It will then also be discussed, in how far the fact that the overlap of 
positions between national parties and their MEPs is first of all a theoretical assumption can be balanced 
empirically by means of triangulation. 
2.5 Conclusion: theoretical expectations for the structure of conflict 
This theoretical chapter set out by reviewing the theoretical contributions on conflict in the EP from the 
extant literature. It was found that the 3G2P approach by Hix and others not only underspecified the root 
causes of defection in the form of a clear conception of ‘national interests’ but further did not provide any 
expectations regarding the way MEPs justify their policy suggestions. The PPC approach by Nils Ringe 
was found to score better on the latter aspect, but failed to point out why, given their seemingly unlimited 
informational advantage, MEPs would ever decide to defect when cooperation within the EPG would in 
principle appear more advantageous. Finally, the bicameral approach by Thomson and Costello could not 
provide any arguments for defection that would apply independent from the role of national parties. 
Hence, the ‘theory of territorialisation’ was to be developed for the purposes of this study. 
As a starting point, definitions of political conflict and its structure were provided first, with 
territorial conflict being the result of defections, defined as policy preferences contrasting with ideological 
core beliefs, by actors in EU politics. National parties were then identified as the central actors in this 
respect. Next the concepts of ideology and national interest were discussed, with the former referring to a 
set of ideas serving as the blueprint for policy among party members and the latter as arising from the 
cross-national distributional effects of EU policy. Based on these definitions, a theoretical framework was 
developed, integrating theories from the wider literature on conflict in EU politics by relating these back 
to general party goals as a common denominator. This theoretical framework was further elaborated for 
the purpose of explaining the reasons national parties give for their preferences in EU politics. To this 
end, giving reasons was considered as an act of strategic framing, with various strategies being transferred 
from recent contributions in a more ‘Rikerian’ strand of literature regarding party competition in two-
dimensional, national policy spaces. The final step then constituted in taking these theoretical 
considerations back to the particular setting of the EP. In the respective discussion, it was found that 
MEPs can for the purposes of this study be assumed as by and large true representatives of their national 
parties. 
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Therefore, by a way of conclusion, the following theoretical expectations concerning the 
structure of conflict in the EP can be formulated. 
First, conflict in the EP will be rather ideological if 
an issue remains non-politicised despite the general trend towards politicisation in EU 
politics 
observed strategy at the micro level: uni-dimensional ‘prism’, no vote-seeking pressure so 
ideological ‘default’ 
OR 
an issue has intra-national distributional effects 
observed strategy at the micro level: uni-dimensional, some blurring to gloss over heterogeneous 
effects within a party’s core electorate or to attract at least some votes on the other side of 
the cleavage 
OR 
an issue has cross-national, but uncertain distributional effects 
observed strategy at the micro level: uni-dimensional ‘prism’, as focus is on justification, often also 
blurring to broaden electoral appeal 
Second, conflict in the EP will be rather territorial if 
an issue is politicised 
AND 
has cross-national distributional effects 
AND certainty of these effects is high (the degree of territorialisation depends on intra-
national distribution) 
observed strategy at the micro level: defection by those parties facing goal conflict of policy and 
votes, covered up by reversed blurring or by taking orientation from national traditions; 
some blurring instead of defection when intra-national distribution is involved as well  
In short, on the one hand, low politicisation, overwhelming intra-national distribution and uncertainty 
should constitute sufficient conditions for ideologically structured conflict, while national traditions such 
as the type of capitalism should be controlled for as a source of limited territorialisation beyond 
distributional effects. On the other hand, a combination of high politicisation, cross-national distribution 
and certainty is needed for territorialisation. In order to test this theory empirically, the next step is to 
identify ways of operationalising the key conditions adequately and of measuring relevant data in such a 
way that the strategic framing efforts can indeed be observed directly. This step is carried out in the next 
chapter. 
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3. Approach 
In the preceding chapter, a theory of territorialisation was developed that potentially explains how conflict in the 
post-Crisis European Parliament is structured under which conditions, given also that the national parties 
represented in the EP have various strategies at their disposal for expressing and justifying their policy preferences by 
using their room for manoeuvre given certain structural parameters. The present chapter now discusses, how exactly 
this theoretical framework should be evaluated, starting with a critical review of the methodological state of the art. It 
is found that there is a lack of smaller ‘N’ research designs suited to operationalise the concepts of national interests 
and ideology in a manner that is sufficiently accurate for testing the value of the theoretical framework, and that data 
on direct MEP-to-voter communication remains understudied. Sections 3.2 therefore suggest a qualitative-
comparative research design, to be applied to just three of policy issues and to a subgroup of national party 
delegations only, while in return allowing for a well-grounded identification of national interests and ideological 
family membership. The respective case selection processes regarding policy issues (Europeanised welfare, Reform 
of the Common Agricultural Policy, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), the subgroup of parties (only 
those from Germany, Austria, the UK, Ireland, France and Italy) and their attribution to the various party families 
based on ideological grounds are pointed out in detail. At the micro-level, techniques from Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) are suggested as a method of analysis as suited for the number of cases on the one hand, and as in 
line with the more general line of thought implied in the theory of territorialisation in terms of causal complexity. 
Next it is argued, that the policy preferences and justifications of these national party delegations concerning these 
issues should be measured by means of a Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) on the press releases they issue. This method 
is selected for its unique capacity to measure and distinguish both policy preference and justification and applicability 
to a rather small sample of texts written in several languages. It will allow for an analysis of the structure of conflict 
for each issue and of the various framing strategies used as operationalised at the end of the chapter. By way of 
conclusion, it is noted how the various aspects constituting this approach to evaluating the theoretical framework 
cannot only be justified on their own grounds each, but also that the way they interact redeems the remaining 
disadvantages of each individual aspect: For instance, a small ‘N’ allows not only for better operationalisation of 
national interests and ideology, but also for more labour-intensive hand-coding in terms of textual analysis, which in 
turn allows for the analysis to include several languages. 
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3.1 The state of the art and its deficits 
In this section, the state of the art on conflict in the European Parliament is critically reviewed in terms of the 
research designs applied, methods of measurement used and sources of data analysed so far. As I point out, extant 
research designs at both the macro-level of policy issues as well as at the micro-level of national party delegations 
tend to be overwhelmingly quantitative. The enormous insights gained by the usage of these designs regarding some 
general patterns notwithstanding, they tend to work with operationalisations of both national interests and ideology 
that are unsuitable for adequately uncovering the detailed causal narrative laid out in the theory of territorialisation. 
Moreover, the extant literature misses out on techniques for the measurement of both preferences and justifications 
that are apt to analyse the more or less direct communication – usually in the respective native language – between 
MEPs and their voters. 
Research designs in the extant literature 
In terms of research design, most of the extant literature tends to adhere to one of two extremes. At the 
one and certainly more populated end, there are large-N studies including many votes on many issues. 
Such designs were applied when actor alignments in the EP were studied for the first time, as the big 
question was whether ideology or nationality would account for the larger number of voting observations 
(Attina 1990; Kreppel 2000; Noury 2002). In later applications of large-N designs, the question 
increasingly became whether some intervening variables increase or decrease cohesion/ make defection 
more or less likely (Faas 2003; Klüver and Spoon 2013). This approach has definitely led to crucial insights 
on conflict in the EP, most importantly with regard to the general pattern of conflict in the EP in terms of 
voting behaviour, but also with regard which kinds of variables seem to matter at all. 
Such a large-N design does not, however, constitute an ideal choice for answering the present 
research question and for subjecting the theory developed in the preceding chapter to an empirical 
evaluation. First, it might be argued that the general approach to social phenomena that usually comes 
with this kind of designs, namely a focus on the explanans, is not what the present research question is 
about. Rather, the present research question is y-centred rather than x-centred, that is, it is interested in 
explaining the (non-)occurrence of a certain outcome rather than the role of a given variables or a set of 
variables (cf. Goertz and Mahoney 2012). Second and more important, ‘national interests’, even defined 
rather concretely as a result of cross-national distributional effects, can hardly be operationalized and 
empirically distinguished from other (e.g. ideological) motives in a valid manner within large-N studies, as 
I point out in more detail in the following. 
In the EP-specific literature, in fact, most studies have not even tried to operationalize ‘national 
interests’ a priori in any way, and have simply assumed that these are behind defection necessarily (e.g. Faas 
2003). In the related literature of voting behaviour in the Council, some attempts were made in terms of 
geographical patterns, for example in terms of rich North vs poor South/East (Thomson 2009; Thomson, 
Boerefijn, and Stokman 2004). 8  Bailer et al. (2015, 439) have rightfully criticised the usage of such 
                                                     
8 Indeed, this difference between the two bodies of literature – i.e. that on the EP and that on the Council – might be 
due partly to the fact that the scholars working on the two institutions have different backgrounds: Comparative 
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geographical patterns for the lack of a clear link to the assumed causal mechanism. In terms of 
operationalisation, a first step in the right direction would certainly be to replace geographical patterns 
with the status as net-payers and net-recipients from the EU budget (e.g. Zimmer, Schneider, and 
Dobbins 2005). If then, however, as is the case in most large-N designs, policy preferences (measured 
usually as votes) on legislative proposals are lumped together across time and across issues, or within a just 
given time period or policy area, there still remains a risk of over-aggregation (Bailer, Mattila, and 
Schneider 2015, 440). For measuring the structure of conflict, Bailer et al. thus suggest moving down to 
the level of individual proposals. Paradoxically, however, while they are well aware of the fact that 
distinguishing the role of ideology and distributional effects would “ideally” call for information about 
partisanship and structural factors at the each individual proposal, they still include 156 policy proposals in 
their study which in their own words makes it “not feasible” to disaggregate partisanship and structural 
factors in the foregoing manner (ibid. 2015, 443). It seems, then, that analyzing conflict in the EP on a 
large number of policy issues, it will arguably always be difficult to establish that it was indeed a particular 
national interest that led a party to defection, just like it would be difficult to trace the opposite, namely 
ideological cohesion, back to a party’s ideological convictions. 
There is yet another extreme of research designs in the extant literature, namely those (few) 
studies that, while still statistically analysing roll-call votes of individual MEPs, focus on just one policy 
area or issue (Chen 2015; Hix and Noury 2007; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Ringe 2005). Thus, at the 
macro-level of structures of conflict, these should be considered as small-N designs. These studies tend to 
go into detail about what the national or ‘economic’ interests of the Member States could be with regard 
to the issue or policy are, which, as such, would seem to complement the large-N studies criticised above. 
Yet, since they do not relate the case-specific considerations to any general concept of ‘national interests’, 
they for the most part do not even try to allow for any wider conclusions, but remain limited, for instance, 
to the domain of migration policy (Hix and Noury 2007) or trade policy (Chen 2015). Indeed, even within 
this limited range generalisation would seem difficult, since the findings are based on roll-call votes on 
very specific pieces of legislation with accordingly very specific issue characteristics. 
Moreover, these studies usually still aim to establish, whether it is e.g. “economic interests or 
politics” that shape the structure of conflict, rather than going into the complex interactions of the various 
factors that will eventually determine the MEPs’ decisions at the micro-level (i.e. who eventually does 
defect and who does not, given which configuration of conditions). One issue, namely the so-called 
Takeover Directive has even been repeatedly selected as a case (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Ringe 2005; 
2010). Noteworthy, this issue is characterised by unfortunate empirical overlap between the two ways in 
which nationality might matter, in that the type of capitalism might matter in this case both as a national 
tradition shaping definitions of Left and Right as well as in terms of the distributional effects the Directive 
could have. Moreover, it was deliberated over a time span of five years, and hence swings in actor 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Politics in the case of the EP, International Relations in the case of the Council. The latter are thus more used to 
working with the concept of ‘national interests’. 
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alignments might also be triggered by the electoral cycle. Thus, it might not constitute an ideal case study 
in general, but it certainly does not with regard to the present theoretical framework. 
Ringe’s 2010 publication partly constitutes a step in the right direction, in that it is focussed on 
just six case studies examined before the background of one and the same theoretical framework (cf. ibid., 
2010, 109-207). Unfortunately, however, Ringe generally treats national traditions and legal status quo as 
being identical with the national interest (ibid., 2010, 112). Hence, for instance, a country with restrictive 
same-sex legislation is attributed a national interest of keeping this legal status quo. Unlike with the 
definition of national interests in terms of cross-national distribution, however, it is not clear at all why 
such a national tradition would necessarily unify parties within national blocks, since such traditions might 
be more supported by some voters and some parties in the country than by others. 
Consider, for instance, the type of capitalism: in the case of the Takeover Directive national 
tradition and national interest might have coincided, in that firms from a particular system might have 
won or lost from one model being adopted at EU level at the expense of another. In general, however, 
parties from a country with a liberal (statist) type of capitalism might not all be equally opposed to 
(supportive of) state intervention into the economy. To the contrary, the question of how much state 
intervention is appropriate is what has shaped politics within the countries since decades in terms of ‘Left’ 
and ‘Right’, and the respective agreement within party families but across types of capitalism is precisely 
why transnational party groups could be formed in the first place. Moreover, Ringe selects his cases based 
on the fact that they are all “high profile” (ibid., 2010, 200), while seeking variance on most other variables 
he considers relevant. His case selection thus misses out on the one condition that would seem decisive 
before the background of the theory of territorialisation, namely distributional effects. The overall finding 
that the structure of conflict in the EP is shaped by endogeneous factors becomes more likely since he 
does not specify which case was chosen for which kinds of characteristics exactly, and how these fit the 
eventual structure of conflict or not. 
In sum, therefore, there still is room for improvement when it comes to research designs, in that 
with regard to the macro-level of policy issues, what is needed is an approach including a systematic, 
theory-driven case selection strategy that allows for cross-case comparison while being ‘close’ enough to 
the case to allow for a valid operationalization of e.g. national interests. As I point out next, such a 
qualitative-comparative approach is also missing so far from the micro-level analysis of MEP or national 
party behaviour, albeit at that level, too, it might complement existing insights. 
For indeed, even those studies focussing on just one policy area or legislative proposal (Chen 
2015; Hix and Noury 2007; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Ringe 2005) nonetheless tend to use 
quantitative tools when analysing what for the present study would constitute the micro-level, namely the 
expression of preferences by MEPs, usually in terms of votes. It might be argued, however, that given the 
very high cohesion of national party delegations, which is even above that of EPGs (cf. Thiem 2009), the 
analysis of individual MEPs’ voting behaviour is a way of ‘artificially’ increasing the number of 
observations. Aggregation at the level of national party delegations would thus be more appropriate in 
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principle, especially since individual MEPs are unlikely to alter the overall structure of conflict in a 
meaningful manner. 
In order to study as many observations of MEP behaviour as possible, extant studies 
operationalise micro-level variables such as party ideology in terms of the classic Left-Right and other 
scales, or in terms of EPG membership. As I have mentioned in the preceding chapter already, these 
scales are merely proxies of party ideology. Using such proxies to operationalise ideology may not be 
generally illegitimate. Yet, if one wanted to distinguish the effects of ideology as a set of ideas, guiding 
parties’ policy-seeking, from the effect of established relationships between parties and particular societal 
groups as core electorates, guiding their vote-seeking, using these proxies across issues might not suffice. 
If ideology is taken seriously as a factor explaining the expression of policy preferences, then, a party’s 
attribution to a particular familles spirituelles as a group of parties sharing similar ideas should be based on a 
more profound knowledge of each party’s belief system. Within a quantitative design to be applied to all 
national party delegations, this is usually not feasible. 
Extant studies, especially those conducted by Simon Hix and his co-authors, tend to use 
statistical techniques such as NOMINATE for the identification of patterns in MEP behaviour. These, of 
course, require a sufficiently large number of observations, one that is probably larger than the number of 
observations resulting from aggregating at the level of national party delegations and selecting among the 
whole of these in order to feasibly operationalise their ideological orientation. However, NOMINATE in 
particular is not without limitations in the first place: As Otjes and Van der Veer note, this and similar 
techniques have been highly valuable for establishing the general patterns of conflict, but are problematic 
due to their inductive features: only those dimensions can be found that the researcher looks for explicitly 
(ibid. 2016, 9). Indeed, while the present study suggests that the structure of conflict will be either 
territorial or ideological, it would be preferable to use a design that is nevertheless able to identify 
unforeseen patterns. 
Otjes and Van der Veer further hold that there should be a shift towards the question “under 
what conditions MEPs vote in a particular way” (ibid. 2016, 4; emphasis in the original). Noteworthy, at least 
with regard to the probability of defection there have been several studies examining conditions that make 
the latter more or less likely (Bailer, Schulz, and Selb 2009; Faas 2003; Klüver and Spoon 2013; Lindstädt, 
Slapin, and Vander Wielen 2011). In this sense, the alleged gap identified by Otjes and Van der Veer is less 
apparent then they might claim. 
Had Otjes and Van der Veer argued that the question “under what conditions” includes 
combinations of conditions, they might have had a point: In the extant literature, only very few interaction 
terms are used in order to account for such combined effects (cf. e.g. Costello and Thomson 2014; Kluver 
and Spoon 2013; Lindstädt, Slapin, and Vander Wielen 2011). The theoretical framework developed in the 
preceding chapter, indeed seems to suggest that it is rarely just a single variable or condition that leads to 
the selection of a particular framing strategy. By definition, for instance, a party is only defecting if it acts 
against its ideological belief and in favour of a given national interest, which means that a party that acts in 
line with both ideology and nationality is not defecting. Apart from this and other expected combinations, 
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it could also be the case that a party only defects in the presence of a particular national interest that is 
simultaneously in line with a particular national tradition. When testing the usefulness of the present 
theoretical framework, therefore, both expected and unexpected interactions at the micro-level should be 
accounted for. The fact that the extant literature does not do so could be due to some difficulties in 
including and interpreting many or higher-order interactions in statistical designs, a problem that only gets 
aggravated when the number of cases is smaller (Hellström 2009a, 6–8). In order to, amongst others, 
adequately operationalise ideology for the purposes of the present study, this would nevertheless seem 
necessary. It would thus seem desirable to analyse the micro-level behaviour of national party delegations 
using techniques other than the quantitative ones hitherto applied. 
Methods of measurement and data 
Considering next the methods of measurement and sources of data that have been used in studies on 
conflict in the EP, a similar and partly related imbalance in the state of the art on conflict in the EP can be 
observed: the bulk of studies has focused thus far on the (statistical) analysis of so-called roll call votes 
(RCV), i.e. those votes which are recorded with regard to each individual MEP. Scholars continue to use 
these votes as data, albeit meanwhile it is well known that the analysis of roll-call votes in the EP might 
involve a serious selection bias that might lead to an overestimation of party cohesion (Carrubba et al. 
2006). In defence of RCV analysis, authors still using the respective data have argued that the bias might 
not be as important, since RCV would be called for only for the very important issues (e.g. Hix, Noury, 
and Roland 2007) or by focusing on selected ‘high profile issues’ (Ringe 2010, 86). Yet, the critique of 
RCV analysis has gone further than this. 
Rasmussen (2008), for instance, has criticised that RCV do not provide any information as to 
“whether a MEP’s support of a proposal is to be taken as fervent conviction, modest support or grudging 
support” (ibid., 12). Similarly, Proksch and Slapin (2010) have argued that the picture provided by means 
of RCV data is not very nuanced. This might be problematic indeed also if one considers the fact that 
there is a kind of ‘consensus culture’ in the EU, so that a lot of negotiation has taken place prior to the 
eventual vote, which hence is a vote on the suggested compromise rather than on the original proposal. 
This is well known for the Council of the EU (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006), but Bowler and 
McElroy (2015) also demonstrate regarding the EP, that cohesion is particularly high whenever the two 
major EPGs have already agreed on a compromise, so that many votes celebrated as indications of 
functioning European parties are actually ‘hurrah votes’. 
For example, if the centre-Left EPG (Socialists and Democrats, S&D) votes in favour of a 
certain proposal while the far-Left EPG (European United Left/Nordic Green Left, GUE/NGL) does 
not, this does not necessarily mean that disagreement was greater between those two than between S&D 
and the centre-Right European People’s Party (EPP); it could also just be due to the fact that majority 
requirements did not allow for a compromise between S&D and GUE/NGL to be adopted in the first 
place. It can thus in general be questioned, whether RCV really display the structure of conflict in the best 
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possible manner. Most importantly from the perspective of the present study, RCV analysis does definitely 
not reveal anything about the justifications that MEPs provide in the communication with their voters. 
Expert surveys are less frequently used than RCV data, but they still constitute a rather 
prominent methodological approach to study actor positions in the EP (cf. Costello and Thomson 2014). 
The points of criticism that might be noted with regard to this method are, however, almost parallel. 
Firstly, in fact, while for RCV the problem of bias is at least well known, in the case of expert surveys it is 
usually not even clear what exactly experts base their judgement on (cf. Ray 2007). Secondly, the 
measurement is not actually that much more nuanced, since the simple ‘yes/no’-dichotomy is exchanged 
for five to seven-point scales in terms of support or rejection of European integration or a certain aspect 
of it in terms of policy area. Finally and again most importantly here, expert surveys do not measure 
MEPs’ justifications either. 
Some scholars have used more or less structured interviews in order to overcome such 
problems. Rasmussen (2008), for instance, has directly asked a sample of Danish MEPs about their voting 
style and the motives behind it. As her example shows, however, it is difficult to carry out such qualitative 
interviews for a large and representative number of MEPs. Moreover, while the interviewees may be more 
or less honest in their replies, they possibly do not give the kinds of justifications that they provide to their 
respective electorates. It is this latter kind of justification, however, that might be of interest for its own 
sake, especially given the potential goal conflicts MEPs face. Ringe (2005; 2010) also uses interviews in 
order to identify, amongst others, how key policy-makers strategically try to set focal points. This might be 
problematic as well, as the actors involved might overestimate their own impact on things and fail to 
acknowledge external influences, such that the idea of an endogenous process might be more easily 
confirmed than rejected. Costello and Thomson (2014) use data resulting from semi-structured interviews, 
but they more or less directly mention the most important short-comings themselves: First, they admit 
that “expert informants were asked to recall a considerable amount of information” (ibid., 4), so that it 
might be questionable in how far they can provide a reliable, unbiased account of events. Second, they 
themselves call for studies that “examine the reasons MEPs themselves give for their behaviour” (ibid., 
10), thereby admitting that their approach does not allow for this. 
If the analysis of the reasons MEPs give is the goal, then, there will hardly be an alternative to 
the analysis of political texts. Most prominently, such analyses have been carried out by the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (CMP) on party manifestoes and in the form of hand-coded content analysis (Budge et 
al. 2001). In EU studies, manifestos have usually been analysed only with regard to their pro- or anti-
Europeanness, even if computerised methods were used meanwhile (for an overview see Ray 2007, 16–
17). One of the reasons might be that the more fine-grained measures concerning particular policy issues 
are more difficult to do, given that not all parties do express their preferences on the same set of policy 
issues and might not to do so in enough detail in the manifestos. In fact, even Helbling et al. (2010) are 
mainly interested in measuring party positions with regard to the two broadest aspects of European 
integration, namely deepening and widening, exemplified by positions on Turkish accession and the 
Constitutional Treaty. Noteworthy also, the level at which they measure frames, as being cultural 
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(nationalist vs. multicultural universalist), economic (labour & social security vs. economic prosperity), and 
other utilitarian (Political efficiency & efficacy vs. security & ecology) is much too broad for the present 
purpose of studying frames on concrete policies. Studies on European manifestos so far would thus seem 
to use methods of measurement that are not suitable for the study of expressed preferences and 
justifications at a policy issue level. Finally, even if they did, there would yet be another problem with 
manifestos as a source of data: they might be influenced by and might influence future MEPs, but to say 
that the justifications they include are the exact ones MEPs themselves give once elected would have to be 
built entirely on the theoretical assumption that MEPs are true representatives of their national parties (see 
Chapter 2 for the respective discussion). 
MEPs themselves regularly justify their policy preferences as ‘explanations of vote’ during 
plenary debates. Yet, there are some caveats here as well, which are partly due to the nature of EP debates 
themselves, and partly due to the manner they have been analsed thus far. First, there is again some kind 
of selection bias involved, resulting from the selection of speakers in a debate: Slapin and Proksch, who 
elsewhere suggested themselves that parliamentary debates could be an alternative to RCV, find that apart 
from EPG leaders, it is precisely those individual MEPs who later defect who speak up disproportionately 
often in debates (Slapin and Proksch 2010). This, in turn, might explain their other finding that conflict in 
EP debates seems to be much more territorial than voting patterns are (Proksch and Slapin 2010). This 
could be held also against Ringe (2010), who amongst others carries out an analysis of EP debates in order 
to identify the focal points used, without considering the selection of speakers. Indeed, one would not be 
able to measure the preferences and justifications of those who do not speak, without being entirely sure 
that their silence means agreement, and it would not be possible, then, to produce a data-set that includes 
the positions of more or less all parties in a priorly defined sample. 
Moreover, both Slapin and Proksch (2010) and Ringe (2010) seem to perceive of EP debates as 
communication among fellow MEPs mainly, while Slapin and Proksch further interpret the speeches by 
defecting MEPs as a signal to the national party. The first view might seem plausible to some extent, as a 
justification right before a vote might have some influence on fellow MEPs. In this case, however, EP 
debates would be less suited for addressing any questions concerning MEPs’ communication strategies 
vis-à-vis their electorates. The second view seems somewhat questionable, however, as MEPs might have 
channels of communicating with the national party other than EP debates and if defection is partly the 
result of monitoring by national parties, this justification might not be needed. Communication with 
voters seems to be, at best, a minor aspect of EP debates. 
In addition to these general features of EP debates, one might also question the manner in 
which scholars have so far analysed these. Slapin and Proksch as well as Ringe do so in a very quantitative 
manner, in the sense that both count the usage of particular words. Generally, one might wonder in how 
far such quantitative text analysis is a valid manner of analyzing the reasons MEPs give, as it seems more 
suited to identify the substantive aspects MEPs focus on than to identify actual lines of argument. 
Moreover, the counting of words that is at the basis of both analyses might underestimate the possibility 
that MEPs reply to each other, so that – in Ringe’s case – the impression of an endogenous preference 
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formation might again be exaggerated. The ‘Wordfish’ software used by Slapin and Proksch might be well 
suited for large data sets, but such techniques typically imply losses of validity for smaller ones, so that its 
application for particular policy issues might be more problematic. More importantly, the issue in question 
is necessarily reduced to one dimension identified by the software itself (Proksch and Slapin 2010; Slapin 
and Proksch 2008), which might not adequately reflect the complexity of EU politics and takes away some 
of the advantages of textual data over a dichotomous vote. 
It is in this respect that the usage of the software package T-LAB as introduced recently into EU 
studies within the domain of interest group research by (Klüver and Mahoney 2015) constitutes a real step 
ahead. With the help of this technique, frames, which are operationalised as co-occurring words (‘clusters’) 
in actors’ expressions of preferences, can be identified and their dimensionality assessed. This 
operationalisation certainly constitutes a good approximation of frames as defined by Entmann (whose 
definition is used both by Klüver and Mahoney as well as for the present paper), and for studies on very 
large number of documents might even form the best tool available to date. In practice, however, frames 
as defined by Entmann are much more about the ‘meaning’ of words rather than their co-occurrence: 
Different words might well carry a similar meaning, depending on how they are used, which is not 
captured by this technique but might be important when the overall number of words is smaller. As it was 
already established above that what is needed in terms of research design is rather a smaller number of 
policy issues, it might be both possible and necessary to analyse the respective texts issued by MEPs on 
these issues by a technique that is valid also for smaller numbers of words and more apt to capture 
meaning. 
Quite decisive for the present study, however, is the fact that the texts used for the kind of 
quantitative analysis performed by Klüver and Mahoney must all be written in the same language (ibid., 
2015, 230). After all, the idea is to analyse how MEPs express and justify their preferences, not least vis-à-
vis their voters, which might often imply that these MEPs communicate in their respective national 
languages. This would not be problematic if EP debates could be used, since they are translated. Given the 
aforementioned arguments against the use of EP debates as data, however, it seems worthwhile looking 
for alternative sources of data and hence also for a technique that can be applied across languages. 
One further argument for analyzing EP debates provided by Slapin and Proksch (2010) has 
been the degree of freedom from institutional constraints that MEPs enjoy in debates as compared to 
voting. However, this might apply even more to web-based channels of communication and indeed, 
scholars have started to analyse MEPs’ and candidates usage of such channels (Nulty et al. 2015; Vergeer, 
Hermans, and Cunha 2013). Yet it seems that these studies have so far focused mainly on the usage of 
such technology itself, while its content has been secondary. Even Nulty et al. (2015), who claim to be the 
first to include an analysis of content, only do so in a limited manner: they focus on the expression of 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ emotions regarding EU issues, and do so with regard to candidates’ Twitter 
activities. Arguably, that the 140 signs constituting the upper limit for so-called ‘Tweets’ might not suffice 
to adequately ‘give reasons’ and that such Tweets are used with a different purpose often. Finally, Nulty et 
al. acknowledge that the usage of Twitter among MEPs is not as widespread yet, as only 21 per cent of all 
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MEP candidates were found to even have a presence on the platform. It would thus appear more 
compatible with the goals of the present project, if a – potentially web-based – channel of MEP/party-to-
voter communication could be identified that is used by more or less all MEPs or at least their national 
delegations and would further include more elaborate lines of argument MEPs use in their justifications. 
3.2 Research design: Qualitative and comparative 
In this section, I present the small-N research design meant to close the gap identified before. To this end, I first 
identify cases of policy issues at the macro-level, after having clarified the criteria for doing so in terms of a balance 
between differences and similarities of the cases. As I argue based on the foregoing theoretical discussion, all policy 
issues selected should be highly politicised, should have been debated in the run-up to the 2014 European elections 
(thereby holding effects of the electoral cycle, of the Crisis, and of the Lisbon Treaty constant), and should be 
generally associated with some idea of ‘national interests’. By contrast, they should display variation when it comes to 
the more precisely conceptualised aspects of ‘national interests’ in terms of distributional effects and their certainty. 
In order to improve the operationalization of national interests and ideology, I further limit myself to just a handful 
of countries and selected parties within them. This selection is made in terms of feasibility (keeping the number low 
and familiarity with countries and parties high), comparability (including only Western European countries with 
members of traditional party families), variation in the relevant national traditions (type of welfare regime and type of 
capitalism), and political weight (in order to keep a certain representativeness of the overall conflict in the EP). In 
addition, of course, the set of countries should be selected in such a way that both sides of a distributional conflict 
are included. The further selection of parties within countries is based on a conception of party family membership 
that is based on ideology in the strict sense, and for this reason requires a more detailed justification than the usage 
of an abstract Left-Right measurement would. Parties should be selected so as to provide a broad ideological tableau 
per country, while excluding those that could not be considered relevant competitors with regard to the 2014 
elections. In order to systematically examine the eventual measurement results sample of parties, I suggest the usage 
of Qualitative-Comparative Analysis (QCA). On the one hand, this is done because the number of observations will 
be too large discussing each party’s strategy individually. On the other hand, this method of analysis is chosen because 
the number of observations per policy issue is too small for statistical analysis. Last but not least, in contrast to the 
extant literature, by using QCA I will not only account for ‘interaction effects’ but will assume their presence from 
the outset, which seems appropriate given the apparent causal complexity behind a party’s decision to defect. 
Macro level: A small-N study of policy issues 
In the above review of the research designs in the state of the art on conflict in the EP, it was noted that 
at the macro level of policy issues, at which the structure of conflict shall be measured here, there is a lack 
of small-N case study designs that systematically compare the structure of conflict regarding a handful of 
policy issues. ‘Systematically’ means here that the cases selected are examined before the background of 
one the same theoretical and conceptual framework, and in order to effectively do so, the balance between 
homogeneity and heterogeneity of cases must be adequately struck (cf. Berg-Schlosser and Meur 2009b). 
As conflict in the European Parliament is not generally a new research agenda, it seems reasonable to 
strife for homogeneity where there is most agreement already within the extant literature as well as between 
the literature and the theory to be evaluated, and to strife for heterogeneity where either the extant literature 
is still undecided or at odds with the theory to be evaluated. For the present study, the implications of this 
general principle for case selection are as follows. 
First, since it is generally assumed, albeit based on varying or unspecified definitions, that 
‘national interests’ cause MEPs to defect (see preceding chapters), one homogeneous selection criterion 
should be that the cases – i.e. policy issues – selected have been taken to involve national interest – for 
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some reason or another. Second, it has been repeatedly found that defection occurs concerning issues that 
are salient (Costello and Thomson 2014; Klüver and Spoon 2013). In the theoretical chapter of this study, 
a certain degree of salience as either electoral relevance (i.e. politicisation) or ideological relevance (i.e. not 
purely technical) was identified as a scope condition of the theory of territorialisation. Since therefore the 
condition of politicisation is rather uncontroversial, it might be more efficient to focus on issues that are 
highly politicised. In pragmatic terms, this also increases the availability of data concerning parties’ 
justifications by means of framing. Third, it seems that electoral cycles at the EU-level matter, be it 
because of rising pressure from the national level (Lindstädt, Slapin, and Vander Wielen 2011) or because 
of increasing experience (‘learning’) on the part of MEPs (Lindstädt, Slapin, and Wielen, R. J. V. 2012; 
Rasmussen 2008) and their leaders (Bailer, Schulz, and Selb 2009). In addition, there are only few post-
Crisis studies (Costello and Thomson 2014; Otjes and van der Veer 2016), and related to this, relatively 
few studies so far refer to conflict in the EP after the Treaty of Lisbon, which has provided the EP with 
increased competences and influence in a number of policy areas. In this latter respect, it is less important 
for the present purpose, whether a concrete legislative process has been started already, but rather that the 
EP will eventually have a real say and now is already expressing and justifying preferences.9 As an overall 
result of these last three aspects, it appears most interesting to focus on only policy issues that were 
discussed towards the end of the last electoral cycle, that is, between January 2013 and May 2014. 
Hence, there will be variation only with regard to the specific manifestations of what has been 
loosely referred to as ‘national interests’, but should be analysed more precisely in terms of the scope, 
direction and certainty of distributional effects. That said, not all possible configurations of these 
conditions are equally relevant in terms of the contribution the present study could make: First, issues 
with distributional effects that are close to non-existent are likely to be technical and not very salient. 
Second, issues characterised by the absence of more than one condition deemed necessary for 
territorialisation are also of minor interest, as finding the structure of conflict to be ideological regarding 
these issues would not be surprising from any theoretical perspective. Indeed, such cases where the 
outcome (here: territorial conflict) to be explained is (probably) absent and an expected necessary 
condition (here: cross-national distribution) is absent as well, are generally less attractive from a qualitative 
point of view (cf. Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 177–91). Third, at the other end of the spectrum, that is, 
where most likely cases for territorialisation characterised by high politicisation and highly certain cross-
national distributional effects with basically no intra-national distribution would be found, the problem is a 
different one as I shall briefly point out in the next paragraph. 
While it might be rather useful to include such a case, it is empirically hard to find. On the one 
hand, before the Crisis, any large-scale mechanism for cross-national redistribution was politically 
unthinkable in the EU (cf. e.g. McKay 2002, 80–81), albeit this is a typical feature of other federations 
(and a typical source of territorial conflict, cf. Lecours and Beland 2010). Some scholars argue, that so-
called ‘Eurobonds’, discussed as a response to the Crisis, would have moved the EU into this direction 
                                                     
9 This is similar to the reasoning behind the selection of ‘key votes’ carried out by Hix (2013) and Nissen (2014). 
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(Begg 2011). It is revealing, however, that it was just this particular measure that at least reached the stage 
of a Commission Green Paper and was discussed in the EP subsequently, that was not an explicitly 
redistributive scheme comparable to the German Länderfinanzausgleich, for instance. Hence, it was possible 
for some political actors to simply deny any redistributive aspect of collective bonds (cf. Wirtz 2012). On 
the other hand, the most obvious existing measure of cross-national distribution, namely the so-called 
Cohesion Funds that are part of the EU’s Structural Policy (Bourne 2007), do not constitute a most likely 
case for territorialisation either: First, with only 39.7 billion Euros spent on under this heading, they 
constitute only a small portion of the EU’s GDP, of the overall budget, and even out of the total budget 
for Structural Policy (183.9 billion) (European Commission 2013d). While the share of the Structural 
Policy within the EU budget is steadily growing, most of it is thus distributed on a regional basis and thus 
also entails intra-national distributional effects (cf. Bourne 2007). Second, and probably related, the EU’s 
Structural Policy has barely been politicised in the sense defined above, that is, as a matter of interest for 
the masses of citizens. A most likely case for territorialisation possessing all characteristics assumed as 
conducive to territorialisation and lacks all others, can therefore not be included here. 
Table 3: Potential cases and their characteristics ranked by relevance; selected cases in bold 
(potential) cases politicisation Cross-national 
distribution 
Intra-national 
distribution 
Certainty 
? (most likely case) High High Low High 
Welfare migration High High Low Low 
CAP Reform High High High High 
TTIP High Low High High 
territorialisation highly 
unlikely 
High Low High Low 
territorialisation highly 
unlikely 
High High High Low 
Technical issues Low 
(by definition) 
Low Low High 
Technical issues Low 
(by definition) 
Low Low Low 
Cohesion funds Low High Low High 
 
The following cases have been selected as representatives of the remaining kinds of cases that appear most 
relevant for the purposes of this study: The question of welfare access for intra-EU migrants, the latest 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). While the detailed description of their characteristics provided at the start of each 
substantive chapter will make the point for their selection even stronger, their selection shall be briefly 
justified here with reference to the foregoing criteria. In addition it is pointed out, why the selected cases 
for each configuration of conditions appears particularly interesting as such. 
The debate on welfare access for intra-EU migrants took off in the second half of 2013 with 
the date of Romania’s and Bulgaria’s full accession to the Schengen area approaching (01-01-2014), was 
made the topic of an EP resolution in January 2014 (European Parliament 2014), and continues to be one 
of the most vivid political debates in the post-Crisis EU. Indeed, it can be considered as a kind of symbol 
of the new era of EU politicisation after the Crisis: First, semantically, terms such as ‘benefits tourism’ and 
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‘welfare tourism’ or slogans such as ‘who betrays, flies’10 used by some political actors and media could 
not be further away from the technical language EU politics was notoriously famous for before the Crisis. 
Second, geographically, the United Kingdom has been a hotspot of the debate and continues to be, given 
its government’s insistence on changes to free movement in this respect during the negotiations on future 
terms of membership (cf. e.g. Foster 2016). Noteworthy, both UK parties and citizens have since long had 
a rather cautious or sceptic attitude towards the EU (Risse 2010). Interestingly, however, ‘welfare tourism’ 
has been made a campaigning issue also elsewhere (European Parliament 2014). 
The change in debating Europe could hardly be better exemplified than by the interview a 
German (with its presumably pro-European population and party system, cf. Risse, 2010 and Lees 2008) 
Christian Democrat (a presumably pro-European party family, cf. Marks & Wilson, 2000), namely Elmar 
Brok, leader of the Foreign Affairs Committee (i.e. not an expert on the issue), gave to the major German 
tabloid (i.e. not the quality press known formerly to cover EU issues to a greater extent, cf. Bijsmans 2011, 
29), the BILD Zeitung on this very issue (Hoeren 2014). Interviewed about the issue of ‘welfare tourism’, 
Christel Schaldemose, a Danish Social Democrat MEP, has even called migration “one of the biggest 
issues during the election campaign” (Debating Europe 2013). Finally, while during the time period 
considered there was no legally binding decision on the issue, it should be noted that the key piece of 
legislation concerning intra-EU migration, namely Directive 2004/38, can eventually be changed only with 
approval of the EP. The question of welfare for intra-EU migrants thus generally fulfils the selection 
criteria in terms of conditions to be shared among the selected cases (timing, politicisation, EP 
competence). 
It is also with regard to those case characteristics for which variation is desired that the question 
of welfare for intra-EU migrants is particularly interesting. On the one hand, social policy in general might 
be considered a ‘typical’ policy area for Left-Right contestation (cf. Treib 2010). On the other hand, 
welfare systems can have cross-national distributional effects and thereby lead to territorialisation of 
political conflict, especially when there are differences in economic development, as the case of Belgium 
demonstrates (Béland and Lecours 2005; Béland and Lecours 2007; Cantillon, Mussche, and Popelier 
2011). Arguably, the case of welfare access of intra-EU migrants resembles the latter, with Romania and 
Bulgaria adding a degree of economic inequality to the EU without precedent (cf. Eurostat 2016b). In fact, 
it is arguably both core electorates of the Left and of the Right that might feel threatened by so-called 
‘welfare tourism’, as it is the former that would be competing with intra-EU migrants for government 
resources while the latter would be forced to finance any additional expenditure. Intra-national 
distribution should thus be negligible in this particular case. 
The EU, of course, is not Belgium, and it does not have one common welfare system, but rather 
a collection of Europeanised national welfare states (Kleinman 2002). What exactly this means, that is, up 
to which point exactly these national welfare states are Europeanised, is legally uncertain. To support this 
                                                     
10 „Wer betrügt, der fliegt“, a major campaigning slogan of German Christian Social Union (CSU), cf. Roßmann 
(2013). 
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statement, a more elaborate kind of argument will be necessary and is thus provided in more detail in the 
respective chapter. For the time being, it should serve as an indication that both EU and national courts 
have been dealing with respective questions quite frequently in recent years, with a view to clarifying the 
situation that apparently left some room for interpretation thus far (cf. Lynch 2014). To date, experts still 
debate even the legality of the exemptions granted to the UK in the aforementioned negotiations on terms 
of British EU membership (e.g. Peers 2016). Legal matters aside, there also is an ongoing scientific debate 
from an economic perspective. First of all, it is unclear in how far migrants are actually attracted by the 
prospect of receiving welfare in a host country compared to other pull factors at all (Barrett and McCarthy 
2008). Second, it is unclear in how far this makes migrants a blessing or a threat for national welfare 
systems, as for instance the inner-German debate between the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the ifo institute 
shows (Bonin 2014; Sinn 2013). Finally and most obviously, since the levels of inequality between 
Romania and Bulgaria vis-à-vis the rest of the were unprecedented, there could be no direct empirical 
experience by the time the debate was started and barely even after the few months into 2014 when the 
European elections took place, i.e. there was no validly measurable budgetary impact yet. In sum, the 
question of welfare migration thus displays the characteristics of a case corresponding to the second row 
of the above table, chosen mainly in order to examine the role of uncertainty for the structure of conflict. 
By contrast, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a rather old EU policy, with decades 
of experience giving a rather good idea of who has won from it so far and who has lost. More important, 
the certainty of its distributional effects is increased by the fact that it is funded (mainly) via the EU 
budget and indeed tended to be its single largest component (with 298 billion spent in the period 2007-
2013 on direct payments to farmers and market measures, and an additional 80 billion rural development) 
(European Commission 2013a). Based on the knowledge about each Member State’s contribution to the 
overall budget on the one hand and the amounts of money it receives in form of the CAP expenditure, it 
is then very easy to calculate the cross-national distributional effects of the policy (e.g. Zahrnt 2010). 
Hence, of all empirically existing cases, the CAP comes closest to the kind of most likely case mentioned 
earlier, except that it also has intra-national distributional effects, as it is clearly farmers who receive a 
subsidy financed by the rest of society. If thus the combined presence of certain and cross-national 
distribution leads to territorialisation, this should be observed here. Since it is a strongly interventionist 
policy that is very much at odds with free market principles (Rieger 2005), it is further interesting from an 
ideological and type of capitalism perspective. 
While as such an old policy, the CAP however continues to be reformed regularly. With the 
latest round of reforms being finalized in 2013, the 2013 Reform of CAP displays the time-related 
characteristics listed above. Moreover, both Hix (2013) and Nissen (2014) consider the votes on CAP 
reform among the ten or fifteen (respectively) key votes of the 7th European Parliament, which includes 
votes that of salience to citizens across Europe and catching media attention (Hix 2013, 1; Nissen 2014, 
20), hence they can be considered as politicised issues according to the definition of politicisation used for 
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the present study.11 Generally, the CAP is further considered as a matter involving national interests in EU 
politics (Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015; Noury 2002). Finally, with the Treaty of Lisbon, the EP was 
given co-decision powers in the policy area (Swinnen, Johan F. M and Knops 2012). In sum, therefore, the 
conditions to be held constant across cases are present in the case of the 2013 Reform of CAP. 
Like the CAP, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the 
EU and the United States (US) is considered as a key vote in the 7th EP by the aforementioned studies 
(Hix 2013; Nissen 2014), and with the resolution to open negotiations with the US in May 2013 and first 
negotiation rounds in early 2014, clearly also fulfils the politicisation and timing conditions. As in the area 
of agricultural policy, the EP is now also a vital player in the domain of EU trade policy 
(European Commission DG Trade 2011). Since furthermore Moravcsik (1993; 1998) applied his whole 
conception of national interests to the economic integration in Europe (from free trade area to currency 
union), TTIP is a case that would classically be considered to involve ‘national interests’ more or less 
loosely defined, too. What makes it interesting for its own sake, however, is the fact that it might thus 
serve also as a test case for Moravcsik’s ‘producer bias’ in the particular context of a post-Crisis EP (rather 
than at pre-Crisis intergovernmental summits). 
As for the distributional effects of TTIP and their certainty, it should be noted first of all that 
TTIP obviously is not a directly redistributive policy. Yet, it is a theoretical possibility of course, that some 
countries’ economies will gain from the agreement, while those of others might lose. Studies trying to 
predict the impact of TTIP on the EU’s economies find, however, that all countries would benefit from it 
in terms of increases in real GDP per capita, independent of the exact shape of the eventual agreement 
(Felbermayr, Heid, and Lehwald 2013), which, as I point out in Chapter 6, is confirmed by country-
specific studies. Felbermayer et al. further find that TTIP would not foster divergence in terms of real 
income among the Member States, albeit some countries can expect larger overall gains than others (ibid., 
2013, 24–26). The cross-national distribution effects of TTIP are therefore considered low here. 
Noteworthy, some sectors of the economy, or even some industries within certain sectors are likely to lose 
individually from the agreement (cf. Fontagné, Gourdon, and Jean 2013, 11 Thelle et al. 2015, 
respectively). Given the protectionist bias that classical trade theory assumes (Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 
12 & 133), this might eventually lead the voices of losers to be louder in those countries expected not to 
gain overwhelmingly from the agreement. Studying the structure of conflict in TTIP is thus also 
interesting from the perspective of trade policy research. 
In fact, this applies even more to those aspects of the agreement that do not just concern 
various kinds of producers within the EU, but also the consumers. For what is mainly negotiated under 
the heading of ‘regulatory cooperation’, which is meant to reduce so-called non-tariff-barriers to trade 
(NTBs) and is a typical element of the current generation of trade agreements, is expected to become its 
most decisive yet controversial part (cf. Akhtar and Jones 2014). For reasons I point out in more detail in 
                                                     
11 The question of welfare for intra-EU migrants could not be included in their respective lists, since the first vote in 
this respect was only held in January 2014 and thus lay outside the time frame of these studies. 
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Chapter 6, this aspect of TTIP entails an intra-national distributional conflict between producers and 
consumers, which indeed has been identified by de Ville and Siles-Brügge as the main pattern of conflict 
over TTIP (ibid., 2015). The latter study has not, however, systematically analysed the importance of this 
pattern vis-à-vis potentially additional territorial ones. Hence, it can be used as one basis for considering 
the intra-national distributional effects as high, but not as the final word on the overall structure of 
conflict. 
Finally, it must be discussed here at least briefly, why the certainty of the distributional effects 
just discussed should be considered ‘high’. After all, in the aforementioned work by de Ville and Siles-
Brügge, scientific studies using so-called computable general equilibrium (CGE) models for calculating the 
potential impact of agreements such as TTIP are treated as exercises in “managing fictional expectations” 
(ibid. 2015, 33–37). In the chapter on TTIP, I name several arguments for still considering the certainty of 
the distributional effects of TTIP as high, of which the following are most important and straightforward: 
First, unlike in the case of welfare migration, there is something close to a scientific consensus here 
(beyond studies using CGE modelling) that TTIP is beneficial for all EU Member States. Second, Member 
State governments command their own studies that confirm this view and hence create certainty for 
themselves, while additionally being lobbied by concrete beneficiaries and losers from TTIP and thus 
provided with information. While furthermore the decades of experience with other EU trade agreements 
do increase the certainty regarding the distributional effects of TTIP to the same level as in the case of 
CAP, it will still be much more difficult to dispute its purely economic consequences. 
In sum, by focusing only on the three cases of welfare for intra-EU migrants, the 2013 reform 
of CAP, and TTIP, it is possible to cover the most theoretically interesting and empirically existing 
configurations of conditions assumed to shape the structure of conflict. In order to be more accurate than 
the extant literature, however, any superficial or general operationalisation of national interests will have to 
be replaced by a better informed, issue-specific one. Similarly, in order to know whether a particular policy 
frame will be in line with an ideology or not, one needs to be aware of the features of the respective 
ideology as a set of ideas and needs to group parties based on their adherence to such ideas, not just their 
‘position’ on some general dimension, their EPG membership or even their name. Additionally, with a 
view to distinguish the impact of national interests in a distributional sense from national traditions, and to 
understand potentially intervening idiosyncrasies of a given national party system or individual party, it 
seems advisable to also restrict the sample of parties (or national party delegations) examined at the micro 
level to a selection of countries only. Justifications for the exact selection of countries and parties are 
thence provided in the following subsections. 
Micro-level: Selecting parties by country 
In this subsection I explain the further focus on a limited selection of parties within a just a subset of EU 
Member States. To this end, I first point out why and in how far such further limitation is needed at all, 
before formulating general as well as issue-related reasons for selecting parties from Germany, Austria, 
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France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Ireland only. Thereafter, I elaborate on the exact choice of parties 
per country and party family. 
If the goal is to move from broad proxies on national interests (e.g. rich North vs poor South) 
to concrete knowledge on an issue-basis, to know about potentially relevant national historical conditions 
and about similarities in structural economic features that would allow for distinguishing the latter from 
ideological like-mindedness (cf. Bailer, Mattila, and Schneider 2015), it would be difficult to cover all EU 
Member States in the intended analysis. Moreover, it might be desirable to be familiar with the basic 
dynamics of the respective party systems and with national peculiarities, and for this purpose alone it 
might be necessary to be in command of the respective national languages. The latter is also needed in 
order to allow for the analysis of non-translated textual data including the direct communication of MEPs 
with their voters, which for given the deficits of e.g. EP debates as data (see Section 3.1) seems advisable. 
This, in turn, means that a computerised analysis of frames is impossible (Klüver and Mahoney 2015), 
which then again would limit the overall amount of text that could be analysed at all (namely by coding 
manually). Obviously, it would not seem feasible to simply acquire the knowledge of whatever language 
which might seem worthwhile knowing for the sake of the study. The resulting overall limitations for 
studying the structure of conflict in the EP are of course considerable. Given the gap in the extant 
literature in terms of methods and data, however, the trade-off appears acceptable in principle, as long as it 
can still be assured that there is a meaningful variance within the sample of countries and parties selected. 
Before discussing this point further, it should be noted here that, similar to the selection of 
issues above, it might also be advisable for the selection of countries and parties to guarantee a certain 
level of homogeneity in order to assure comparability in addition to feasibility. This necessitates another 
trade-off: On the one hand, some of the largest cross-national distributional effects can be expected from 
the relatively rich ‘old’ Member States in Western Europe towards the comparatively poor ‘new’ Member 
States in the East (cf. e.g. Thomson 2009), it might seem desirable to include both old and new Member 
States. On the other hand, however, the Central and Eastern European party systems are still very much 
in flux as a result of the transition from Communist rule (cf. Budge et al. 2001, 8–9), and the membership 
of Eastern European families in the known familles spirituelles of Western Europe is questionable 
(Bressanelli 2012; Mair and Mudde 1998, 213–14). Some minimum degree of ideological equivalence 
across countries would however be required in order to relate similar kinds of arguing back to similar 
ideological traditions where applicable. This, in turn, would be necessary in order to actually distinguish 
policy-driven expressions of preferences from those being due to vote-seeking at the micro-level, and it 
would be necessary at the macro-level for not confusing differences due to varying interpretations of Left 
and Right with those related to distributional effects. For reasons of comparability, then, the selection of 
parties is limited to Western European Member States only. 
Within Western Europe, interpretations of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ might not diametrically oppose 
each other, yet they might vary slightly across countries due to the degree of state intervention into the 
economy that would be considered ‘normal’. This phenomenon, usually referred as the ‘type of 
capitalism’, has been found to influence party positions on European integration and EU politics (cf. e.g. 
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Marks 2004; Thomson, Boerefijn, and Stokman 2004; Thomson 2009; Ringe 2010), and should thus 
arguably be taken into account as well. The type of capitalism further constitutes a potentially relevant 
national tradition with regard to at least two of the three policy issues selected above, namely CAP and 
TTIP. Reducing the present study to parties from countries characterised by one type of capitalism only 
might however constitute one limitation too much, in that it would then be even more difficult to still find 
variation for all three policy issues in terms of distributional effects. Hence, the selection of countries 
should include at least two countries per type of capitalism, because in this manner systematic variation 
should become noticeable and distinguishable from other conditions. 
A final criterion that is independent of the case (i.e. issue) selection at the macro-level might be 
the political weight of the countries selected within the EU as a whole. Arguably, focusing on just one very 
unimportant Member State it might be possible to identify, whether there is defection in line with possible 
national interests or not, might in principle constitute at least a limited test of the theoretical framework 
developed. Nevertheless, the findings resulting from the present study will be much more valuable from a 
substantial perspective if at least to some extent they provide an idea of the conflict in the whole EU. 
Therefore, it seems preferable to include the most powerful member states in the sample, that is, 
inasmuch as this is possible given the foregoing criteria. 
The sample of countries composed of Germany, Austria, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
and Ireland not only fulfils these criteria, but further displays sufficient variation in terms of the issue-
specific national interests. In how far this is the case and which exact indicators are chosen or not is 
explained in detail in the respective chapters on each case. At this point, I simply provide a quick 
overview: With regard to each case, I point out the variation in terms of cross-national distributional 
effects and relevant national traditions. 
First, with regard to the question of welfare access for intra-EU migrants, this selection of 
countries is arguably not perfect in that Romania and Bulgaria, the alleged countries of origin of 
prospective ‘welfare tourists’ are not included. Given, however, the aforementioned criterion of 
comparability, adding them to the sample would not be a good idea. The Crisis has, however, considerably 
affected overall migration flows within the EU (Hanewinkel 2013). Most importantly, the countries most 
affected by the Crisis became less attractive destinations for intra-EU migrants, who instead shifted to 
those faring better, but also for their own citizens. Within the present sample, Italy, France, Germany, and 
the UK have experienced an increase in immigration from Romania and Bulgaria, whereas many intra-EU 
migrants have left Ireland. In 2012, relative to its overall population, Ireland had the highest net 
emigration in the whole EU (Kenny 2013). Noteworthy also, Crisis-ridden Italy may still have experienced 
net immigration, but its net immigration has been falling throughout the Crisis, which is mainly due to the 
emigration of Italian nationals (ISTAT 2013). As a result, with Ireland included in the sample, there is at 
least one country which in principle might have interests that are different from those of France, 
Germany, the UK and Austria, who are still mainly ‘host’ countries to potential welfare tourists: Irish 
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politicians might want to portray themselves as protecting also Irish emigrants abroad.12 Italy finds itself in 
an interesting mixed situation. Hence, the present sample not only allows for testing the theoretical 
predictions made here with regard to potential defections by – domestically – pro-welfare parties in 
France, Germany, the UK and Austria, but to some extent also should depict the other side of the 
conflict. 
Similarly, there is at least some variation when it comes to the type of welfare regime (cf. 
Esping-Andersen 1990a) prevailing within each of the six. As I point out in more detail in Chapter 4, this 
might be less important in the sense that presumably more ‘generous’ countries would have more to lose, 
but rather in terms of national traditions: Parties’ and voters’ general ideas about welfare might partly 
shape their perception of what is ‘normal’ also with regard to welfare access for migrants. While Esping 
Andersen (ibid.) would consider the UK and Ireland as part of the ‘residual’ world of welfare, Germany, 
France, Italy, and Austria would be part of the ‘conservative’ type, with the latter approaching the social-
democratic one. 
Second, concerning CAP, the situation is even clearer, for interestingly enough some of the 
countries that traditionally have been the main beneficiaries of CAP – and to a considerable extent still 
benefit from it – do not lie in the poor East. Within the present sample, this clearly applies to France and 
Ireland, while Austria is a CAP beneficiary only if rural development funds are added to the calculation 
(Zahrnt 2010). Germany, the UK, and Italy, however, are net payers (ibid.). Moreover, net payers and 
beneficiaries are distributed evenly across the three types of capitalism, which given the implications they 
have for considering state intervention into the economy as ‘normal’ might be the crucial national 
traditions in this case. 
Third, the sample should dispose of sufficient variation in terms of national interests when it 
comes to TTIP. This is because it includes countries winning the least (Austria, France) and those winning 
the most (UK, Ireland) from TTIP according to Felbermayr et al. (2013). 13  Since various types of 
capitalism also tend to have implications in terms of openness to trade, they can again be considered as 
the most relevant national traditions in this respect. In sum, therefore, this selection of countries might 
not be perfect in every respect or equally ideal with regard to every case, and is certainly not the only one 
conceivable. Nevertheless, given the various general criteria as well as the fact that identifying such a small 
number of countries showing equally suitable variation with regard to each of the issues is not easy, it 
appears that focusing on this sample of countries is adequate in order to approach an answer to the 
research question. 
 
                                                     
12 Noteworthy, Irish emigrants themselves are not allowed to vote from abroad. 
13 Arguments for using their calculations as a basis are presented in the chapter on TTIP. 
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Table 4: Selected countries and their characteristics in terms of cross-national distribution and relevant national 
traditions for each case 
country welfare CAP TTIP 
Distribution: 
immigration 
vs. emigration 
Tradition: 
welfare 
regime 
Distribution: 
net payer / 
recipient 
Tradition: 
type of 
capitalism 
Distribution: 
winning more 
or less 
(relative) 
Tradition: 
type of 
capitalism 
Germany Immigration  Conservative payer Managed More Managed 
Austria Immigration  Conservative 
/ social 
democratic 
recipient Managed Less Managed 
UK Immigration  Liberal payer Liberal More Liberal 
Ireland Emigration  Liberal recipient Liberal More Liberal 
France Immigration  Conservative recipient Statist Less Statist 
Italy immigration/ 
emigration 
Conservative 
/ Southern 
payer Statist More Statist 
 
Micro-level: Selecting parties by party family 
Noteworthy, for the purposes of this study, not all parties within each of these six countries are equally 
relevant. The selection again follows a number of general criteria: Firstly and most importantly, in order to 
examine the role of ideology versus that of nationality, an attempt should be made to display a broad 
ideological tableau. That is, within each country, the party families that are typically identified in the 
literature, namely Christian Democrats and Conservatives, Social Democrats, Liberals, Greens, far 
Left/post-Communists, populist and far Right (Detterbeck 2011; Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006; Ware 
1996).14 Secondly, at the same time, it might not be necessary to include all parties, but rather to select one 
representative per party family, preferably the most influential one. Thirdly, the parties included should be 
relevant for the European elections 2014, in that they actually competed in the election and could be 
attributed at least a slight chance of obtaining a seat based on their performance in this and two earlier 
elections. This explicitly also includes parties that did not have MEPs between 2009 and 2014, since this 
has a number of advantages: it allows for some degree comparison between parties with and without 
MEPs, which is interesting given the assumption that MEPs will behave in terms of defection very much 
as their national parties would, and it completes the ideological range in a number of countries up to a 
certain point (i.e. actually relevant parties). As a result, for instance, a liberal party (the NEOs) is included 
for Austria in order to complement the analysis of this family, while an Austrian far Left party of 
relevance in the present sense simply cannot be included. 
Fourthly, what might be called the ‘regionalist’ party family (cf. Ware 1996, 39–40) is excluded 
from the sample. While this might mean to exclude a set of parties that in some countries constitute 
relevant competitors, this particular family nevertheless defies any fruitful comparison with regard to the 
key factors of ideology and national interest. This is because they not only vary significantly regarding the 
economic component of their ideologies, but also in terms of vote-seeking will be taking orientation from 
                                                     
14 Relevant members of the ‘agrarian’ party family do not exist in the six countries selected, cf. Ware (1996, 39). 
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the regional rather than the national interest (Massetti and Schakel 2015). The Italian Lega Nord, for 
instance, does therefore not form a part of the sample, and neither does the Scottish National Party. 
Noteworthy, however, the Bavarian Christian Social Union is included as partner of the Christian 
Democratic Union, as is Sinn Féin in its role of a far Left Irish (not regionalist British) party. Finally, it 
must be possible to attribute the party more or less clearly to any of the larger party families by using the 
approaches discussed by Mair and Mudde (1998) or by drawing on extant literature. The electorally most 
relevant party thereby excluded from the sample is the Italian Five Star Movement. Like the German 
Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD), it a relatively recent formation. However, 
whereas the AfD can be rather safely placed within the Right-wing populist family already given its 
ideology and origin (Decker 2015), and more recently also its transnational links (derStandard.at 2016; 
Teffer 2016), this does not appear possible for the Five Star Movement (yet) (Conti and Memoli 2015, 
531). 
In the following I will present the basic ideological tenants of each family at a very general level, 
noting also longer-term trends and possible internal variation, before pointing out their respective core 
electorates in the past and present. Noteworthy, more detailed ideological and electoral aspects of 
relevance for each policy issue will be discussed in the respective substantive chapters. Within the present 
subsection, arguments are then provided for attributing the various parties to the respective families, for 
choosing just these as representatives and not others, and for aggregating or separating party families. In 
these arguments, the approaches discussed by Mair and Mudde (1998) are used in a way that ranks them 
according to their usefulness for the study. 
Transnational links of parties in terms of membership in European Political Groups (EPGs) are 
of course not generally irrelevant for studying conflict in the EP. Indeed, it has been shown that not only 
EPGs are cohesive, as was already mentioned, but also that parties choose their EPG mainly according to 
ideological criteria (Bressanelli 2012). Yet, Bressanelli also shows that ideology is not a deterministic factor 
for joining a given EPG. Ideology as a system of ideas forming a party’s very identity, however, is assumed 
here to be causally important when it comes to the structure of conflict in EU politics. Hence, the 
attribution of a party to a particular family must rank ideology in this sense higher than the simple but 
straightforward criterion of EPG membership. Similarly, the origin of a party in terms of societal 
cleavages should be used complementarily, as Mair and Mudde (1998) recommend. Nevertheless, since the 
representation of societal groups divided by these cleavages has more to do with a party’s vote-seeking 
ambitions than with its ideology-driven policy goals, it should also be ranked lower than ideology in the 
strict sense. Attribution by name may not be as misleading as in some of the examples mentioned by Mair 
and Mudde (ibid.), and yet especially in Ireland and Italy is often not very helpful. By contrast, party origin 
and EPG membership might thus be helpful starting points, but even they should be overruled by the 
ideology approach here. 
The first set of parties that I consider as being part of essentially one family constitutes a case in 
point for the primacy of the ideology approach here: I refer to it as the family of Christian Democratic 
and Conservative parties, or, as a matter of convenience, as the centre-Right. It includes the German 
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Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale 
Union, CDU/CSU), Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP), the British Conservative 
Party, the Irish Fianna Fáil (FF) and Fine Gael (FG), the French Union for a People’s Movement (Union 
pour un Mouvement Populaire, UMP), and the Italian Forza Italia (FI). Grouping such parties together 
for cross-national comparison is not a novelty as such (e.g. Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wüest 2010, 508). 
Most of the literature on party families, however, treats them as two distinct families (Detterbeck 2011; 
Marks and Wilson 2000; Ware 1996), whereas some scholars have tended to consider the Christian 
Democrats a subgroup of Conservative parties (Liedhegener and Oppelland 2011, 99). It is argued, that in 
general as well as in particular with regard to the parties belonging to these two families within the 
countries considered here, separating the two is not necessary any longer, if indeed an ideological 
approach to party families is given primacy over other criteria. 
For admittedly, these parties do not form one group in the EP, with most of them being part of 
the European People’s Party (EPP) group, but the Conservative Party and Fianna Fáil being part of other 
groups (European Conservatives and Reformists, ECR, and Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe, ALDE, respectively). Nor are they of identical or similar origin in terms of the societal cleavages 
from which they originated in the first place. Yet, it should be noted with regard to cleavage structures, 
that the religious cleavage that was crucial to the formation of Christian Democratic parties has 
considerably lost in importance (cf. Marks and Wilson 2000, 451), such that using this criterion is likely to 
overestimate potential differences. 
Conservative ideology, then, has frequently found its expression mainly in opposition to other 
ideologies and indeed Conservatives themselves have often denied that it constitutes an ideology at all 
(Festenstein and Kenny 2005, 119). However, the preference of stability and moderate change over radical 
change or revolution can in itself be seen as a Conservative core value (cf. Festenstein and Kenny 2005, 
119; Detterbeck 2011, 121; Ware 1996, 32). Along these lines, common sense is preferred over science, 
hierarchy over equality, traditional values and communities (the family, the nation) are highly appreciated 
(ibid.). This appreciation of stability in its various expressions is equally found among Christian 
Democrats. As Detterbeck notes: “As in Conservatism, society is understood as a ‘moral unit’, which links 
various parts in a hierarchical order characterised by authority” (ibid., 2011, 122). It can thus be argued, 
then, that the normative ideological basis of Christian Democrats and Conservative parties has generally 
been very similar anyway. 
With regard to EU politics, Marks and Wilson (2000) argue that Conservative parties value ‘the 
nation’ as a community higher than Christian Democrats do, who in line with Catholicism often take a 
more supranational orientation. Pointing to the German CSU in particular, these same scholars also note, 
however, that nationalism can also be strong in Christian democratic parties (ibid., 452). Similarly, while 
Ware denies that Germany has a Conservative party (ibid., 1996, 32), Miliopoulos (2011) does count CDU 
and CSU among the Conservative parties, and the same point has been made about the Austrian ÖVP (cf. 
Liedhegener and Oppelland 2011, 112). Indeed, a closer inspection of the ideology of the CDU would 
exemplify the aforementioned parallels to Conservatism (Walter, Werwath, and D'Antonio 2014, 21), and 
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the CSU even defines itself as a Conservative party (Weigl 2013, 508). The case of the French UMP 
further makes the distinction in terms of a pro-European Christian Democratic family and a Eurosceptic 
Conservative family difficult, for the UMP and its predecessors have generally been considered 
Conservative (e.g. Miliopoulos 2011; Ware 1996, 49), but still the UMP is part of the relatively pro-
European EPP group rather than of the ECR (Liedhegener and Oppelland 2011, 108). Drawing any 
borders between the two families is thus difficult if not impossible, once the criterion of origin (here: the 
meanwhile irrelevant religious cleavage) is considered secondary. 
It is in a similar vein that the Irish Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil can be attributed to the one family 
of Conservatives and Christian Democrats, as both von Beyme (1985) and Marks and Wilson (2000) do, 
despite Ware’s protest, which indeed is explicitly built on origin-related arguments (ibid. 1996, 23). The 
fact that Fine Gael has joined the Christian Democratic EPP while Fianna Fáil (until 2014) was part of 
ALDE has more to do with “the appearance of difference for domestic political competition” than with 
actual ideological difference, which in general should be “seen as a matter of degree” (Reidy 2009, 517). In 
fact, while generally more nationalist than the ‘Christian Democratic’ Fine Gael , the rather ‘Conservative’ 
Fianna Fáil left the Union for a Europe of the Nations because it rejected its anti-Europeanism (Hayward 
and Fallon 2009). In fact, Miliopoulos, for instance, considers both of them as Conservative parties 
anyway (ibid. 2011, 133). Hence again the possibility of differentiation by the degree of nationalism is 
limited. 
When I have argued that the importance of the Church-State (or ‘religious’) cleavage, which 
would have differentiated Christian Democrats and Conservatives, is in decline, I have mainly considered 
that so far in terms of the ‘origin of parties’ approach. Moreover, while I have shown some basic similarity 
on the ideological value dimension of these parties, it could still be noted that the difference in origin has 
left some kind of lasting ideological difference in some more specific aspects. Indeed, some scholars 
would hold that Christian Democratic parties would interpret the Christian aspect of their tradition in a 
way that makes them more open towards regulation of capitalism and towards a more generous social 
policy in particular (Detterbeck 2011, 122; Ware 1996, 36–37). It must then also be noticed, however, that 
so-called ‘New Right’ ideas on economic matters have influenced both Conservative and Christian 
Democratic parties since the 1980s, and the latter even more so (cf. Ware, 1996, 33 & 36-37; Detterbeck, 
2011, 122; Festenstein & Kenny, 2005, 119-127).15 While the inclusion of these ideas is not without 
contradictions and often leads to internal tensions within such parties, it nevertheless has led both of these 
parties to change their diagnoses of economic processes and, consequently, their policies towards the 
economic Right. That is, they now tend to perceive of market intervention as a problem rather than as a 
solution and hence instead favour free market policies over protectionism. As a result, if a difference once 
existed on economic matters between Christian Democrats and Conservatives, the adoption of New Right 
ideas has largely made it shrink or even erode. 
                                                     
15 Since Nicolas Sarkozy, this applies even to the French UMP, cf. Nielsberg and Sahuc (2006). 
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Its embrace of this New Right or neoliberal ideas is also one of the ideological features of the 
Forza Italia (FI) (Newell 2010, 220). Its features as the ‘personal party’ of Silvio Berlusconi 
notwithstanding (Donovan 2015; Musella 2015), the values this party itself propagates as being its “secular 
faith” (“credo laico”) very much fit the ideological profile of both Conservative and Christian Democratic 
parties (Forza Italia). In fact, while Donovan sees the FI as an impediment to the creation of a ‘real’ 
Conservative party in Italy (ibid. 2015), Miliopoulos holds that it is just that (ibid. 2011, 132–33). FI is 
further part of the ‘Christian Democratic’ EPP (cf. Liedhegener and Oppelland 2011). Hence, while 
noting that there are further centre Right parties in Italy which however have been electorally much 
weaker (considered by Donovan as “small fry”, ibid. 2015, 21), I select the FI as the Italian representative 
of what is considered one Conservative and Christian Democratic family here. 
Conservative and Christian Democratic ideology has traditionally been attractive for societal 
groups on the rural side of the urban-rural cleavage as well as for the employer side of the class cleavage 
(cf. Detterbeck, 2011, 75-84; Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2007, 168–211). While voters remain decreasingly 
attached to one particular party, this trend should not disguise the fact that these cleavages continue to 
play an electoral role (cf. ibid.). Hence, in principle, Conservative and Christian Democratic parties risk 
alienating these groups by defecting from the aforementioned ideological tenets. Taking positions on 
globalisation and European integration may lead to tensions within these parties as well as amongst their 
electorates, as business associations and corporations will favour neoliberal economic policies and a 
certain degree of cosmopolitanism/Europeanism, while especially the latter aspect might not be favoured 
by the non-business segments within the centre Right’s core electorate (cf. Grande and Kriesi 2012; Marks 
and Wilson 2000). Whether these parties defect for vote-seeking reasons will thus depend on the exact 
distributional effects of a policy for all of these groups. 
The selection of parties that I attribute to the family of Social Democratic parties should be 
much less controversial and hence necessitates a less extensive justification. This subsample includes the 
Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD), the French 
Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste, PS), the Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Österreichs, SPÖ), the Italian Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD), and the Irish and UK Labour 
parties. The attribution of these parties to this family is not only straightforward insofar as they are all part 
of the EPG of Socialists and Democrats (S&D). Moreover, in terms of their origin, they are all parties that 
–in Italy, this applies to the Socialist and Social Democratic parties joining the new PD formation (cf. 
Newell 2010, 210–48) – were formed with regard to class cleavage, and hence also Marks and Wilson 
(2000, 442–48) would not distinguish any relevant subgroups in terms of intra-family ideological variation. 
This common origin of these parties has directly led to highly similar ideologies. Social 
Democratic and Socialist ideologies are centred around the normative goals of solidarity and social justice, 
mainly in terms of greater equality, which includes certain rights for workers, in a spirit of internationalism 
(Detterbeck 2011, 123; Jun 2011, 71; 2011, 70; Marks and Wilson 2000, 442; Ware 1996, 34). Capitalism 
was identified as problematic in early Socialist thinking, especially Marxism (Festenstein and Kenny 2005), 
and was meant to be overcome by means of public ownership and by explicitly redistributive welfare 
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policies (Detterbeck 2011, 123; Ware, 34-35). Unlike Communists, however, Social Democrats have 
generally been striving for reform rather than revolution, and over time came to accept liberal democracy 
and free market economics. Nonetheless, they still perceived unregulated markets as problematic and 
made arguments in favour of state intervention along the lines of Keynesian economics (ibid.). Hence, 
Newell summarises modern Social Democracy as “a political outlook that involves a commitment to the 
reform of capitalism with a view to its regulation, in order to thereby remove its injustices and 
inefficiencies” (ibid., 2010, 219). In other words, while thus the goals of social justice and equality 
remained, Social Democrats have been relatively pragmatic in identifying ways of achieving them. 
In the course of the last decades, Social Democratic parties have broadened the range of their 
norms to include so-called postmaterial ideals such as environmental protection, gender equality and 
peace, into their ideologies (Detterbeck 2011, 124; Inglehart 1984). Several scholars further hold that these 
parties, too, have been influenced by the rise of New Right ideas (e.g. Ware 1996, 34–35 Detterbeck 2011, 
124), a movement often referred to as a ‘Third Way’ (Detterbeck 2011, 123) resulting in the formation of a 
‘New Left’ (Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006). As Ware notes:  
The parties moved yet further away from a commitment to public ownership and more towards 
controlling the excesses of private economic power and to protecting those most vulnerable to economic 
dislocations through maintaining state-funded policies that had developed in the post-war years (ibid. 1996, 35, my 
emphasis). 
Policies now had to serve the overall public good in a manner that was not only ‘fair’, but also efficient 
(Jun 2011, 79) At the same time, market liberal policies have often been justified by claiming that they 
were necessary in order to save the welfare state (Jun 2011, 76). To some extent, it would seem then that 
welfare policies have become a goal in themselves rather than a policy to achieve more equality.  
Indeed, it also appears that European integration is interpreted along these lines, for Social 
Democratic parties seem to endorse it as long as it allows for re-regulation at the EU-level rather than 
forming a threat to past regulatory and welfare achievements (Marks and Wilson 2000, 442–48). It is 
before the background of this shift towards economically centrist positions that it seems appropriate the 
Italian PD within this group, as Jun (2011) does, albeit it partly also consists of former (though rather 
leftist) Christian Democrats and Liberals (Newell 2010). In addition, the PD’s collective decision to sit 
with the S&D group in the EP would seem to underline this categorization (cf. Bressanelli 2012).  
On the one hand, postmaterialism and the ‘Third Way’ have made Social Democratic parties 
attractive to a new set of core voters, namely for what Grande and Kriesi refer to as the “‘social-cultural 
professional’ middle class” (ibid. 2012, 15; see also Detterbeck 2011, 124). These voters appreciate 
postmaterial values and policies, and will prefer re-regulation of liberalised markets above the nation-state, 
“rather than a mere ‘retreat of the state’” (ibid.). Therefore, Social Democrats will continue to compete 
with neoliberal ideologies (cf. Marks and Wilson 2000, 447), rather than adopting them entirely. On the 
other hand, however, the decreasing emphasis on strong market intervention and generous welfare risks 
making Social Democratic parties less attractive for their traditional supporters, i.e. the working 
class/employees (cf. Ware 1996, 33): The latter often appreciate more traditional social values and in 
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combination with less Leftist economic policies can hardly be mobilised in favour of Social Democrats on 
the economic dimension (Grande and Kriesi 2012, 19; Jun 2011, 93). When expressing positions on EU 
politics, Social Democratic parties will thus have to balance the preferences of these rather diverse core 
electorates. Indeed, the financial crisis has partly led Social Democratic parties to reconsider the ‘Third 
Way’ already (Jun 2011, 82–83) – maybe partly as a move not to lose too many of their traditional 
supporters. In any case, however, these recent developments might indicate that the family’s more 
traditional values are more lasting then the temporary changes in the age of neoliberalism. 
The sample includes only four rather than six Liberal parties, because the liberal parties one 
might have selected for Ireland and Italy do not meet the general criteria. In Ireland, Fianna Fáil, the 
ALDE group member that Franzmann considers a ‘national liberal’ party (ibid. 2011, 169), is already 
attributed to the family of Conservative and Christian Democratic parties for good reasons, while the 
Progressive Democrats, who are considered “economic liberal” by Franzmann (ibid.) and who describe 
themselves as a liberal party (Progressive Democrats), have dissolved in 2008 (Franzmann 2011, 168; 
O'Leary 2012, 328). In Italy, where the Radical Party still managed to gain seats in the EP in 2004 (as the 
‘Bonino List’), it did not do so in 2009 and in 2014 decided not even to compete (radicali italiani 2014). At 
the same time, ALDE group member Italy of Values (Italia dei Valori, IdV) was essentially founded in 
order to “combat illegality and less-than-impartial application of the law” (Newell 2010, 216) and is further 
a leader-created party (Musella 2015, 233). It is therefore neither a Liberal party by origin, nor would it 
seem to provide a full-scale Liberal ideology, which is why it is not considered here. By contrast, with the 
Democratic Mouvement (Mouvement Démocrate, MoDem), I include a French Liberal party that is one 
of the successors of the Union Démocrate Francais (UDF), precisely because it is that part of the UDF 
that left the close allegiance (Franzmann 2011, 170) with the UMP and became part of ALDE, unlike the 
ex-UDF members that formed the Nouveau Centre (Litton 2015, 721). Hence, I consider Liberal 
representatives of the remaining four countries, namely the German Free Democratic Party (Freie 
Demokratische Partei, FDP), the British Liberal-Democrats, the Austrian NEOs (merger of Liberal 
Forum and the New Austria, i.e. ‘Neues Österreich’, NEOS), and the aforementioned MoDem. 
It is fairly easy to point out the ideological core value and starting point of Liberalism, namely 
individual freedom in political and economic matters (Festenstein and Kenny 2005, 52; Marks and Wilson 
2000, 448). Vassallo and Wilcox go further by citing Kirchner and naming “religious tolerance, free 
inquiry, self-government, and the market economy” as central values common to all Liberal, but even they 
have to concede that there is cross-country variation within this family as to the relative importance of 
these elements (ibid. 2006, 419). Marks and Wilson even hold that the liberal one is “the most 
ideologically diverse” (Marks & Wilson 2000, p. 448) family. Indeed, most scholars distinguish various 
subgroups within this family. Since agrarian parties, as I noted above, are irrelevant in the countries 
considered, and since many of the parties that today are still characterised by the predominance of a 
nationalist wing within the party are better placed elsewhere (cf. Franzmann 2011), I will distinguish just 
two, namely the Right-wing Liberal (or ‘economic’) and Left-wing Liberal (to include Social Liberal and 
3. Approach 
96 
Radical Liberal parties). Noteworthy, some Liberal parties might in principle include several ‘wings’, but 
what is important here is which one should be considered dominant at the moment. 
These two do share the goal of individual freedom, but disagree about the best means to achieve 
it. Apart from the finding that Liberal parties might also have appreciated a certain vagueness over the 
means for electoral and office purposes (Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 419), the main difference consists 
in perceptions of the appropriate role of the state in the economy. In general, Liberals share a certain 
scepticism towards the state, and there is much agreement here when it comes to the societal role of the 
state. By contrast, in economic matters, the state is sometimes perceived as either an obstacle to individual 
freedom in itself or as a tool to safeguard individual freedom from underregulated markets (Detterbeck 
2011, 120; Marks and Wilson 2000, 448–49; Ware 1996, 29–31). In both variants, scepticism towards the 
state as a collective entity would seem to rule out aggressive nationalism and manifestations of the nation-
state that, like national borders, limit individual freedom (Marks and Wilson 2000, 448–49). 
Within the present sample, it seems appropriate to attribute the British Liberal Democrats to the 
subgroup of Left-wing Liberals (see also: Franzmann 2011, 169). Their predecessor, the British Liberal 
Party has traditionally been categorised in this way due to the fact that they proposed limited forms of 
state intervention into the economy (Marks and Wilson 2000, 450; Ware 1996, 30–31), and after their 
fusion with the Social Democratic Party a party itself formed by former Labour members (Russell and 
Fieldhouse 2005, 30–34), this is unlikely to be less appropriate. One might categorise MoDem in a similar 
manner: MoDem’s predecessor the UDF, already while still formed by Liberal as well as Christian 
Democratic elements (Ware 1996, 31), was generally considered to be Left of the UMP in economic 
matters (Bornschier and Lachat 2009, 370). Given that those who refused to join MoDem have formed 
the Nouveau Centre, staying with the UMP and even joining the EPP group together with them, one 
might expect the remaining MoDem to be less Right-wing Liberal than the UDF and hence to be a true 
‘Centrist’ party or even part of the Left-wing Liberal subgroup. Also when categorising the Austrian 
representative of the Liberal family selected here, namely the NEOS, one should probably take recent 
mergers into account.16 The traditional Liberal party of Austria, the Liberal Forum (Liberales Forum, LF) 
might have been counted among the Left-wing subgroup (cf. Franzmann 2011, 169), and have fused with 
the NEOS in January 2014 (adopting the latter’s name) (LIF). The NEOS, in turn, were however founded 
by a member of the ÖVP’s business wing (Dolezal and Zeglovits 2014, 645), which might impact on their 
collective ideology, but it is too early to determine the exact balance. By contrast, the German FDP once 
had a strong Social-Liberal wing that dominated the party throughout the 1970s and would have made it 
similar to the Liberal Democrats, and hence most scholars would have rightfully counted it within the 
Left-wing subgroup (Detterbeck 2011, 120–21; Marks and Wilson 2000, 450). With the chance of the 
coalition partner in the early 1980s from Social Democrats to Christian Democrats, however, many Social-
Liberals have started to leave the party, and throughout the 1990s the party adopted an ever more 
                                                     
16 The at most ‘national liberal’ Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) should not be 
counted as a Liberal party any longer, cf. Franzmann (2011, 168). 
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economic or Right-wing Liberal course (Treibel 2014, 45–83), which is where it is better placed today (see 
also: Franzmann 2011, 169). In sum, one might thus expect the Liberal Democrats leaning towards the 
Left ideologically, the FDP towards the Right and the other two somewhere in between. In general, 
however, the room for manoeuvre that the rather ambiguous concept of individual freedom leaves to 
these parties without openly betraying their ideology is rather large: Nevertheless, if a Liberal party turns 
towards Conservative or even Nationalist societal policies or strongly interventionist economic policies 
with regard to a given issue, defections might still be detected. 
Electorally, Liberals depend strongly on middle-class votes, since the appearance of Social 
Democratic parties has eroded the support among workers they enjoyed in their early years (Ware 1996, 
31). They hence rely mainly on the middle-class, especially small entrepreneurs and self-employed, while 
the general trend towards larger corporations has reduced the number of votes they can obtain in this 
manner (ibid.). Within the middle-class, however, they compete partly also with Green and Social 
Democratic parties on questions of social permissiveness (ibid.), which might be particularly important for 
Left-wing Liberals, whereas one should expect Right-wing Liberals to look more towards big corporations 
as an additional source of votes. 
Identifying the members of the party family that Ware refers to as “the newest” (ibid. 1996, 43), 
the Green family, from the countries considered in this study seems relatively straightforward, once the 
general criteria named above are taken into consideration: the German Alliance ‘90/The Greens (Bündnis 
‘90/Die Grünen, B90), the Austrian Greens (Die Grünen), the Irish Green party (also: Comhaontas glas), 
the Green Party of England and Wales, the French Greens (Verts), and the Italian Greens (I Verdi). On 
the one hand, in terms of their name, their origin (ecologist social movements of the 1970s) and their 
international and EP affiliations, there can be no doubt (cf. Bukow and Switek 2011). On the other hand, 
ideologically, there might be some cross-national variation, but as I will argue in the following, there is an 
increasing, identifiable core. 
Interestingly, while there is consensus that the Greens constitute a party family of their own, 
some scholars have denied that there was a coherent and independent Green ideology (Beyme 1985; 
Bukow and Switek 2011; Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006). Yet, in their work on political ideologies, 
Festenstein and Kenny come to the conclusion that ‘ecologism’ should be considered an ideology of its 
own, while acknowledging the existence of “various antecedents for, and influences upon, this 
perspective, stretching back to the nineteenth century and beyond” (ibid. 2005, 327). In fact, it might be 
argued that not having predecessors and not taking up ideas from other ideologies should as such 
constitute a criterion for considering an ideology as coherent and independent, for as was already noted, 
Conservative ideology was influenced in the 1980s by neoliberalism, that is, by “a set of views that . . . can 
be seen as a direct descendant of a main strand of nineteenth-century Liberalism” (Ware 1996, 33). 
Similarly, Social Democracy was influenced by some postmaterialist ideas, most notably 
environmentalism, which were brought up by ecologist thinkers in the first place and which continue to 
form the value basis of Green ideology (Festenstein and Kenny 2005, 327–31). 
3. Approach 
98 
Postmaterialists, by definition, strive for individual and societal goals other than material wealth 
to be achieved by economic growth (ibid.). Next to environmental protection, postmaterialist ideals are 
peace and a general idea of a ‘uniting of the peoples’ (Bomberg 1998; Bomberg 2002; Bomberg and Carter 
2006). Conversely, postmaterialists tend not to be normatively attached to the allegedly too materialist 
nation-state (Janssen, Joseph I. H. 1991). At the same time, Green parties value international cooperation 
and European integration for pragmatic reasons, that is, as a means to achieve other, e.g. environmentalist, 
goals (Ware 1996, 43). This combination has arguably turned the family from Eurosceptics into the most 
explicit Euroenthusiasts (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). Similarly, the family’s stance on social 
permissiveness might be partly an electoral strategy, as Ware (ibid. 1996, 43) argues, but finds its 
ideological justification in a rejection of the “human invention” of hierarchies (Festenstein and Kenny 
2005, 330). 
The stance on social permissiveness is one aspect that makes this family a part of the Left, and 
the consolidation of Green ideology in favour of state (or supranational) intervention is another. 
Following Ware, this has to do with “the logic of state action in the policy areas that are most central to 
environmentalism” (ibid. 1996, 43), in that state intervention would be a necessary means to ecologist 
ends. As a result, while Green parties might have added several strands to their ecologist basis in the early 
years, the more Leftist ones are becoming increasingly dominant (ibid.). This is in line with the 
observation in terms of concrete policy preferences voiced by Green parties regarding environmental 
protection, welfare, multiculturalism, and the market economy, which despite some variation across 
countries can in most cases be considered on the Left of the spectrum (Bukow and Switek 2011). In fact, 
while Bukow and Switek would find the Greens to be less cohesive than other families (albeit more 
cohesive than the Conservatives) based on CMP data (ibid. Bukow and Switek 2011, 207), a comparison 
based on Chapel Hill expert survey data provides the opposite picture (Spier 2011, 233). In sum, while the 
other three criteria for party family attribution allow for a straightforward identification of Green 
representatives from the six countries, Green parties in general further seem to share ideological ground 
sufficient for corroborating this categorisation. 
Since the 1980s already, a number of parties that – at least on non-economic matters – have 
positioned themselves clearly to the Right of Conservatives and Christian Democrats, has celebrated 
electoral victories (e.g. Eatwell 2000), and, parties such as the French National Front (Front National, FN) 
2014 were particularly successful in the elections to the European Parliament (Russo 2014, 184). In his 
overview of party families, Ware described the difficulties in defining the characteristics of a party family 
of the far Right as follows: Fascism would constitute “an obvious starting point”, but few parties had been 
explicitly Fascist in the post-war era (ibid. 1996, 42). At the same time, he noted that racism as a feature of 
Fascism had also been part of the success story of parties such as the FN (ibid.). Yet others have argued 
that it was precisely the FN that was among the forerunners of parties characterised by a new kind of 
racism (Bornschier and Lachat 2009, 374), also called neo-racism or ethno-exclusivism, built not on 
biological but on cultural terms mostly (Mondon 2013, 23–25). Indeed, it appears that much has been and 
still is in flux on the far Right, so that any categorisation and distinction within the far Right might become 
3. Approach 
99 
irrelevant at some point. The distinction I intend to make seems worthwhile for the time being, but it 
might also be the case that, just like Social Democrats have shifted their position on the market economy 
over the decades, there simply is a process of transformation going on that will eventually lead to just one 
far Right party family. Meanwhile, however, it seems possible to distinguish two different far Right party 
families, namely one referred to here as right-wing populist (RWP) and one extreme Right family. 
Noteworthy, this distinction is entirely in line with the general approach to party families 
followed here, in that it can be made on purely ideological grounds. Contrasting extreme Right and RWP 
parties can be done by referring to just a handful of key features used to define Right-wing extremism on 
the one hand and Right-wing radicalism on the other.17 The former is defined in a highly similar manner 
by both Eatwell (2000, 411) and Mudde (1995) as comprising racism, hostility to democracy, a preference 
for a ‘strong state’ and nationalism. By contrast, RWP according to Mondon (ibid. 2013, 37) includes 
ethno-exclusivism (see above), a “cautious denunciation of parliamentary democracy (ibid.)” and populism 
in the sense of “‘the people’ vs. the elites”. If one adds to that the phenomenon of welfare chauvinism and 
the defence of ‘identity’ not necessarily defined by nationality, but also by religion and culture (cf. Decker 
and Lewandowsky 2011), this definition is entirely parallel to the ones by Eatwell and Mudde for Right-
wing extremism. Hence, it shows exactly where, at least in theory, the line of demarcation lies between the 
two families. This is not to say, of course, that some parties that one would classify as extremists would 
not sometimes make use of populist arguments (cf. ibid.), but it is possible to see two independent lines of 
thought here. Indeed, while ideology as a set of ideas should be the main defining criterion for party 
families in the context of the present study, it is worth noting that RWP parties are increasingly organising 
at the transnational level and in doing so try to exclude those parties they consider extremist (Maggini 
2014). 
In terms of policy, both RWP and extremists parties are clearly critical of immigration and of 
the EU, which combines a number of features that both families reject, namely (liberal) democracy, 
cultural diversity, and liberal economics. With regard to the latter, however, it should be noted that some 
RWP parties partly started out with rather liberal preferences on economics themselves (Ware 1996, 42), 
but most RWP parties are less neoliberal today and tend to focus on welfare chauvinism and protectionist 
positions on social security (Decker and Lewandowsky 2011, 276–77; Grande 2012, 281–82). Indeed, it 
seems that, in a similar manner as the Green party family in its early years, the RWP family might still have 
to find some kind of consensus or might be on its way in doing so. Maybe, some kind of Sachlogik could 
provide a direction here as well: As Decker and Lewandowsky note, RWP parties often take more 
economically Leftist positions where cultural and economic protectionism go together (ibid. 2011, 276). In 
sum, it might partly be an empirical question, in how far there is cohesion on economic issues within the 
RWP family and in how far its moderated approach to politics also implies moderated policy preferences. 
                                                     
17 I take Right-wing Radicalism as used by Mondon (2013) and RWP as used by most scholars intuitively to be 
synonymous. 
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The core electorate of the far Right families is usually assumed to consist in ‘globalisation 
losers’, that is, usually relatively unskilled, male voters, who expect their economic prospects to worsen 
(Decker and Lewandowsky 2011, 272–73; Grande 2012; 2012, 281–82). Noteworthy, however, it has 
recently been argued that RWP parties are able to also attract votes from more affluent, middle-class 
voters who mainly perceive their prospects to worsen, and who otherwise vote Conservative (Ford, 
Goodwin, and Cutts 2012; Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 420), whereas extremist and non-strategic 
extreme Right voters tend to feel betrayed by the Left (Ford, Goodwin, and Cutts 2012). Hence, the vote-
seeking calculus for RWP and extreme Right parties will not be completely identical. 
In the selection of parties across countries and their categorisation as either RWP or extremist, it 
partly becomes clear why again the differentiation between the two has been such an issue for academic 
debates. The aforementioned FN, for instance, is still referred to as extremists by Decker and 
Lewandowsky (2011). At the same time, the party’s early use of neo-racist arguments (Bornschier and 
Lachat 2009, 374) might be part of the reason why, as even Decker and Lewandowsky (2011, 269) 
acknowledge, it has occasionally referred to as the “father” (ibid.) or “avant-garde” (Bornschier and 
Lachat 2009, 374) of the RWP party family. Even if the FN might up to a certain point still have carried 
traces of extremism, these have been further reduced by a newer generation under the leadership of 
Marine Le Pen, daughter of the indeed extremist party founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen, opening the party up 
for new voters and making it more successful than ever (Mondon 2014). At the same time, FN’s presence 
may have prevented any relevant extremist competition. Its RWP competitor Movement for France 
(Mouvement pour la France, MPF), has never been equally successful and, belonging to the same family, 
is ignored here. 
Noteworthy, Eatwell considers the FN to be itself modelled on the Italian Social Movement 
(Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI), a rather neo-fascist party that, after declining in the 1970s, was reborn 
in 1994 as the moderated National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN) (ibid. 2000). Its moderation has not 
only led it into a centre-Right governing coalition (Eatwell 2000; Newell 2010), but also into the EPP 
group. AN’s extremist competitor, the Tricoloured Flame (Movimento Sociale – Fiamma Tricolore, MS-
FT), a party that regards itself as the only true heir of the MSI, after some limited success in earlier EP 
elections, did not compete in the 2014 elections (Ministero dell'Interno 2014). AN’s RWP competitor, the 
Northern League (Lega Nord, LN) is explicitly not included here due to its regionalist features, including 
hostility towards the South of Italy (cf. Newell 2010). The AN is thus the only party from the far Right 
that is part of the sample here. While its heritage is certainly (neo-)fascist and enjoys the respective 
support among certain voters, it is still considered part of the ideological centre Right today (ibid.). 
The Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) is sometimes considered as 
a ‘transformed established party’ (Grande 2012, 281), which suggests that it has taken a different road than 
the other parties in the RWP family: from mainstream towards radicalism, rather than from extremism to 
moderate radicalism. Indeed, some would see it as a former ‘national liberal’ party (Franzmann 2011), but 
even Franzmann acknowledges that it should now be considered RWP (ibid. 2011, 168), just like its less 
successful offspring the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, BZÖ). Indeed 
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this classification seems confirmed by the literature for both FPÖ and BZÖ (Decker and Lewandowsky 
2011; Luther 2001; 2005; 2008). Since the split between FPÖ and BZÖ was about office-seeking issues 
rather than ideology (Luther 2005), the more successful FPÖ is the party selected as representative of the 
RWP family for Austria, ignoring the BZÖ. 
For the UK, I include the British National Party (BNP) as an extremist and the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) as an RWP party. The aforementioned study by Ford, Goodwin et 
al. (2012) would seem to confirm this categorisation, in that the BNP is generally attributed more outright 
racist features than UKIP. The latter has developed from a single-issue anti-EU party, which as such is 
perfectly in line with an RWP profile, towards an RWP party with a typical programmatic profile (Mondon 
2015). Similarly, for Germany I include the National Democratic Party of Germany 
(Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD) and the newly founded Alternative for Germany 
(Alternative für Deutschland, AfD). For a long time, German far Right parties could not win any seats in 
the EP, as they did not pass the respective hurdles. The NPD managed to do so in 2014 only because of 
the removal of the threshold and with that is the only German extreme Right party to ever achieve this 
(Plescia and Johann 2014). While it has sometimes been counted within the RWP family due to its 
populism (e.g. Decker and Lewandowsky 2011), it still shows extremist features (Mudde 1995). Despite its 
newness, the AfD has already been categorised as an RWP party (Decker 2015) and, because of its 
impressive success in winning of 7 per cent of the votes , it is included here albeit it did not have seats in 
the EP prior to the election (Plescia and Johann 2014). The present paper thus also provides an 
opportunity for examining the AfD’s ideological profile based on the assumption that it is RWP. In total, 
this selection of parties on the far Right should allow for within country and cross-country comparison of 
the – alleged – members of the respective families. Noteworthy, no Irish party is included as a far Right 
representative. The only ‘candidate’ for developing such a profile, namely Sinn Féin, did never decide to 
move into this direction, while at the same time, it has arguably prevented such a party from rising 
electorally (O'Malley 2008). In fact, this party is now mostly considered a part of the far Left (Maillot 
2009; O'Malley 2008; Spier 2011, 229), the final family of parties considered here, to which I turn next. 
Indeed, with the notable exception of the aforementioned Sinn Féin, identifying the parties to 
be selected for a far Left party family is relatively straightforward: The German The Left (Die Linke, 
former Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS), the Italian Lista Tsipras (former Communist Refoundation 
or Rifondazione Communista, RC) (Lista Tsipras), and the French Left Front (Front de Gauche, FdG, 
including the Communist Party of France) all have their roots in traditional Communist parties. While the 
French Communist Party has changed only slightly towards what is called Eurocommunism (Spier 2011, 
228), the larger part of the Communist Party of Italy (Partito Communista Italiano, PCI) has turned into 
the by now rather Social Democratic PD (Spier 2011, 228). This is why in this case, the non-conforming 
remnants of the PCI, namely the RC, is included as representative of the far Left family (Rifondazione 
Communista). Die Linke is successor of the PDS, who in turn succeeded the East German Communist 
Party (Ware 1996, 39) and was later joined by a smaller party consisting of former Social Democrats 
disappointed precisely with the integration of neoliberal ideas into the SPD’s programme (Coffe and 
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Plassa 2010). Via different roots, these parties have come to adopt a rather cohesive ideology, as Spier 
notes, and in combination with their at least partially similar origin and international organisation can be 
considered as part of the same family (ibid. 2011). Albeit not necessarily all at the same time, have slightly 
moderated their programme over the years towards the acceptance of liberal democratic institutions (Spier 
2011; Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006). It is these parties that chose and now partly are defined negatively 
by their opposition to neoliberal economics even when all most other parties adopted some aspects of it 
(Spier 2011, 231).  
Defined positively, the ideology now shared by these parties is based on the value of social, 
political, and economic equality in society and in terms of policy seek to “regulate human consumption in 
an egalitarian manner” by means of increased public ownership, welfare expansion (not retreat!) (Vassallo, 
F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 417–18). On the economic L-R dimension, therefore, they still occupy the most 
Leftist position, constantly and coherently valuing social justice over the free market (Spier 2011, 240). 
Noteworthy, however, albeit the cohesion is lower on that dimension, far Left parties also support a high 
degree of social permissiveness (Spier 2011, 240; Ware 1996, 39). In their development towards modern 
far Left parties, some members of this family have also taken up post-material concerns such as 
environmentalism and pacifism (Spier 2011, 230; Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 417; Ware 1996, 39). It is 
this ideological mix that, as Spier (2011, 237) notes, appeals to three kinds of electorates: First, the 
classically Communist electorate of low-educated, male manual workers (also those now retired). Second, 
a Green-Alternative electorate similar to the core electorate of Green parties, with highly educated women 
working in socio-cultural professions. Third, a rather small, young radical Left electorate with medium to 
high educational levels. 
Noteworthy, far Left parties have never been electorally relevant in Austria and the UK (ibid. 
2011, 229), that is, with the exception of Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland. The latter is included in this 
family, for the ideological profile it now displays is most similar to that of the other far Left, like the other 
three is part of the United European Left/Nordic Green Left (Gauche Unitaire Européenne/ Nordic 
Green Left, GUE/NGL) (Maillot 2009; O'Malley 2008; Spier 2011, 229), and indeed due to its ‘all 
Ireland’-approach to EU politics (cf. Maillot 2009) might even be counted as representative of the far Left 
in Ireland and the UK simultaneously.18 In terms of its core electorate, it is still slightly different, however 
(Spier 2011, 238). An Austrian representative is not included. 
In Section 3.3 I will point out the exact manner in which the preferences and justifications of 
these parties, or, for the most part, their representatives in the EP will be analysed. Before doing so, 
however, it must be spelled out what the consequences of this additional narrowing of the sample will 
mean in terms of research design for the micro-level. This is the purpose of the next subsection. 
                                                     
18 Were it only for its role in Northern Ireland, it would be excluded as a regional party, of course, hence it is 
generally considered Irish for analytical purposes. 
3. Approach 
103 
Table 5: Overview of party selection by country and party family 
 Austria (A) Germany (D) France (F) Ireland (IRE) Italy (I) 
United 
Kingdom 
(UK) 
Far Left - 
THE LEFT (DIE 
LINKE) 
Left Front 
(Front de 
Gauche) 
Ourselves 
(Sinn Féin) 
The Other 
Europe With 
Tsipras 
(L’Altra 
Europa con 
Tsipras) 
- 
Greens 
The Greens 
(Die Grünen) 
Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens (Bündnis 
‘90/Die Grünen) 
The Greens 
(Les Verts) 
Green party 
(Comhaontas 
glas) 
The Greens  
(I Verdi) 
Green Party 
(of England 
and Wales) 
Socialists 
Social 
Democratic 
Party of 
Austria 
(Sozial-
demokratische 
Partei 
Österreichs) 
Social Democratic 
Party of Germany, 
(Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands) 
Socialist Party 
(Parti 
Socialiste) 
Labour Party 
(Ireland) 
Democratic 
Party (Partito 
Democratico) 
Labour Party 
(UK) 
Liberals 
New Austria 
(Neues 
Österreich) 
Free Democratic Party 
(Freie Demokratische 
Partei) 
Democratic 
Mouvement 
(Mouvement 
Démocrate) 
- - 
Liberal 
Democrats 
Conservatives 
& Christian 
Democrats 
Austrian 
People‘s Party 
(Öster-
reichische 
Volkspartei) 
Christian Democratic 
Union / Christian 
Social Union 
(Christlich-
Demokratische 
Union/Christlich-
Soziale Union) 
Union for a 
People’s 
Movement 
(Union pour 
un 
Mouvement 
Populaire) 
Soldiers of 
Destiny 
(Fianna Fáil), 
Family of the 
Irish (Fine 
Gael) 
Go Italy! 
(Forza Italia) 
Conservative 
Party 
Right-Wing 
Populists 
Freedom 
Party of 
Austria 
(Freiheitliche 
Partei 
Österreichs) 
Alternative for 
Germany (Alternative 
für Deutschland) 
National 
Front (Front 
National) 
- 
National 
Alliance 
(Alleanza 
Nazionale)/ 
Brothers of 
Italy (Fratelli 
d’Italia) 
United 
Kingdom 
Independence 
Party 
Extreme 
Right 
- 
National Democratic 
Party of Germany 
(Nationaldemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands) 
- - - 
British 
National Party 
 
QCA as method of analysis at the micro-level 
Narrowing down the focus of the study further in the foregoing manner, one arrives at a sample of 34 
national parties and their delegations to the EP in six countries. This results in a maximum of 34 
observations of framing strategies per policy issue or 102 such observations across all cases. Before the 
implications of these numbers of the choice of an analytical strategy are considered further, two caveats 
should be noted. First, some parties may choose not to express and justify their preferences with regard to 
each of the selected policy issues, even though these were selected with regard to their politicisation. While 
this might be a strategic move in itself for these parties, and while thus this finding does not imply 
‘missing data’, it still cannot be interpreted as an instance of defection or ideological loyalty. Second, 
comparing the results at party level across policy issues might not be unproblematic, since the strategic 
options available may be partly dependent on substantive features of the policy issue (e.g. on the degree of 
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differentiation of the respective debate). For instance, in the case of CAP, European Commissioners 
strategically designed new agricultural policy frames so as to allow for compromise between proponents of 
an interventionist CAP and those pushing for market liberalisation (Rhinard 2010). Had they not done so, 
an important option for framing the 2013 Reform would be absent, so that a number strategic framing 
decisions at party level might be slightly different. To some extent, therefore, the observable implications 
of the ToT at the micro level will be contingent on issue level features (what might be called the discursive 
infrastructure) that seem impossible to identify a priori and hence not comparable across issues. Finally, 
case knowledge on individual parties will be hard to integrate into such an overall analysis, which would 
bereave QCA of one of its strengths. 
Recall that the goal of the micro-level analysis for the present study essentially is to examine, 
whether it is indeed those parties that based on the theory of territorialisation are expected to defect 
actually do so. On the one hand, discussing the strategy of each and every party one by one would not 
only be tedious to report and read, but would also imply an overload of information with no clear 
message. On the other hand, limiting the analysis to a raw overview added by some examples entails the 
risk of cherry-picking those parties who behave in line with the theory. Hence, even the number of 34 
parties per issue appears too large for this kind of qualitative analysis. It will thus be necessary to 
systematically summarise part of the information instead. 
In order to do so, I employ what has been referred to as Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA) (Rihoux and Ragin 2009) or Set-Theoretic Methods (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). It has been 
described by one of its inventors as a tool to “help researchers represent and synthesize what they have 
learned about their cases” (Ragin 2005, 33–34), which before the background of the aspired familiarity 
with the various parties in the sample and the intense study of their framing strategies appears as exactly 
what is needed then. Along these lines, it is not aspired here to use QCA in such a way that the adherence 
to certain technical rules alone guarantees valid results, but just the modest ambition to systematise a 
qualitative analysis. 
For the present purpose, this approach further appears preferable over quantitative, statistical 
analysis. One reason for this consists in the number of cases at the micro-level: Hellström (2009a), who in 
his analysis of party-based Euroscepticism has made an attempt to use QCA and statistical approaches in 
an analogous manner, finds that a small ‘N’ (5-34 cases) as it is found here per issue is unsuitable for 
applying statistical methods that, in principle, correspond to QCA. In fact, even with a moderately large 
number of cases (40 to a few hundred), the application of statistical models with interaction effects meant 
to replicate what some identify as a main strength of QCA (i.e. accounting for ‘causal complexity’, see 
Schneider and Wagemann, 78 Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009) can be problematic (Hellström 2009a, 23).19 
Hence, even if the whole number of micro-level observations across issues were analysed statistically here, 
                                                     
19 There is, in fact, a continuing debate (see the Comparative Political Science Special Issue “Debating Set Theoretic 
Comparative Methods” 49 (6) of May 2016) as to whether interactions and conjunctural causation actually are 
equivalent or not, which however cannot be – and, given the other arguments provided here – need not be 
accounted for here.  
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the ‘N’ might still be too small – that is, provided one would want to do so while accounting for ‘causal 
complexity’ in the way QCA does. 
Yet, causal complexity is arguably involved here, for defection by a national party delegation is 
likely to be the result of not just one factor at a time, but of various potential combinations (or 
‘configurations’) of conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 276). For instance, at the most basic level, 
‘defection’ will by definition only be observed for a party coming from a country that has a national 
interest in the policy which is at odds with this party’s ideology, so that at least two conditions must be 
simultaneously involved. At the same time, I might even have underestimated this ‘causal complexity’. For 
instance, it could be that as an additional condition, only those parties will ever defect who due to having 
their own committee member are informationally independent. In this case, it would then also be 
preferable to employ a method that takes the assumption of complexity as a starting point, rather than leaving 
it to the researcher, how many interaction terms to include (Hellström 2009a, 6–8). Noteworthy, the latter 
argument is independent of the number of cases included. 
The relatively small number of 34 cases results from the narrowing down the focus of the study, 
which however was done for good reasons. Yet, if this came at the price of being deprived of some 
research design options, then one would at least want to make the best of those cases that remain in the 
sample. Here, QCA might offer an advantage over statistical methods as well, for it guarantees that each 
single case is taken into account (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 9). In other words, no case ever becomes an 
‘outlier’ that at some point might be hidden behind some number. This is precisely what should be aspired 
here, since the number of defections will probably be small, so one would want to account for each single 
defection at least. 
Finally, many of the variables (or ‘conditions’) considered theoretically relevant, such as national 
tradition (e.g. type of capitalism), government status or committee membership are categorical anyway, so 
that also in statistical analyses, they would be dichotomized as ‘dummy variables’. In the present study, 
therefore, one of the arguments used against the dichotomisation that some QCA techniques involve (cf. 
Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 24–25) would not be as relevant as it might be in other studies. Along 
these lines, it should be noted that none of the above arguments is meant to establish any general 
superiority of QCA over alternative techniques, nor even that for the present case it is definitely the one 
and only solution. Rather, in sum it appears that it does have a number of advantages that fit the overall 
outline of the study. 
Having clarified the choice for QCA, then, the typical steps in a QCA shall briefly be outlined 
here. Regarding the selected variant of QCA, I intend to refer to what is called “crisp-set QCA” (csQCA) 
rather than, for instance, “fuzzy-set QCA” (fsQCA) (Rihoux and Meur 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 
2012). As is recommended in the QCA-literature, this is decision is based on the kinds of concepts and 
the structure of data potentially used in the course of operationalisation (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 
277). As I already mentioned, many of the conditions are categorical anyway. 
Last but not least, employing QCA for the micro-level analysis means that the analysis will be 
based on set-theoretic reasoning (Rihoux and Ragin 2009; Schneider and Wagemann 2012), which seems 
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helpful insofar as this is also a typical feature of small-N research designs (Goertz and Mahoney 2012), 
such as the one applied at the macro-level of policy issues. It also means to adopt the respective 
assumptions regarding the aforementioned causal complexity, but also of causal asymmetry (i.e. the 
presence and absence of an outcome must be explained independently of each other), and equifinality 
(several paths might lead to the same outcome) (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 8–10; Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, 56–90). This is why I have used set-theoretic thinking in the formulation of the theory 
of territorialisation already. 
There are six steps in conducting a csQCA according to Rihoux and de Meur (2009): The first is 
the aforementioned dichotomisation of the various conditions as well as the outcome. Next this data table 
is transformed into a so-called ‘Truth Table’ (Step 2). Therein, the cases are grouped together in rows by 
the various configurations of conditions and the respective outcome. This might at times lead to so-called 
‘contradictory configurations’, which means that the same combination of conditions leads to diverging 
outcomes. The researcher then has a number of options for handling this problem (Step 3) – e.g. 
adding/removing/replacing conditions, going back to the cases causing the problem, or to consider the 
cases as ‘unclear’ – all of which must be carefully selected and justified (cf. ibid. 2009, 48–56). Thereafter, 
the information included in the Truth Table can be further summarised by means of Boolean algebra in a 
so-called ‘Boolean minimisation’, using software such as Tosmana, fsQCA or the respective R-packages 
(Step 4). In the course of this process, so-called ‘solutions’, expressed in set-theoretic language, are 
produced that summarise the configurations of conditions that always lead to the outcome (i.e. they are 
collectively sufficient) or its absence (the procedure is conducted separately for both). One can then also 
check for those conditions that are shared by the various solution terms in order to identify possible 
necessary conditions. 
Noteworthy, the default minimisation formula remains at a largely descriptive level, in that it 
only uses the information provided by the empirically observed cases. It is therefore also referred to as the 
‘conservative’ or ‘complex’ solution (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 162). Step 5 thus consists in 
advancing beyond what is empirically observed and including so-called ‘logical remainders’, that is, non-
observed cases corresponding to configurations of conditions that are not found empirically. Software can 
select a number of such cases inasmuch as they would lead to a simpler solution formula, assuming for the 
moment that such a case existed – hence they are referred to as ‘simplifying assumptions’. The researcher 
then has the choice to either include as many of such simplifying assumptions as possible (‘parsimonious 
solution’) or to restrict their usage to those that would appear plausible based on theoretical and empirical 
knowledge (‘intermediate solution’). At a minimum, the researcher must ensure that the assumptions 
included do not contradict each other (Rihoux and Meur 2009, 59–65; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 
151–77). While some degree of simplification is thus one of the goals of using QCA, for the present study 
already the ‘conservative’ solution carries value, for it guarantees a summary of results from which no 
single case is lost or simply neglected without further justification (i.e. there can be no ‘cherry picking’).  
Before interpreting the results (Step 6), the researcher is usually advised to calculate the 
consistency and coverage of the conditions or combinations of conditions potentially constituting 
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sufficient or necessary conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 119–50). With regard to sufficient 
conditions, the notion of ‘consistency’ displays the degree to which contradictions still exist in the Truth 
Table even after taking measures to resolve them and can be used as a guide for deciding whether a given 
combination should still be considered a ‘sufficient condition’ (comparable to the ‘fit’ of a model, 
according to Rihoux and de Meur, 2009, p. 64). Using strict thresholds, it might still be possible to use 
results produced despite some remaining contradictory configurations, but only after having tried to 
remove these (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 123). ‘Coverage’ denotes how much of the outcome is 
explained by a single path to the outcome (‘raw coverage’), uniquely by this particular path (‘unique 
coverage’) or by the whole solution term (‘solution coverage’). Concerning necessary conditions, 
consistency measures “the degree to which the empirical information is in line with the statement of 
necessity, i.e., how far the outcome can be considered a subset of the condition” (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, 143), whereas the coverage provides an idea of the relevance of the necessary conditions 
(ibid. 2012, 147). Calculating these parameters for necessary conditions can help to compare the relevance 
of various causal paths and to avoid wrong interpretations (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 231–32). In 
addition, robustness checks are only helpful for large-N QCA with more than a hundred cases (Grauvogel 
and Soest 2014, 646). Generally, it should be noted here that the parameters just mentioned are less 
central when using the – in many ways truly ‘logical’ – csQCA than they are when using fsQCA. 
It must be acknowledged that, the advantages of QCA just mentioned notwithstanding, it has 
been repeatedly argued that QCA does not allow for the testing and potential falsification of hypotheses 
and theories in the same way statistical techniques do (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009, 2–3; Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, 296–305). This is why, in order to avoid misunderstandings, these scholars writing about 
QCA thus prefer the term ‘theory evaluation’ (ibid.). In this sense, Schneider and Wagemann note, that it 
is well possible to compare theoretical expectations noted prior to QCA to the results obtained thereby. In 
highly technical terms, they point out how to create ‘intersections’ between theory written as a Boolean 
expression and the solution obtained as the result of Boolean minimisation, and they further suggest 
calculating the consistency and coverage for the solution term (ibid. 2012, 296–305). Less technically, one 
might simply discuss in how far the solution term produced includes any conditions that one would have 
expected to drop out or does not include conditions expected to remain relevant. 
In fact, however, some degree of theory evaluation should even be possible at an earlier stage, if 
(cs)QCA is applied in a rather conservative manner: For in fact, inasmuch as a Truth Table including 
conditions based on a particular theory contains contradictory configurations, this theory – at least in the 
manner operationalised – obviously cannot account for all cases corresponding to this particular 
configuration of conditions. Contradictory configurations that cannot be resolved can therefore also be 
seen as a form of ‘falsification’ according to Rihoux and De Meur (ibid. 2009, 50). Inasmuch as numerical 
consistency thresholds are used in dealing with contradictory configurations, the occurrence of the latter 
will not necessarily be considered as problematic, which is arguably why Schneider and Wagemann, who 
strongly advocate the usage of such parameters (ibid. 2012, 122), do not pay much attention to this rather 
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straightforward aspect of theory evaluation. Applying such numerical criteria within this study, however, 
would contradict the argument made earlier that every single case (party) should be accounted for. 
Hence, in the present study, csQCA is used for theory evaluation in the following manner. First, 
a macro level overview is provided to determine the overall structure of conflict (in terms of the ‘index of 
territorialisation’, see below), followed by a description of frame usage.20 Before this background, it is then 
possible to reconsider the operationalisation of defection beyond the strictly quantitative criterion 
indicated below. This act of recalibration based on case knowledge, which might seem arbitrary to readers 
more familiar with statistical approaches, is in fact common practice in the iterative process of QCA (cf. 
Rihoux & Meur 2009, p. 49; Schneider & Wagemann 2012, p. 121). The only departure from this common 
practice here is that, for reasons of presentation, I undertake this step prior to the csQCA, and not only at 
the point when potentially flawed calibration decisions result in contradictory configurations. 
This, then, is followed by the csQCA proper with regard to defection. To a core of rather 
unspecified conditions of ideology (Left-Right) and national interest (issue-specific), I first of all separately 
add the conditions considered relevant by extant theories (government participation and committee 
membership) as well as the theory of territorialisation (more specific conditions related to party families, 
national traditions). This approach is chosen because it might be difficult to exclude individual conditions 
simply due to ‘limited diversity’ if all possible conditions were included from the very beginning. 
Moreover, at this point, it will already show in how far the various theoretical approaches individually 
entail contradictory configurations, in how far the (complex) solution terms following from the Boolean 
minimisation can be meaningfully interpreted and in how far, then, they correspond to the observable 
implications of these theories in terms of the conditions they include or not. 
With regard to the theory of territorialisation, an attempt will be made for resolving 
contradictory configurations while staying within the same theoretical framework, e.g. by specifying 
conditions further or by qualitatively accounting for individual cases. Noteworthy, it is not possible to 
apply the same efforts to the other theories, as doing so is not feasible within the scope of this project. 
After all, some of these theories are not necessarily formulated in set-theoretic terms and difficult to test 
by means of QCA to the full extent, further data might have to be collected and theoretical arguments 
extended. At least, however, the key conditions to be added according to these theories will eventually be 
integrated in one final Truth Table combining the conditions included in the ToT and extant theories, and 
then subjected to the usual further steps of csQCA outlined above. Thereby, it will be possible to 
establish, whether any of the conditions turns out to be entirely irrelevant. 
This rather extensive analysis of defection is followed by a discussion on the other framing 
strategies. With regard to blurring, a csQCA is conducted, however including only those conditions 
considered relevant by the ToT, as the other theories do not contain information on blurring. Even with 
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analysis becomes necessary in the first place. 
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the ToT, however, it is difficult to predict exactly all the different motivations for blurring in various ways 
(to avoid defection, to attract more voters outside one’s core electorate, to cover up defection etc.), so that 
the discussion is mainly about broader patterns and does not imply the ambition to resolve all 
contradictions entirely. The same applies to the csQCA concerning the remaining cases of a prism (uni-
dimensional) strategy. With regard to subsuming, the situation is even less predictable. Yet particular 
attention will be paid to those parties for whom the reliability test involved coding problems, as these 
might indicate a creative way of recombining or re-contextualizing frames. Finally, it should be noted that, 
unlike standard practice in QCA would suggest, non-defection, non-blurring etc. are not subjected to 
separate analyses for the simple fact that unlike earlier theories, the ToT was developed with the explicit 
purpose of explaining the presence of these outcomes, not their absence. Noteworthy also, the attention 
paid to explaining the usage of alternative strategies largely covers the explanations for non-defection 
already. 
In sum, this intended application of QCA arguably remains at a rather basic level. Nevertheless, 
it systematically relates framing analysis back to theoretical reasoning, even though the number of cases is 
comparatively low. This rather small ‘N’, in turn, allows for an innovative way of systematically analysing 
policy frames that is precisely what is needed given the aforementioned deficits of the state of the art in 
this respect. As a result, while the choice of QCA as such can be justified as above, the present use of 
QCA is intended here as nothing more than a door-opener. 
3.3 Measurement, data and operationalisation 
When reviewing the methodological state of the art (see section 3.1), I have pointed to the problems of measuring 
policy preferences and the resulting structure of conflict in terms of roll-call votes (bias, dichotomy of positioning, 
no reasons), and have further discussed the disadvantages of extant textual analyses (broad categories for hand-
coding, restriction to one language with computerisation), which especially given the need for sources of data on 
MEPs’ communication beyond EP debates is problematic. It is before this background that for the present study, I 
suggest the application of a method called Policy Frame Analysis (PFA), which fits the concept of policy frames as 
defined in the preceding chapter. It can be applied across languages and due to human coding, relatively small 
amounts of data can be validly coded. It thereby clears the way for introducing web-based press releases from 
national party delegations. The method is shown to be reliable within acceptable ranges. Hence, I then turn to the 
operationalising the outcomes at macro- and micro-level, i.e. the structure of conflict and parties’ framing strategies. 
Finally, I operationalise the conditions expected to cause these outcomes. 
Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) as method of measurement 
When reviewing the methodological state of the art (see section 3.1), I have pointed to the problems of 
measuring MEPs’ policy preferences by means of roll-call votes (RCV) as biased (given the strategic use of 
RCV), insufficiently fine-grained (yes/no dichotomy) as well as obviously ignorant of the reasons MEPs 
provide. As was also noted, however, extant textual analyses do not provide satisfactory measurements 
either, for hand-coding approaches of texts tend to measure in rather broad categories inapt to the analysis 
of positions on individual policy issues and computerised ones must be restricted to texts provided in the 
same language. This is problematic insofar as MEPs will communicate with their electorates in their 
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respective national language. While translations of EP debates are available, the latter entail problems as a 
source of data given the combination of institutional constraint and potentially biased self-selection of 
speakers. There thus is need for methods of measurement and sources of data that have so far been 
underexplored in research on the European Parliament. 
It is before this background that I suggest, for the purposes of this study, the application of a 
method called Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) as developed by Radulova (2011). Before justifying this choice 
further, its main elements as laid out by Radulova and as elaborated on in the present context shall be 
introduced here. Since many readers are likely to be familiar with the hand-coding approach used in the 
CMP, the parallels with this approach shall be noted when introducing PFA. 
Recall that policy frames as defined by Radulova – mirroring, however, the widely used 
definition by Entman (1993) – consist of a normative, a constitutive, a cognitive (together: ‘the 
justification’) and a policy dimension (for more detail and examples see Chapter 2). Following Radulova, 
the first step in analysing such policy frames consists in the identification of the various frames within the 
policy-related discourse, by which she understands basically everything that has ever been said or written 
on the policy (ibid. 2011, 44–46). This can be done, amongst others, by using secondary literature. 
Similarly, the researchers behind the CMP developed their general Left-Right scale by identifying what 
could be considered a ‘typical’ Leftist or Rightist statement, using e.g. classic writings by Marx (Left) or 
Burke (Right) (Budge et al. 2001, 21–24). For the present study, this identification of frames was 
conducted separately for the three policy issues selected (see Section 3.2). Where possible, a ‘short-cut’ 
was deployed by drawing on other scholars’ analysis of the respective policy discourse, and thinking them 
further with regard to the specific issue at hand (e.g. transferring the logic behind the discourses on CAP 
as identified by Rhinard (2010) to the core issues of the 2013 Reform). Based on the identification of these 
different frames, I then develop a codebook including the general philosophy behind each policy frame, 
specifying potential observable instances and concrete examples. The three codebooks thus developed are 
included in Annex II. 
Next, Radulova checks for references to the policy in the data-set of documents and then codes 
these references according to the pre-identified policy frames, which forms the basis for eventually 
calculating the relative weight of each policy frame within the document, the overall data-set or subsets 
thereof (e.g. documents connected with a particular author) (ibid. 2011, 44–46). Similarly, the CMP codes 
statements within the manifestos in order to eventually quantify the results. Noteworthy, for Radulova as 
well as in the case of the present study, the idea behind quantification is not to measure the salience of the 
issue for the parties. Rather, the idea is to measure, in how far a party is consistent in its usage of frames 
and, in case it is not totally consistent, which frame is the one being used predominantly by the party and 
what other frames it is combined with. 
Concerning unitisation, however, PFA as conducted in the present study is closer to the CMP 
than to Radulova: for rather than just coding each ‘reference’ to a particular policy, the sentences 
concerned with the policy issue are unitised as something that resembles the CMP’s quasi-sentences. A 
quasi-sentence in the CMP is defined rather vaguely as “an argument – that is, the verbal expression of 
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one political idea or issue” (Budge et al. 2001). This implies that several quasi-sentences may be included 
within the same natural sentence, as well as that the two overlap. Similarly, it is thinkable that one natural 
sentences (i.e. from period to period) includes statements in line with more than one policy frame or 
touching upon more than one dimension of the same frame (e.g. it includes a norm and a policy). In such 
a case, it would be desirable for the purposes of the present study to also subdivide the natural sentence 
and code the respective parts as instances of the respective frame and its dimension. The exact procedure 
and examples can be found in Annex I. In any case, this elaboration of Radulova’s coding procedure is 
meant to, on the one hand, increase precision of the measurement and, on the other hand, make it even 
more similar to what is common practice in the hand-coding of political texts. 
While taking inspiration from the CMP might entail sharing some of the latter’ shortcomings 
(e.g. Laver and Garry 2000), it also means that one can draw on some of the problem solving strategies 
that they offer for some of the most common problems in hand-coding (Budge et al. 2001, 170–73). In 
fact, even its critics still tend to evaluate their eventual results on the basis of the CMP itself (Budge et al. 
2001), and at least the validity of computerised techniques is generally tested by comparing it to hand-
coding results (e.g. Klüver 2013). That said, since human coding, and the human coding of frames in 
particular, involves an element of subjective interpretation, it had to be assured that the codebooks used 
are sufficiently reliable so as to allow for the reproduction of the results obtained. 
Hence, it is by now widely agreed that content analyses should be subjected to reliability tests as 
a matter of good practice (Krippendorff 2004; Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002; Neuendorf 
2002; Rustemeyer 1992). The analysis of policy frames as I conduct it here certainly also shares some 
features with the rather interpretivist tradition of discourse analysis, but it should be precisely at the point 
of reliability and the possibility of reproducing the findings obtained that it should be closer to classic 
content analysis. Thus, a reliability test was also conducted for the PFA carried out in this study. Three 
test coders (BA-level students in political science) were hired and trained (8 hours per coder per 
codebook, incl. a pilot study), and two rounds of tests performed independently and per codebook, with 
round 2 being based on clarifications regarding the most common disagreements from round 1.21 The test 
coders’ codings were compared pairwise with the respective codings of the author as the main coder, but 
not amongst each other. After all, the idea was to test the reliability of the method and coding schemes, 
not inter-coder reliability to guarantee the comparability of findings across coders. The comparison of 
codings was conducted at several levels of measurement precision, including the categorisation of quasi-
sentences to a policy frame and to a dimension within the policy frame. By doing so, it should ideally be 
possible to distinguish references to the policy dimension (i.e. expressions of preferences concerning a 
concrete measure to be adopted) and the justification (i.e. the remaining three dimensions). 
At this point, only the results of the test are presented, but further detail is provided in Annex I 
(e.g. on sample size and composition). There is more agreement on the fact that reliability tests are needed 
than there is concerning the choice of a respective index of reliability and acceptable levels (Lombard, 
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Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002; Neuendorf 2002). Clearly, however, it is not sufficient to report the 
percentage of codings for which there was agreement. In addition, it is recommended to calculate an index 
of agreement that takes per-chance-agreement into account (ibid.). While according to Lombard et al. 
(2002) the percentage agreement is considered ‘too liberal’, other indices might at times be ‘too 
conservative’. When using a more conservative index such as Cohen’s kappa, it is sometimes considered 
appropriate to accept lower levels of agreement. For instance, .75+ has been taken to indicate excellent 
agreement, .40 to .75 fair to good agreement beyond chance and below .40 as poor agreement beyond 
chance (Neuendorf 2002, 143). Noteworthy, Krippendorff has been critical of some of these 
recommendations on indices and levels, and suggests Krippendorff’s alpha as a generally applicable index, 
with thresholds of .8 as appropriate level of agreement and .667 for cautious tentative conclusions (Hayes 
and Krippendorff 2007; Krippendorff 2004). I thus follow Klüver’s (ibid. 2013, 78) example in calculating 
both Cohen’s kappa and Krippendorff’s alpha, while taking into account the aforementioned, somewhat 
diverging recommendations on the acceptable levels. 
Table 6: Reliability scores for the three codebooks used for the PFA 
Issue: Welfare CAP TTIP 
Level: frames dimension frames dimension frames dimension 
Round: 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 
% 75.30 87.50 68.24 82.50 78.43 90.43 61.89 70.33 92.88 78.08 
kappa 0.677 0.828 0.606 0.786 0.677 0.861 0.543 0.642 0.885 0.719 
alpha 0.677 0.829 0.608 0.787 0.676 0.882 0.541 0.642 0.885 0.719 
 
Table 6 summarises the results of the reliability test. At the level of frames, the reliability score is sufficient 
for round 2 at the latest. When measuring frame and dimension at the same time, the results are ‘fair to 
good’ beyond chance in round 2 at the latest, and meet or approach Krippendorff’s standard for tentative 
results. Given the limited resources available for the test in terms of budget and time, these results are 
highly satisfying. After all, they allow for the identification of the framing strategies as operationalised 
below, for which measurement at the level of frames is sufficient, and even for some cautious conclusions 
when it comes to the distinction between policy and justification. Indeed, given the improvement across 
codebooks (the tests were conducted one by one, in the order presented in the table), it would seem that 
with further training, even better results could have been obtained. While it must be noted that the 
number of categories also decreased across cases (from five policy frames for welfare to three for TTIP), 
the choice of indices that account for per-chance-agreement still makes the results comparable. It might 
also be that the students simply got better acquainted with the method as such, and that codebooks with 
more categories should be used with more training only. 
Noteworthy, there was some disagreement in terms of unitisation also. Indeed, this is one of the 
reasons why the use of quasi-sentences in the CMP has been criticised and the use of natural sentences 
has been suggested and defended instead (Däubler et al. 2012). Disagreement on unitisation can be 
problematic in two ways mainly. First, coders who disagree on the beginning of a new unit might also 
disagree on the code to assign (e.g. Rustemeyer 1992, 111). This aspect is already included in the way the 
above results were obtained, in that codes were generally compared for the same passage of text, always 
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using the more fine-grained unitisation among the two coders as the base-line. Second, it might lead to 
disagreement concerning the overall result of a party if, for instance, one coder sub-divides some 
sentences disproportionately coded into category 1 very often, while another sees more units in a passage 
consisting of units disproportionately coded into category 2. 
The latter problem does not, however, call the appropriateness of PFA as a method of 
measurement as applied here into question. In fact, codings were compared also at document level so as 
to identify potential cases where the overall balance was different because of disagreement on unitisation. 
Noteworthy, coders generally agreed on the most dominant frame in the document and on the mix of 
frames in it. Moreover, given the operationalisations of the structure of conflict and of party strategies 
pointed out below, agreement on the predominance of a particular frame and the mix of frames is 
sufficient. In other words, the PFA results will not be used as a scale variable. 
In sum, therefore, PFA appears as an adequate method of measurement for the present 
purposes. Noteworthy, once the general reliability of the method was demonstrated, disagreements 
between the main coder and the test coders were not of concern anymore. This is because the codings of 
the main coder can generally be attributed a greater validity than those of the test coders, based on the 
main coder’s greater expertise in the policy area, higher familiarity with the various policy frames and the 
method, as well as greater knowledge of the context (i.e. the overall debate on each issue). 
Press releases as data and data collection process 
Having summarised how PFA works as well as having demonstrated its reliability (with more detail on 
both aspects in the Annexes), it is now possible to point out its capacities for filling the methodological 
gap identified before. Firstly and most importantly, the pre-identification of frames allows the researcher, 
in the present context, to check for overlaps between the highly policy-specific and each party family’s 
main ideological tenets and each country’s national traditions. Thereby, a direct link can be made between 
ideas and framing, which makes it much more straightforward to distinguish ideological similarity from 
similarity in structural conditions across countries. 
In addition, using this method rather than a computerised approach paves the way for analysing 
different, more suitable kinds of data in terms of MEP-to-voter communication for two main reasons. 
First, PFA can be applied across languages, because the coder must identify the line of argument behind a 
frame rather than particular words, which makes it possible to identify a line of thought that is similar to 
another but slightly modified for a national context, including, for instance, due to references to particular 
national institutions (e.g.: the acronym NHS for National Health Service). Hence it is possible to analyse 
texts used by MEPs to directly address the electorate, not just indirect signals in terms of votes or EP 
debates. Obviously, coders need to be sufficiently fluent in the respective language. Second, even very 
short statements can be analysed with considerable precision. Computerised methods drawing on 
statistical correlations between the usage of particular words and only inferring ‘meaning’ from them 
usually work best when the data-set is as large as possible. Indeed, at the document level, agreement 
among coders turned out no less precise for short texts than it was for long ones. 
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The kind of data that is analysed here by means of PFA is the press releases issued by MEPs. I 
thereby follow the example of Grimmer (2010), who analyses press releases to study how US senators 
explain their work to their respective constituents, which is very much what is intended here also. 
According to Grimmer, this direct channel of communication is relatively underexplored by political 
scientists so far in spite of knowledge on its importance (ibid. 2010, 1–2). Using this source for the present 
purpose not only appears appropriate for the qualities I point out next as well as an alternative to the 
definitely imperfect sources used so far (votes, EP debates, manifestos), but also constitutes a rather 
innovative feature of the present study within political science in general and with regard to the EP in 
particular. 
Nowadays, such press releases tend to be published online (at least in addition to other venues), 
which makes them directly available for interested voters. Arguably, the more important feature of press 
releases is included in the term itself, in that they contain those kinds of statement that the author would 
wish to see distributed via the press. That said, there is of course no guarantee that this actually happens, 
but at least one might reasonably assume that this possibility is intended and taken into account in the 
drafting of press releases. 
Noteworthy, with regard to manifestos it has been a point of discussion in the literature, what 
exactly their function really is and, consequently, who the addressee might be: manifestos might be serious 
promises on which parties might expect to be judged, they might constitute non-binding advertisements 
or instruments of coordination and conflict resolution within the party (Ray 2007, 16–17). Indeed, it 
cannot be excluded here that MEPs use press releases as a means of making their own voice heard within 
the party and/or to report back to their national principals, signalling loyalty and activity. At the same 
time, if internal communication was their only goal, they might as well use other, non-public channels for 
doing so and arguably might speak more openly of their dilemmas, for instance. The usage of a channel 
accessible to the wider public might thus still serve as the basis for assuming that the genuine intention of 
a press releases remains at least one of its functions. 
Press releases leave considerable room for manoeuvre to MEPs. First of all, they do have a 
choice to issue a press release on an issue or not to do so. Doing so can compensate them for not being 
given word in the plenary, for instance. Not doing so can help them to keep out of delicate debates, albeit 
only up to a certain point, as there might be public pressure to take a stand due to politicisation. Even 
then, they can still have some leeway regarding the timing, length and exact content – including, of course, 
framing – of the statement. Framing strategies can consequently be much more fruitfully observed in 
press releases rather than in EP debates or Twitter statements analysed in the extant literature (see Section 
3.1), which are subject to much more significant institutional and technical constraints. Moreover, while of 
course they usually are much shorter than manifestos in total, they still are both more to the point and 
exhaustive concerning a particular issue. 
An appropriate measurement of the framing strategies of national parties and their delegations 
in the EP by means of PFA might thus be conducted on press releases or a functional equivalent such as a 
‘news’ item on a website. Ideally, press releases that are collectively issued by the national delegation 
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should be collected. Indeed, this was possible for almost half of the parties in the sample. Where this was 
not possible, alternative data had to be found while trying to arrive at an equivalent of a collective 
statement by the party delegation. Noteworthy, in using alternative, but roughly equivalent sources of data 
other than the ideal one this study again follows the example of the CMP: for the CMP, data other than 
manifesto, e.g. speeches by party leaders, were used whenever there was no manifesto available (Budge et 
al. 2001, 7-8; 164-165). Due to the manual coding of the texts and due to the fact that the eventual result 
is only important in relative terms (i.e. identification of the predominant frame and of possible mixtures of 
frames), the variation in length of the texts or the number of codings per party is not important (cf. 
Helbling, Hoeglinger, and Wüest 2010, 509). Press releases collectively issued by the national party 
delegation thus constitute the ‘ideal type’, but the usage of equivalents is neither unusual nor problematic. 
For instance, as it can be noted that statements by the national delegation are usually authored 
by or in the name of the respective policy expert, it should also be acceptable to directly use the expert’s 
statement. Moreover, one might assume that a delegation leader can be taken as representative of the 
official delegation. Likewise, press releases authored by MEPs but issued via the national parties are used. 
In the case of very small parties, another option is to indeed check all members’ press releases and 
aggregate them. Thereby, almost 80 per cent of all measurements of framing efforts, i.e. the sub-set of 
data per party per policy issue, were issued directly by MEPs. Since however some parties in the sample 
did not have MEPs between 2013 and May 2014 yet, in those cases press releases by national parties or 
manifestos are used. Manifestos are further used as a general tool for triangulation, thereby ensuring that 
an expert MEP is not a complete outlier, e.g. corrupted by his or her special interests. That said, 
sometimes there might still be no data, arguably when parties explicitly chose to avoid any positioning via 
public statements. Noteworthy, in those cases there will still be voting data available, which generally 
constitutes a further tool for triangulation. (For the exact the composition of the data set, consider the 
‘source’ listed among detailed results in Annex III.)  
The actual data collection was carried out as follows. Since nowadays press releases are generally 
available on politicians’ websites, these websites can be used to access, collect, and eventually analyse the 
press releases, and at the same time will often offer alternative but functionally equivalent data (e.g. 
“news”, see above). As websites are designed differently for each party, they have different structures, so 
that the data available on these sites, especially the specific data concerned with Europeanised welfare, 
CAP reform and TTIP, cannot be collected in an entirely uniform manner. Some websites offer quite 
effective and efficient tools for key word search, others do not. Where such tools are not available, the 
data have to be downloaded manually one by one, clicking through all the press releases issued in the 
respective period of time. Indeed, even where search tools are provided, their quality must be checked 
manually. 
Using web-scraping techniques implemented in “R”, it is however possible to collect – amongst 
others – all press releases provided on a website (Munzert et al. 2015, 228–32). Data downloaded in this 
manner can then rather easily be searched using standard data explorers. Noteworthy, however, not all 
websites are designed in such a way that using the technique described by Munzert et al. for the 
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downloading of press releases can be efficiently and effectively applied, for they would either involve 
writing more complicated code or would require knowledge and practice in further techniques. In order to 
collect the press releases forming the overall data set from the various websites, I thus made the choice of 
collection procedure dependent on the structure of the website, while generally trying to always triangulate 
the result at least with one other technique. In fact, for those cases where all three techniques – manual 
collection, website search tool, web-scraping – could be easily applied, it was found that they lead to the 
same results. The overall data-set is composed of 414 documents, including 5011 units coded by PFA.22 
Operationalisation: The structure of conflict, framing strategies, and controls 
By applying Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) to the press releases issued by national party delegations, it 
should thus be possible to analyse how parties frame the three policy issues selected above. The next step, 
then, would be to move from coding results to the overall structure of conflict and to individual parties’ 
strategies. How this can be achieved is pointed out in this subsection. 
Recall that in the preceding chapter, political conflict was defined as diverging preferences over 
the right policy among actors being subjects of the same polity. By means of a Policy Frame Analysis, in 
principle such policy preferences are directly measured as references to the policy dimension of a frame. On 
the one hand, it was noted that the distinction between the various dimensions was not as reliably 
measured as might be desirable. On the other hand, one might still expect at least a minimum degree of 
consistency in a party’s line of argument, as it would not convince anyone if the justifications provided all 
the time would not link at all with the policies suggested. One might therefore think of the structure of 
conflict as a pattern in the use of the frames that are predominantly used by the various parties. I consider 
a party to be ‘predominantly’ using a given frame if the majority of its quasi-sentences (norms, labels, 
causal narratives and policy suggestions) have been coded as instances of this frame. In set-theoretic 
language: the majority of the norms, labels, causal narratives and policy suggestions referred to by a party 
are members of the set of norms, labels, causal narratives and policy suggestions constituting frame X, 
which makes the party a member of frame X users. 
In fact, most methods of measurement used for textual analysis, such as the hand-coding into 
categories by the CMP or the Wordfish method (see section 3.1) would not even attempt at distinguishing 
statements including explicit policy suggestions and their justification, yet would still claim to measure the 
policy positions of actors. When identifying the predominant frame a party uses, therefore, PFA would 
already reach a similar level of accuracy concerning the measurement of policy preferences as these 
methods do, while nobody would criticise if CMP data or Wordfish results were used to determine the 
structure of conflict. This is even more obvious when a party uses the same frame more or less all the 
time. When several frames are used in a way that one might speak of ‘blurring’ in the sense operationalised 
below, it is then still possible to check whether the policy dimension is particularly strongly used in the 
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other, secondary frame. Thereby, it can be made sure that the assumption that the predominant usage of a 
frame points to a particular policy preference is not violated. 
The pattern in the predominant usage of frames, taken as a measure of the structure of conflict, 
can then be analysed further in three ways. First, a simple table is created containing the relative 
frequencies of each parties frame usage and ordering them according to the frame they use predominantly. 
Thereby some first impression of how the parties cluster together can already be obtained: if they cluster 
together mostly within their respective party families, the structure of conflict would seem to be mainly 
ideological, while if they cluster mostly within their respective countries it would seem to be territorial. 
When the structure of conflict is rather mixed, however, it would be difficult to describe it as either 
ideological or territorial and to compare it to the structure of conflict on other issues. 
Second, therefore, some complementary quantification for measuring the structure of conflict 
seems helpful, albeit given the small ‘N’ it will necessarily be highly sensitive to individual cases. While 
aware of this limitation, I hence calculate an ‘index of territorialisation’ that is inspired by the indices of 
agreement found elsewhere in the literature (Attina 1990; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007). In contrast to 
these indices, what is described by this index is precisely not ideological cohesion, but the degree of party 
behaviour in line with the national interest as opposed to ideologically consistent behaviour. It is 
calculated as follows: 
 
Index of territorialisation    of parties framing in line with national interest –  of parties framing in line with ideology 
 
This formula accounts for the possibility of a party behaving in line with both national interest and 
ideology as well as for the opposite, that is, the possibility that a party – for whatever reason not yet 
understood – frames an issue in a way that corresponds to neither motive. This is important as some 
parties will usually find themselves in the lucky situation of overlapping national interests and ideological 
predilections. What makes the difference is thus whether overall, the larger number of parties can be 
explained by nationality or ideology. Accordingly, if the structure of conflict is predominantly ideological, 
the index will be negative, while it will be positive in case of territorialisation. 
The third and final element of the macro-level discussion is an examination of patterns of frame 
usage: it is discussed frame by frame, in how far the parties using it predominantly share particular 
ideological or territorial feature and in how far this would seem to correspond to theoretical expectations 
discussed beforehand. As a part of this rather descriptive analysis that remains very close to the individual 
cases, it is also considered which of the parties who seemingly defect as operationalised in purely 
numerical terms (see below) should be calibrated as such in the csQCA on party strategies. Thereby, a link 
is created between the discussion of the discussion of the macro-level pattern and the micro-level analysis 
to follow. 
Once the structure of conflict has been studied as operationalised in the aforementioned ways, 
the various framing strategies – defection, blurring, prism, subsuming –employed by the parties are 
analysed. Thereby it will be possible to explore, in how far the micro-level decisions of the parties actually 
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are in line with the theory of territorialisation, so that the observation concerning the overall pattern which 
is potentially in line with the theory is not a mere coincidence. As they have been conceptually clarified 
and visualised in set-theoretic terms in the theoretical framework for this study, the following 
operationalisations are focused on the measurement related aspects of the strategies. 
Defection (as the issue-level counterpart of a two-dimensional strategy) is technically 
operationalised as the predominant usage of a frame that is not the one identified as the frame that fits the 
respective party family’s ideology best. In other words, the party is defecting if the majority of the norms, 
labels, causal narratives and policy suggestions it refers to are members of a set of norms, labels, causal 
narratives and policy suggestions (i.e. a policy frame) that is not in line with the party’s ideology, but rather 
in line with the national interest or tradition. A party will be considered blurring if it frames an issue by 
making use of norms, labels, causal narratives and policy suggestions from at least two different frames, 
with the framing units attributed to the secondary frame used making up at least 20 per cent of the overall 
framing efforts of the party. The 20 per cent threshold is chosen so as not to confuse potential 
measurement error with purposeful blurring. The prism strategy (as the issue-level counterpart of a uni-
dimensional strategy) is operationalised as the absence of both blurring and defection. 
Given that subsuming was defined as the rather original and innovative way of framing an issue, it 
will not be possible to detect it directly by a technique using pre-identified categories. Nevertheless there 
are ways for a coder to notice subsuming when he or she sees it. Obviously, hand-coding is about actual 
reading of the texts to be coded, so that the researcher will simply recognize statements that are 
innovatively framed. Indeed, it turned out that subsuming also tends to lower the reliability measured at 
the document level, as different coders tend to disagree on how to categories the innovative elements. As 
was already expected in the theory chapter, MEPs tend not to be frame entrepreneurs and thus subsuming 
is a rather rare phenomenon. 
For each of the other three strategies, a csQCA will be carried out, with the respective strategy 
being treated as the outcome to be explained. As for the conditions explaining these outcomes, only the 
issue-level conditions of uncertainty and politicisation will be held constant, as they apply to all parties 
equally. The other conditions have to be separately specified for each of the three policy issues, as any 
more general operationalisation would run counter to the argument made above that national interests 
cannot be adequately operationalised in terms of such general conceptions as net-payer or net-recipient of 
the overall EU budget. In terms of national interests induced by cross-national distribution, for instance, it 
needs to be discussed in context which country can be expect to gain or lose from a given policy. 
Likewise, national traditions should be identified inasmuch as they are of relevance with regard to a 
particular issue. In the discussion on case selection at the micro-level (Section 3.2), some key points in this 
respect have already been made and will be pointed out in the respective chapters on Europeanised 
welfare, CAP and TTIP. 
Similarly, it was argued earlier that ideology operationalised numerically in terms of ‘positions’ 
on Left-Right or new politics scales do not capture the actual nature of ideology as a set of ideas shared 
transnationally within the various party families. That said, in order to keep the solution terms produced 
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by csQCA parsimonious and interpretable, it might be helpful to summarise the membership of several 
party families within just one or two conditions, rather than treating (non-)membership in each family as a 
separate condition. The important difference to extant studies will nevertheless be, that even if such a 
condition should distinguish rather classically between Left and Right, this operationalisation will be 
grounded in a case-based argumentation regarding the features shared by ideologies of the Left and Right 
as sets of ideas. 
Other conditions that should be included to control for them are government participation, 
committee membership and regional electoral incentives. The first of these, government participation, is 
operationalised based on the Political Data Yearbook.23 In the UK, Austria, France, and Ireland, the 
parties in government have remained the same for more or less the whole period studied, so that the 
operationalisation is very straightforward and stays the same for every case. Since the results of the PFA 
are not differentiated on a time scale, so as to generate enough data for every party, the changes in 
government cannot be directly taken into account for the remaining two countries, i.e. Germany and 
Italy.24 
In Germany, the CDU/CSU changed its coalition partner from the FDP to the SPD as a result 
of the elections in September 2013. For the debate on Europeanised welfare as well as for TTIP, the SPD 
is thus considered a part of the government and the FDP is not, whereas for the CAP, the reverse is 
coded. This issue-specific difference is due to the slight differences in the timing of the debates despite the 
already limited time frame selected for the study as a whole: the debate on CAP Reform started in 2010 at 
the latest and was more or less concluded in December 2013. Hence most statements issued on this 
debate will be made under the CDU/CSU/FDP government. Since the debate on TTIP as well as on 
welfare really took off only in the second half of 2013 but lasted into 2014, the opposite is true for those 
two issues. 
Inasmuch as the Italian parties in the sample are concerned, the only question is whether or for 
which issues the Forza Italia (including under the other party labels such as Popolo della Libertà) should 
be considered as a part of the government. They entered government in April 2013 and left in February 
2014. For CAP and Europeanised welfare, it is therefore considered ‘in’, since the resolution on 
Europeanised welfare was passed in January 2014 and the CAP reform more or less completed in 2013. 
All statements that were collected from Forza Italia MEPs regarding TTIP were issued after the party had 
left government in 2014, which is why it is coded ‘out’ for this issue. 
While in the theory of territorialisation (see Chapter 2), committee membership was not 
expected to influence party’s framing strategies after all with regard to highly politicised issues, it should 
nevertheless be controlled for. In order to operationalise it, I draw on the list of committees, their 
                                                     
23 http://www.politicaldatayearbook.com  
24 In fact, even in the case of CAP Reform, concerning which some first press releases were issued as early as 2009 
(which are not in the eventual data-set but were still collected), significant changes in framing over time did not 
become visible. 
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members and substitutes, from the European Parliament’s official archive.25 Parties will be considered as 
disposing of the expertise coming with committee membership if they have a member or a substitute 
member in the committees specialized on the respective issue. These committees are the Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) committee regarding 
the debate on Europeanised welfare, the Agricultural and Rural Development (AGRI) committee in the 
case of the CAP Reform,26 and the International Trade (INTA) committee in the case of TTIP. 
Finally, it was noted that under specific circumstances, national electoral rules might influence 
MEPs’ incentive structures, e.g. if an electoral pay-off could be expected by adhering to a regional, rather 
than a national interest. While in general all national electoral rules applying to EP elections must 
eventually respect the principle of proportional representation, Ireland, the UK, France, and Italy divide 
their territory into several constituencies, while in Germany this applies only to the internal party list of 
the CDU/CSU (Bux 2015). For several reasons, it would not seem helpful, however, to generally include a 
condition about ‘regional electoral incentives’ in the csQCA. First of all, the potential effect of such 
incentives is already countered whenever the data collected is collectively issued by the national party 
delegation and thus can be considered representative of the delegation as a whole. Second, this 
representativeness would also be ensured by triangulation, while parties that explicitly follow a regional 
interest (with the exception of the CSU) have been excluded from the sample for this very reason in the 
first place. Hence it seems more advisable to treat this aspect as background knowledge to be put to use, 
for instance, in order to resolve contradictory configurations. 
The solution formulas obtained for the various framing strategies by means of QCA can then be 
compared to the observable implications derived from the theory of territorialisation with regard to each 
policy issue. Thereby it can be explored, in how far not only the result for the overall structure of conflict 
was in line with the theoretical expectations, but also whether it was correct for the right reasons. To the 
knowledge of the author, it will thus be analysed for the first time, up to which point national party 
delegations in the EP can actively shape the structure of conflict, rather than simply responding to 
structural constraints.27 As a final step, the results concerning the structure of conflict and individual 
party’s decisions can then be compared to voting results, while recalling that the latter are subject to very 
different institutional constraints noted earlier, as well as to results obtained otherwise in the literature. 
                                                     
25 Accessed on 22 May 2016 via 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parlArchives/comArch/com7.do;jsessionid=1BFD87515071B6002395FC1CB1D8
ACE8.node1?language=EN  
26 Including further committees for their advisory role here would mean to include so many committees that the 
condition of expertise might basically become omnipresent. 
27 As is argued in Chapter 2, Ringe (2010) simply seems to imply that their capacity to do so is unlimited. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
In this Chapter, two main points were made regarding a suitable approach for addressing the question, 
under what conditions MEPs express and justify their policy preferences in such a way that the structure 
of conflict becomes territorial rather than ideological. First, concerning the choice of a research design, the 
extant literature relies too much on quantitative methods alone. Their merits notwithstanding, these 
methods hardly allow for an adequate operationalisation of national interests and ideology, for which a 
higher degree of familiarity with both policy issues (macro-level) and party (micro-level) would be 
required. The few cases of qualitative designs applied so far, however, tend not to relate their case studies 
to any broader concept of national interests and define it entirely on a case-by-case basis. Hence I have 
argued in favour of a qualitative-comparative research design, to be applied to only three policy issues and 
a subgroup of parties, yet always with reference to one explicit and shared conception of national interests. 
The respective case selection was explained then in some detail. 
Second, the extant literature on the EP did not provide a method for the analysis of the reasons 
parties give – conceptualised here as ‘framing’ – that would be applicable to a small but multilingual data-
set of texts intended for rather direct communication between MEPs and their voters. I have thus 
suggested an elaborated version of Radulova’s Policy Frame Analysis (PFA), taking inspiration from the 
hand-coding of quasi-sentences as applied in the CMP project. This method can then be applied to (web-
based) press releases issued by, ideally, national party delegations, even if this means that these press 
releases are written in the respective native language. Finally, I have pointed out how the measurement 
results thus obtained and the other conditions not captured by case selection criteria could be 
operationalised. 
In conclusion, it can hence be noted that the various decisions taken in order to resolve the 
deficits of the extant literature with regard to the purposes of the present project can be justified each on 
its own grounds. In addition, however, with hindsight it should now also become clear that the various 
justifications not only are compatible with, but even reinforce each other: For instance, the hand-coding 
approach chosen to analyse a multilingual data-set of texts would also in turn require a smaller number of 
policy issues and parties, while restricting the set of countries to the languages sufficiently known to the 
researcher increases the familiarity with these countries and their respective cultural idiosyncrasies etc.  
The overall approach presented here therefore appears suitable meaningfully complementing the extant 
literature by following a different but consistent line of reasoning, apt in particular to address the 
aforementioned research question, without necessarily questioning the value of prior studies in their own 
right. 
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4. The Europeanisation of Welfare 
This chapter presents the first case study on conflict in the European Parliament intended for evaluating the theory 
of territorialisation (ToT) presented earlier and is meant to demonstrate in particular the capacity of parties for 
avoiding defection under uncertainty. First, some background information on this case, namely the Europeanisation 
of welfare, is provided, such that its features as a case are fully understood and the justification of its selection is 
corroborated: most importantly, the issue is characterised by some potential for cross-national distribution, which 
however was highly uncertain at the time of the public debate. This is followed by the first step of the Policy Frame 
Analysis conducted to eventually measure the structure of the conflict as well as parties’ communication strategies: 
five possible policy frames on the question of welfare access for intra-EU migrants are identified from secondary 
literature, so as to lay the basis for the codebook applied to the press releases issued by national party delegations to 
the EP on the issue (Section 2). These frames combine the attitudes on migration as identified by Roos with 
discourses on welfare, which in turn are inspired by Esping-Andersen’s classic typology. The third section then 
specifies the relationship between the general characteristics of the policy issue for the sample of parties selected. It 
does so by first pointing out the interests of the parties’ countries of origin and then formulates the respective 
expectations based on classic theories before turning to the observable implications of the theory of territorialisation. 
Thereafter, Section 4 discusses the results of the PFA with regard to the structure of conflict observed, a descriptive 
summary of the usage of the various frames and a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on the various party 
strategies (defection, blurring, and subsuming). As it is found, the structure of conflict is overwhelmingly ideological, 
as the theory of territorialisation would have suggested. At the micro-level, the usage of the various framing 
strategies largely fits this theoretical framework: parties generally stick with their own ideologies, but in most cases 
make use of ‘blurring’ in the wider sense in order to reach out to a larger set of voters, which confirms the role of 
politicisation assumed in the theory. Unexpectedly, participation in government seems to lead some parties to adopt 
defection strategies. Noteworthy, however, these choices do not seem to be related to any potential national interest 
in distributional terms, but rather to the respective parties’ roles within the governing coalition in terms of (not) 
controlling the social affairs ministry. Arguably, these exceptions are due to the technical expertise concerning 
information on the respective national situation some governing parties have access to, an aspect of the issue that 
borders on the scope conditions of the ToT. In addition, it is found that far Right parties tend to subsume the 
problem definitions and causal narratives of other actors deemed unsuspicious of racism under their general, much 
more radical framing. Most parties generally emphasise the constitute and cognitive dimensions of policy frames 
rather than the policy dimension, which further indicates that they are well aware of the risk of scaring off voters by 
calling for policies that involving outright cross-national distribution. Similarly, roll-call votes on the respective EP 
resolution also show that the structure of conflict is absolutely ideological, even beyond the six countries covered in 
the PFA, and further that the most controversial votes concerned those aspects of the resolution concerned with 
problem definition. Hence, the structure of conflict cannot simply be seen as a result of a blindfold transfer of 
ideological policy preferences on welfare from domestic politics to the EU-level, but rather that it is indeed 
uncertainty that allows parties to avoid goal conflict by framing. As it is concluded in Section 5, therefore, MEPs are 
indeed able and willing to ‘relativise’ potential or at least alleged national interests under uncertainty. It was not just 
this general result that can be accounted for by the theoretical framework presented in this study, but also how 
exactly they are able to make use of the leeway left by uncertainty. Indeed, it could be shown also that this theory of 
territorialisation provides a more accurate account of the respective causal mechanisms than earlier approaches. 
Noteworthy, doing so was only possible in this detail by means of a case-study approach at the macro-level and by 
familiarity with the parties, as well as by analysing conflict by means of Policy Frame Analysis: The theory of 
territorialisation may, to some extent, have predicted the outcome of the roll-call vote on the resolution on free 
movement, but the effect of uncertainty would not have been as directly observed as when studying the parties’ 
framing efforts. 
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4.1 EU social policy and the Europeanisation of national welfare systems 
This section provides background information on EU social policy and the Europeanisation of national welfare 
systems. As it is argued, the limited scope of EU social policy does not mean that, legally speaking, the national 
welfare systems would not be accessible to intra-EU migrants at all. Before this background, it is then possible to 
understand the characteristics of the debate on what is pejoratively called ‘welfare tourism’ as a case for this study. 
The question of welfare access for intra-EU migrations received an enormous public attention (i.e. politicisation) in 
late 2013, when the restrictions on free movement for citizens of Romania and Bulgaria were about to be lifted for 
good: with national welfare systems not entirely closed off and a discrepancy in GDP per capita without precedent 
for countries having joined the EU, the prospect of indirect cross-national distribution appeared theoretically 
relevant. Since however the exact legal conditions for receiving welfare in a host country are far from entirely certain 
at this point, and even less so at the time of the debate, and since further it is still a matter of academic debate in how 
far welfare might act as a pull factor for migrants at all, these distributional effects should considered as highly 
uncertain. In addition, the intra-national distributional effects of ‘welfare tourism’ should be considered negligible, 
since both recipients and contributors to national welfare schemes in the native population stand to lose from it, 
while the intra-EU migrants themselves could hardly constitute an electoral compensation for national parties 
engaging in their favour. As I conclude, the debate on Europeanised welfare thus forms an ideal test case for the 
theory of territorialisation in general and the interplay between structural conditions – here: uncertainty of cross-
national distributional effects – and party strategies for avoiding goal conflict in particular. As moreover a brief 
account of more or less issue-specific extant literature shows, comparable cases have not been studied so far. 
The limited meaning of social policy at the EU-level 
In order to understand what ‘social policy’ means at the EU-level and what it does not, one must take 
notice of what European integration has meant for the bigger part of its histry, namely the creation of a 
common market for goods, labour, services, and capital. Before this background, it might not be as 
‘paradoxical’ as Falkner (2007, 273) claims, that “the sole explicit Community competence for social policy 
regulation under the original EC Treaty was not in the part of the Treaty that dealt explicitly with social 
policy” (ibid.), but rather in the part on free movement of goods, labour, services, and capital. Article 48 
of the Treaty provided for non-discrimination of workers on grounds of nationality with regard to 
employment, wages, and other working conditions. In order to implement the free movement of workers, 
the Community was given competence to adopt respective measures in the field of social security, and 
indeed several EC regulations were adopted so as to protect internationally mobile workers and their 
families (ibid. 2007, 276). Legally speaking, according to Falkner, the common market provisions would 
have left further room for manoeuvre allowing for harmonization of social policies, yet the fact that 
unanimity was required in the Council largely prevented it politically (ibid. 2007, 273). At the same time, 
the principle of non-discrimination for workers and their families, especially as it was further specified in 
Regulation 1612/68 (cf. Barnard 2007, 286), certainly formed a first towards step the Europeanisation of 
national welfare systems as it is discussed below. 
While the Treaty of Maastricht changed the provisions on social policy, with the UK insisting on 
an opt-out from the latter, and the number of directives in this area increased rapidly, their scope still 
mainly includes what at the national level is referred to as ‘labour law’ (ibid. 2007, 275–78): working 
conditions, equal opportunities in the work sphere, occupational health and safety, social inclusion (see 
also: Kleinman 2002, 111). As Kleinman consequently notes, what constitutes social welfare policy at the 
national level is at best sidelined at the EU-level (ibid.). This holds even if the European Social Fund 
4. The Europeanisation of Welfare 
124 
(ESF) is taken into account. As Falkner argues: “Its aims are narrower than its name suggests as they 
concern only labour market policy and mostly target specific regions” (ibid. 2007, 280; see also: Kleinman 
2002, 85). Noteworthy also, the budget allocated to it was very small compared to that of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Kleinman 2002, 85).28 Nevertheless, the ambition to strengthen what Falkner 
calls ‘the EU’s social dimension’ as a part of the Maastricht Treaty can be seen as an element of a more 
general goal, namely “to give integration a more human face” (Kleinman 2002, 86). Another element 
arguably was the creation of Citizenship of the European Union, which indirectly would prove much 
more decisive in the kind of Europeanisation of national welfare systems that is of interest here. 
The Europeanisation of national welfare states 
Nowadays, the concept of Europeanisation is commonly considered to include a bottom-up component, 
where national actors ‘upload’ their preferences to see them realised at the EU-level, as well as a top-down 
perspective, where EU-level decisions impact on the national level (cf. Börzel 2005). On the one hand, the 
aforementioned limitations of EU-level social policy are a consequence of the uploading of the Member 
States’ preferences for not shifting competences to the EU-level in this field beyond those needed to 
guarantee the functioning of the common market. On the other hand, national welfare systems are 
affected in many different ways by EU-level decisions: indirectly, for instance, by the very fact that there is 
a common market that amongst others allows for the free movement of capital, as well as quite directly as 
a result of the Crisis, namely when budgetary discipline is enforced. What is meant by Europeanisation of 
national welfare systems here, however, is much narrower, namely that while the literally national welfare 
systems may not be fused, they nonetheless are partly opened to European non-nationals. 
As was mentioned above, a first step into this direction was made with Council Regulation 1612/68/EC, 
in that workers and their families were given access to national welfare systems so as to foster the free 
movement of workers provided for in the Treaty. With the Treaty of Maastricht and the resulting 
establishment of ‘Union citizenship’, however, a gradual process was set in motion, decisively driven via a 
number of rulings by the European Court of Justice, which has at least partly decoupled the (social) rights 
of intra-EU migrants from their status as workers (Barnard 2007, 250; Hailbronner 2007b). This process 
shall be briefly reviewed here, so as to get an idea of the legal status quo at the time the debate on ‘welfare 
tourism’ started. 
What became Article 17 of the Treaty establishing the European Community with the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1992, provided that any citizens of an EU Member State shall likewise be a citizen of the 
Union. Article 18 then declared the right to free movement for Union citizens, which appeared not to 
bring much of an innovation (Hailbronner 2007b, p. 314). Noteworthy, this right was subject to 
limitations given in other Treaty provisions as well as secondary law. As Hailbronner notes, however: 
                                                     
28 In fact, scholars such as Rieger (2005) and Altomonte and Nava (2005) have argued that the Common Agricultural 
Policy can be seen as a kind of social policy. However, since this is the subject of a later chapter and further has no 
relevance as background information for the debate on Europeanised welfare, I do not take it into account here. 
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In a series of decisions, starting with Sala and Grzelczyk, the Court declared that ‘Union citizenship is 
destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Members States’, implying that, in its opinion, 
the principle of equal treatment extends to all citizens of the Union, subject only to such exceptions as 
explicitly provided for. (ibid., 2007b, p. 314) 
Indeed, in its ruling on Sala, the Court granted social rights such as child benefits in Germany to a 
Portuguese national who in fact did neither qualify as a worker nor possess sufficient resources to be 
entitled to free movement as a non-economically active EU citizen. In doing so, it further referred to the 
principle of non-discrimination (Art. 12 EC) for citizens residing legally in another Member State. 
According to Chalmers et al. (2006, 599), the Court thereby opened the door to welfare tourists. 
The Court invoked these principles again in its ruling on Grzelczyk, where it also held that the 
expulsion of citizens could not be an automatic consequence of an EU citizen’s reliance on social benefits 
in a host Member State. In addition, however, the Grzelczyk ruling contained the criterion that a Union 
citizen searching for a job would be entitled to unemployment benefits in the host Member State if there 
exists a ‘genuine link’ between the EU citizen and the country in question (Hailbronner 2007a, 316–17). 
Before this background, Hailbronner (ibid.) notes that the Court has never denied that there might be 
limitations and sometimes established new ones itself, such as the ‘genuine link’. 
Similarly, Barnard has interpreted the ‘genuine link’ condition as well as the requirement of a 
certain period of residence in the host country as applied in the Bidar case as indications of the Court’s 
“awareness of the sensitivities of the issue, in particular concerns about ‘benefit tourism’” (ibid. 2007, 
458). This awareness might be further demonstrated by the fact that the Court has taken up the latter term 
explicitly in its judgement on the Trojani case and in its Opinion on Bidar as “moving to a Member State 
with a more congenial social security environment” (ibid. 2007, 458). Other scholars, however, have read 
these rulings in a rather contrary manner. 
Chalmers et al., for instance, interpret the Bidar ruling quite differently, namely as “the most 
extraordinary example of judicial activism” and as an instance of “[t]he insistence by the Court of Justice 
that any citizen lawfully resident in another Member State has a right to the same social benefits as the 
state’s own nationals”, leading to a ‘nested social citizenship’ (ibid. 2006, 600–601). Similarly, Hailbronner 
(2007a) holds:  
The most remarkable feature of the Court’s reasoning is that it seems to have no hesitation in attributing 
to Community law a different meaning from the one that would follow from an interpretation on the 
basis of the objective wording of the provision, its systematic context and its purpose. (ibid. 2007a, 319) 
He also concludes that the Court has established a kind of social citizenship for intra-EU migrants (ibid. 
2007a, 317). In fact, the rulings mentioned above have not only at times run counter to earlier ones, but 
also to secondary law (ibid. 2007a, 315–16). Directive 2004/38/EC, adopted under the co-decision 
procedure (i.e. with the EP as a veto-player), was meant to clarify the situation by turning case law into 
statute law. 
The main elements of this Directive, also known as the Citizens’ Rights Directive (CRD) can be 
easily summarised: within the first three months of their stay, all Union citizens have the right of 
residence. After that, however, citizens who are not economically active must be able to sustain 
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themselves and have health insurance. After five years, they obtain the right to permanent residence 
(Hailbronner 2007a, 320). During the first three months, the host Member State is not “obliged to extend 
social assistance . . . generally, or, where appropriate, for the longer period in which those seeking 
employment are entitled to remain, as long as they are continuing to look for work and have a genuine 
chance of being engaged” (ibid. 2007a, 322). Seemingly, the result should be that no redistribution would 
result from EU citizens’ enjoyment of free movement, as they either would not be entitled to assistance in 
the beginning of their stay or thereafter would have to fulfil conditions that meant to prevent reliance on 
assistance. 
However, the CRD takes up the jurisprudence of the Court that was summarised above, and 
often does so word-for-word (Hailbronner 2007a, 322) – and thus remains equally unclear. This applies, 
for instance, to the concept of an ‘unreasonable burden’: If a Union citizen, allowed to reside in a host 
country during the first three months does not fulfil the conditions of being able to sustain himself or 
herself in the ways foreseen (employment, self-employment, sufficient means), he or she can thereafter 
not be expelled simply on the grounds of requiring welfare benefits, but only if he or she becomes an 
‘unreasonable burden’ on the host social system. As Hailbronner points out, proving an individual citizen 
to be an unreasonable burden will be difficult in practice (ibid. 2007a, 322–23). He even holds: “In case of 
disputes, courts, however, are unlikely to have many choices other than granting a residence right to a 
Union citizen who is for one reason or another dependent upon social welfare” (ibid. 2007a, 323). The 
possibility of ‘welfare tourism’, therefore, cannot be totally ruled out on legal ground so far. Similarly, 
Chalmers et al. conclude:  
As the sources of entitlements are many, with each responding to developments prompted by the other, it 
is impossible to point out an overall ideology defining which social entitlements should be granted to EU 
citizens. And this, in many ways, is EU citizenship’s greatest weakness. In return for the grant of citizens’ 
rights to non-nationals, it has sacrificed any kind of overall scheme or programme that could act as a 
totem or symbol informing the Union’s citizens how the Union enfranchises them and why it does so. 
(ibid. 2006, 602) 
This also shows that, from the citizens’ point of view, it will be hard to determine their chances of 
receiving benefits. 
On top of this, by the end of 2008, when the transposition period for the CRD was officially 
over, the Commission noted that no Member State had implemented the CRD effectively, and nowhere 
was transposition entirely correct. A number of legal proceedings followed (Ferrera 2012, pp. 268-269). 
The correct implementation of national measures to prevent welfare tourism in particular has long been a 
matter of public as well as expert discussions. It was only in May 2014 that the Advocate General of the 
Court of Justice issued an opinion saying that Member States can deny benefits to welfare tourists (Pop 
2014), which was later confirmed by the Court’s official ruling (Kröger 2014). This has not, however, 
prevented further legal proceedings against national authorities (bos/tbw/Reuters 2015), nor experts 
calling the conformity of specific measures with European law into question (e.g. O'Brien 2015). As a 
result, it can be safely argued that at the time the debate started and throughout the period studied here 
(i.e. until the European elections held in May 2014), there was a considerable degree of legal uncertainty 
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surrounding the question of welfare access for intra-EU migrants. While there might have been 
differences in implementation across countries, none of them, it would seem, could be sure to have 
adopted measures sufficient to prevent welfare tourism without constituting a breach of EU law. 
Welfare as an economic incentive for intra-EU migration? 
In federal systems such as Belgium and Canada, social policy – and welfare in particular – is a regular issue 
of contention, not least because of its openly redistributive effects (Béland and Lecours 2005; Béland and 
Lecours 2007). While the EU is considered a quasi-federal entity by some (Börzel and Hosli 2002), it was 
pointed out above that there is no common welfare policy at the EU-level that political actors from richer 
Member States could denounce as ‘excessive’ in the way actors from the – wealthy – Belgian region of 
Flanders do (Béland and Lecours 2005, 684; Cantillon, Mussche, and Popelier 2011). At the same time, 
due to the Europeanisation of national welfare systems, the latter are not completely closed off either. 
Noteworthy, while in systems with federal welfare the inhabitants of poorer states can rather easily receive 
benefits that are disproportionally financed by the citizens of other the wealthier state(s), there are 
considerable hurdles here in the EU. Whereas the exact nature of these hurdles may be legally uncertain, 
as I have shown above, migration to a wealthier Member State is an obvious requirement.29 Hence, cross-
national distribution due to welfare tourism will only occur to the extent that potential tourists are willing 
to make the effort. 
In how far, then, do welfare prospects actually attract migrants? Barrett and McCarthy (2008) 
review a number of studies on this question, some of which have included theoretical models arguing that 
more generous welfare systems might be highly attractive directions for migrants, and for the low-skilled 
ones in particular. While such effects were found in all three studies under review, they tended to be very 
small, statistically not significant or barely so. Indeed, it would appear that other factors such as the 
existence of ethnic networks in the recipient country are more important, as the authors of the review 
argue. It should also be noted that the effect of wages on location choice was shown to be ten times 
higher than that of welfare (ibid. 2008, 545). Given this latter aspect in particular, it would seem only 
straightforward that several studies have found migrants to contribute more to national welfare systems 
than they take out: this has been argued for migrants in general for the case of Germany (Bonin 2014), for 
the specific case of Central and Eastern European intra-EU migrants in the UK (Dustmann, Frattini, and 
Halls 2009; Springford 2013) and for intra-EU migrants in the EU as a whole (Juravle et al. 2013). While 
of course this does not mean that there is no welfare tourism at all, intra-EU migration could not be 
shown to harm national welfare systems, but instead were beneficial to them. Noteworthy, however, these 
studies were consciously chosen here as studies relying (for obvious reasons given their publication dates) 
on pre-2014 data. I thus explicitly ignore any later studies so as to identify what political actors and 
                                                     
29 Even in order to receive family allowances at least one member of the family would have to migrate. 
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citizens could know by referring to the economic state of the art at the time of the 2013 debate on welfare 
tourism. 
The reason for doing so is, that the knowledge gained in this manner might not be perfectly 
transferable to the situation when Romanian and Bulgarian citizens were given the full right to free 
movement in January 2014. This is because this situation, to some extent, constituted a precedent. 
Romania and Bulgaria are poorer than the rest of the EU, but this is not the main point: At several 
instances throughout its history, the European Community (later European Union (EU)) has been joined 
by countries that were poorer than the average of the existing membership. Of the nine countries that 
joined the EU prior to the Eastern enlargement, Ireland (accession in 1973), Greece (1981), Spain and 
Portugal (both 1986) have been entitled to Cohesion Funds, available for states with a per capita GDP of 
less than 90 per cent of the EU average (Bourne 2007, p. 295). When however the first cohort of Central 
and Eastern European countries joined in 2004, all of them would have been entitled to the maximum of 
structural funding in addition to similarly voluminous payments from the Common Agricultural Policy 
(ibid.). In the past, some alleviation was achieved by means of such subsidies, yet while the challenges 
have been growing with each accession, levels of Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds have been 
dropping (cf. ibid. 2007, p. 296). Indeed, considering the current situation of budgetary austerity 
throughout Europe, an increase in the near future seems highly unlikely. 
Given the lack of alleviation of poverty by means of EU policy within these countries, citizens of 
these countries might in principle be motivated to make use of their right to free movement to escape 
poverty. In order to limit the scale of this phenomenon, interim restrictions on free movement for some 
of these countries were implemented by a number of existing Member States, primarily intended for 
preventing labour market distortions due to wage differences. Indeed, by the time these final restrictions 
were removed, the 2004-accession countries concerned had considerably caught up. While similar 
restrictions had been imposed for Romania and Bulgaria (accession in 2007) until January 2014, by 2012 
these countries had reached a level of GDP per capita that was barely half of the EU28-average (Eurostat 
2016b). Due to these discrepancies, politically influential economists such as the German Hans-Werner 
Sinn have pointed out that a life on welfare payments in one of the rich countries may yield two to three 
times the average employment-generated income in the Romania or Bulgaria (Sinn 2013). He predicted 
that this would necessarily lead to a mass immigration from these states into Germany, ‘eroding’ the 
latter’s welfare system (ibid. 2013). While of course these predictions might have taken the specific 
economic features of Romania and Bulgaria into account, they were essentially theoretical predictions that 
at the point of their publication could not be tested directly by empirical means. 
Case characteristics of the debate on ‘welfare tourism’ 
Given that the general link between welfare and territorial identity can be easily used for purposes of 
political mobilization (Béland and Lecours 2005), and given that due to the Crisis, not only a general 
awareness of EU politics but also of identity issues within the EU was fostered, it should not come as a 
surprise to find that the debate on welfare tourism became so highly politicised in late 2013, in that it was 
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turned into a major campaigning issue (Debating Europe 2013; European Parliament 2014),  and was 
picked up regularly even by the yellow press (e.g. Hoeren 2014). Its status as a campaigning issue might 
not have been the only reason the EP adopted a resolution on the matter in January 2014 (European 
Parliament 2014): After all, the EP had been a full co-legislator concerning the Citizens’ Rights Directive, 
and could hence be expected to be involved in any future changes to the CRD. The debate on welfare 
access for intra-EU migrants thus fulfils the criteria in terms of conditions to be held constant for the 
cases of policy issues under study here in terms of politicisation, timing, and EP competence. 
Whereas I have made these points on politicisation, timing, and EP competence in Chapter 3 
already, in the present chapter I have provided background information on the legal and economic 
perspectives on welfare tourism that can be summarised as follows. Arguably, since legally speaking, 
national welfare systems are not entirely closed to intra-EU migrants, and since economic incentives for 
(at least some of) them can be identified for trying to receive welfare payments in a richer host country, 
there is potential for cross-national distribution here. Accordingly, one might make arguments about the 
national interests of host countries in particular, and to some extent also about those of emigrant 
countries concerned. Importantly, however, these distributional effects are characterised further by what is 
in fact a dual uncertainty: First, it is legally uncertain both in how far migrants have access to national 
welfare systems of other countries without having contributed to them earlier as well as in how far 
Member States are able to deny them welfare entitlements by means of national legislation given the 
current EU-level legal framework. Second, it is economically uncertain in how far individual migrants, 
especially those from Romania and Bulgaria, are actually aware of and motivated by the prospect of 
welfare benefits abroad and in how far the full accession of these countries to the Schengen area might 
alter the prior net contribution of all intra-EU migrants. This dual uncertainty should provide the right 
kind of leeway to political parties for sticking with their respective ideology even in the face of potentially 
cross-national distribution.  
An interesting additional feature of this policy issue is, however, that its intra-national 
distributional effects are negligible. It is true, of course, that social policy in general and welfare in 
particular tends to involve intra-national distribution and for the way it does so constitute a typical case of 
Left-Right contestation at the domestic level (Treib 2010). This does not, however, apply to the issue of 
welfare tourism: On the one hand, those native citizens who do or at some point might depend on welfare 
spending would more or less directly find (or perceive they do) themselves in competition with the welfare 
tourists, especially in times of tight public budgets. On the other hand, those native citizens who 
contribute to the welfare system will be unwilling to contribute an even bigger portion of their income. 
Hence, the two blocs that usually struggle over the right amount of welfare spending might in this case 
agree that sharing it with migrants – especially with those who have never contributed. That is, provided 
that there is something like welfare tourism indeed and provided that the overall balance of intra-EU 
migration regarding the welfare state turns out negatively as a result. Inasmuch as migrants contribute 
more than they take, of course, both native recipients of and contributors to national welfare systems 
should approve of intra-EU migration. 
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Nevertheless, it might be argued that the distribution between the native population and the 
migrants already living in a host country is, in fact, intra-national and will have the respective political 
consequences, because some parties within the host countries have closer electoral ties to migrants than 
others. After all, it has been shown that immigrant parties in many countries, including four that the 
present studies is focussed on, that migrants regularly favour Left-wing parties over Right-wing parties 
(Wüst 2011a). Indeed, in European elections, EU citizens residing in another Member State are generally 
allowed to vote there (Bux 2015). At the same time, this needs to be qualified by a number of figures: In 
2012, only 2.7 per cent of the citizens residing in the Member States of the EU where living in a Member 
State that was not their home Member State (Eurostat 2013). In Germany, for instance, about 4.4 per cent 
of persons entitled to vote in the 2014 European elections were citizens of other EU Member States, 
which – for most of them – meant that they had the choice of voting either in Germany or in their 
country of origin (Egeler 2014). While it is difficult to obtain data on the number of non-nationals actually 
voting, Diehl and Wüst note that in the 2004 European elections, only 7 per cent of non-Germans entitled 
to vote did actually register for the election in Germany (2011, 49), albeit the German deadline for 
registration is comparatively lenient on a European scale (European Parliament). If this is transferred to 
the 4.4 per cent allowed to vote in the 2014 European elections, it sums up a total of 0.3 per cent of the 
electorate that could potentially be attracted by positions in favour of intra-EU migrants. Not all of those 
will, of course, be equally interested in the issue of welfare access. 
Moreover, even the party family that is most successful in attracting migrant votes will not be 
able to obtain all of these votes. As Jenny (2011) notes for the case of Austria, while the Greens are the 
most pro-immigrant party, it is the Social Democratic party who tends to get by far the biggest share of 
the immigrant vote, namely 41 per cent, while the Greens obtain only 19 per cent. While it may be safely 
assumed that Green parties in other European countries are also the most immigrant friendly parties in 
the system, the members of the Social Democratic family tend to obtain the highest vote-shares among 
immigrants in Germany (Wüst 2011b), the UK (Saalfeld 2011), and France (Tiberj 2011) as well. In other 
words, the most pro-immigrant stances do not even result in the maximum electoral pay-off among the 
immigrant electorate. 
Ironically, while Social Democrats are apparently highly popular among immigrants, Alonso and 
da Fonseca (2012) have argued, that pro-immigrant positions are likely to appeal to at best the liberal-
minded, socio-cultural elite within their core electorate, whereas such positions might not resonate well 
with its working class voters. They further find that Social Democratic parties might thus become more 
anti-immigrant for vote-seeking reasons, especially if there is competition from the far Right (ibid.) – 
which is the case in all countries under study here. Inasmuch as welfare tourism actually threatens the 
welfare state, one might expect this effect to be even stronger. In sum, only very few additional votes 
could be gained from immigrant voters at all, and these would most likely come at the much higher price 
of losing native working class voters. 
Consequently, inasmuch as they exist at all, intra-national distributional effects could hardly be 
the cause of an ideologically structured conflict in the present case. Instead, given the cross-national 
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distribution potentially resulting from welfare tourism, ideologically structured conflict over Europeanised 
welfare would arguably be the result of the dual uncertainty characterising the issue. It is this uncertainty 
which according to the theory of territorialisation could provide the MEPs in their respective national 
delegations with the necessary leeway for avoiding territorialisation by means of strategic framing. This is 
what makes this case particularly interesting for testing the value of the aforementioned theory. 
Extant research on conflict over EU social policy and migration 
The extant literature on conflict in EU politics has, to the knowledge of the author, not examined the 
issue of welfare access for intra-EU migrants as a case in its own right. On the one hand, Treib (2010) has 
studied determinants of conflict concerning social policy among the actors – national governments, 
MEPs, national parliamentarians – involved in the Convention on the future of Europe taking place in the 
early 2000s. He finds that party ideology is the most important factor in shaping cleavages on social policy, 
followed by national interests in terms of the regulatory status quo and the related national traditions and 
potential adaptation costs, and that such national interests are represented mainly by actors adhering to 
government parties (independent of their role as parliamentarians or governments). His results are, 
however, not directly comparable, precisely because the debate on social policy at large includes regulatory 
standards, which are not as openly redistributive as welfare in the strict sense, tend to be less politicised 
(especially prior to the Crisis) and, inasmuch as they do involve distributional effects, these will be intra-
national as well (e.g. between employers and employees). 
On the other hand, Hix and Noury (2007) have studied the voting behaviour of MEPs on 
migration policy in the fifth EP (1999-2004), finding that political factors and party ideology in particular 
are most decisive, while economic interests are less important. Nevertheless, since their study is focussed 
on legislation that a. addresses migration by third country nationals, b. was not explicitly redistributive in 
the sense welfare is, and c. was passed before the Crisis, their results cannot be easily interpreted as 
predicting the structure of conflict on welfare access for intra-EU migrants. The analysis of this particular 
case is thus also a substantive contribution to the literature on these policy areas. 
4.2 Identification of possible policy frames 
This section points out how the possible policy frames were identified, namely by complementing Gosta Esping-
Andersen’s well-known typology of welfare by considerations on their implications for migrants’ access to the 
respective entitlements. The five frames identified in this manner are then briefly presented: Two rather extreme 
ones, excluding any or including all welfare rights for intra-EU migrants simply by their conceptions of nationality, 
and three more moderate frames that differ by their ideas of welfare policy in general, while not questioning the 
nation-state. They form the basis for the codebook used for the Policy Frame Analysis on the MEPs’ press releases. 
Their presentation at this point is further a necessary condition for formulating the observable implications of the 
present theoretical framework. 
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How the policy frames were identified 
An inductive identification of policy frames would seem difficult to reconcile with the goal of theory 
evaluation, as a bias introduced in the identification of frames would risk translating into biased overall 
results. At the same time, it will hardly be possible to identify the frames used in the 2013 debate on 
welfare tourism from extant literature one to one, given that the analysis was conducted so shortly after 
the time period studied. Hence, it will be necessary to integrate the lines of thought on both policy fields 
affected, namely welfare and migration. Thus, in order to identify the kinds of policy frames that might be 
used by parties for position taking on the question of welfare for migrants, this paper first and foremost 
draws on the work by Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990a). This is done not only because this work was 
absolutely seminal for the field of comparative welfare research. More importantly for the purpose of 
frame identification, Esping-Andersen’s categorisation includes detailed arguments on the logic behind the 
respective welfare regimes, helpful in identifying the normative, constitutive and cognitive dimensions of 
possible policy frames on welfare for migrants. In order to make these even more explicit, the paper 
further takes orientation from George and Wilding’s (1985) work on ideology and welfare, as there is a 
considerable ideational overlap between the logics of Esping-Andersen’s liberal, conservative and social-
democratic welfare regimes on the one hand, and George and Wilding’s anti-collectivist, reluctant 
collectivist and Fabian socialist approaches to welfare, on the other hand. 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes are an ideal starting point for the identification of frames 
since the different welfare regime types carry the labels of party political ideologies, while these labels are 
used to characterise welfare regimes prevailing in clusters of states. Identifying policy frames on this basis 
should thus be unbiased with regard to the question, whether ideological or territorial conflict is 
observable concerning the question of welfare for migrants, but should simply lead to a list of ways in 
which welfare policy can be thought. For instance, it would appear that, a priori, it is totally up to the 
German Social Democratic MEPs whether they decide to use the policy frame corresponding to the logic 
behind the social democratic welfare regime, thereby following their policy-seeking goals, or whether they 
will make use of the frame mirroring the logic of the conservative welfare regime prevailing in Germany, 
in doing so justifying restrictions on free movement so as to their vote-seeking interests. 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime types vary not only by their degree of de-commodification, 
i.e. the degree to which they make citizens independent from the market as the sole source of income, but 
also by their role in social stratification. The stratifying features of welfare may be of particular importance 
for migrants, as for instance policies following a conservative logic may disadvantage migrants 
considerably, precisely because conservative welfare tends to be generous towards those who ‘deserve’ it 
based on prior contributions. Yet the degree to which migrants are entitled to the same rights as nationals 
is only one feature of migration policy, the second policy area that matters for the issue at hand. 
In fact, as Roos notes, migration policy is first about admission to a potential host country, then 
about the rights of admitted migrants (ibid. 2013, 43–47). After all, if migrants are not even allowed to 
enter a country, the question of welfare access for them does not even arise. Vice versa, if nation-states 
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and national citizenship are not considered relevant any longer, any restrictions would seem unjustified. 
Not surprisingly then, the debate on ‘welfare tourism’ has arisen in the shadow of the fading out of 
restrictions on admission for Romanian and Bulgarian citizens. In order to capture the migration policy 
aspects of ‘welfare tourism’, therefore, Roos’s detailed work on policy preferences in the area of migration 
policy forms another source for identifying policy frames on welfare tourism. By complementing the 
logics of welfare policy behind Esping-Andersen’s typology with the relevant migration policy aspects, 
then, it should be possible to identify the frames used on welfare tourism a priori. As for the order in 
which these frames are presented and eventually numbered, it should be noted that ordering them from 
Left to Right or permissiveness to strictness is consciously avoided, since they are meant to constitute 
independent, policy-specific lines of thought. Instead, I will first present the two extreme frames, which 
simply by their understanding of migration pre-empt any discussion on welfare access, before turning to 
the adapted Esping-Andersen-based frames on national welfare for migrants. 
The possible policy frames on ‘welfare tourism’ 
A first possible frame would not even require a consideration of migrants’ social rights, but would simple 
stop admission of migrants completely. This frame may be used by those actors who consider immigration 
as a problem as such, because they are normatively attached to an exclusionary concept of national culture 
and identity. Open borders as they are aimed for within the Schengen area, obviously allow for 
immigration and might thus be identified as the source of the ‘immigration problem’ (Frame F1). At the 
other extreme, any treatment of individuals grounded in nationality may be labelled as an act of 
discrimination, running counter to human rights and/or EU fundamental rights. Thinking in terms of 
nation-states is at the root of such problematic policies, and should be abandoned for the sake of full 
equality of rights for nationals and (intra-EU) migrants. The first of these two frames justifies a policy that 
includes neither admission nor equal treatment for migrants, while the second demands both maximum 
admission and rights (Frame F2). In between these two extreme poles one might find three alternative 
policy frames corresponding to the logics of Esping-Andersen’s world of welfare, leading to five possible 
policy frames in total. 
Taking orientation from the liberal welfare regime, a third frame is built normatively speaking 
on maximum individual freedom. Hence, migration is not a problem from this perspective, as free 
movement across national borders quite obviously increases individual freedom. Moreover, it has the 
capacity to increase efficiency by improving the allocation of labour. Welfare schemes, by contrast, may 
easily lead to inefficiency if designed in a too generous fashion prone to decreasing incentives for taking 
up work. Next to the pragmatic consideration of efficiency, generous welfare requires high taxation, which 
in turn encroaches upon individual freedom. Welfare is thus almost a problem as such, while welfare for 
migrants may additionally turn the virtues of migration into a vice: migrants might then choose to migrate 
for the wrong reasons, thereby increasing the inefficiency of the welfare state. Such ‘welfare tourism’ 
would thus be a problem from this liberal perspective, and should be addressed by curbing welfare for 
migrants (if not in general). In order to reap the benefits of open borders, however, restrictions on 
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admission, for instance by changing the rules of the Schengen area, are rejected (Frame F3 or ‘liberal’ 
frame). 
From a conservative point of view (i.e. not necessarily referring to Conservative parties), 
‘welfare tourism’ constitutes an even bigger problem: It imposes a threat to the existing social order – 
valued as such by conservatives – in several ways. First, immigration may not be a problem as such, but is 
considered as a potential threat to order if occurring on a large scale. The prospect of becoming a welfare 
tourist might induce too many people to migrate. Second, if welfare payments can be obtained 
‘undeserved’, that is without having contributed to the scheme, this also threatens the existing economic 
order and might have redistributive implications generally avoided in conservative welfare regimes. Third, 
welfare tourism, if permitted, not only constitutes an equalization of workers and non-workers, but further 
of nationals and non-nationals, thereby questioning the concept of the nation-state and nationality as such. 
It is important to note here, that it is thus not necessarily the financial costs that welfare tourism might 
involve, and hence not necessarily the scale of welfare tourism, but its sheer existence that is problematic. 
Since it is the combination of open borders as well as the principle of non-discrimination that lead to 
‘welfare tourism’, and since neither policy would appear worth protecting as such to a conservative, both 
limits on admission of intra-EU migrants as well as on their rights appear as legitimate policies from this 
perspective (Frame F4). 
It might seem at first sight, that a frame in line with the social democratic welfare state would be 
equivalent to the cosmopolitan frame F2, at least if the idea of ‘universal’ access to welfare is taken 
literally. As however considerable progress in terms of equality and solidarity have been achieved at least 
to some extent by means of the national welfare state, the latter may now also be considered here as an end as 
such. Immigration would only be a problem in itself if it led to unfair competition, which however can be 
avoided by granting equal social rights to migrants. Welfare for migrants may in parts have a similar effect, 
and hence is welcome, also as an aspect of international solidarity. The limits of this solidarity might only 
become visible if welfare for migrants would threaten the welfare state as a whole. As long as this is not 
observed, e.g. because migration also increases the number of contributors to the welfare system, there 
would not be a problem in granting welfare to migrants. This differentiates this policy frame from the 
liberal and conservative ones, where already some ‘welfare tourism’ would be considered problematic. If 
anything, rather than limiting admission or cutting welfare for migrants, the welfare state is to be 
strengthened so as to cope with the new challenges (Frame F5). 
The logics behind these five policy frames form the basis for the codebook provided in the 
Annex II. Their presentation at this point is further a necessary condition for formulating the observable 
implications of the present theoretical framework. Table 7 provides an overview of their key features on 
the four dimensions that are part of every policy frame. 
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Table 7: Overview of possible policy frames on welfare access for intra-EU migrants 
frame What sort of values do 
you need in order to 
see this as a problem? 
(Normative 
dimension) 
What is the problem? 
(Constitutive 
dimension) 
What has led to the 
problem?  
(Cognitive dimension) 
What should be done 
about the problem? 
(Policy dimension) 
Nationalist 
(F1) 
National identity and 
community 
Immigration as the 
influx of ‘others’ 
Free movement policy Stop immigration 
Cosmopolitan 
(F2) 
Fundamental Rights, 
equality 
discrimination Nationalism, thinking 
in terms of nation-
states 
No more 
discrimination based 
on nationality 
Liberal 
(F3) 
Individual freedom Inefficient welfare 
arrangements increase 
tax burden 
Unconditional welfare 
for migrants sets the 
wrong incentives 
Allow free movement 
for efficient allocation 
of resources, restrict 
welfare 
Conservative 
(F4) 
Stability, order, 
tradition 
welfare tourism as a 
real concern 
(redistributive 
potential, mass 
immigration, 
elimination of status 
national/non-national) 
Loss of control over 
migrant rights 
Restrict welfare for 
migrants and/or 
restrict migration 
Social 
democratic 
(F5) 
Solidarity and equality, 
as embodied in the 
(national) welfare state 
There is no problem if 
or as long as there is 
no threat to the 
historical achievement 
of the welfare state 
Migrants potentially 
contribute to the social 
system 
Strengthen welfare 
authorities were 
necessary, otherwise 
no need for action 
 
4.3 Observable implications of the theoretical framework for the case 
This section first specifies the case characteristics for the sample of countries on which this study is focussed, namely 
Germany, Austria, France, Italy, the UK and Ireland. As I argue, four of these countries might potentially become 
‘host countries’ for welfare tourists, given that they already are attractive migratory destinations at the outset of the 
debate. By contrast, I hold, Ireland and to a lesser extent Italy might have incentives to favour full welfare access for 
migrants, given not only their history as emigrant countries but more importantly recent trends in these countries net 
emigration rates since the beginning of the Crisis. Moreover, it will be argued in some detail, why a further 
distinction according to welfare generosity is hardly possible given the complexity of national welfare provisions and 
not actually desirable given legal uncertainty of restrictions on welfare for migrants. At the same time, welfare 
regimes can be considered relevant national traditions that might potentially shape perceptions of the adequate 
welfare access for migrants, independent of what is actually the status quo in the country or the EU in general. 
Therefore, the six countries can be categorised as ‘host’ and ‘tourist’ countries and by the welfare regime they 
represent (following Esping-Andersen’s typology). The subsection then points out what the various extant theories 
discussed in Chapter 2 would expect with regard to the structure of conflict and which causal narrative they include 
in this respect. It starts with those theories predicting the most parsimonious outcome in terms of a completely 
ideological or territorial structure of conflict, for once these extreme scenarios have been pointed out in detail, it is 
easier to contrast them with the more nuanced ones. While some of the extant theories would, in fact, predict the 
same overall structure of conflict and two of them would even relate it to uncertainty, the third subsection then 
points out how the theory of territoriaisation (ToT) differs from these theories in terms of the exact causal narrative. 
Most importantly, the ToT expects uncertainty to provide the kind of leeway parties can exploit by framing, in that 
they evaluate the uncertain phenomenon in their own way and focus on the justification rather than concrete policy 
suggestions. In addition, in the face of politicisation, parties are expected to blur their own ideological frames with 
ideologically similar ones to broaden their electoral appeal, rather than blindly sticking to their own limited logics. 
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Specification of case characteristics for the sample of countries 
As I have explained in Chapter 3, this study is focussed on national parties and their delegations to the EP 
from just six countries only, namely Germany, Austria, the UK, Ireland, France, and Italy. Covering all 
countries would not be feasible, nor would the inclusion of the so-called New Member States from 
Central and Eastern Europe seem advisable due to a lack of comparability of their party families. For the 
present case study, this means that Romania and Bulgaria are not included, albeit it is citizens of these 
countries that are expected to increasingly become ‘welfare tourists’ after January 2014. Hence, it must be 
acknowledged that the set of countries that this study focuses on does not offer maximum variation with 
regard to potential winners and losers from welfare tourism. 
 
Figure 9: Net emigration as percentage of the overall population in the respective year. Source: Own calculations 
based on Eurostat data. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that this selection of countries displays no variation at all in this respect. 
The remaining variation can be understood as a consequence of the Crisis that hit the EU as of 2010. It is 
visualised in Figure 9 in terms of net emigration data, set in relation to the size of the respective overall 
population. Greece is included for illustration purposes here, as the country hit hardest by the Crisis, as 
well as Romania, whose citizens are expected to become welfare tourists after January 2014. As can be 
noted, then, the Crisis has affected the attractiveness of the various Member States, with some become 
more attractive migratory destinations, while others not only losing attractiveness for immigrants but even 
being left by considerable numbers of their own nationals. Whereas Germany and Austria have seen 
massive decreases in net emigration due to an increasing influx of immigrants, net emigration has 
remained rather stable in the UK and France, albeit in case of the former, it has been constantly and 
significantly negative. By contrast, net emigration from Ireland, a country hit directly by the Crisis, exhibits 
a sharp increase in its already positive net emigration. Similarly, while still experiencing more immigration 
than emigration, net emigration has been on the rise in Italy. Whereas this country did not have to be 
bailed out by the other members of the Eurozone, it still suffered from a rather slacking economy in these 
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years. Finally, it is worthwhile noting that a massively decreasing number of Romanians have been leaving 
their country, at least prior to January 2014. 
Based on these data it might be argued, that Ireland and Italy have much less or even no reason 
to denounce ‘welfare tourism’ as a problem and to curb welfare access for migrants compared to the other 
four countries in the sample for two reasons. First, they have become much less attractive apparently for 
migrants in general (not only from within the EU) than the other four (NB: In France, both emigration 
and immigration have been increasing). Second, due to the rather sharp increases in emigration by their 
own nationals, they might have an increasing interest in the eligibility of these migrants for other 
countries’ welfare programmes, rather than having these emigrants return in case of e.g. unemployment 
and relying on their home welfare system. In fact, while net emigration in Italy may still be much lower 
than in Ireland, the destinations of Italian citizens are primarily other European countries such as the UK, 
Germany, Switzerland and France (ISTAT 2013). For reasons of completeness, however, it must be noted 
that in the case of Ireland, the second aspect of this potential national interest cannot directly translate 
into a vote-seeking incentive, since Irish citizens residing outside their country are not allowed to vote in 
Ireland during European elections (Bux 2015). This does not lessen the potential effect of the first 
argument, nor does it preclude indirect effects of either friends and relatives taking emigrants’ interests 
into account or politicians portraying themselves as generally ‘fighting for our people abroad’. 
While thus there is at least some variation in terms of potential ‘welfare hosts’ and ‘welfare 
tourists’, it might further be considered, in how far there are differences between the host countries due to 
the varying degrees of ‘generosity’ of their welfare systems. As I point out with regard to some possible 
ways of operationalising this generosity, however, the complexity of national welfare systems means that 
such differences can hardly be operationalised in a valid manner. Given this complexity, such differences 
in generosity arguably should not be taken into account, because neither voters, nor welfare tourists, nor, for 
the most part, political actors will actually be able to estimate exactly how generous any national system 
really is. This is all the more true since the aforementioned legal uncertainty hovers above any national 
measure meant to reduce the risk of welfare tourism. 
Arguably, the easiest measure of generosity would consist in the proportion of the GDP spent 
on social protection. Following Eurostat, the list for 2011 would be led by Denmark, followed by France, 
the Netherlands, Belgium and – surprisingly – Greece, with Sweden following only considerably later, and 
the UK somewhat below the EU average. Noteworthy, for 2010 (when the crisis started in Greece), the 
list would have looked rather different, however, except for the two leading positions (Eurostat 2016a). It 
thus appears that this measure is very much subject to economic cycles, rather than being a good 
indication of generosity of welfare systems. 
Indeed, Gosta Esping-Andersen in his seminal work on “The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism” (1990b) has already criticised the then widespread usage of social expenditure statistics as a 
measure of welfare generosity, as this measure hardly contains any indication of the quality of the welfare 
provided. Instead, he categorised welfare systems by their degree of providing de-commodification and 
social stratification. The former concept refers to the capacity of welfare systems to make citizens 
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independent of market-based income, while the latter captures the extent to which welfare regimes serve 
as a tool for redistribution. With regard to the generosity of welfare systems, the former measure is 
certainly more revealing. Based on data from the 1980s, he arrived at the de-commodification ranking 
displayed in Table 8.  
Table 8: De-commodification scores according to Esping-Andersen (EU only) 
country pensions sickness unemployment overall score 
Ireland 6,7 8,3 8,3 23,3 
United Kingdom 8,5 7,7 7,2 23,4 
Italy 9,6 9,4 5,1 24,1 
France 12 9,2 6,3 27,5 
Germany 8,5 11,3 7,9 27,7 
Finland 14 10 5,2 29,2 
Austria 11,9 12,5 6,7 31,1 
Belgium 15 8,8 8,6 32,4 
Netherlands 10,8 10,5 11,1 32,4 
Denmark 15 15 8,1 38,1 
Sweden 17 15 7,1 39,1 
     Mean 10,7 9,2 7,1 27,2 
S.D. 3,4 4 1,9 7,7 
 
Among the Member States of the EU, the UK and Ireland would be classified as ‘liberal’ welfare regimes, 
Italy, France and Germany would considered as examples of the ‘conservative’ type, Denmark and 
Sweden as ‘social democratic’, whereas Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria would fall in-between the 
last two types. Following this approach, there would be quite some variation among the six countries 
listed above, albeit arguably there could be more of it if one of the Scandinavian countries were included. 
While this variation in the type of welfare regime is important in terms of national traditions that 
might still shape what is perceived ‘normal’ in a given country, there is a problem with using Esping-
Andersen’s concept of de-commodification with regard to welfare generosity for migrants, as is noted by 
Morissens and Sainsbury (2005): Migrants usually have not been part of the labour force before arriving in 
a host country. The concept of de-commodification as used by Esping-Andersen, however, also takes into 
account the generosity towards those who, after a long period of employment (and thus often 
contributions to an insurance scheme) only then become unemployed. Yet to those who have not paid 
into the system, often only the non-contributory social minimum income schemes are available. If these 
are compared across Europe, then the UK – as a liberal country – scores remarkably high, second only to 
Luxemburg, while Sweden as a social democratic case is only about half as generous (cf. Giorgi and 
Pellizzari 2006, Table A3). 
Morissens and Sainsbury, in their own work, measure generosity in terms of the effectiveness of 
welfare states for migrants, that is, they compare the percentages of migrants living above and below the 
poverty line. Based on data from the Luxemburg Income Study, Sweden should be most attractive to 
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migrants, as 88.2 per cent of them live above the poverty line there, compared to only 62.4 per cent in the 
United States. However, the United Kingdom would again appear as a rather generous welfare destination, 
while Denmark with 63.6 per cent does only slightly better than the US (ibid., 2005, p. 644). The problem 
with using this indicator is, however, that it does not say anything about welfare access, especially not for 
intra-EU migrants. 
A study conducted by request of the European Commission by Juravle et al. (2013) aimed at 
“fact finding” with regard to the possibilities for and experiences with welfare tourism in the Member 
States. Since it was focused on economically non-active intra-EU migrants and their chances of obtaining 
healthcare as well as so-called special non-contributory cash benefits (SNCB), it might appear closer to 
what would be needed in order to classify the various Member States in the sample by their ‘generosity’ in 
the present context. Their findings suggest, for example, that Austria spends only relatively small amounts 
on SNCBs for intra-EU migrants. 
Indeed, the study is certainly closer to what would be required for the present purposes, but it is 
eventually insufficient for a number of reasons. First of all, the data on intra-EU migrants actually 
receiving SNCBs is characterised by many gaps, and numbers are lacking for the UK, for instance (Juravle 
et al. 2013, 81–83), not to mention comparable data on the money actually spent on these purposes. 
Second, the study focuses on SNCBs as listed in EU legislation (Annex of Regulation 883/2004/EC and 
Regulation 465/2012/EU), falling into the wider categories of old-age, unemployment and disability 
benefits (ibid. 2013, 3–7). It is not easy to see, for instance, why the Austrian Mindestsicherung (basic 
subsistence) (see European Commission) is not included, albeit it would seem subject to similar conditions 
as the German “basic subsistence costs jobseekers [sic]”, for instance. This also means that the 
Mindestsicherung payments are not included in the numbers for Austrian SNCB recipients. Third, the focus 
on SNCBs for economically non-active migrants is a rather narrow focus that includes only the most 
obvious forms of what might indeed be called welfare tourism. Payments like the Austrian Mindestsicherung 
or its German counterpart can, however, also be received by migrants having just a very low income, 
which means that they might well be working but will not be contributing to the system. The same applies 
to migrants having worked for a short period of time only that would not suffice to make contributions 
equalling later benefits. It also means that more sophisticated forms of welfare tourism are not accounted 
for. In sum, therefore, it would not seem reasonable to rank the countries in the sample based on this 
study, neither on the data they provide in terms of numbers of SNCB-receiving intra-EU migrants nor 
based on an index one might construct based on the availability of the various kinds of SNCBs. 
Beyond the aforementioned study, Austria may again serve as a case in point for the general 
arguments made earlier in terms of legal uncertainty applying even where national governments have tried 
to tighten the rules on welfare access for intra-EU migrants already before January 2014. Indeed, Austria 
had changed some rules on welfare eligibility, which is why it is frequently reported by the Austrian media 
that welfare tourism is not possible in Austria, especially with regard to the Mindestsicherung scheme 
mentioned above (Hierländer and Böhm 2014; Oswald 2014). It has also been noted by the Austrian 
Court of Auditors, for instance, that the actual implementation of these rules is fraud with difficulty due to 
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its complexity (Ettinger 2014). In addition, the stricter rules on a particular Austrian pensions scheme 
(“Ausgleichszulage”) meant to guarantee a minimum standard of living in old-age and in principle also to 
be added on top of non-Austrian pensions, where challenged before the European Court of Justice. The 
Court decided in its judgement on the Brey case, that it would first have to be proven that the payment 
constituted an ‘unreasonable burden’ (Kommenda and Ettinger 2013). In other words, sustaining just the 
kind of legal uncertainty mentioned earlier and, as some commentators saw it , calling into question the 
whole package meant to avoid welfare tourism (Kommenda and Ettinger 2013). 
By way of concluding this subsection, it can thus be argued that the only meaningful 
classification of the countries in the sample is  
a. by their status as potential host countries for intra-EU migrants requesting welfare on the 
one hand, or as less attractive destinations and countries of origin of intra-EU migrants on 
the other hand and 
b. by their welfare regime as identified by Esping-Andersen, but mainly in terms of a national 
tradition shaping citizens’ perceptions of the welfare right kind of welfare policy, rather than 
as indications of their generosity. 
Table 9 summarises the respective classification. 
Table 9: Overview of country selection and case-related characteristics 
country welfare regime host or tourist country 
Germany  conservative  host  
Austria  (quasi-)social democratic  host  
France  conservative  host  
Italy  conservative  mixed 
UK  liberal  host  
Ireland  liberal  mixed  
 
Observable implications of earlier theoretical approaches 
Before spelling out the observable implications of the theory of territorialisation presented in Chapter 2, I 
will first discuss which predictions for the structure of conflict and individual parties’ framing strategies 
based on the extant theoretical literature I have reviewed in detail in the same chapter. I will start with the 
more general theories of conflict in EU politics, before turning to the EP-specific ones and eventually to 
the explanations provided by Treib on conflict concerning EU social policy. 
Marks and Wilson’s (2000) cleavage approach would assume that the national parties – as 
represented in the EP here – would simply stick with their ideological ‘prism’, as they consider voter 
preferences on European integration to be insufficiently specified. From this rather straightforward 
perspective, what would the consequences look like at macro- and micro-level? Logically, if all parties 
acted according to their respective ideological ‘prism’, the overall structure of conflict would be expected 
to be ideological. Before the background of the ideological profiles of the various party families, it is now 
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possible to identify the links between these ideologies and the five frames identified above: Given the 
reference to national identity and the general anti-immigrant tone of frame F1, this would be the choice 
for extreme Right parties in the sample. RWP parties would also make use of this frame, but even more so 
of the other frames involving restrictions on migrants, so as to avoid any appearance of outright racism. 
F4 would serve them to warn of ‘mass immigration’, while F3 would provide a tool for economic 
reasoning against welfare for migrants. Unsurprisingly, Conservative and Christian Democratic parties 
would equally identify welfare tourism and mass immigration as a problem, due to the challenges it poses 
to the existing social order, which would make them call for restrictions of various kinds. Hence, 
conservative frame F4 would clearly suit them best. Liberals should frame the issue mainly in terms of F3, 
arguably mixed with some F5 reasoning where they are generally open to welfare spending (as e.g. in case 
of the Liberal Democrats). Even the more Right-leaning Liberal parties should not be expected to make 
use of frame F4, to the contrary: numerical restrictions on free movement run counter to individual 
freedom and do not follow from economic reasoning. Social Democratic ideology might have changed in 
the last decades, but even New Left policies were still based on the normative claim of saving the welfare 
state as a whole. As long as this is not threatened by free movement including welfare for migrants, they 
will not see a problem, and hence they would use frame F5. By contrast, post-nationalist Greens should 
favour frame F2 as a way of opposing discrimination based on nationality, as should far Left parties due to 
their lasting preference for welfare extension and international solidarity. In terms of framing strategies, 
parties would be expected to favour a uni-dimensional, or, as I have renamed it based with reference to 
exactly this cleavage approach, ‘prism’ strategy. 
An opposite prediction would be made based on Marks’s (2004) distribution model. 
According to this model, the main determinant of the structure of conflict are distributional effects that 
can be either intra- or cross-national. In the present case, there could potentially be cross-national 
distribution but arguably no intra-national one. Hence, one would expect the structure of conflict to be 
entirely territorial. Consequently, parties from Ireland and Italy to call for non-discrimination and full 
access to welfare for (not least their) EU citizens abroad (frame F2), whereas parties from Germany, 
Austria, the UK, and France should deny welfare access to migrants while making use of their 
contributions as workers (frame F3), or at least should in some way or another avoid any instances of 
welfare tourism by restricting migrants’ rights and/or access to their countries (frame F4 or F1). 
Strategically, this means that parties will defect from their respective ideology if this ideology contrasts 
with the national interest in terms of cross-national distribution. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993; 1998) is often cited as theory stressing the 
predominance of domestically formed, national interests in EU politics. As I have noted earlier (see 
Chapter 2), Moravcsik’s theory is actually more nuanced, acknowledging that uncertainty of distributional 
effects allows governments to follow their ideological predilections. Noteworthy, by ideology he mainly 
means nationalist vs. federalist thinking as captured by frames F1 and F2. The more nuanced accounts 
included in frame F3 and F5 in particular would be of little importance. Similarly, postfunctionalism 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009) would see uncertainty at work. According to this theory, uncertainty would 
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allow RWP parties in particular to make the issue a matter of ‘identity’ by means of cues and frames. Once 
more, it would be difficult to predict the differences between parties building their arguments on so-called 
inclusive national identities, that is, conceptions of identity that are neither pan-European nor exclusively 
national. 
Among the EP-specific theories, the 3G2P theory (e.g. Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007) would 
probably expect the structure of conflict to be ideological due to the high cohesion of EPGs, which in 
turn is mainly the result of MEPs’ EP-internal office-seeking efforts. Since EPGs are largely ideology-
based, the usage of frames would be very much as predicted also by the cleavage approach, for instance. 
Defections would be few, but most likely wherever there is strong control by the national party. From 
Ringe’s (2010) PPC approach it would follow that experts in the EP’s committees are able to shape the 
structure of conflict, which at times might mean that they respond to constituency pressures (i.e. national 
interest). A prediction for the structure of conflict will be difficult to make based on case characteristics. 
At any case, however, it should make a difference whether a party disposes of an own expert welfare for 
migrants or not. By contrast, the bicameral theory (Costello and Thomson 2014) would argue that, on a 
salient matter such as welfare tourism, national governments will lobby their home country MEPs to 
favour policies in line with the national interest and to defect from the EPG line if applicable. 
Accordingly, one should expect a territorialised structure of conflict on the issue, with frames used by 
parties in the same way as predicted by the distribution model. 
For his theoretical argument on cleavage structures concerning EU social policy, Treib (2010) 
draws on a bunch of theories, many of which are included above. Thereby, he arrives at the expectation 
that the conflict on EU social policy will be primarily but not exclusively ideological. His reasoning is that 
parties behave in line with their ideology mainly due to intra-national distributional effects of social policy 
(at large). At the same time, actors that are linked to the national governments (including MEPs from the 
respective parties) will be more strongly focusing on the national interest, due to their stronger exposure 
in terms of electoral performance. 
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Table 10: Overview of expectations and causal narratives based on extant theories 
Theory Predicted structure of conflict Causal narrative 
General theories on conflict in EU politics 
Cleavage approach (Marks & Wilson 
2000) 
ideological Parties’ domestic habits, lack of 
citizen preferences on EU issues 
Distribution model (Marks 2004) territorial Distributional effects (here: cross-
national only) 
Liberal intergovernmentalism ideological (pro/anti-EU) Uncertainty allowing for ideological 
leeway 
Postfunctionalism (Hooghe & Marks 
2009) 
ideological (pro/anti-EU) Uncertainty allowing for identity-
based cueing and framing 
EP-specific theories 
3G2P theory (Hix, Noury et al. 
2007) 
predominantly ideological (by EPG) Office-seeking within the EP, some 
defection due to vote-seeking 
PPC approach (Ringe 2010) ? Expertise within EP committees 
bicameral theory (Costello & 
Thomson 2014) 
territorial Lobbying by national governments 
in line with national interests 
Policy-specific theoretical arguments 
Treib 2010 predominantly ideological, some 
territorialisation 
Domestic Left-Right tradition on 
social policy, Government parties 
representing national interest more 
strongly due to stronger vote-seeking 
pressures 
 
Observable implications of the theory of territorialisation 
According to the theory of territorialisation, the structure of conflict regarding the issue of welfare access 
for intra-EU migrants would be expected to be predominantly ideological. This contrasts with some of the 
extant approaches, but overlaps with others. Yet, even with regard to those theories equally predicting an 
ideological structure of conflict, there are differences in the micro-level reasoning that can be contrasted 
and will have slightly diverging observable implications in terms of framing. In other words, due to the 
usage of Policy Frame Analysis, it will be possible not only to distinguish the causal narratives included in 
the theory of territorialisation from the extant approaches, but also to formulate diverging observable 
implications. 
First of all, unlike the cleavage approach, the theory of territorialisation (ToT) holds that the 
reason for the ideological structure of conflict is not uncertainty over citizens’ preferences on EU matters, 
because to a considerable extent, these are known meanwhile due to politicisation: at the most basic level, 
it would seem certain that most citizens would reject a policy that runs counter to ‘the’ national interest. 
Second, unlike Treib (2010) the ideological structure can still be accounted for by the ToT, even if there 
are no intra-national distributional effects worth mentioning. Rather, in line with liberal 
intergovernmentalism and postfunctionalism, the ToT would expect uncertainty to provide the leeway to 
frame the issue in ideological terms. At the same time, the ToT expects the role of ideology under 
uncertainty to be more complex than one of simply dividing actors in terms of pro- or anti-Europeanism. 
What does this mean in observable terms? At a broad level, each party will choose the frame 
that fits the core tenets of its respective ideology best, in the same manner as was pointed out for the 
cleavage approach. The difference between the line of argument of the ToT and the cleavage approach 
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will become apparent in two ways, however: first, due to issue-related uncertainty, much of the debate will 
be centred on problem definition rather than policy preferences. This will be particularly pronounced for 
the parties struggling to avoid a potential goal conflict. In the present case, this essentially concerns the 
parties of the Left in the countries potentially ‘hosting’ welfare tourists. For on the one hand, the policies 
limiting welfare access for migrants in some way or another (included in F1, F3, F4) would seem to serve 
the potential national interest in case welfare tourism led to substantial cross-national distribution, hence 
would be promising in terms of vote-seeking. On the other hand, the respective justifications behind these 
policies are at odds with the norms of Left-wing parties’ ideologies. Uncertainty over outcomes allows 
these parties, however, to challenge the problem definition and causal narratives in those frames, without 
necessarily spelling out the policy consequences of their own ideology-driven reasoning. In sum, what will 
be observed is that these parties in goal conflict will use the frame that overlaps most with their ideology, 
but will disproportionally refer to the constitutive and cognitive dimensions of these frames and less so to 
the policy dimension. Noteworthy, there would be no goal conflict and hence no need for framing the 
issue in exactly this manner if either citizens would still be indifferent to EU politics (i.e. if there was no 
politicisation as assumed in the cleavage approach) or if EU social policy was all about intra-national 
distribution as a matter of principle (as assumed by Treib). Second, rather than referring to one frame 
only, most parties will moderately mix their lines of argument in such a way as to reach out to a larger 
electorate. In other words, the widespread use of blurring strategies might be an additional indication of 
parties’ vote-seeking efforts, something which the cleavage approach would not expect. 
In contrast to the 3G2P approach, the ToT will expect parties to use the same or similar frames 
independent of their EPG membership. For example, the UK Conservatives in the ECR should use the 
same line of argument as the German CDU/CSU and other members of the EPP. Contrasting the ToT 
with Ringe’s PPC is more difficult, since almost all of the parties in the sample are represented in at least 
one of the EP committees for civil liberties (LIBE) and employment and social affairs (EMPL) and 
accordingly might possess some degree of in-house expertise on Europeanised welfare. Unlike the 
bicameral theory, the ToT would not expect any national party delegation whose home party is not part of 
the government to give in to governmental lobbying (and to defect as a result), as there is no causal link 
between these lobbying efforts and the three party goals on which the ToT is built. Consequently, one 
should not expect national party delegations who are in opposition at home to fall in line with their 
government. 
A possible reason for territorial influences might in principle be the type of welfare regime 
prevailing in a country. According to the ToT, this has less to do with adaptation costs (as Treib would 
argue) and more with the welfare regime acting as a kind of ‘national tradition’ that shapes peoples’ ways 
of thinking about an issue beyond its actual distributional effects. Since in the present case, however, the 
various ideologies show rather clear overlaps with the respective policy frames, there is little reason to 
assume that the parties give up their policy-seeking goals for the sake of national traditions. Any influence 
of welfare regime types on framing is thus expected at the margins at most, in the sense that the regimes 
considered particular generous (social democratic) or strict (liberal) might shape perceptions. 
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4.4 Results and discussion 
This section presents the results of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) and discusses them with regard to the extant 
theories and the theory of territorialisation (ToT) contrasted above. It can be shown that the structure of conflict, as 
expressed numerically in the territorialisation index, is mainly ideological indeed. This would seem to support the 
ToT rather than the distribution model. However, Irish and Italian parties were found to behave rather passively, i.e. 
barely issuing any statements on the issue. The few parties from these countries participating in the debate, however, 
choose to frame the issue in just the same manner as their ideological counterparts abroad. Since frame choice seems 
related to ideology rather than to EPG membership, the ToT appears more accurate here than the 3G2P approach. 
Moreover, the debate appears to evolve in a much more differentiated fashion than in terms of pro- vs. anti-EU 
attitudes, especially since the allegedly Eurosceptic far Left is the main defender of non-discrimination, which speaks 
against liberal intergovernmental or postfunctional lines of argument. At the micro-level, two defections are noted 
which are hard to account for theoretically – both using extant theories and the ToT alike. A closer look at these two 
individual cases reveals, however, that this might be due to a partial violation of one of the scope conditions of the 
ToT. Nonetheless, all other micro-level results can be explained in detail by the ToT. For example, the widespread 
use of blurring in terms mixing several frames, in combination with emphases on frame dimensions forming the 
justification, appear to indicate that MEPs are aware of politicisation of the issue and the resulting vote-seeking 
pressures. Regarding subsuming, it can be noted that parties belonging to the far Right like to quote other actors 
arguing against welfare tourism for their own purposes, choosing actors who are comparatively unsuspicious in terms 
of racism (Conservatives, economists, migrants). A comparison of these results to the recorded votes on the free 
movement resolution passed in January 2014 shows very similar lines of conflict, but also shows how majority 
requirements and related tactical considerations may shape ‘conflict’ as expressed in votes. It further lends external 
validity to the idea that the passivity of Irish and Italian parties in the debate is not an indication of a hidden 
territorial conflict. 
Case-specific data-set and reliability 
For the sake of analysing the framing efforts of national party delegations from the six focus countries, 66 
press releases or other passages of text (e.g. manifestos) could be collected, resulting in 919 codings in 
terms of quasi-sentences attributed to a particular frame dimension. 24 parties or their delegations decided 
to express and justify their policy preferences via these channels, out of 34 parties whose websites were 
scraped manually or automatically. Accordingly, the parties issued 2.75 press releases on the issue on 
average including an average amount of 38.3 codings per party. The reliability test conducted on the case-
specific codebook (based on the above identification of five policy frames) produced results ranging from 
acceptable to excellent for both the distinction between frames and between dimensions (see Table 11). At 
the same time, it must be noted that the reliability scores for this codebook were inferior to those achieved 
for the other two codebooks employed in this study. This might be due to a general training effect among 
the coders across cases, but also to a potential overspecification of categories (frames): If coders would 
have had to distinguish only those frames expressing a certain lenience towards migrants and those 
implying more restrictive approaches, the reliability score in terms of Krippendorff’s alpha is 0.844 in test 
round 1 already. It should further be noted that disagreements among coders were strongest for the press 
releases of the Front National and UKIP included in the test sample, which might be an indication of 
subsuming, that is, a party using arguments from the pre-identified frames in innovative ways. This first 
hint at subsuming is discussed further below. 
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Table 11: Reliability scores for the codebook on Europeanised welfare 
Level: frames dimension 
Round: 1 2 1 2 
% 75.30 87.50 68.24 82.50 
kappa 0.677 0.828 0.606 0.786 
alpha 0.677 0.829 0.608 0.787 
 
Macro-level: overall structure of conflict and descriptive summary of frame usage 
Table 12: Percentage of each party’s statements per code (frame) 
Party 
nationalist 
(Frame 1) 
cosmopolitan 
(Frame 2) 
liberal 
(Frame 3) 
conservative 
(Frame 4) 
social 
democratic 
(Frame 5) 
UK BNP 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F FN 77.4 0.0 0.0 22.6 0.0 
D NPD 50.5 0.0 20.6 29.0 0.0 
F FdG 0.0 97.8 0.0 0.0 2.2 
D LINKE 0.0 93.3 0.0 0.0 6.7 
F Verts 0.0 92.3 0.0 0.0 7.7 
IRE Greens 0.0 83.3 16.7 0.0 0.0 
UK Greens 0.0 67.8 0.0 0.0 32.2 
D B90 0.0 61.5 0.0 0.0 38.5 
A SPÖ 0.0 57.1 0.0 0.0 42.9 
D FDP 0.0 15.6 84.4 0.0 0.0 
D AfD 0.0 0.0 51.1 48.9 0.0 
F UMP 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
A FPÖ 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
I AN 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
UK Cons 0.0 2.3 4.5 93.2 0.0 
D CDU/CSU 0.0 17.2 3.4 65.5 13.8 
UKIP 25.0 0.0 31.5 43.5 0.0 
A ÖVP 0.0 23.1 0.0 38.5 38.5 
UK Lib 0.0 7.5 31.8 37.3 23.4 
UK Lab 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
D SPD 0.0 17.9 0.0 5.1 76.9 
F PS 0.0 20.0 0.0 5.0 75.0 
A Grüne 0.0 31.3 0.0 6.3 62.5 
 
Already a very brief look at the results of the Policy Frame Analysis as displayed in Table 12 seems to 
suggest that the overall structure of conflict is ideological: ordered according to the frame they use the 
most, parties from the same party family seem to cluster together. Indeed, looking closer, it turns out that 
20 out of 24 parties issuing press releases (or other texts) on the question of welfare for intra-EU migrants 
choose frames that fit their respective ideology, while only 12 exclusively or simultaneously choose to 
frame in line with their supposed national interest. This results in a score of -33.33 per cent on the 
territorialisation index defined earlier, indicating that the structure of conflict is overwhelmingly but not 
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purely ideological. This overall picture largely corresponds to most of the theories discussed above, 
including the ToT developed in the present study, while it seems to expose the deficits of the distribution 
model (neglecting uncertainty) and partly already questions the power of national governments over their 
MEPs as expected by the bicameral theory. 
Table 13: The structure of conflict on Europeanised welfare in numbers 
Parties framing in line with… …ideology: …‘national interest‘: 
Absolute number: 20 12 
Percentage: 83.3 50 
Index of territorialisation: -33.3 
 
Another striking finding in terms of broader patterns is that almost no statements on the issue could be 
found that were issued by Irish or Italian party delegations. In fact, the two parties whose framing 
strategies could be analysed, namely the Irish Green Party and the Italian Alleanza Nazionale, did only 
very shortly refer to the issue of free movement and welfare for migrants in their manifestos rather than in 
specifically issued press releases. At this point, however, any conclusion on these apparent silences would 
seem premature. 
Zooming in closer by analysing how the parties cluster together according to their preferred 
frames, one finds that frame F1 is indeed used by the two extreme Right parties in the sample, namely the 
BNP and the NPD. Somewhat surprisingly, the Front National – which I have classified as RWP rather 
than extreme Right – also uses this frame frequently, even more so than the NPD. This should not, 
however, be calibrated as a defection for the below QCA, since I have noted that the distinction within 
the far Right between extremists and Right-Wing Populist families would still have to prove its empirical 
use. At the other end of the spectrum, namely on the far Left, frame F2 is preferred. In fact, both far Left 
parties making a statement on the issue (Sinn Féin and the Lista Tsipras did not) use this frame almost 
exclusively. So do most, but not all, Green parties: The Austrian Greens only use it in about one third of 
its quasi-sentences. Noteworthy, instead the Austrian Social Democrats use frame F2 predominantly, 
albeit not that much more than they use frame F5. 
Frame F3 is used mostly by two German parties, namely the Liberal FDP and the RWP AfD. In 
the latter case, this is not exactly what one would expect, yet it should be noted that the AfD uses the 
more restrictive frame F4 almost equally often. The fact that just these two cluster together here might be 
due to the AfD, in its early months, was trying to establish itself as an alternative to the FDP and therefore 
was still relying on economic arguments included in frame F3, only slowly moving to more explicit anti-
migrants stances. More surprising is the fact that the British Liberal Democrats use frame F4 
predominantly rather than F3, a result which would neither seem to fit its ideology nor the type of welfare 
regime. This defection arguably requires further explanation. 
As expected, frame F4 is used by all Conservative and Christian Democratic parties. Similarly, 
one would expect RWP parties to draw on this frame rather than the more openly anti-immigrant frame 
F1, which holds for most of them, with the notable aforementioned exception of the FN. Interestingly, 
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the Italian Alleanza Nazionale is making use of this frame as well, although a purely distributional account 
of conflict in European politics would have expected this party to be less strict on welfare access for 
migrants. In fact, while the respective passage of its manifesto is very brief, it says quite clearly that the 
Citizens’ Rights Directive should be interpreted as harshly as possible, such that those who after three 
months of residence do not dispose of an employment contract are to be expulsed immediately 30 – 
although the same fate might in principle await Italian emigrants. However, it must be noted also that the 
Austrian ÖVP uses frame F5 exactly as much as it uses frame F4, and since it adds to that the even more 
migrant-friendly frame F2, it should be considered defecting from the rest of its party family even. Frame 
F5 otherwise is the expected main choice of most Social Democratic parties, except for the Austrian 
member of this family, who as was mentioned already, is replaced here by the Green party from this 
country. 
In sum, at the macro-level of the structure of conflict, the results of the PFA seem to fit the 
theoretical framework of the present study quite well. This even applies to the parties from Italy and 
Ireland, albeit most of them do not take a position on the issue, which is why this aspect should be taken 
up again when comparing the results of the PFA to the roll-call votes on the resolution on free movement 
from January 2014. In general, however, not only do most parties cluster together ideologically, they also 
use the exact same frames that would seem to fit their respective ideology best.  
Nevertheless, albeit the observable expectations for the RWP and extreme Right parties was left 
rather unspecified for reasons related to the current dynamics within this part of the ideological spectrum, 
some findings for these parties certainly deserve particular notice with regard to the discussion on their 
strategies. More importantly, four parties did not primarily use the frame most in line with their ideology: 
The Austrian Greens, the Austrian Social Democrats, the Austrian Christian Democrats, and the British 
Liberal Democrats. Moving beyond the strictly numerical criterion for operationalisation, it shall be briefly 
discussed in how far these four should be considered ‘defecting’. 
In case of the former two, namely the SPÖ and the Austrian Greens, it might seem overrated to 
speak of defection: After all, those two parties are using just those two frames that are generally highly 
prominent on the centre Left and are combined there in various fashions, with Green parties usually 
favouring the rather generous frame F2 and the Social Democrats the at least rather lenient frame F5. In 
other words, regarding the Austrian Left, the only difference is that the roles are reversed. In case of the 
latter two, namely the LibDems and the ÖVP, one might argue that the degree of their defection, at least 
in quantitative terms, is not as high either. Inasmuch as these two were considered ‘defecting’, the 
deviance from the theory of territorialisation is still limited. Nevertheless, since it is quite surprising to find 
the British Liberal Democrats arguing for restrictions on immigration and the Austrian ÖVP much more 
                                                     
30 “Fratelli d’Italia –Alleanza Nazionale chiede inoltre la piena applicazione della direttiva 38/2004 che prevede 
l’espulsione degli immigrati comunitari, nomadi compresi, che entro tre mesi dal loro arrivo in uno Stato membro 
non siano in grado di dimostrare di avere un regolare contratto di lavoro e risorse lecite sufficienti per il proprio 
sostentamento.” 
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lax in its analysis of the situation than its sister parties abroad, the defection of these two parties certainly 
deserves further investigation. 
Micro-level: Analysis of defection 
Based on the foregoing results of the PFA and their discussion at the macro level, it was argued that only 
two parties out of 24 should be considered defecting. This very small degree of variation in terms of the 
outcome is, of course, not an ideal starting point for a QCA. Nevertheless, an attempt is made here to 
examine, whether the defection by these two parties still follows a common pattern that could be 
explained by any of the extant theories mentioned earlier or by the ToT. 
Clearly, very simple explanations, relying national interest or ideology only, do not apply, nor do 
combinations of the two: While the national interests of Austria and the UK might be similar – given their 
potential role as ‘host’ countries for welfare tourists – no other party from these and other host countries 
defects. As for ideology, defined as sets of ideas shared by the familles spirituelles, it seems appropriate 
regarding this particular issue to merely distinguish party families by their categorisation as Left or Right. 
After all, those parties considering ‘welfare tourism’ as a problem will do so because they ideologically 
consider either welfare spending or immigration as problematic (or both) – i.e. the Right, and only those 
who favour both will not see a problem – i.e. the Left. In this respect, Liberal Democrats and ÖVP would 
even be counted in different camps, as one can attribute the Liberal Democrats to the ‘Left’ based on their 
pro-immigration and pro-welfare stances, while the ÖVP should generally be considered a party of the 
Right. 
As a first extension to a basic explanation founded on national interest and ideology alone, one 
might add the condition of government participation, given that some of the extant theories discussed 
before consider it relevant: governments are taken to be the representatives of ‘the’ national interest. 
Indeed, both the ÖVP and the LibDems did participate in the respective national governments at the 
time. Nevertheless, as it stands, the condition of government participation (“gov”) does not help to 
explain the defections, but rather involves contradictory configurations, as the following Truth Table 
shows. In fact, there is nothing to minimise even, that is, there is no possibility of identifying one or even 
separate but consistent paths towards defection before this background. Being part of the government 
could, at best, be considered a necessary condition for defection, since this is a feature both defecting 
parties share. Yet, this statement should be taken with a pinch of salt, because due to the relation of the 
number of defecting parties and the number of parties in government, the coverage of this necessary 
condition is quite low (0.286). 
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Table 14: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; basic + ‘gov’ condition, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case id 
Left hostCountry gov defection party 
0 1 0 0 
UK BNP, F FN, D NPD, D FDP,  
D AfD, F UMP, A FPOE, UKIP 
1 1 0 0 
F FdG, D LINKE, F Verts, UK Greens, 
D B90, UK Lab, A Gruene 
1 0 0 0 IRE Greens 
1 1 1 C A SPOE, UK Lib, D SPD, F PS 
0 1 1 C UK Cons, D CDU/CSU, A OEVP 
0 0 0 0 I AN 
 
One might argue, that it might not necessarily be the party delegation leading the national government 
who defect themselves, but rather other parties from the same country who are lobbied by them, as the 
bicameral theory by Costello and Thomson (see above) holds. Clearly this does not apply to all parties in 
Austria or the UK. Inductively, one might still take note of the fact that both the LibDems and the ÖVP 
are junior partners in a coalition, who might hence be pressured by the larger partner. As the below Truth 
Table shows, however, a contradictory configuration would still remain due to the non-defection of the 
German SPD, so that the complex solution derived is merely a description of the ÖVP. 
Table 15: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; basic + 'gov' condition refined, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
Left hostCountry coalition_jun defection party 
0 1 0 0 
UK BNP, F FN,  
D NPD, D FDP,  
D AfD, F UMP, 
A FPOE, UK Cons,  
D CDU/CSU, UKIP 
1 1 0 0 
F FdG, D LINKE, F 
Verts, UK Greens,  
D B90, A SPOE, UK 
Lab, F PS, A Gruene 
1 0 0 0 IRE Greens 
0 1 1 1 A OEVP 
1 1 1 C UK Lib, D SPD 
0 0 0 0 I AN 
 
Table 16: Complex solution Europeanised welfare; basic + 'gov' refined, outcome: defection 
Complex solution 
Solution terms31 Cases covered 
left * HOSTCOUNTRY * COALTION_JUN A OEVP 
 
If any concrete hypothesis concerning defection can be derived from Ringe’s PPC approach at all, then 
one would argue that disposing of an expert MEP who sits in the committee responsible is a necessary 
                                                     
31 Upper-case/lower-case notation is used throughout for the presentation of solutions terms, with the upper-case 
letters indicating presence, lower-case letters indication the absence of a condition. As usual, ‘*’ stands for the logical 
AND, ‘+’ for the logical OR, cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012, 42-55. 
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condition for making the independent decision of defecting as a national party delegation. With regard to 
welfare tourism, expertise might be found in the committees for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
(LIBE) and for Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL). This also means, however, that almost all parties 
in the sample (inasmuch as they already had seats in the EP) have access to such expertise. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, the coverage of the expertise condition (“expert”) is even lower than that of government 
participation (0.100), and adding the condition of expertise in general does not produce any solution 
formula either. In fact, the inconsistencies are even more significant here. 
Table 17: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; basic + ‘expert’, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
Left hostCountry expert defection party 
0 1 0 0 
UK BNP, D NPD, D 
AfD 
0 1 1 C 
F FN, D FDP,  
F UMP, A FPOE, 
UK Cons, 
 D CDU/CSU, 
UKIP, A OEVP 
1 1 1 C 
F FdG, D LINKE, 
F Verts, UK Greens,  
D B90, A SPOE, UK 
Lib, UK Lab, D SPD, 
F PS, A Gruene 
1 0 0 0 IRE Greens 
0 0 1 0 I AN 
 
What could be explained by means of the Theory of Territorialisation, however, is defection along the 
lines of national traditions such as welfare regimes, especially under uncertainty. Indeed, the parties 
defecting do not come from countries with the conservative type of welfare, which might be considered 
either as the middle ground between two more extreme poles in terms of welfare generosity in general or 
as the potentially most restrictive type when it comes welfare for migrants. Inductively, the former would 
seem to matter more here, since the LibDems from the UK with its liberal welfare regime are more 
restrictive, whilst the ÖVP from Austria with its quasi-social democratic welfare regime are more generous 
than their sister parties. Since, however, none of the other parties from these countries defects, 
contradictory configurations remain equally problematic as with the extant approaches here. The national 
tradition (“WoWNotCons”) also fares badly in terms of coverage as a necessary condition (0.182). 
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Table 18: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; ToT based conditions, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
Left hostCountry WoWNotCons defection party 
0 1 1 C 
UK BNP, A FPOE,  
UK Cons, UKIP, 
 A OEVP 
0 0 1 0 
F FN, D NPD,  
D FDP, D AfD,  
F UMP,  
D CDU/CSU 
1 0 1 0 
F FdG, D LINKE, F 
Verts, D B90,  
D SPD, F PS 
1 1 0 0 IRE Greens 
1 1 1 C 
UK Greens, 
 A SPOE, UK Lib, 
UK Lab, A Gruene 
0 0 0 0 I AN 
 
Even if all conditions are added simultaneously, which dramatically increases the number of 
configurations covering just one or a few cases as well as the number of missing but logically possible 
combinations, contradictory configurations remain. In sum, the ToT does neither seem to provide a better 
account of the two defections nor does it do worse. 
Table 19: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; comprehensive approach, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
Left 
WoW 
NotCons 
hostCountry gov expert defection party 
0 1 1 0 0 0 UK BNP 
0 0 1 0 1 0 
F FN, D FDP, 
 F UMP 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
D NPD, 
 D AfD 
1 0 1 0 1 0 
F FdG, 
 D LINKE, 
 F Verts,  
D B90 
1 1 0 0 0 0 IRE Greens 
1 1 1 0 1 0 
UK Greens, 
UK Lab,  
A Gruene 
1 1 1 1 1 C 
A SPOE,  
UK Lib 
0 1 1 0 1 0 
A FPOE, 
UKIP 
0 1 1 1 1 C 
UK Cons,  
A OEVP 
0 0 1 1 1 0 D CDU/CSU 
0 0 0 0 1 0 I AN 
1 0 1 1 1 0 D SPD, F PS 
 
At this point, therefore, the following interpretation of the PFA results seems appropriate. On the one 
hand, one might defend the ToT based on the results as they are, arguing that the defections were not as 
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harsh, since both LibDems and ÖVP use the frames they are supposed to use for ideological reasons 
almost equally often as they use the ones at odds with their ideology. Hence one could conclude that the 
ToT not only explained the overall structure of conflict rather well, but also accounted for the micro-level 
decisions in terms of defection, as there were no ‘real’ defections. The analysis of the further framing 
strategies might then lend additional support. Alternatively, one might turn to a purely qualitative analysis 
of the cases left unaccounted. This seems appropriate not only because none of the other theories would 
seem to offer a better explanation, but also because handling just two unexplained cases in this manner 
appears feasible. 
Going back to the data itself, it turns out that the defections at least in these cases can be related 
back to the parties’ participation in government – albeit, as I argue, in a manner that is still compatible 
with the ToT. Concerning the Liberal Democrats, it can then be noted that most of the codings attributed 
to the Conservative frame F4 (and hence not in line with the LibDem ideology) resulted from the fact that 
a Liberal Democratic MEP cited a speech by Nick Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister at the time, in one of his 
press releases. In this speech, Clegg defended the government’s new immigration policy, that is, the policy 
of the coalition with the Conservative Party. All other press releases were dominated by the Liberal frame 
(F3), mixed with the Social Democratic frame (F5), which is exactly what would be expected from a 
comparatively Left-leaning Liberal party in ideological terms. This clearly puts the ‘defection’ in a different 
light. 
The ÖVP recognises that welfare tourism may be a problem in principle (F4), but will not be in 
Austria given that the measures in place will be sufficient (F5) – measures which the coalition of ÖVP and 
SPÖ has passed together in 2011. Noteworthy, the Austrian ministry for social affairs, which arguably has 
the best insight into actual data as well as national-level legal expertise concerning welfare spending for 
intra-EU migrants, is controlled by the Social Democrats. In this respect, the case of welfare tourism 
might then be bordering the scope conditions of the ToT, in that the technical expertise on national 
welfare residing with national governments would explain the impact of the government participation 
condition. Indeed, this explanation could be extended partly also to the Liberal Democrats, in that they 
did not control the ministry of social affairs either. Consequently, one might now integrate this insight 
back into the QCA by adding a condition capturing the expertise within the EP with national-level 
expertise possessed by national administrations (“socaffairscontrol”). In fact, it would make sense to 
replace the condition on expertise within the EP by this condition, as more or less all parties in the sample 
have access to and that might not be of help regarding the adequacy of specific national regulations for 
addressing ‘welfare tourism’. 
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Table 20: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; ToT refined, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
Left 
WoW 
NotCons 
hostCountry gov 
socialaffairsc
ontrol 
defection party 
0 1 1 0 0 0 
UK BNP,  
A FPOE, 
UKIP 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
F FN, 
 D NPD,  
D FDP,  
D AfD,  
F UMP 
1 0 1 0 0 0 
F FdG,  
D LINKE,  
F Verts, 
 D B90 
1 1 0 0 0 0 IRE Greens 
1 1 1 0 0 0 
UK Greens, 
UK Lab,  
A Gruene 
1 1 1 1 1 0 A SPOE 
0 1 1 1 1 0 UK Cons 
0 0 1 1 0 0 D CDU/CSU 
0 1 1 1 0 1 A OEVP 
1 1 1 1 0 1 UK Lib 
0 0 0 0 0 0 I AN 
1 0 1 1 1 0 D SPD, F PS 
 
Table 21: Complex solution Europeanised Welfare; ToT refined, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
WOWNOTCONS * HOSTCOUNTRY * GOV * 
socaffairscontrol 
A OEVP, UK Lib 
 
Integrating this condition resolves the contradiction, and it further produces a solution term that covers 
both defecting parties. Moreover, it is possible to interpret this formula plausibly along the lines of the 
ToT and its scope conditions: to the extent that technical expertise on national welfare legislation is 
needed and can serve to replace a merely ideological judgement under uncertainty, parties who find 
themselves in a governing coalition with a partner who controls this information are inclined to follow the 
partner and thereby ‘defect’. Indeed, if technical expertise from national administrations makes the 
difference, as the effect of adding the “socaffairscontrol” condition suggests, ideology should not matter – 
which is why the non-technical nature of policy issues is a scope condition for the ToT in the first place. 
One might argue further that, as the ToT would provide, this step is eased by the national tradition on 
welfare that might be potentially more or less generous (as a state of mind), since after all the Conservative 
ÖVP becomes more lenient in line with Austria’s quasi-social democratic welfare regime, while the Liberal 
Democrats become less generous in line with the UK’s liberal or ‘residual’ welfare regime. The latter 
aspect of the interpretation should be taken with a pinch of salt, however, given that the Liberal 
Democrats become stricter on immigration, but not so much on welfare. 
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In the parsimonious solution (Table 22), another of the five conditions drops out, namely the 
“host country” condition, provided one assumes that parties from tourist countries would behave similarly 
in this particular constellation of conditions. Dropping the host country condition is not entirely 
implausible, if social affairs expertise in these countries refers to the number of national citizens 
depending on the welfare within one’s own borders. Noteworthy also, among the four candidates for 
necessary conditions in terms of software output, the host country condition scores lowest Table 23. 
Table 22: Parsimonious solution Europeanised Welfare, ToT refined, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
WOWNOTCONS * GOV * socaffairscontrol A OEVP, UK Lib 
Simplifying assumptions: 
Left{0}WoWNotCons{1}hostCountry{0}gov{1}socaffairscontrol{0} + 
Left{1}WoWNotCons{1}hostCountry{0}gov{1}socaffairscontrol{0} 
 
Table 23: Analysis of Necessity Europeanised Welfare (inclusion score = 1.0), outcome: defection 
Condition(s) Coverage 
socialaffairscontrol 0.100 
GOV 0.286 
WOWNOTCONS 0.182 
HOSTCOUNTRY 0.091 
 
Alternatively, one might produce an intermediate solution, using so-called direction expectations 
indicating indifference regarding ideology, but still assuming the host country status to matter in this 
constellation. Yet, unsurprisingly, there is no reduction of complexity compared to the conservative 
solution. As a result, then, the interpretation of the results based on the conservative solution arguably 
remains the most appropriate one. 
Table 24: Intermediate solution Europeanised Welfare, ToT refined, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
WOWNOTCONS * HOSTCOUNTRY * GOV * 
socaffairscontrol 
A OEVP+ UK Lib 
 
In sum, therefore, it can be understood why there are defections where as such the theory of 
territorialisation would not have expected any: Apparently, the issue of Europeanised welfare touches 
upon a scope condition of this theory in terms of technical expertise available in national administrations 
used by parties in government to make sense of the situation for themselves and to convince possible 
coalition partners that do not have the same information. Within its scope, however, the ToT remains 
valid and can account for defection at least equally well as competing theories. In addition, however, the 
ToT makes predictions regarding alternative strategies, whose plausibility vis-à-vis the PFA results are 
discussed in the next subsection. 
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Micro-level: further framing strategies 
Starting with blurring, I now turn to further framing strategies that the various national party delegations 
apply when talking about welfare access for intra-EU migrants. When blurring is defined in the widest 
sense, i.e. just as any mixing of frames, it becomes clear that this strategy is used by a lot of parties, which 
is an important finding as such: This, as was argued above, might well indicate the impact of politicisation, 
as parties might try to appeal to a wider range of voters or at least make sure to cover all components of 
their core electorate, by including various ideological and territorial focal points. 
However, when making the first analytical step in a QCA, namely producing a Truth Table, the 
result includes no less than five contradictions. Arguably, reducing them by changing the number of 
conditions does not appear very promising, since it would shift the balance of logically possible 
combinations in such a way that any reduction would require an unacceptable number of simplifying 
assumptions. The same would apply to shifting towards a multi-value QCA: while it would allow for 
distinguishing the various party families beyond dichotomisation, its potential for minimisation is generally 
limited (Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser 2009), so that the result would hardly be more than a description. 
In this case, one might just as well look at some general, albeit non-deterministic patterns on blurring in 
the wider sense by means of Table 25 including the raw results first, and then solve the contradictions by 
considering blurring in a stricter sense, i.e. combining frames that cross the potential distributional line 
between ‘hosts and tourists’. 
Table 25: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; ToT refined, outcome: blurring (wide definition) 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
Left 
WoW 
NotCons 
hostCountry gov 
socialaffairsc
ontrol 
blurring 
_wide 
party 
0 1 1 0 0 C 
UK BNP,  
A FPOE, 
UKIP 
0 0 1 0 0 C 
F FN,  
D NPD,  
D FDP,  
D AfD,  
F UMP 
1 0 1 0 0 C 
F FdG,  
D LINKE,  
F Verts,  
D B90 
1 1 0 0 0 0 IRE Greens 
1 1 1 0 0 C 
UK Greens, 
UK Lab, 
A Gruene 
1 1 1 1 1 1 A SPOE 
0 1 1 1 1 0 UK Cons 
0 0 1 1 0 1 D CDU/CSU 
0 1 1 1 0 1 A OEVP 
1 1 1 1 0 1 UK Lib 
0 0 0 0 0 0 I AN 
1 0 1 1 1 C D SPD, F PS 
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First of all, it can be noted then that there is a lot of blurring, apparently, on the far Right, with the British 
National Party forming an exception with its purely nationalistic stance. Another pattern is arguably found 
among Green and Socialist parties, who mix the frames F2 and F5 to varying degrees, which was used as 
an argument earlier for considering the Austrian parties of the centre Left as not defecting. Moreover, the 
defecting parties, the Liberal Democrats and the ÖVP, still partly use the frames they would prefer 
ideologically speaking. 
Focusing only on blurring that cuts across the potential distributional line between ‘hosts and 
tourists’, there is just one national party delegation that is found doing so without going as far as defecting, 
namely the German CDU/CSU. Next to the expected frame F4, the party makes use of the frames F2 and 
F5. Interestingly, no contradictory configurations appear if blurring is defined in this strict sense and if the 
same conditions are used to explain it (see Table 26). Arguably, the fact that the German Social 
Democrats hold the social affairs ministry within this coalition has influenced the CDU/CSU, but since 
there is no national tradition to ease a defection, and since in addition the SPD is only the junior partner, 
the party limits itself to blurring. 
Table 26: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; ToT refined, outcome: blurring (strict definition) 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
Left 
WoW 
NotCons 
hostCountry gov 
socialaffairsc
ontrol 
blurring 
_strict 
party 
0 1 1 0 0 C 
UK BNP,  
A FPOE, 
UKIP 
0 0 1 0 0 C 
F FN,  
D NPD,  
D FDP,  
D AfD,  
F UMP 
1 0 1 0 0 C 
F FdG,  
D LINKE,  
F Verts,  
D B90 
1 1 0 0 0 0 IRE Greens 
1 1 1 0 0 C 
UK Greens, 
UK Lab,  
A Gruene 
1 1 1 1 1 1 A SPOE 
0 1 1 1 1 0 UK Cons 
0 0 1 1 0 1 D CDU/CSU 
0 1 1 1 0 1 A OEVP 
1 1 1 1 0 1 UK Lib 
0 0 0 0 0 0 I AN 
1 0 1 1 1 C D SPD, F PS 
 
Table 27: Complex solution Europeanised Welfare, ToT refined, outcome: blurring (strict definition) 
Solution terms Cases covered 
left * wownotcons * HOSTCOUNTRY * GOV * 
socaffairscontrol 
D CDU/CSU 
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Uni-dimensional framing is most systematically found on the fringes, namely with the aforementioned 
BNP and the far Left parties in the sample. This does not, however, serve as a general piece of evidence 
for niche party arguments, since many Green parties and RWP parties are not as radical and ‘pure’ in their 
line of argument. The fringe parties might not want to lose the more radical ones of their supporters, and 
in this sense might be reluctant to blur their position. The German NPD, however, does not follow this 
pattern. Finally, there is no discernible difference between ‘host’ and ‘tourist’ countries, even though the 
two parties from tourist countries (the Irish Greens and the Italian Alleanza Nazionale) both use uni-
dimensional strategies. After all, the Austrian FPÖ or the French Greens frame the issue in just the same 
manner as their counterparts from ‘tourist’ countries. 
Table 28: Truth Table Europeanised Welfare; ToT refined, outcome: uni-dimensional 'prism' 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
Left 
WoW 
NotCons 
hostCountry gov 
socialaffairsc
ontrol 
Uni-
dimensional 
‚prism‘ 
party 
0 1 1 0 0 C 
UK BNP,  
A FPOE, 
UKIP 
0 0 1 0 0 C 
F FN,  
D NPD,  
D FDP,  
D AfD,  
F UMP 
1 0 1 0 0 C 
 F FdG,  
D LINKE,  
F Verts,  
D B90 
1 1 0 0 0 1 IRE Greens 
1 1 1 0 0 C 
 UK Greens, 
UK Lab,  
A Gruene 
1 1 1 1 1 0  A SPOE 
0 1 1 1 1 1  UK Cons 
0 0 1 1 0 0 D CDU/CSU 
0 1 1 1 0 0  A OEVP 
1 1 1 1 0 0  UK Lib 
0 0 0 0 0 1  I AN 
1 0 1 1 1 C D SPD, F PS 
 
The analysis of subsuming cannot be based on pre-defined coding schemes, since the rather innovative 
aspects of changing or re-framing arguments cannot be foreseen. Because the PFA is a hand-coding 
procedure, however, acts of subsuming can still be noticed directly, and they further tend to find their 
expression in the disagreements among coders during the reliability test. In the present case, taking 
subsuming into account helps to complete the picture by understanding the large variation on the far 
Right: In fact, these parties often quite explicitly quote arguments made by actors known for their 
Conservatism or their economic expertise, adding only some arguments in line with their anti-immigrant 
ideologies. Usually, the latter involves crediting the actors quoted with adequate analyses or policy 
suggestions, but doubting their willingness to act accordingly. Along these lines, the FPÖ refers to the 
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policy suggestions of the British Prime Minister, David Cameron; the NPD quotes the economist Hans-
Werner Sinn and thanks the General Secretary of the Conservative CSU, Andreas Scheuer for putting the 
issue of welfare tourism on the agenda; the AfD quotes the Advocate General of the Court of Justice 
where it suits them; the Front National interprets the words of the French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls; 
and UKIP refers to Bulgarian politicians or personal encounters with Bulgarian citizens. Since these 
parties quote whatever outside source not easily accused of racism, it is clear that also their overall lines of 
argument will be diverse. All that unites these quotes is that they will be used for justifying restrictions vis-
à-vis intra-EU migrants, which is why they vary but will remain within the range of frame F3 or F4. 
As a final indicator of the role played by uncertainty, the theory of territorialisation suggests that 
parties, in particular those arguing against what might become a potential national interest, will 
concentrate on the justification part of policy frames rather than on suggesting policies. Indeed, it seems 
that policies implying restrictions on welfare migration (code: F4 pol) are called for much more intensively 
than policies calling for equal treatment or just inaction (code F5 pol) (see Table 29). Parties using frame 
F2 or F5 rather tend to focus on the constitutive dimension, that is, they deny the existence of welfare 
tourism or denounce the remaining discrimination. Hence, it appears that parties are aware of the vote-
seeking dimension of their statements and are therefore avoiding open calls for cross-national distribution, 
rather than simply doing ideological business as usual. 
Table 29: Distribution of codings across dimensions. * = Relative to all codings for all frames 
 
Frame F4 
 
Frame F5 
 
total 
 
 
absolute percentage absolute percentage absolute percentage 
Frame total 322 35* 160 17,4* 919 100* 
norm 41 12,7 4 2,5 152 16,5 
cons 99 30,7 91 56,9 327 35,6 
cogn 55 17,1 48 30 193 21 
pol 127 39,4 17 10,6 247 26,9 
 
Beyond the PFA: external validity of the findings 
The European Parliament resolution on “respect for the fundamental right of free movement on the EU 
(2013/2960(RSP)” was passed in mid-January 2014, when the debate on the question of welfare access for 
intra-EU migrants had reached its peak. The remaining restrictions on free movement for Romania and 
Bulgaria had been abolished by then, but arguably it was still too early to judge the existence and degree of 
any resulting welfare tourism. It called upon the Member States to respect the right of free movement very 
much along the lines of frame F2, referred to empirical evidence on the contribution of mobile workers in 
terms of frame F5 and merely “Reminds the Member States of their social responsibility to tackle misuse 
of their social welfare systems, regardless of whether it is committed by their own citizens or by citizens of 
other Member States; calls on the Member States to comply with the provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC 
and to address possible abuses” as a mild reference to frame F3 and F4. The resolution eventually passed 
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was a joint one, sponsored by all EPGs except the Conservative ECR and the Eurosceptic Europe of 
Freedom and Democracy (EFD). 
At first sight, it might seem here that the EPP was more in line with the other groups than with 
the ECR, for why else would it have joined its resolution with S&D, ALDE, GUE/NGL and Verts/ALE 
rather than with the ECR? This, in turn, might be interpreted as counter to the idea that the members of 
the EPP and ECR actually form an ideological family and that this common family membership is 
somehow meaningful. Such EPG cohesion rather than ideological cohesion in the strict sense would seem 
to support the 3G2P approach at the expense of the theory of territiorialisation. A closer inspection, 
however, reveals that the matter was more complex than this and shows that the votes were in many ways 
in line with the results of the PFA. 
At the same time, differences between voting records and the framing analysis might not 
necessarily prove the latter wrong or meaningless in its own right. This is all the more so given the flaws 
of RCV and the fact that voting is much more bound by institutional rules than press releases are. For 
instance, the resolution required a single majority. Achieving a majority without the groups it eventually 
cooperated with would have been difficult if not impossible for the EPP. After all, even if an agreement 
with the ECR had been reached, the EFD might not have constituted a reliable, cohesive partner, might 
not have followed as a matter of principle, or might have made suggestions that could have been too 
radical for the EPP. Even so these three groups would not have achieved a majority on their own, which 
becomes clear by looking at the more controversial vote on particular amendments to which I return 
below. The EPP thus only had the choice to either cooperate with groups to its Left or remain without 
any influence on the resolution. What it achieved by cooperation was the inclusion of the aforementioned 
element, that was originally a part of the EPP’s own – already rather lenient – resolution, but arguably the 
one that was most in line with frame F4. The reason for the divide in terms of votes might thus have had 
to do more with majority requirements than with ideological differences on this particular issue. 
This becomes even more obvious when looking at the most controversial parts of the 
resolution. On both of these votes, the EPP voted cohesively against the Leftist groups, while now the 
ECR was split. The first of these two votes concerned the question, whether the abuse of social security 
systems by mobile workers referred to in §7 was to be considered ‘alleged’ or not (i.e. as a fact). The 
second concerned the question, whether it was in fact a ‘social’ responsibility of the Member States to 
address abuse as provided by §10. There was no RCV on the second one, but the number of votes in 
favour, against, and of abstentions was almost exactly the same so that it may be assumed that it followed 
the same pattern. The former vote at least concerns a core elements of the conservative frame F4: The 
constitutive dimension of this frame holds that welfare tourism is a real problem, hence the EPP 
(cohesively) and the British Conservatives (as part of the ECR) took issue with the word ‘alleged’. At the 
same time, the word ‘alleged’ captures the constitutive dimension of frame F5. In other words, this is 
precisely the distinction between the migrant-friendly and the restrictive frames on intra-EU migrants’ 
access to welfare abroad. But just as the analysis of frames revealed, this conflict evolves along ideological, 
not territorial lines. 
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The fact that this vote was not mainly about a split between the ECR and the EPP was also 
documented by some of the other votes, when individual members of the French UMP, the Italian 
Alleanza Nazionale and the Italian Forza Italia defected from the EPP and voted with the British 
Conservatives and non-attached Eurosceptics from FPÖ, BNP and the Front National. The vote 
concerned §2 of the resolution, and by voting against this paragraph these MEPs supported the position 
taken by some national governments who had been thinking aloud about possible restrictions to free 
movement. This is particularly interesting with regard to the Italian Right parties, as they are just not 
defecting to foster the interests of their emigrants but rather favour a much more restrictive course as the 
AN did in its manifesto. 
The Irish parties vote along with their respective party group, even on the most controversial 
votes. Noteworthy, this also implies that Fianna Fáil votes with the ALDE, while Fine Gael votes with the 
EPP. Rather than indicating an ideological split between these two parties, the roll call data also confirm 
the passive behaviour of most of the Irish political parties established earlier in terms of press releases, 
instead of revealing a formerly hidden but strong preference. Noteworthy, rather than supporting welfare 
tourism, Irish politicians from various parties have begun – albeit mainly at a later point in time – to 
actively promote the return of their own emigrants (Boland 2015; Green 2014; Socialist Party 2013). 
Finally, two remaining caveats in terms of the country selection can now be set aside for good. 
Before taking the voting records into account, it might have been argued, that with Italy still being a 
destination for immigration and Irish voters not being allowed to vote from abroad, the selection of 
countries was unsuited for identifying a potential territorial structure of conflict, with parties from these 
countries having no incentive for defending the interests of their emigrants abroad. Noteworthy, however, 
the Irish Green party still did so, and thereby it is acting just like its party family members abroad, while 
also the Italian Right behaved along ideological lines. In addition, the silence of the other parties might 
have been considered as an indication of the relevance of territory. The voting results show, however, that 
had these parties expressed their opinion by means of press releases, their framing would probably not 
have been different from that of their respective counterparts abroad. In fact, beyond that, the fact that in 
the RCV data on the resolution all Member States were covered but the structure of conflict even on the 
most controversial votes still remained ideological, should remove any final doubt on the selection of 
countries. At the same time, focusing on just some countries in order to conduct a framing analysis could 
further show the exact role played by uncertainty, which indeed was specified much more explicitly by the 
theory of territorialisation compared to extant theories, yet was largely confirmed. 
4.5 Conclusion on Europeanised welfare 
This first case study has demonstrated, that under the increased politicisation of EU politics, parties and 
their representatives in the EP are in principle aware of vote-seeking pressures and potentially relevant 
national interests, but remain reluctant to defect. Indeed, under uncertainty, they rather use the remaining 
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room for (rhetorical) manoeuvre by framing the issue in primarily ideological terms. As a result, the case 
study generally seems to corroborate the theory of territorialisation developed in Chapter 2. 
Simultaneously, however, it demonstrates the appropriateness of the approach taken in terms of 
research design and methods, as only this approach could prove the value added of the ToT. That the 
present case of Europeanised welfare is characterised by uncertainty of potential cross-national 
distribution could only be shown by an extensive discussion of the legal and economic aspects of the 
issue, which would hardly have been possible in a large-N design. Similarly, only a Policy Frame Analysis 
could reveal the degree of precision with which the ToT accounts for micro-level processes. First, the 
identification of policy frames demonstrates in the first place, that there is not just one simple way of 
perceiving the issue and the distributional effects of various policy options. Second, the fact that parties 
use their room for manoeuvre by focussing more on justifications in order to avoid goal conflict could 
only be shown if a method is used that allows for such differentiation. Third, the PFA uncover how 
parties under uncertainty abstain from defection, while trying to broaden their electoral appeal by using 
strategies of blurring (while remaining close to their own line of argument) and subsuming (especially on 
the far Right). Last but not least, using a method of analysis at the micro-level that, at least in the 
conservative manner it was applied here, does not allow for glossing over ‘outliers’, has shown the – 
expectable – limitations of the ToT. 
The case study following in the next chapter will demonstrate in particular the limits MEPs’ 
ability and willingness regarding the avoidance of defection. These limits, it will be argued, are set by the 
certainty of cross-national distribution. Further research on the present case of Europeanised welfare 
might extend the time frame of the study, so as to fill the gap between these two instances of 
(un)certainty. Thereby, the question might be addressed, how exactly certainty is established and at what 
point parties start to lose their leeway. 
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5. The 2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy 
This chapter presents the second case study on conflict in the European Parliament intended for evaluating the 
theory of territorialisation presented earlier and is meant to demonstrate in particular the limits of parties’ ability and 
willingness for avoiding defection given certainty of cross-national distribution. First, some background information 
on this case, namely the 2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), is provided, such that its features 
as a case are fully understood and the justification of its section is corroborated. Most importantly, the policy issue is 
characterised by a relatively high degree of cross-national distributional effects, which at the same time are rather 
certain. Earlier research has therefore been quick to invoke CAP more generally as a typical case involving ‘national 
interests’ and increasing rates of defection. Interestingly, however, it also involves considerable intra-national 
distribution, namely between farmers and the rest of society, which may not erase but relativise incentives for 
defection depending on the core electorate of a given party. Before the observable implications of extant theories 
and the theory of territorialisation can be contrasted, the policy frames that the various national parties represented 
in the EP might use to take positions on the reform are identified (Section 2). Four such frames are identified in total 
by complementing policy frames on CAP as identified by Mark Rhinard with more topical arguments used in the 
literature (mostly consisting in think tank publications at the time of writing) on the latest reform. The third section 
then brakes down the specific implications of the reform for the parties in the sample. It does so by first pointing out 
the interests of the countries selected and then formulates the respective expectations in terms of structure of 
conflict and framing strategies for the various parties in the sample based on extant theoretical approaches and the 
theory of territorialisation on the other hand. Thereafter, Section 4 discusses the results of the Policy Frame Analysis 
(PFA) with regard to the structure of conflict observed, a descriptive summary of the usage of the various frames 
and a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on defection and other framing strategies (blurring, subsuming). As it 
is found, the structure of conflict is considerably but not entirely territorialised, as the theory of territorialisation would 
have suggested. At the micro-level, the usage of the various framing strategies equally fits this theoretical framework, 
as in the face of certain cross-national distributional effects, some parties are indeed led to give in to their vote-
seeking goals by defecting from their ideology-driven policy-seeking. Parties who cannot expect their defection to be 
electorally rewarded, however, prefer blurring over outright defection. Interestingly, vote-seeking interests seem to 
reach beyond a purely distributional logic and towards national traditions, as is indicated by the behaviour of Italian 
national delegations in the sample. Subsuming again appears as a prominent strategy among far Right parties, who 
instead of blindly arguing for decentralisation of the policy try to bring this in line with more broadly accepted values 
and causal narratives. In contrast to the debate on ‘welfare tourism’, however, the policy dimensions of the various 
frames are referred to much more frequently, which seems to follow the ‘leeway’ argument on certainty and framing. 
While a relation between the PFA results and voting data can be established in terms of external validation, this case 
also demonstrates in how far voting records are shaped by negotiation dynamics rather than a reflection of the 
underlying conflict. In sum, Section 5 concludes, the conflict on the reform of the CAP demonstrates that, while the 
EP is not immune to national interests when these can be identified easily, it still remains a highly sophisticated 
channel of representation, in that the intra-national distributional aspects of a policy still find their expression in the 
limits of territorialisation. This is in line with the theory of territorialisation, in that national party delegations are 
expected to carefully weigh their various party goals against each other, so that defection as a temporary surrender of 
policy-seeking will only be considered where compensation is to be expected in terms of votes gained. 
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5.1 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the 2013 Reform 
In this section, some background information on the CAP prior to the 2013 Reform and on the major proposals 
included in the debate on the latter are provided. Most importantly, it will be shown how the CAP became as 
relevant in budgetary terms as it still is (to a lesser extent) today , how it was slowly but steadily transformed away 
from away from interventionism to more market orientation, and how it was added by new policies in terms of rural 
development and environmental protection. These trends are partly continued in the 2013 Reform, with the 
abolition of remaining production quotas and the ‘greening’ of farmers’ income support, but have been partly 
reversed at the same time by the continuing existence of so-called ‘coupled’ payments and the new ‘safety net’. Based 
on this information, it is possible to further corroborate the classification of the 2013 Reform as a case (high 
politicisation, post-Lisbon, post-Crisis, cross-national as well as intra-national distributional effects of high certainty) 
and to eventually understand the logics behind the various frames identified in the second section. Before the start of 
the latter, however, I briefly review the extant literature on the structure of conflict concerning CAP (without striving 
for completeness, though), showing that there are policy-specific open questions making this case study worthwhile 
beyond its function within the present research design. 
The ‘old’ CAP and its legacies 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been described as the only policy that has ever reached a 
level of integration that, according to Elmar Rieger could be considered ‘federal’, in that decisions were 
not only made, but also implemented at the EU level (ibid. 2005, 164). In addition to being one of the 
most integrated policies, the CAP is also one of the oldest policies of what today is called the European 
Union. Its foundations were laid already in the Treaty of Rome of 1957, and, in contrast to other policies, 
it was put into practice within the next five years (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 254). The fact that the CAP 
was created at the time and the way in which it was done has often been interpreted as a quid pro quo 
between France and Germany, with the latter’s industry benefitting disproportionally from the customs 
union, while the former’s huge farming sector would be compensated by the created of the CAP. Ackrill 
discusses this question in some detail, but eventually comes to the conclusion that “[t]he full story of why 
the CAP exists, however, goes well beyond the simple quid pro quo for Germany’s industrial exports to 
France” (ibid. 2000, 39–41). With reference to a number of historians, Rieger agrees that this account of 
the creation of CAP should be “laid to rest” (ibid. 2005, 164). To a certain extent, this may be read as a 
warning of post-rationalization when it comes to alleged log-rolling, which in turn supports the issue-by-
issue approach taken in this dissertation project. At the same time, this is not to deny the existence and 
relevance of log-rolling in EU politics per se. Within the European Council in particular, compromises are 
certainly reached frequently in this manner. However, given the high degree of specialization within the 
EP, this is less likely to occur in this legislative’s daily business. More importantly, log-rolls matter when a 
conflict is obvious already – not at the stage of position taking during which the structure of conflict is 
shaped in the first place. 
The foregoing claim that CAP was more than a quid pro quo between France and Germany rests 
essentially on the fact that Germany and other countries accepted the principle of CAP (Ackrill 2000, 41). 
This was because, as Rieger points out, in all of the countries involved farmers played an important role, 
both in terms of their contribution to the Gross Domestic Product of these countries and their share of 
the electorate (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 255; Rieger 2005, 168). The first of these facts had contributed 
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to the creation of national agricultural policies that served the interests of farmers: In France, the 
government had installed a price-support scheme and subsidized mechanization with a view to increase 
output and farming incomes, and had imposed quantitative restrictions on agricultural imports. In West 
Germany, Import and Storage Boards intervened in markets so as to maintain prices and farmers incomes, 
thereby incentivising an expansion of output. Even in Italy, where the government partly tried to create 
incentives for labour to leave agriculture, the government intervened, for instance, into wheat crops in 
order to stabilize prices (Ackrill 2000, 25–28). It was also due to the second fact, the electoral weight of 
farmers, Rieger argues, that agricultural policy was communitarised, thereby winning over this part of the 
population for the project of European integration (ibid. 2005, 168). In this sense, the creation of the CAP 
may have contributed, if not to enthusiasm for integration among the rural population, then at least to 
acceptance; in other words to the (in)famous permissive consensus. 
Market intervention for price stabilization, which according to Ackrill (2000) was the most 
common approach to national agricultural policy, also turned out to be a key feature of the early CAP. Of 
the instruments chosen to achieve this, the guarantee or target price is certainly the most essential element, 
whereas the others are more or less supporting the feasibility of its application. By fixing prices, the 
uncertainty confronting farmers under market conditions is considerably reduced, and they now have an 
incentive to produce sufficient amounts (or even to overproduce by finding ways of increasing 
production, as the target price is set above the market price) (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 259). Tariffs are 
set on agricultural products entering the common market in order to avoid an influx of cheap food from 
outside, thereby serving the principle of Community preference (ibid. 2005, p. 258; Fouilleux 2013, 310). 
While prices could be kept at the target level by buying up and storing surpluses (Fouilleux 2013, 310), the 
surpluses could also be avoided by setting quotas or by refunding exports (i.e. making European food 
competitive on a global level) (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 259). By shifting these policies – which in more 
or less similar manner had already been applied nationally – to the EU-level, it was possible to create a 
common market for agricultural goods while not exposing farmers to the associated risks (ibid. 2005, 255). 
Next to this unified market and the principle of Community preference (EU agricultural products are to 
be preferred over imported ones), the principle of financial solidarity was established. The latter meant 
that all expenses on agricultural policy had to be financed from the Community budget (ibid. 2005, 257). 
Since moreover the CAP was directly resulting from the Treaties, agricultural spending was considered 
part of the ‘compulsory’ expenditure (Ackrill 2000, 79). This combination had important consequences for 
the CAP and its distributional effects, which in many ways last to the present day, and hence shall be 
discussed in turn. 
On the one hand, the distinction between compulsory expenditure and non-compulsory 
expenditure was used in the past in order to limit the influence of the European Parliament on the EU 
expenditure (Ackrill 2000, 79). This matters for the present project in so far as the EP was able to formally 
and significantly influence CAP for the first time with the 2013 Reform, given its new rights under the 
Treaty of Lisbon (cf. Fouilleux 2013, 310). On the other hand, ‘compulsory expenditure’ meant that, while 
there was leeway concerning the instruments of the CAP, the resulting costs would definitely have to be 
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covered by the EU budget – in contrast to the non-compulsory expenditure, for which the total amount 
was limited both for each year as such and with regard to possible increases (Ackrill 2000, 79). Again, such 
limitations did not exist regarding the CAP. 
As Ackrill (2000) notes, the CAP was meant to be financed by the ‘own resources’ of the EU 
(EC), most notably by the revenue gained from the common external tariff. Yet, because of the 
overproduction that the policies constituting CAP caused at the time, the related expenditure increased 
continually. Additional ‘own resources’ were created based on Value Added Tax (VAT) contributions 
from the Member States, but even these were soon insufficient to cover the costs of CAP. Hence, further 
contributions from the Member States, calculated on the basis for the Gross National Product (GNP), 
had to be mobilised (ibid. 2000, 77–79). First ideas on how to reduce spending on CAP nonetheless were 
provided by the Commission already a decade after its creation, but this did not change one fact: The 
EU’s budget was effectively out of control because of CAP (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 264–66). 
Noteworthy, while the CAP became the main component of the EU expenditure to which all countries 
had to contribute in more or less proportionate amounts, the returns they received varied 
disproportionally. 
This seems easy to understand, as one might assume of course resources allocated to food 
production will end up mostly in those countries with substantial farming sectors. Indeed, France has 
classically received the largest chunk from the CAP budget, even beyond its share of the overall budget, 
while the UK has received less from the CAP than it has contributed. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the UK 
has always pushed for reforming the CAP soon after it joined the EU in 1973 (Ackrill 2000, 52). But while 
preferences concerning the degree and direction of reform may have varied across countries, the UK was 
not alone in this struggle, as a number of factors functioned as pressures for reform. 
First, while European post-war economies had been characterised by a rather high degree of 
state intervention in the economy, the 1980s saw the general rise of an ideational framework geared 
towards liberalisation and deregulation, and the strongly interventionist CAP appeared as a relic of the 
past that did not sit well with such ideas (Rhinard 2010, 81). Second, while the UK was particularly 
negatively affected by the extent of the CAP expenditure, the steady increase of the latter posed a problem 
to the rest of the EU as well, as it meant that resources could not be freed for other purposes. Third, 
international trade agreements, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in particular, 
collided with the protectionist elements of the CAP and led to conflict within international fora, risking to 
harm European countries – Germany in particular (ibid. 2010, 97) – in other trading sectors. Fourth, the 
rising tide of environmentalist actors was highly critical of the agricultural practices fostered by the CAP 
(for a detailed account of reform pressures, see Ackrill 2000, 77–114 Rhinard 2010, 79–85 and Altomonte 
and Nava 2005, 264–75). Finally, as Rhinard (2010, 93) notes, as the prevalence of small-scale, inefficient 
farming practices in Germany were one reason why the country had joined France earlier in preventing 
reform, the fact that the average farm size in Germany more than double with reunification (Ackrill 2000, 
20) will have contributed to a change in the German position towards increased openness to reform. 
Given Germany’s political weight in the EU-9 and later EU-12, this change of mind will certainly have 
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constitute an important “crack in the armour” (Rhinard 2010) of the old CAP, which then could no longer 
resists the pressures for reform. 
Shortly before German reunification, in 1988, Commission President Jacques Delors had made 
an effort to reform the CAP, introducing further cuts in target prices and introducing production quotas 
(Altomonte and Nava 2005, 264–67). However, like the Mansholt Plan of 1968, the Delors Reform only 
addressed some symptoms of the issues of the classic CAP without changing the general approach to the 
policy area. On the one hand, with the Delors Reform, the expansion of the CAP expenditure came to a 
halt. On the other hand, the innovative element of the reform – the quota system – tends to create a 
feeling of injustice among the countries concerned, which Altomonte and Nava consider almost 
“inevitable” (ibid. 2005, 266–67). In addition, the budgetary impact of the CAP was just one of the 
aforementioned pressures for reform, while all others, most notably the associated problems with 
international trade agreements, remained (ibid. 2005, 269). It was only with the adoption of another 
reform, designed under the Irish Commissioner for Agriculture Ray MacSharry, that CAP changed 
fundamentally. 
In fact, the changes introduced with the MacSharry Reform were quite literally fundamental, in 
the sense that the reforms that followed – the Agenda 2000, the 2003 Reform and the Health Check of 
2008 – more or less were built on what was started in 1992. Like previous reforms, the MacSharry Reform 
reduced target prices, but it did so drastically and in turn introduced so-called direct payments to 
compensate for the losses incurred by farmers (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 268–70). This was the start of 
a process referred to as ‘decoupling’, which means that the subsidies available are no longer coupled to the 
amount of food produced by the farmers, but are paid directly to the farmers. The important implication 
is that thereby, the link between increases in production and agricultural expenditure is broken (Rhinard 
2010, 98; Rieger 2005, 178). 
Next to ending ‘automatic’ increases in spending, decoupling has another effect, namely that 
farmers have less incentives to exploit the land they cultivate ever more recklessly, which is arguably 
conducive to the environment. However, the MacSharry Reform also directly introduced environmental 
concerns into the policy area, by allocating subsidies for so-called agri-environmental measures (AEMs), 
which included, for instance, measures to reduce the usage of fertilizers, and to support organic farming, 
extensive production, reduced stock densities, maintenance of the countryside, upkeep of abandoned 
woodland, set aside farmland. At the time, the measures covered made up about 2-3% of agricultural 
spending (Rhinard 2010, 101). Yet, Rhinard argues, the agri-environmental measures “would have prove 
to have a significant effect on future policymaking” (ibid. 2010, 101). 
Indeed, with the further reform of the CAP that was decided as part of the EU’s Agenda 2000, 
it became evident that the CAP expenditure was resting now on two ‘pillars’ (Fouilleux 2013, 314–15; 
Rhinard 2010, 132). The first pillar consists of the money allocated to the direct payments and are drawn 
from the ‘guarantee’ section of the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF), 
while the second pillar, funded respectively from the ‘guidance’ section, is consists in more structural 
support in terms of rural development (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 270–73). Noteworthy, the Agenda 
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2000 reform widened the scope of agricultural spending that was not for income recompensation: Next to 
the aforementioned agri-environmental measures, pillar 2 fosters investments in farm business (reduction 
of production costs, environmental protection, quality improvements), the entry of young farmers and 
retirements of older ones, farming in Least Favoured Areas (LFAs; e.g. mountainous areas), forestry, 
processing and marketing of agricultural products, and general rural development in terms of basic 
services for rural communities, rural heritage, economic diversification, infrastructure, and even tourism 
(cf. Rhinard 2010, 132–33). Direct payments, which now came to replace even bigger portions of price 
support, partly became ‘national envelopes’ distributed by the Member States (Fouilleux 2013, 318). 
The 2003 Reform then again continued this trend aiming for complete decoupling by the 
creation of the so-called Single-Farm-Payment (SFP) (Fouilleux 2013, 315–16; Rieger 2005, 177). These 
unique direct payments were made subject to what is known as ‘cross-compliance’, that is, conditioned on 
the adherence to environmental, food safety, animal welfare, health and occupational safety standards and 
on keeping farmland in a generally good condition (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 274). Since the 2003 
reform, Member States can transfer part of their national envelope dedicated to direct payments to the 
second pillar, a process referred to as ‘modulation’, which has been continued in the 2008 Health Check (3 
per cent available for modulation after 2003, 10 per cent after 2008). The latter reform also introduced 
further modulation of 4 per cent on individual direct payments above 300,000€ (Fouilleux 2013, 315–18). 
Since these changes were minor, the 2008 Health check is usually not considered a ‘major reform’ (Mahé 
2012, 255), but it does certainly not break with the trend started in the MacSharry Reform, which generally 
can be summarised as follows: 
- replacement of market management (from 90 % in 1992 to 5% in 2013) with direct 
payments (‘decoupling’) (94  in 2013) (cf. European Commission 2013e, 4) 
- an increased number of rationales for agricultural policy spending via pillar 2 
- ever-increasing environmental awareness 
- a certain degree of decentralisation in terms of implementation and targeting of spending at 
the national level 
Yet, in spite of these gradual but fundamental changes, there are some legacies of the ‘old’ CAP that had 
lasting and considerable distributional consequences. 
While the introduction of direct payments led to a decoupling of production and income 
support, the level of support prior to decoupling continued to be relevant in a number of ways. First, 
direct payments were considered as a means to close a gap in farming incomes, just like price support had 
done before (Rieger 2005, 179). At the time of their introduction, therefore, the level of direct payments 
was determined with regard to a reference period (2000-2002). More precisely: “When the Single Farm 
Payment was introduced in 2003, the money that was freed up by removing subsidies that had hitherto 
been coupled to production was transferred to national Single Farm Payment envelopes in accordance 
with Member States’ previous receipts of coupled subsidies” (Zahrnt 2009). The direct payments per farm 
could be based on a. a ‘historic’ model, which meant that entitlements per farm would be calculated on the 
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basis of the amount of payments received by that farm during the reference period or b. a regional model, 
which included a flat rate payment per hectare based on the amount of payments received in a region in 
relation to the total number of eligible hectares within that region (d'Oultremont 2011, 2; Jomini et al. 
2010, 9). Given these path dependencies, it would seem unsurprising that the overall level of agricultural 
support still remained largely unchanged to the present day (Mahé 2012, 1). 
In fact, however, hidden behind this observation of crude numbers lies what has been referred 
to as “the single largest reduction of CAP support ever agreed by the member states in the history of the 
Union” (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 174). After all, while overall support has remained constant, the same 
amount of subsidies is to be shared by what are now 28 instead of 15 Member States of the EU. This 
could only be achieved because the 2002 Brussels European Council simply decided that support levels of 
2006 should serve as the overall ceiling for the CAP budget until 2013 (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 273–
74). The direct payments for the new Member States should only slowly be ‘phased in’, Hence, with a view 
to the approaching enlargement, the Brussels European Council of 2002 decided that the levels of direct 
payments in the new Member States would equal 25 per cent of the level in the EU15 in 2004, 30 per cent 
in 2005, 35 per cent in 2006, 40 per cent in 2007, 50 per cent in 2008 and thereafter would rise annually by 
10 per cent until reaching the same level of support across the EU in 2013 (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 
273–74). Until then, the governments of the new Member States would be allowed to top-up the direct 
payments by the remaining percentages (Jomini et al. 2010, 9). In sum, support levels prior to the 
introduction of decoupling have remained relevant even in an enlarged EU, and still, the average of 
support per farm was reduced. 
One should be cautious, however, not to confuse the idea of ‘phasing in’ with total equity 
among farmers across Member States. This is because of the second way in which pre-decoupling support 
levels have remained relevant: Most of the old Member States had chosen the historic model for the 
introduction of direct payments (cf. Jomini et al. 2010, 9), whereas -due to the absence of the respective 
references – only two of the new Member States (Malta and Slovenia) chose the regional model, while the 
rest opted for the Single Area Payments Scheme (SAPS) as a transitional measure. As the Commission 
formulates it on its website: 
Due to limited administrative capacities and the absence of historical data, new member states (i.e. those 
that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007) were granted the possibility of applying the single area 
payment scheme instead of applying the standard direct payment schemes. The single area payment 
scheme provides a flat-rate decoupled area payment paid for eligible agricultural land and replaces almost 
all payments granted in other than new member states. (DG Agriculture and Rural Development 2016) 
It is argued, that the retention of historic output references has contributed to a situation where a Dutch 
farmer receives €458 of direct payments per hectare, while his Latvian colleague only receives €95 
(d'Oultremont 2011, 4; 2012, 6–8; European Commission 2013e, 8; Matthews 2011, 52). 
Finally, the legacies of the old CAP, again in terms of historic references, also influence the 
distribution between farmers: Large farms who had produced more during the reference period and, 
besides, maybe would not actually need support, would also received higher amounts of direct payments 
(80% of payments go to 20% of farms) (cf. d'Oultremont 2011, 2), while small farms, which in principle 
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might not be able to survive under market conditions and would thus really depend on support, would 
continue to be structurally disadvantaged (d'Oultremont 2012, 12; Rieger 2005, 179). Noteworthy, this 
distributional issue is not just an intra-national one. As Mahé notes: “The capping of direct aid per farm 
has always been a bone of contention between member states, for some very large ones [i.e. farms] are 
concentrated in the UK, in the north of Germany and in certain Central and Eastern European states” 
(ibid. 2012, 21). 
In sum, because of historical legacies, a number of pressures remain for further reform. First, 
the budget was and still is the single largest chunk of the EU’s expenditure and for this reason alone, it can 
be expected that in times of budgetary discipline such as these, it remains under pressure (Mahé 2012, 2; 
Zahrnt 2010, 2). Noteworthy, the Crisis in particular may lead to reform pressure on the part of the 
‘donors’, while those hit by the Crisis but benefitting from CAP will cling all the more to it. More 
generally, pressure for reform that continues the aforementioned trends towards decoupling and greening 
may be met with resistance from those who, not appreciating this trend anyway, want to turn back the 
clock. Decoupling as the shift to direct payments has further made the distributional effects within and 
across countries more visible, making them appear even bigger than they once were (Altomonte and Nava 
2005, 271; Fouilleux 2013, 321–22; Rhinard 2010, 100). Based on the knowledge about the past of the 
CAP, it is now possible to understand the measures discussed in the debate on the CAP post-2013. 
The 2013 Reform of the CAP... 
In the following I shall concentrate on the concrete proposals for the 2013 Reform of the CAP as they 
were forwarded by the Commission. It would probably fill more than one book to consider all other 
suggestions for reform by all other participants in the debate. At the same time, it should be clear also that 
of course there was a certain corridor for each and every proposal as regards the direction, scope and 
extent of change. Thus, before introducing the main suggestions made for the 2013 Reform of the CAP, I 
shall briefly discuss the different roads leading away from the crossroad at which European policy-makers 
found themselves at the time of reform. First, one might consider the most general trends in the preceding 
reforms, namely the de facto reduction in the overall budget (given enlargement) and the increased focus on 
public goods related to agriculture rather than food production itself. Certainly, the CAP could be even 
more focused on public goods production, so that there is room to simply move further along exactly this 
line. Some might also have interpreted earlier reforms as a move away from state intervention, and, 
consequently, towards liberalisation of the CAP. Total liberalisation certainly would constitute a more 
radical step than the continuation of the concentration on public goods. That said, there is arguably no 
automaticity in the reforms, in that it might in principle also be considered to reverse previous reforms. 
Finally, compared to the times of the old CAP, agricultural policy the prior to the reform was certainly less 
‘Common’ than it once had been, and further decentralisation in principle constitutes another broad 
direction for further reform. 
While these might be the broad directions towards which some actors might push in terms of 
policy change, it is clear from the preceding discussion that there is a strong status quo bias concerning the 
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overall design of the CAP. As has been shown above, direct payments under pillar 1 have become the 
main instrument of the CAP. It is not surprising, that hence the liveliest discussions on the CAP reform 
concern changes to the allocation of direct payments, albeit just one of the four main legal proposals that 
make up the reform is dedicated to them (cf. Matthews 2011, 1). These discussions can be summarised 
under the notions of ‘greening’, ‘targeting’, ‘capping’, and ‘convergence’ and shall be discussed here in 
turn. 
With regard to the ‘greening’, d’Oultremont holds: “The most important and innovative change 
proposed by the Commission is the green payment, making 30  of the CAP’s direct payments national 
envelope conditional on three ‘greening’ measures” (ibid. 2011, 6; Mahé 2012, 13). In fact, from the 
foregoing section it should become clear that earlier reforms have also aimed at ‘greening’ the CAP: direct 
payments can be considered greener than price support, as they limit environmentally harmful 
overproduction. They have further been made subject to cross compliance, i.e. amongst others, the 
adherence to environmental minimum standards. Moreover, those farmers that went beyond these 
minimum standards could become eligible for support under pillar 2. 
Rieger holds, however, that these measures, the Agri-Environmental Measures (AEMs) in 
particular, had produced very limited results other than channelling additional money to farmers by being 
misused (ibid. 2005, 179). Noteworthy, the AEMs were voluntary, so that, Mahé argues, greening of the 
first pillar effectively adds another layer to cross-compliance. In fact, he notes, “Greening consists of the 
split of the bulk of the payment between a basic payment and an environmental bonus”, the latter being 
paid for measures involving crop diversification, maintenance of permanent grassland, ecological focus 
areas (7%) (ibid. 2012, 6). Moreover, organic farms automatically qualify for the green payment (ibid. 
2012, 6, 29). By making 30 per cent of direct payments conditional on environmental friendly measures, 
even those states who according to Mahé have been least capable of organizing voluntary greening would 
now be forced to participate (ibid. 2012, 28). Comparing only the Commission Memos on the 2013 
Reform from 2011 (launching of the proposals) and 2013 (political agreement), respectively one can 
hardly fail to notice the introduction of the notion of ‘Greening Equivalence’ (European Commission 
2013c, 4). Behind this, there is the idea of taking existing greening efforts under e.g. AEMs into account 
when calculating the 30 per cent (ibid.). Arguably, this implies that the additional effect of greening direct 
payments is considerably limited. 
It is almost a logical consequence of the concept of ‘targeting’ that several different policy 
suggestions go under this heading. First, similar to the greening albeit not in extent, a mandatory share of 
2 per cent of the national envelopes shall be used to top-up direct payments for young farmers (<40 years 
of age) for the first five years after installation (European Commission 2011a, 2). Second, 5 per cent of 
national envelopes for direct payments may be allocated (i.e. voluntary if Member States so decide) to areas 
with natural constraints, also called Least Favoured Areas (LFAs) as defined and subsidized to some 
extent already under pillar 2 (ibid. 2011a, 2; European Commission, 3). Third, a certain percentage 
(varying between 5 and 13 between) of the national envelope for direct payments may be paid as coupled 
support linked to specific products (ibid.) Fourth, payments shall be limited to ‘active farmers’, that is, 
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those enterprises whose primary business is indeed of agricultural nature, thereby excluding some 
businesses also based on a ‘negative list’ (e.g. airports) from CAP funding (European Commission 2011a, 
3; 2013e, 4). Fifth, money can be shifted from pillar 1 to pillar 2 and vice versa to a certain degree 
(differing by the stage of negotiation, but never higher than 15% of the national envelope) (European 
Commission 2013a, 4; European Commission 2011a, 2). Sixth, Member States may opt for introducing a 
Small Farmers Scheme, which allocates participating farmers a rather low amount of direct payments at a 
rate fixed per Member States (but ranging between €500 and €1250), while exempting these business from 
greening as well as some of the cross-compliance requirements (European Commission 2011a, 2; 2013c, 
3). In principle, ‘targeting’ could also mean that support is reduced for those who do not really need it for 
economic survival or is allocated based on the production of public goods, which usually does not rise 
proportionally to farm size. Yet, this shall be explained here under the heading of ‘internal convergence’. 
The debate on the 2013 Reform again saw the return of the idea of capping, which so far had 
been introduced very moderately under modulation. While from the start this was not meant to lead to 
cross-national redistribution, it would have implied, as formulated by the Commission in 2011, that direct 
payments would be limited to a maximum of €300000 per year, while stepwise reducing direct payments 
as off a total of €150000 (European Commission 2011a, 3). By 2013, it had been agreed, however, that 
capping should be compulsory only to a limited degree as off €150000 per year, making the maximum of 
€300000 optional, and always now taking salary costs into account (European Commission 2013c, 2). 
Member States should have the right to redistribute up to 30 per cent of their national envelope to 
farmers on their first 30 hectares (ibid.). At a more general level, internal convergence also means that by 
2019, direct payments per hectare of cultivated land should become more equal: ‘uniform’ it says in the 2011 
proposals (European Commission 2011a, 1); reducing the difference between those below 90 per cent of 
the regional or national average and the national/regional average by one third in 2013 while 
proportionally decreasing the amounts for those above average (European Commission 2013c, 2). 
Thereby, effectively, historic references for countries under the Single Payment Scheme shall be abolished, 
and the part of direct payments not subject to greening shall be called Basic Payment Scheme. 
As was already noted, historic references and pre-enlargement legacies had not only led to high 
internal variance within the Member States, but also to a high degree of variance across Member States, 
especially when average amounts of direct payments per hectare are considered. Many of the new Member 
States therefore particularly asked for total external convergence (d'Oultremont 2011, 3). The Commission 
reports to have examined prospects for basing the allocation of direct payments across Member States on 
so-called ‘objective criteria’, but because of the massive distributional effects resulting from these criteria 
opted for a ‘pragmatic’ approach (d'Oultremont 2011, 3; Matthews 2011, 5): quite in analogy to the 
process of internal convergence, the gap between the Member States with average direct payments per 
hectare below 90 per cent of the EU average should be closed by one third, financed by those Member 
States currently above these 90 per cent (d'Oultremont 2011, 3; European Commission 2011a, 1; 2013c, 2; 
Matthews 2011, 5). Arguably, with regard to this particular aspect of cross-national distribution, one of the 
potentially most controversial items was already off the table by early 2013. 
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An orientation towards more ‘objective criteria’ was also suggested regarding pillar 2 national 
allocations (European Commission 2011a, 4), but eventually, via a ‘discretionary payment’ agreed in the 
European Council its distributional effects were largely contained or even reversed (Matthews 2013). Also 
with regard to pillar 2, it was agreed that 30 per cent of Rural Development (RD) spending would be 
devoted to environmental friendly measures (including e.g. organic farming) (European Commission 
2013c, 6). More generally, some conceptual changes were made concerning pillar 2 spending, which as a 
result shall allow Member States greater freedom in setting priorities (ibid.). 
Most of these measures can be considered as a continuation of earlier reform trends and, as will 
be shown in the next section, follow a similar logic which is distinct from the one that underpinned the 
old CAP. Arguably, some of the measures discussed under targeting increase the flexibility of Member 
States (cf. European Commission 2013e, 5) and in that sense might be the beginning of a new trend 
towards decentralisation. Yet, in the debate on the 2013 Reform of the CAP, there was not just 
continuation of old policy trends or the start of a new one. While both the Commission as well as 
commentators conclude that the trend towards market orientation is eventually continued 
(European Commission 2013c, 5; Matthews 2011, 9), there have also been “some calls from quarters for a 
reversal of this process, and for the reintroduction of high support prices underpinned if necessary by 
supply control measures such as quotas” (Matthews 2011, 9). Indeed, quota regimes were set to expire. 
And yet, the Regulation on the Single Common Market Organisation (CMO) provides that common rules 
shall be introduced covering all sectors of agricultural production that would recognize Producer 
Organisations (POs) who amongst others would strengthen producers vis-à-vis other actors in the food 
chain (European Commission 2011a, 4; 2013c, 5; Matthews 2011, 10). 
More importantly, the proposal on the CMO regulation introduces a general, harmonized ‘safety 
net’ in terms of public intervention possibilities, albeit at a lower level than traditional target prices, 
suggests that farmers should be eligible for receiving assistance from the European Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund (EGAF), and calls for the creation of a ‘crisis reserve’ of a yearly maximum of €500 
million (European Commission 2011a, 3; 2013c, 5; Matthews 2011, 10). The final political agreement has 
it, that the crisis reserve should be financed by reducing direct payments in turn (European Commission 
2013c, 5). It should be noted, however, that this was not what was provided for in the original proposal, 
which provided that pillar I and II should be complemented by the crisis reserve and the EGAF money from 
outside the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) (European Commission 2011b, 7). Based on this 
proposal, Mahé actually calls these reformed market measures as “forerunners to a third CAP pillar” (ibid. 
2012, 43). As a discussion evolved around the sufficiency of this safety net (d'Oultremont 2011, 10), one 
might wonder whether the old CAP has re-entered through the backdoor with the 2013 Reform. At the 
very least, it seems, this return to the past has been attempted by some actors. 
... and its characteristics as a case 
Based on this background information, it is now possible to discuss in more detail than it was possible in 
Chapter 3, what exactly makes the 2013 Reform of the CAP an interesting case for the present study. In 
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doing so, I start with those features of this case that should be similar across cases studied here, namely 
politicisation, EP competence and timing of the debate. Only then will I turn to the characteristics that 
make CAP special within the sample of policy issues in terms of distributional effects, their direction and 
certainty. 
The politicisation of the CAP is arguably not a result of the Crisis, but has a much longer 
history. One starting point might be seen in the UK’s calling into question of the cross-national 
distributional effects of the CAP, which subsequently induced other Member States to draw up similar 
calculations (Olper 2008, 85), with Thatcher’s call for getting “her money back” still being quoted in 
public debates on the EU (e.g. Freund and Schwarzer). Noteworthy, however, it was not just the directly 
financial component of CAP that has been politicised: As Olper (2008, 89) notes, the food scares of the 
1990s have caught the interest of a wider public and, albeit not necessarily a result of CAP, influenced 
politicians thinking about its reform. Indeed, the food scares of the 1990s have not been the last, and the 
so-called ‘horse-meat scandal’ was actively taken up by some political actors commenting on the 2013 
reform. Generally, food and food production seem to catch the attention of an increasing number of 
people, given, for instance, the fact that meanwhile almost 400,000 people visit the ‘Green week’ (Grüne 
Woche) in Berlin, an event initiated by the German food producers’ associations (Messe Berlin GmbH). 
Moreover, farmers all over Europe may have been shrinking in numbers, but are still very good at 
mobilizing and at providing the media with impressive images (e.g. Eckinger 2016). It is thus also not 
surprising that the 2013 Reform of the CAP received media coverage across Europe (Le Monde 2013; 
vks/fdi/dpa 2013). In general, commentators on the CAP tend to agree that the legitimacy of the policy is 
a major issue and that the pressure for justification is (Bianchi 2011) and remains (Moehler 2015) high. 
Finally, with the 2013 Reform taking place during the Crisis, it was also considered as a potential strain on 
(or source of) European solidarity. It can be safely assumed, then, that political actors involved in the 
Reform were aware of its potentially politicised nature. 
An additional increase in politicisation might result from the direct involvement of the EP in the 
reform process, since this is generally thought to increase the transparency of the process at least to the 
extent that at various instances, the proposals on the table would have to be made publicly available 
(Swinnen, Johan F. M 2015a, 15). Noteworthy, this involvement of the CAP was a novelty introduced 
with the Treaty of Lisbon, which made the EP a co-legislator in this policy area (Swinnen, Johan F. M and 
Knops 2012). At the same time, the fact that the empowerment of the EP in this area is still not unlimited 
indirectly leads this case to fulfil the timing requirements for this study in terms of the legislative and 
electoral cycle: given the budgetary relevance of the CAP, the months after the agreement on the Multi-
Annual Financial Framework (MFF) had been achieved (March 2013) proved to be decisive (Swinnen, 
Johan F. M 2015b, 9). The formal adoption of the respective legislative package was then achieved in late 
2013, leaving open only some technical implementation details in terms of delegated acts (ibid. 2015b, 2). 
Thus, the critical phase of the reform overlaps with the run-up to the elections in 2014, and was situated 
rather late in the legislative circle. Noteworthy, the fact that the MFF agreement was awaited first does not 
mean that MEPs did not comment on it, not to speak of voicing their opinion of how to spend the money 
5. The 2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy 
175 
allocated for CAP. As I have noted above already, the so-called ‘safety net’ would not even be part of the 
MFF and hence not constrained by the decisions made there. 
In the preceding subsection, it was already mentioned how decoupling as the shift to direct 
payments has further made the distributional effects within and across countries more visible, making 
them appear even bigger than they once were (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 271; Fouilleux 2013, 321–22; 
Rhinard 2010, 100). In order to understand 2013 Reform as a case, it is necessary to consider the direction 
and certainty of these distributional effects. First, generally, if public money is spent to increase or at least 
support the income of farmers, it is taxpayers and consumers (if support is achieved by target prices) that 
have to finance these subsidies. In other words, there is an obvious intra-national distribution between 
farmers and the rest of society resulting from CAP spending. While Eurobarometer surveys (albeit clearly 
framed in a pro-CAP manner) show that many citizens do not perceive CAP spending as beneficial for 
farmers only (European Commission 2014a, 37), the balance between that part of CAP spending that 
most directly benefits farmers at the expense of other members of society and those parts that, in terms of 
rural development or environmental public goods, benefit society at large was at stake in the 2013 Reform. 
At the broadest level, this concerns the question of the size of the CAP budget, but also the distribution 
between the two pillars (income support vs. rural development). More concretely, if direct income support 
is further made conditional on the provision of environmental public goods in terms of ‘greening’, this 
involves costs for farmers at the benefit of the rest of society (Swinnen, Johan F. M 2015b, 6–7). Similarly 
but more indirectly, quota regulations involve intra-national distribution by artificially increasing prices (cf. 
e.g. Altomonte and Nava 2005), so that their abolition under the heading of ‘market orientation’ also 
should be relevant in this respect. As has further been noted, a considerable part of the 2013 Reform was 
the distribution of CAP spending between farmers, especially between small and large farmers. This 
concerns the ‘first hectare’ payments and the ‘capping’, for instance, but indirectly also greening, since the 
latter benefits farmers applying higher standards already (e.g. by subscribing to organic farming).  
As was noted already, the CAP has always been and continues to be financed via the common 
EU budget. Member State contributions are crucial to this budget and are mostly based proportionately 
on a countries economic strength. Given that, as was just noted with regard to intra-national distribution, 
CAP mainly serves farmers at the expense of the rest of society, it is logical that what countries can get out 
of the commonly financed CAP depends on their farming sectors. This, in turn, leads some countries to 
contribute more than they receive from CAP and vice versa, since the farming sector of a country is often 
not proportionate to its overall economic weight. Therefore, some countries turn out to be net payers in 
terms of CAP, while others are net recipients (cf. Bertelsmann Stiftung 2013; Zahrnt 2010). While before 
the reforms of the 1990s the CAP used to constitute 70 per cent of the EU budget, before the 2013 
Reform it still made up almost 40 per cent (European Commission 2013a). In sum, therefore, not only 
does the CAP have cross-national distributional effects, but there is also no other single policy that shifts 
similar amounts of money between the Member States. 
In the 2013 Reform debate, there were several elements affecting this general cross-national 
distributional pattern. First of all, each reform of course offers the opportunity to change the general 
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direction of the CAP, e.g. towards market orientation or back towards more intervention. Market 
orientation generally would mean lower amounts of subsidies, and accordingly less cross-national 
distribution. Beyond such general features of CAP reform debates, a more concrete one concerning the 
2013 Reform was the Crisis-context and the strain it exerted on national budgets and economies across 
the EU (Swinnen, Johan F. M 2015b, 9). Accordingly, the size of CAP budget within the MFF was an 
important element in the debate on the CAP, given the need for justification (Matthews 2015). Even more 
specifically, the suggestions for ‘external convergence’ would clearly involve cross-national distribution, 
aiming at the removal of perceived injustices in the distribution of CAP spending across countries. In 
sum, then, the cross-national distributional effects of CAP were relevant to the 2013 Reform debate. 
What makes the CAP particularly interesting, however, is not simply the extent of the cross-
national distributional effects, but also their certainty. To some extent, this certainty results from the 
decades of experience with this policy. In addition, however, they result from the fact that CAP spending 
as a part of the EU budget is so highly visible and the date accessible, such that it is rather easy to 
calculate, who wins and who loses from the policy (cf. Bertelsmann Stiftung 2013; Zahrnt 2010). These 
figures leave relatively little room for rhetorical manoeuvre, and they do not require elaborate causal 
narratives, so that also the effects of potential changes as part of a reform can be judged rather easily. 
Extant research on conflict over CAP 
Given the highly visible nature of these distributional effects across countries, it should not come as a 
surprise that the CAP is often invoked as an example of a policy area involving and being shaped by 
national interests in the extant literature (e.g. Fouilleux 2013). While Noury (2002) only suspected that on 
issues such as CAP conflict in the EP might diverge from the typical Left-Right pattern he (as well as 
others before and thereafter) discovered, Faas (2003) was indeed able to detect higher probabilities of 
defection in this policy area. To the knowledge of the author, the idea of CAP (and other issues involving 
cross-national distribution) as an exception to the rule (i.e. ideologically structured conflict in the EP) has 
never been questioned.32 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that studying the conflict on the 2013 Reform of CAP, especially 
in the manner intended here, is worthwhile beyond the purpose of comparison with the other two policy 
issues in the sample, in that it promises additional insights to some open questions also with regard to this 
particular policy area. First, Fouilleux notes that “CAP is also an excellent example of what happens when 
there is no real link between the EU institutions and the EU’s citizens”, in that Member States could often 
use the Commission as a scapegoat in this policy area (ibid. 2013, 312). With the combined effects of 
general politicisation and the involvement of the EP, voters’ preferences might play a more important role 
and might act counter to a potential producer bias, for instance. 
                                                     
32 Studies on the 2013 Reform itself, inasmuch as they existed at the time of writing, will be considered in Section 5.4 
as a part of the external validity of the findings produced in the present study. 
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Second, Bailer et al. (2015) find that national interests as ‘objective’ as those established in the 
domain of agriculture considerably shape the conflict in the Council of the EU, while for instance the 
Left-Right orientation of governments does not do so at all. At the same time, Fouilleux notes that even 
farmers themselves, as the party most directly concerned by CAP’s distributional effects, often have 
preferences that cannot be reduced to their economic interests alone: For instance, they prefer price 
support over direct payments for reasons of professional ethics, albeit the former leave them financially 
worse off (ibid. 2013, 312). To some extent, then, the role of and relation between ideas and interests is 
still open even when it comes to this seemingly well researched policy area. 
The theory of territorialisation presented in Chapter 2 suggested answers to both of these open 
questions, which will be contrasted with extant theoretical approaches in Section 3 of the present chapter. 
In addition, the highly qualitative research design used here will not only be able to detect, whether the 
number of defections is higher regarding CAP than it is for the debate on Europeanised welfare, for 
instance, but will further avoid the motives of individual parties being hidden behind overall probabilities. 
Thereby, the difference between position taking that is driven by ideas rather than interests should 
become visible where applicable. At the level of measurement, the Policy Frame Analysis conducted on 
the 2013 Reform of the CAP will establish in how far the arguments used to justify a particular direction 
of CAP reform are instrumental to the pursuit of national interests or to those of particular societal 
groups within the country, or whether they correspond to a party’s genuine ideology or a national 
ideational tradition of market intervention. As a first step in this analysis, the next section presents the 
possible policy frames on the reform as identified based on secondary literature mostly, which then serves 
as the basis for the respective codebook (see Annex II) and allows for the formulation of observable 
implications of the various theoretical approaches. 
5.2 Identification of possible policy frames 
In this section, the possible policy frames identified with regard to the 2013 Reform of the CAP are identified by 
complementing and updating frames policy frames on CAP employed by the European Commission as analysed by 
Rhinard with secondary literature and expert commentaries on the Reform. Four frames are identified in this 
manner: First, a ‘classic’ frame addressing primarily the needs of farmers, given the ‘special’ nature of agriculture, by 
means of strongly interventionist and cost-intensive policies. Second, a ‘liberalisation’ frame that challenges the 
classic frame in basically all respects by treating agriculture like any another economic sector and by demonstrating in 
terms of classic economics the social cost of the respective subsidies. Third, a ‘multifunctionality’ frame 
acknowledging the particularities of farming, albeit mainly in terms of the public goods it provides, which in turn 
calls for a different sort of income support. Fourth, an anti-centralisation frame centred on the causal narrative that 
the heterogeneity of European landscapes defies the effectiveness of a common agricultural policy. 
How the policy frames were identified 
The preceding section focused on policies that have been adopted or discussed with regard to European 
agriculture. In doing so, I have tried to avoid inasmuch as possible any reference to the ‘reasons’ either in 
terms of what has caused a certain policy or what has justified it, with the notable exception of general 
pressures for reform. This was done so as to make it easier to perceive of these justifications as separate 
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and more or less independent logics, which together with the policies they address form the policy frames 
that have been and are used with regard to European agricultural policy. This section, then, presents these 
logics that were identified using secondary literature. As a starting point for doing so, the work by Mark 
Rhinard (2010) on the policy framing strategies of the European Commission has been particularly 
helpful. He has identified what he calls the ‘classic’ frame on CAP, two further frames used to drive the 
MacSharry and Fischler reforms that (with more historical hindsight) I found helpful to fuse into one, as 
well as the basics of a ‘liberalisation’ meta frame that I have further specified for CAP. These starting 
points allowed for finding examples and ‘updates’ of these frames in further secondary literature, mostly 
think tank publications making sense of the 2013 Reform proposals in a kind of pioneering role. 
Most of the policy proposals included in the 2013 Reform package as well as arguments in 
favour of or against them in the expert debate could be straightforwardly linked back to the frames 
identified by Rhinard. Noteworthy, Erjavec et al. (2015) identify a very similar set of discourses (or 
frames) – a productivist, neoliberal, and a multifunctional one – that dominated the debate on the 2013 
Reform, which corroborates the identification of frames as a part of the present study that had to be 
completed prior to the publication of Erjavec et al.’s work.33 A fourth and final possible frame was 
constructed by combining arguments in favour of de-centralisation found in various academic and expert 
publications. Noteworthy, the description of the frames does not draw in any way on the data used in the 
empirical analysis. 
The possible policy frames on CAP reform 
The first frame identified has dominated the Common Agricultural Policy for the first three decades of its 
existence and is thus referred to by Rhinard (2010) as the ‘classic’ frame, a label that is adopted for here 
the further discussion of policy frames on CAP. While this frame was created in particular historical 
conditions which have contributed to its dominance, this does not necessarily mean that all actors 
involved in negotiating CAP or affected by the negotiated outcomes have been equally pleased with the 
moves away from the classic frame. In fact, commentators on the 2013 reform have used (or invoked?) 
the legitimacy crisis of the CAP for reviving what they called “The Forgotten Ideas” (Bréhon 2011, 8). 
As Rhinard points out – and explains before the historical background of the post-war era – 
food security was the central rationale of this frame (ibid. 2010, 70). The link of food security to the well-
being of farmers is mainly historical: at a time when farmers’ well-being mattered for the economic 
rationale of food-security, it also carried a considerable political importance, as farmers made up a central 
political force (percentage of the population, capacity for mobilization) as well. Nonetheless, the logical 
overlap between these two aims consists in attributing the status of an end in itself to the act of producing 
food. In recent years, the issue of food security has seen a twofold update: On the one hand, a globalized 
                                                     
33 The main difference appears to be that they attributed the idea of ‘public money for public goods’ to a neoliberal 
line of thought. In the present study, this line of reasoning is attributed instead to the multifunctionality frame, given 
the strong link between multifunctionality and the provision of environmental public goods, for instance. 
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perspective on agriculture challenges the self-evident way in which food security is considered in Europe 
today (Bréhon 2011, 7–8). In this context, it has also been pointed out that the alternative, food 
dependence, is morally problematic: in the case of global shortages, rich European countries would still be 
able to import food at the expense of poorer regions (ibid.2011, 7). On the other hand, food security is 
now also framed in qualitative terms rather than quantitative terms (ibid. 2011, 9). Thereby also the act of 
producing food obtains renewed prestige. At the same time, alternative value bases for CAP such as 
‘multifunctionality’ (see below), ecological aspects of it in particular, as well as competitiveness are rejected 
as secondary or too complex for achieving popular support (ibid. 2011, 7–11). 
Anything that impinges on the production of food as such as well as on farmers as the actors 
entrusted with the honourable task of producing food is therefore perceived as problematic within this 
frame. Noteworthy, such problems are inherent to agricultural production. In this sense, agriculture has 
been considered as an industry apart, with ‘special’ needs (cf. Rhinard 2010, 70). After all, agriculture is 
subject to force majeure in terms of weather conditions, which confronts producers with considerable 
uncertainty about production conditions. For instance, in a recent volume of ‘The European Union 
Explained’ issued by the European Commission, this classic frame stressing the uncertainty as a problem 
particular to agriculture and explaining it by reference to climate- and weather-dependency is still cited 
(European Commission 2014b, 7). While uncertainty may affect other industries as well, farmers further 
need to plan production very much in advance. At the same time, demand for food tends to remain rather 
stable, so that even if prices drop, consumers will not buy more food while farmers cannot reduce 
production quickly enough (Ackrill 2000, 20–21; Altomonte and Nava 2005, 258). If left to itself, 
agriculture may hence be much less attractive than other professional activities, which means that without 
intervention, jobs in (European) agriculture may get replaced (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 258). Logically, 
if too few people decide in favour of an occupation in agriculture, food production in Europe would be 
threatened. 
While these problem definitions and causal narratives have a long tradition, recent developments 
in world markets seem to provide them with new relevance in that price volatility is expected to develop 
into “an increasingly regular phenomenon” (Bianchi 2011, 164; d'Oultremont 2011, 10; Mahé 2012, 3), 
partly due to financial speculation (Bianchi 2011, 16). The crises in the dairy sector are cited as an example 
from which ‘lessons’ should be learned (ibid. 2011, 14). In sum, this frame is arguably far from dead, 
although it has lost its former dominance in shaping policy. 
Classically, three policy solutions are suggested by advocates of this frame, grouped under the 
heading of Common Market Organization (CMO): guarantee prices, tariffs, quotas and export subsidies. 
Of these, the guarantee or target price is certainly the most essential element, whereas the others are more 
or less supporting the feasibility of its application. By fixing prices, the uncertainty confronting farmers 
under market conditions is considerably reduced, and farmers then have an incentive to produce sufficient 
amounts (or even to overproduce by finding ways of increasing production, as the target price is set above 
the market price) (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 259). Tariffs are set on agricultural products entering the 
common market in order to avoid an influx of cheap food from outside, thereby serving the principle of 
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Community preference (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 258; Fouilleux 2013, 310). While prices can be kept at 
the target level by buying up and storing surpluses (Fouilleux 2013, 310), the surpluses can alternatively or 
additionally be avoided by setting quotas or by refunding exports (i.e. making European food competitive 
on a global level) (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 259; Matthews 2011, 10). Quotas may not be attractive 
within this frame (if compared to target prices), given that while they also lead to higher prices, they limit 
production quantities by definition and thus eventually limit farmers’ incomes indirectly. At the same time, 
if compared to a completely liberalised market, where goods can be sold only at world market prices, 
quotas might still seem attractive and act as a safeguard for farmers’ economic existence (e.g. Barnes 
2015). Accordingly, their abolition for the sake of liberalisation will be opposed by proponents of this 
frame. 
The ‘classic’ CAP policy instruments have been under massive critique for decades due to the 
burdens they impose on consumers and tax payers (who have to pay directly or indirectly for target 
prices), on non-EU countries (not least on developing ones who are hampered massively in their 
development due to the fact their only competitive sectors are effectively hampered from exporting to the 
EU) (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 260), and on the environment (Rhinard 2010, 71–73). Nevertheless, in 
the debate on the 2013 Reform, they have seen a revival in the form of a ‘safety net’ consisting mainly of a 
new Special Reserve for market interventions in times of food crises (d'Oultremont 2011, 10; Mahé 2012, 
35–37). As a whole, the values, reasoning, and the policy solutions of this frame appear to carry relevance 
beyond the history books. Just because the reforms so far have indicated a move away from this frame, 
this does not mean that it continues to shape the conceptions of the CAP in the hearts and minds of some 
actors. 
At the same time, even the most ardent supporters of this frame will not necessarily limit 
themselves to suggesting a return to the ‘old’ CAP. Next to a probably extensive ‘safety net’, they are likely 
to generally support a ‘strong’ CAP, rejecting budgetary cuts. On the one hand, some proponents of this 
frame in the literature, most notably Bréhon (2011), seem to consider the current way of justifying and 
applying direct payments as somehow ‘unworthy’ of the noble task of food production. That is because 
such direct payments are consciously ‘decoupled’ from food production, not actually rewarding this 
activity. 
Along these lines, one might attribute the 2013 Reform proposal for limiting direct payments to 
‘active farmers’ to this first frame. On the other hand, however, within the current system they are likely to 
prefer what is referred to as ‘Pillar I’ over ‘Pillar II’, as the latter has always been meant to fund those 
aspects of farming that go beyond food production, which means that from the perspective of the classic 
frame, it lacks legitimacy and diverts resources from where they should actually be allocated. By contrast, 
direct payments under the first pillar have replaced price support, and so the minimum supporters of the 
classic frame would want to achieve is there subsistence, preferably historical levels. Among the more fine-
grained measures, the specific support for young farmers fits the general logic of this frame, as it serves to 
sustain farming as a profession in Europe based on the normative idea that this profession is valuable as 
such. Needless to say, market liberalisation should be rejected from this perspective, as should ‘greening’, 
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because it imposes costs on farmers and might be considered too intrusive to the food production 
process. 
In his work on strategic framing by the Commission, Rhinard (2010) discusses three frames on 
CAP that have been promoted by the Commission at different points in time, of which the ‘classic frame’ 
discussed above is one. In explaining frame change away from the classic frame, Rhinard also mentions a 
‘market liberalisation meta-frame’ that was particularly strong in the 1980s and is said to have shaped the 
Single Market agenda (ibid. 2010, 81). It is not clear, however, why liberalisation policies should be pushed 
by means of a frame that is necessarily of some kind of ‘higher order’. Instead, if the classic frame mainly 
considers agriculture as a policy apart, a CAP-specific version of the supposed meta-frame may challenge 
exactly this by evaluating, analyzing and treating CAP like any other policy. Before this background, it 
seems plausible to consider works comparing policies and policy-making in the EU (Wallace, Wallace, and 
Pollack 2005) and on the economics of these policies in particular (Altomonte and Nava 2005) in order to 
distil a ‘liberalisation frame’ specifically regarding CAP. 
Indeed, when introducing CAP as an EU policy, Elmar Rieger makes great effort to stress its 
anti-market and anti-liberal foundations (ibid. 2005, 162, 196). As he points out: 
Unlike other welfare-state institutions, agricultural measures typically fuse production – that is, output-
increasing- with income-related goals, making it hard to separate distributive and regulatory dimensions, 
and in ways that defy the application of normal economic efficiency criteria. This is still true for the new regime 
of ‘decoupled’ farm aid. (ibid. 2005, 164, my emphasis) 
The idea of ‘normal economic efficiency criteria’ can accordingly be considered as the normative 
foundation of the liberalisation frame before which the CAP is to be evaluated and on which the right 
kind of CAP would have to be founded. In other words, the problem with CAP consists in the policies 
adopted in this policy area, especially under the classic frame, which do not follow ‘normal economic 
efficiency criteria’ and hence entails social costs that are unacceptably high. 
So what, according to this frame, has caused this problem? One more time, Rieger’s work, 
consciously or not, quite obviously exemplifies this frame:  
CAP planning is premised on a view of a ‘general’ European interest and notions of a basic incentive 
structure common to all farmers. It shares this feature with state socialism, where the diversity of 
interests, not properly taken into account in the planning process, spontaneously makes itself felt when 
individual farmers make decisions most convenient for them. CAP decisions have been made as if these 
objective economic laws did not apply in agriculture. Therefore, ‘post-decision surprises’ are a constant 
feature, because economic laws continue to function. (ibid. 2005, 176)  
In order to complement this causal narrative, one has to be familiar with these ‘objective economic laws’, 
usually elaborated in a classic social cost analysis using a supply and demand curve (cf. Altomonte and 
Nava 2005, 258). The argument is that classic CAP policies place a burden on consumers who pay the 
“difference between the smaller quantity actually consumed at the politically determined domestic target 
price (PT) and the higher quantity eventually available for consumption without price intervention, at price 
P0 or, without tariff protection, at price PW.”, while on top of that taxpayers have to pay for the export 
subsidies (ibid.). In addition, these export subsidies and tariffs harm third-country producers and 
eventually hamper free trade, causing further indirect harm to efficiency. Direct payments, the policy 
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suggested by the multifunctionality frame discussed below, are more efficient and hence preferred over 
market interventions. Nevertheless, direct payments may keep farm business in the market that would 
otherwise not be economically viable, that is, which are inefficient (d'Oultremont 2012, 15; Mahé 2012, 
30–31; Rieger 2005, 172). What is implied here is that a farm which is not working efficiently is also not 
worth supporting. Obviously, these causal narratives are not always told in all detail in political statements; 
yet, references to the ‘wrong incentives’ set by existing policies in terms of public spending may be seen as 
instances of the cognitive dimension of this frame. 
On the policy dimension, subsidies of any kind – even direct payments – must therefore be cut 
and eventually abolished, as they are considered problematic with regard to ‘normal’ economic efficiency 
criteria (Rieger 2005, 166). Such a policy of budgetary discipline has coincided in time with the rise of the 
liberalisation frame (Ackrill 2000, 87), but further would be valuable regarding efficiency. After all, all 
government spending must be based on taxes, which in turn, are likely to hamper the Pareto efficient 
allocation of resources. Of the other policy tools considered in CAP, and with regard to the 2013 Reform 
in particular, the so-called ‘greening’ is probably not endorsed – at least not actively promoted – by 
proponents of this frame. (Politically determined) environmental objectives of the CAP might be 
considered at odds with efficiency: they limit the free choice of the farmer-entrepreneur to allocate 
resources in a market-oriented – and hence efficient – manner. In order to avoid coding ambiguities, 
however, active opposition to ‘greening’ will be attributed to the classic frame. After all, ‘greening’ of 
direct payments would be out of question anyway if direct payments were abolished. 
Inasmuch as the ‘capping’ is concerned, large farms are often considered more efficient (Mahé 
2012, 30–31), so that capping might punish exactly those enterprise that do their job ‘best’. At the same 
time, it could be argued that efficient farms do not need any further support, so that if they receive direct 
payments they do not need, the support system would be inefficient (d'Oultremont 2012, 15). This 
contradiction, however, only exists as direct payments are not a policy of choice for proponent of the 
liberalisation frame anyway. Indeed, further market orientation is the general line of policy following from 
this frame. During the debate on the 2013 Reform, advocates of the liberalisation frame will thus call for a 
further reduction in direct payments, will support the expiry of the quota system and will fight the creation 
of a ‘safety net’ and of Producer Organisations (cf. d'Oultremont 2011, 9–10). Finally, it must be noted, 
that the liberalisation frame does not reject all of the features of CAP: after all, free trade in agricultural 
goods as provided for in the Single Market project would appear desirable. 
When identifying policy frames, it is important not to confuse the temporal appearance, rise to 
dominance and decline of a frame with its genuine logic. As for what is referred to here as the 
‘multifunctionality frame’ it might be argued that it replaced the classic frame as the dominant frame for 
policy-making on CAP mainly because of pressures that were part of a climate of liberalisation. Ackrill, for 
instance, identifies the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the “main motivation” behind 
the 1992 MacSharry Reform which marked the decline of the classic frame (ibid. 2000, 67). Supporters of 
the liberalisation frame may have used GATT as an argument for reforms of the CAP, while supporters of 
the classic frame might have struggled to at least substitute for key aspects (e.g. some form of income 
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support for farmers) of the classic frame. The rise of the multifunctionality frame may thus have been the 
result of the compromise between these two more extreme camps. Such explanations notwithstanding, the 
multifunctionality frame does follow a logic of its own, and this logic may then become a tool in the hands 
of political actors involved in the 2013 Reform. With some historical hindsight, it also seems appropriate 
to abandon Rhinard’s distinction between the Rural World frame on which the MacSharry Reform was 
based and the multifunctionality frame that served as the basis for the 2003 ( or ‘Fischler’) Reform by 
considering the latter as an extension of the former. 
The multifunctionality frame and the classic frame have in common that they both value 
farming. Yet, while in the classic frame the act of farming is valuable as such, i.e. as food production, the 
multifunctionality frame values farming as a means for the production not just of food but also of other, 
public goods. These consist in the maintenance of the countryside, including both rural traditions but also 
the preservation of the natural environment (Rhinard 2010, 71–75). Farming techniques meant to aim at 
the production of these public goods by definition, such as organic farming, would thus appear 
particularly valuable. However, often there is not only a shortage of positive externalities of farming, but 
farming may even harm the environment (negative externalities). If farming is not seen as a value as such 
but should actually produce public goods rather than reducing them, this is obviously problematic. 
Advocates of the multifunctionality frame argue, that overly intensive farming practices are the cause of 
the negative externalities of farming (ibid. 2010, 71). Noteworthy, as was argued above, intensive farming 
was precisely what the classic instruments of CAP were meant to achieve. At the same time, the 
multifunctionality frame recognizes that the farmers have “special needs” (ibid. 2010, 75), i.e. they require 
public funding to survive – which they deserve provided that they produce the desired public goods in 
addition to food itself. 
From a multifunctionality perspective, therefore, simply abolishing all subsidies and leaving 
farmers to free competition is not the solution, since the market does not pay for the desired public goods 
(cf. European Commission 2014b, 4). In order to produce the desired public goods, farming must be 
subsidized – without, however, fostering the negative externalities resulting from excessive production. 
Hence, the multifunctionality frame propagates the concept of ‘decoupling’, that is, of paying farmers 
directly, independent of the amount of food they produce. From the perspective of this frame, 
‘decoupling’ does not mean, what Rieger takes it to mean, namely that “farmers obtain payments 
irrespective of what – and how much – they produce” (ibid. 2005, 178). Following a multifunctional logic, 
farmers are actually paid for what they produce, namely public goods next to food. In order to obtain 
direct payments, farmers have to comply with environmental, food quality and animal welfare standards. 
As was mentioned before, the direct payments constitute the so-called ‘pillar 1’ of the CAP. 
Under the old system of the Single Payment Scheme, however, direct payments were still largely a reward 
for earlier food production records and at best indirectly related to public goods production. Hence, the 
structural funds forming ‘pillar 2’ of the CAP are even more central to this frame, as these funds were 
more targeted at the multiple other functions of agriculture. More recently, the proposals for the 2013 
Reform have somewhat blurred the borders between the two pillars (cf. Mahé 2012), as a ‘greening’ of the 
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first pillar was suggested, which meant that 30 per cent of the national envelopes would have to be directly 
made conditional on even stricter environmental conditions. With ‘greening’ adopted, direct payments 
would be more in line with the logic of this frame, because they would directly be related to the 
production of environmental public goods. In fact, the more and the stricter ‘greening’ is introduced, the 
more desirable it would seem for proponents of this frame. 
Many other innovations of the 2013 Reform are also very much in line with the idea of 
multifunctionality. The so-called internal convergence – implied in ‘capping’ and the small-farmers scheme 
– mentioned above makes sense insofar as the production of the desired public goods would not seem to 
grow proportionally to the size of a farm business. Similarly, the concept of ‘equity’ with regard to the 
Single Farm Payments (i.e. the ‘ungreened’, standard part of the direct payments) makes sense within this 
frame: so far, the SFPs are lower in some member states than they are in others (most importantly in the 
new member states). However, one might argue that the production of the agriculture-related public 
goods should be equally valued in all parts of the EU (d'Oultremont 2011, 2; 2012, 15). By contrast, from 
a classic frame perspective, historic production accounts may be considered a fair basis for the distribution 
of payments both across and within countries. From a liberalisation perspective, direct payments should 
be abolished anyway, and yet if they persist, they should arguably not distort competition and should 
thence be the same across countries (d'Oultremont 2012, 15). In sum, while the multifunctionality frame 
may have started as a lowest common denominator between two older frames, it has become a logic of its 
own, and it has dominated the 2013 Reform agenda. Obviously, that does not mean that all actors are 
equally supportive of it. 
Setting CAP on the normative foundation of public goods while making the respective policies 
more compatible with market dynamics might have saved the CAP since the 1990s decades. In fact, 
however, what could eventually kill the CAP as an EU policy is precisely what has so far contributed to its 
survival – this, at least, might is the impression created by some commentators on CAP and on the 2013 
Reform. The line of argument outlined only tentatively by these scholars might form the basis for a fourth 
frame. This anti-centralisation frame is not among the frames identified by Rhinard (2010), but shall still 
be outlined here, as it is plausible that some actors within the EP will forward it in the debate on the 2013 
Reform. 
Like the multifunctionality frame, the anti-centralisation frame would be based on the value of 
farming in terms of public goods. While there is some variation regarding the extent to which the 
following applies, however, several scholars argue that (some of) these public goods are much more local 
in nature than they are European (Altomonte and Nava 2005, 272; Mahé 2012, 48–50; Rieger 2005, 174–
75). This implies that also the demand for these public goods would be local, and hence arguably 
dependent on local circumstances of local farmers and rural populations. It is the specific needs of ‘our’ 
farmers and rural areas, then, which forms the normative basis of this frame. 
Following this logic, the EU might not be able foster the provision of these public goods in the 
best possible manner. In other words, there might be a problem in terms of a mismatch between the level 
of public goods provision, a ‘distance’ between ‘Brussels’ and the respective localities would exist. This 
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distance could then lead to a gap in terms of local knowledge about the special needs of the local farming 
population, and would imply a long chain of top-down delegation open to mismanagement and 
intransparent channels of subsidy allocation (Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 276; Rieger, 2005, pp. 174-175). 
As a result, the justification for steering direct payments from the EU-level is undermined (Mahé, 2012, 
pp. 48-50; Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 272; Rieger, 2005, pp. 174-175). 
In policy terms, the consequence would accordingly be partial or even total re-nationalisation of 
agricultural policy, more indirectly referred to as ‘flexibility’. Provided that this does not entail the 
abolition of all subsidies, however, this might in turn lead to serious distortions of competition on the 
common market for food; for after all, different member states might not want or not be able to grant the 
same amounts of subsidies to their respective farming communities. Hence, giving up EU-financing of the 
CAP also means to give up an important element of the Single Market, and, eventually, of European 
integration (cf. d’Oultremont, 2011, p. 3; European Commission 2014b, p. 6). Noteworthy, this frame is 
partly already reflected, it seems, in the 2013 Reform itself, for even the Commission makes use of it when 
proclaiming the new CAP after 2013:  
There is new flexibility for Member States in the budgeting and implementation of first Pillar instruments, 
acknowledging the wide diversity of agriculture, agronomic production potential and climatic, 
environmental as well as socio-economic conditions and needs across the EU. (European Commission 
2013e, p. 5) 
Not surprisingly, however, the Commission makes use of this frame only scarcely, and to the foregoing 
statement immediately adds: “This flexibility will however be framed by well-defined regulatory and 
budgetary limits in order to ensure a level-playing field at European level and that common objectives are 
met” (ibid.). Yet, during the debate on the Reform, there most likely have been actors using this frame 
much more eagerly. 
At this point, the general policy trajectories for CAP – return to market intervention, 
liberalisation, greening and convergence, decentralisation – have been linked to a particular policy frame 
with norms, labels for problematisation and causal narratives. This also holds for most of the more 
specific policy measures discussed as part of the 2013 Reform, that is, they can be analysed as parts of 
wider ideational frameworks (for an overview see Table 30 below). As the individual policies belong to a 
particular frame for a reason and can be traced back to a similar value system, they also tend to be similar 
in their distributional effects. For instance, policies belonging to the policy dimension of the classic frame 
all tend to be primarily beneficial for farmers, and indirectly for those countries with substantial farming 
sectors. Hence, it should now be possible to derive from extant theories as well as from the theory of 
territorialisation, which national party delegations from which countries can be expected to make use of a 
particular frame predominantly, whether they will thereby defect from their respective ideology and what 
this means for the resulting structure of conflict. Precise guidelines for coding statements on the 2013 
Reform, including typical examples, as well as more specific instructions on such difficult choices shall be 
provided in a codebook as part of Annex II. 
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Table 30: Overview of policy frames on CAP and the 2013 Reform 
frame What sort of values 
do you need in order 
to see this as a 
problem? 
(Normative 
dimension) 
What is the problem? 
(Constitutive 
dimension) 
What has led to the 
problem?  
(Cognitive 
dimension) 
What should be done 
about the problem? 
(Policy dimension) 
classic (F1) Food production, food 
safety 
 farming as an end 
in itself 
Economic uncertainty 
of farming, nowadays 
in the form of extreme 
price volatility 
Farming is special, an 
industry apart that 
cannot be made 
subject to market laws 
because of weather 
conditions and rigidity 
of demand; food 
speculation enhances 
the problem 
Market intervention or 
at least generous 
recompensation in 
terms of direct 
payments; safety net as 
third pillar; extra 
support for young 
farmers; ‘active 
farmers’ condition 
Liberalisation 
(F2) 
efficiency Market distortions and 
their social cost 
Market intervention 
(including direct 
payments, which keep 
unprofitable 
businesses in the 
market) of any kind 
reduces efficiency  
Liberalisation, i.e. 
more market 
orientation, no more 
subsidies (at least cut 
CAP budget) 
Multi-
functionality 
(F3) 
Environment; social 
justice; development; 
equity 
 farming as a means 
for public goods 
Farming externalities 
(too many negative 
ones, while the 
positive ones remain 
unrewarded) 
Caused by: wrong 
subsidies BUT ALSO 
market failure 
Direct payments and 
Pillar 2 
 greening 
 capping 
 Pillar 2 rather than 
Pillar 1 
 convergence 
(internal & external) 
Anti-
centralisation 
(F4) 
The specific needs of 
‘our’ farmers – local 
public goods 
CAP as a European 
policy 
The EU cannot get 
things right because it 
is ‘too far off’, does 
not know local 
circumstances 
Nationalisation of 
subsidies, flexibility in 
implementation 
 
5.3 Observable implications of the theoretical framework for the case 
This first of all specifies the characteristics of the case with regard to the six countries whose MEPs the present study 
is focused on. As is argued, this selection of countries is almost ideally balanced in terms of net payers and net 
recipients (i.e. national interests), as well as in terms of the types of capitalism (i.e. national traditions). The limitation 
to Western Europe is not a problem either, since the more specific distributional effects of ‘external convergence’ 
did barely become the object of conflict in the debate. Next, the observable implications of extant theories on 
conflict in the EU at large and in the EP in particular are formulated for this case and set of countries/parties, in 
order to be subsequently contrasted with those based on the theory of territorialisation developed in Chapter 2. 
Several of the extant approaches would expect some but not total territorialisation of conflict regarding the 2013 
Reform of CAP. This would apply to the theory of territorialisation as well. However, where the extant theories fail 
to specify the exact manner in which distributional effects translate into actor behaviour or are built on pre-Crisis 
assumptions, the theory of territorialisation provides more precise and up-to-date accounts. Accordingly, Christian 
Democratic and Conservative parties from net-recipient countries (Ireland, France, Austria) are expected to defect, 
as are other Right-wing parties from state capitalist countries (France), as they are forced trade-off policy-seeking for 
vote-seeking due to structural conditions (certainty of distributional effects). By contrast, Left-wing parties from net-
paying countries will resort to a blurring strategy at most, given that their voters can be catered in terms of policies 
corresponding to centre-Left ideology anyway, while at the same time serving their distributional interests within the 
countries. 
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Specification of case characteristics for the sample of countries 
As was pointed out in Chapter 3, for reasons of feasibility and comparability, this study is limited to 
national parties and their delegations to the EP from six Member States only, namely Germany, Austria, 
the UK, Ireland, France, and Italy. Before the observable implications of both extant theories as well as 
the present theoretical framework can be formulated, it is helpful to specify the implications of the policy 
issue for this particular set of Member States. Thereby, it can be examined, in how far exactly this 
selection of countries covers both sides of a potential cross-national distribution, but also in how far 
national traditions can be controlled for. 
Given the certainty of cross-national distribution and the straightforward manner in which net 
payers and net recipients of the CAP can be identified, it can be shown in a quick and uncontroversial 
manner, that this selection of countries is very well balanced: it includes three countries who can be 
considered net payers to the CAP budget, namely Germany, the UK, and Italy, as well as three net 
recipients, namely France, Ireland, and Austria (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2013, 36–55; Zahrnt 2010). The 
concept of net payers and net recipients, respectively, is quite important here, because a classification of the 
countries simply by the absolute amounts they receive or contribute is just likely to reflect their size. A 
country such as Ireland, for instance, does not even receive a third of the amounts Germany receives, but 
it also only contributes about a tenth of the amount Germany pays. At the same time, Ireland receives 
about twice as much as it contributes itself, and thus would have a much bigger interest in keeping CAP a 
well-funded EU-level policy than Germany does. 
This aspect is particularly important with regard to Italy, for one might otherwise easily associate 
it with a stereotype of ‘Southern’ countries characterised by large and productive agricultural sectors and 
hence with a ‘national interest’ in a strong CAP. In fact, however, the country would be better off if it had 
to finance its own farmers only. Noteworthy also, the UK and Germany rank among the countries getting 
most out of the CAP in absolute terms, but are generally not suspected as typical supporters of CAP. 
The six countries selected cover rather extreme cases of net recipients and net payers, but with 
Austria also include a country that, while still counting as a net recipient, is situated somewhere in the 
middle. More important than the differences in amounts of net payments/ receipts is the fact that Austria 
only becomes a net recipient of the CAP if pillar 2 payments are included (cf. Zahrnt 2010). In other 
words, if direct payments to farmers alone are considered, it contributes more than it receives, but 
overcompensates for that by the amount of rural development spending. Its ‘objective’ national interests 
should thus be different from those of net payers, but also from those of other net recipients. In the next 
subsections, it will be discussed how exactly this should be observable in terms of frame usage. 
Does this imply, then, that with regard to cross-national distributional effects of CAP and the 
2013 Reform, the selection of countries is ideal? So far, only the overall budgetary implications of CAP 
have been evaluated in this respect, and they certainly do figure in the debate on the 2013 Reform, not 
least because of the Crisis context in which it would take. It might be argued, however, that one of the 
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more concrete proposals of the 2013 Reform, namely external convergence, also had potential to shift the 
net balance of CAP payments, and hence deserves particular attention. 
As this distribution would occur mainly between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States, the selection of 
countries would seem to lack representatives of the new Member States. As Swinnen notes, however, this 
particular aspect of the Reform “played less of a role in the debates than one would have expected” (ibid. 
2015b, 16), an impression that was more than confirmed during the coding process for the purposes of 
this study. Swinnen (ibid.) lists no less than four possible explanations for this lack of controversy on 
external convergence, none of which contradicts the general idea that distributional effects matter for the 
structure of conflict. For example, it is possible that the new Member States “were more focused on 
lobbying for the maintenance of the overall DP [i.e. direct payments] budget” (ibid.). This, in fact, would 
not seem to set them apart from net recipients included in the sample. As a result, the six countries 
selected should cover the distributional aspects of the conflict on the 2013 Reform of CAP adequately 
indeed. 
In addition, this set of countries accounts for the hypothetical possibility that policy preferences 
on CAP are not exclusively shaped by distributional concerns. This is because it includes ‘Northern’ as 
well as ‘Southern’ countries, but more importantly, countries that vary with regard to their respective type 
of capitalism (e.g. Schmidt 2005). The type of capitalism, in turn, might function as what I have referred to 
by the notion of ‘national tradition’ and thereby shape perceptions on the appropriateness of state 
intervention in the economy. As should be clear by now, controversies on the CAP as well as its reforms 
have been precisely about the question of the appropriate degree of state intervention into this particular 
branch of the economy. The statist type of capitalism would seem to resonate well with CAP, and with the 
‘classic’ CAP in particular, while these same policies might be more critically reviewed in countries where 
state intervention is considered less ‘normal’. Hence, the set of countries should include net payers and net 
recipients from the various types of capitalism. Fortunately, this is the case here, in that there is one net 
recipient and one net payer per type of capitalism. In sum, therefore, inasmuch as country-level conditions 
in terms of national interests or traditions shape the structure of conflict on CAP and its 2013 Reform, the 
selection of countries should adequately reflect such a pattern. 
Table 31: Country-level conditions of relevance for CAP specified for the six countries 
country Type of capitalism Net payer 
Germany managed yes 
Austria managed no 
Italy statist yes 
France statist no 
UK liberal yes 
Ireland liberal no 
Observable implications of earlier approaches 
Before spelling out the observable implications of the theory of territorialisation presented in Chapter 2, I 
will first discuss which predictions for the structure of conflict and individual parties’ framing strategies 
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based on the extant theoretical literature reviewed in detail in the same chapter. I will start with the more 
general theories of conflict in EU politics, before turning to the EP-specific ones and eventually to the 
explanations provided by Bailer et al. (2015) on conflict involving ‘objective’ national interests as in the 
case of CAP. 
The ‘cleavage approach’ (Marks and Wilson 2000) would assume that CAP is interpreted by 
the national parties represented in the EP through their respective ideological lens, attributing no role to 
national interests induced by cross-national distributional effects. Consequently, the structure of conflict 
would also be ideological. It seems worthwhile spelling out here, which frames the members of the 
various party families would use accordingly, because this very clear-cut picture can then be contrasted 
with more nuanced predictions later. This is done here by moving from the far Right to the far Left. 
Extreme Right parties such as the BNP and the NPD should clearly prefer the anti-
centralisation frame (F4) as an expression of their nationalism and principled Euroscpeticism, and the 
same holds for Right-Wing Populist parties, inasmuch as these parties can be said to employ an 
established ideology yet. Conservative and Christian Democratic parties have strong electoral ties to the 
farming world, resulting historically from the so-called rural-urban cleavage but persisting to some extent 
to the present day for the respective parties in the sample (in general and with special reference to France 
see Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2007, 173 for the former Italian Christian Democrats, whose ‘heirs’ are 
both Forza Italia and the Partito Democratico, see Donovan 1994, 80 for Austria, see Müller and 
Steininger 1994, 93 for Germany see Walter, Werwath, and D'Antonio 2014 and Weigl 2013; for Ireland 
see Holmes 1996; for the UK see Brannen 2015). That said, with the change of Conservative/Christian 
Democratic ideology towards the inclusion of neoclassical economic ideas that took place in the 1980s (cf. 
Chapter 3 also), the overlap between rural/farmers’ interests might persists in some policy areas, but not 
regarding an economic policy such as CAP. Rather, one would expect Conservative and Christian 
Democratic parties to adopt the liberalisation rhetoric (here: frame F2) they have adopted in all other 
policy areas since the 1980s.34 
Liberal ideology clearly corresponds to the kinds of arguments included in frame F2, which 
these parties should use predominantly, strictly opposing the ‘old’ CAP and its legacies. Social Democratic 
parties generally favour market intervention, albeit the efficiency of such measures has become a concern 
for these parties in recent years. Ideologically speaking, they should therefore prefer a CAP that corrects 
market failures but is centred on the efficient provision of public goods by means of public money, which 
corresponds to the multifunctional frame (F3). This frame should clearly also be preferred by Green 
parties due to its strong emphasis on environmental public goods and environmental protection policies. 
                                                     
34 Of course one might argue also, that ‘agricultural exceptionalism’ is itself an element of Conservative/ Christian 
Democratic ideology. Considering ideology as a set of ideas rather than the sum of expressed policy positions, 
however, there is nothing really in Conservative (cf. Festenstein and Kenny (2005)) or Christian Democratic (cf. 
Dierickx (1994)) ideology that would directly imply the special treatment of farmers. In fact, in this case those 
Conservative and Christian Democratic who then call for market orientation would be defecting, which eventually 
will not make much of a difference concerning the role of distributional effects provided by some theories, including 
the theory of territorialisation. 
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Far Left parties should prefer the classic frame (F1), for exactly the kind of ‘socialist’ elements of the old 
CAP that have been subject to critique in each reform debate (see above). 
By contrasts, a liberal intergovernmentalist (Moravcsik 1998) approach (if extended to the 
parliamentary setting of the EP, of course) would provide that in a policy area such as CAP, nationally 
based producer interests shape the structure of conflict into a strictly territorial direction. Where these 
producer interests – here: farmers – are strong, governments – here: MEPs – will conform to them, 
whereas if they are weaker, they will prefer liberalisation over a potentially failing EU-level policy (ibid. 
1998, 495). Arguably, one might use the balance between contributions to the CAP budget (based on 
economic strength in general) and the receipts (still based more or less on the size of the farming sector) 
as a proxy for identifying the frames national delegations should use. Accordingly, agricultural producers 
will get their way in France and Ireland, so that parties from these countries use the frame F1 
predominantly. By contrast, in Germany, the UK, and Italy, they should not be able to convince parties of 
the necessity of a strong CAP, so that parties from these countries should use frames calling for 
liberalisation or decentralisation of the policy (frames F2 and F4, respectively). Similarly, Austrian parties 
should use frame F3 mostly, because the country does not benefit disproportionately from direct 
payments to its farmers (see above). Noteworthy, even if the above proxy regarding the strength of 
farmers’ interests were incorrect, the structure of conflict here would still be territorial as a whole. After 
all, Moravcsik seems to expect that under certainty, all governments or parliamentary elites are more or 
less equally affected by producer pressures, independent of their respective ideology. 
The ‘distribution model’ (Marks 2004) and the postfunctionalist theory (Hooghe and Marks 
2009) building on it – the postfunctional extension in terms of uncertainty and identity should not matter 
here – would both predict that the simultaneous presence of intra- and cross-national distributional effects 
would produce a mixed or ‘territorialised’ structure of conflict, but not full-scale territorialisation. 
Moreover, given that the EP is a parliamentary setting, they would expect it to be slightly biased towards 
ideology. As I have criticised earlier, however, they do not point out the exact degree or mechanism via 
which distributional effects are translated into defection and eventual territorialisation. 
Party goals in terms of office, votes, or policy might help to fill this gap, and this is what the 
3G2P approach by Hix and others is built on. While office and, to a lesser extent, policy-seeking would 
normally lead to Left-Right contestation in the EP according to this approach, ‘national interests’ might 
lead national parties to pressure MEPs towards defection. Which parties defect exactly would largely be 
influenced by institutional parameters here, such as EPG membership (leading to a goal conflict with 
office-seeking) and control mechanisms available to the national party, rather than the interplay between 
the exact issue characteristics and party goals. Territorialisation would be limited by the goal conflict 
between intra-EP office-seeking and re-election seeking, which in their pre-Crisis account means being 
nominated again by the national party rather than the national party winning votes in the first place. 
Ringe’s (2010) PPC approach equally expects ideologically structured conflict as a default which 
is only rarely abandoned, namely when ‘national interests’ in the form of ‘constituency interests’ are 
involved, which by all accounts is the case for CAP and CAP reform. Following Ringe, expert MEPs 
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might give in to such interests and might then be unable to come an agreement within their respective 
EPG, while the non-expert members national party delegations will trust their own experts (here: 
members of the agricultural committee, COMAGRI) or those from the same EPG. Consequently, one 
would expect some territorialisation from this perspective, and it would seem that national party 
delegations disposing of an expert of their own are more likely to defect from the party group rather than 
being guided by an expert from sister party. 
According to the ‘bicameral theory’ (Costello and Thomson 2014) of conflict in the EP, 
lobbying by national governments is the main source of defection. It will occur in the presence of national 
interest, especially if these are salient and if a government finds itself isolated in the Council. Given its 
budgetary implications, the salience of the national interests on CAP is beyond doubt, so that lobbying by 
national governments should be massive with regard to the 2013 Reform. Noteworthy, Costello and 
Thomson seem to consider all parties equally receptive towards such governmental lobbying, so that even 
a complete territorialisation would seem plausible. Frames would thus be used in the same manner as 
predicted by liberal intergovernmentalism. According to Swinbank (2015), the United Kingdom was 
particularly isolated in Brussels, so that parties from this country would be particularly likely to defect, 
given the combination of national interests, their salience and isolation. 
Transferring the line of argument by Bailer et al. (2015) from the Council to the EP, ‘objective’ 
national interests in terms of cross-national distribution should be highly relevant in a case such as CAP, 
rather than party ideology or alternative geographical patterns. At the same time, parties are not expected 
to give in to producer interests only, but also to consider the policy preferences of the electorate at large. 
Accordingly, one might expect rather far-reaching territorialisation along the lines of net payments rather 
than absolute receipts per country, and one should neither expect ideology to matter beyond 
representation of particular voter groups, nor should nationality play a role beyond hard, distributional 
logic. Frames should thus be used in line with the status as net payers and recipients as pointed out earlier. 
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Table 32: Overview of expectations and causal narratives based on extant theories 
Theory Predicted structure of conflict Causal narrative 
General theories on conflict in EU politics 
Cleavage approach (Marks & Wilson 
2000) 
ideological parties’ domestic habits, lack of 
citizen preferences on EU issues 
Distribution model (Marks 2004) territorialised distributional effects are both cross- 
and intra-national 
Liberal intergovernmentalism territorial producer bias 
Postfunctionalism (Hooghe & 
Marks 2009) 
territorialised distributional effects are both cross- 
and intra-national 
EP-specific theories 
3G2P theory (Hix, Noury et al. 
2007) 
territorialised (limited) Some defection due to re-election 
seeking (i.e. being nominated by the 
national party), but countered by 
office-seeking 
PPC approach (Ringe 2010) territorialised? Expert MEPs give in to 
constituency interests, others just 
follow experts 
bicameral theory (Costello & 
Thomson 2014) 
territorial Lobbying by national governments 
in line with national interests 
Policy-specific theoretical arguments 
Bailer et al. 2015 territorial ‘Objective’ national interests in 
terms of distributional effects, but 
no producer bias 
Observable implications of the theory of territorialisation 
The theory of territorialisation (ToT) provides that, given the politicisation of a post-Crisis EU, policy 
issues characterised by cross-national distributional effects lead to a territorial structure of conflict, 
provided that these cross-national distributional effects can be established with certainty. All of these 
conditions apply to the 2013 Reform of the CAP. In addition, however, there is a considerable degree of 
intra-national distribution involved. Therefore, the ToT would predict partial territorialisation of conflict 
only, and in this sense would resemble some of the extant theoretical approaches. What is special about 
the ToT, however, is its capacity for pointing out in detail, which parties exactly can be expected to defect 
from their ideological convictions, because it combines the idea of simultaneously aspired party goals with 
framing strategies available to parties under particular structural conditions. 
National parties represented by their delegations in the EP are generally assumed to be 
simultaneously pursuing three goals, namely policy, votes, and, to an almost negligible extent, office 
(office-seeking within the EP is not rational, as Ringe points out, while office-seeking with regard to 
national governments is only indirectly affected). As the ToT holds, policy-seeking is driven by a party’s 
ideology, while vote-seeking in EU politics is bound to a particular national territory. If parties followed 
their policy-seeking goal only, they would thus behave very much as predicted by the cleavage approach 
(see above). In a politicised EU, however, they cannot necessarily do so any longer, at least not when 
cross-national distributional effects are present and certain, without risking the attainment of their vote-
seeking goals, which in turn are instrumental to the achievement of policy. Since policy-seeking is 
considered as the intrinsic motivation of these parties, they will, however, trade it in favour of vote-
seeking only if this ‘defection’ is worth it. Outright electoral opportunism is not a viable strategy, because 
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it is not only detrimental to policy-seeking, but also to vote-seeking itself in the long run due to a loss of 
credibility. Parties will thus defect only if they can be rather sure that their action is not perceived as 
inappropriate by the electorate. Since most EU citizens – voters – identify more strongly with their nation-
state than they do with Europe, defection for the sake of a certain national interest should be accepted 
usually. In addition, framing an issue in a way that people are used to from the national level (i.e. in line 
with a relevant national tradition) should not put a party’s credibility at risk. 
Parties on the Right should be ideologically opposed to an interventionist CAP (along the lines 
of frame F1 or F3), albeit for reasons that vary in importance across the party families of the Right, 
namely opposition to market intervention, regulation, and supranationalism. Accordingly, some 
(Conservatives, Liberals, partly RWP parties) should prefer frame F2 (liberalisation), and others should 
prefer frame F4 (extreme Right and RWP parties). However, for net recipients of the CAP, there is a 
highly certain and visible national interest for an interventionist CAP (frame F1 or at least F3 in the case 
of Austria), which would mean that Right-wing parties in such countries would be acting against this 
national interest if they stuck to their ideologically preferred frames. Clearly, however, a party that 
normally denounces the downsides of state intervention or of EU centralisation risks losing credibility if it 
suddenly becomes an advocate of EU-level interventionism. This risk will only be acceptable under two 
conditions. First, the party is sure to otherwise lose part of its core electorate, because this core electorate 
includes farmers, which first and foremost still applies to Christian Democratic and Conservative parties 
in the sample (see above for the important distinction between ideological and electoral links in this 
regard). Second, the party can be sure that its defection is in line with a pre-existing national tradition in 
terms of interventionism (applies to parties from France and Italy). 
By contrast, Left-wing parties should favour some form of market intervention from an 
ideological point of view and agriculture should not form an exception to this. Clearly, net paying 
countries might have an interest in a less interventionist CAP. However, the goal conflict for Left-wing 
parties is not symmetrical to that faced by Right-wing parties from net receiving countries. This is because, 
first, the majority of citizens do not generally perceive of agricultural subsidies as an outright loss, as is 
documented by Eurobarometer data (European Commission 2014a). Second, parties whose ideology is in 
line with the multifunctional frame F3 anyway can direct attention to environmental and other public 
goods, to which the working class part of their core electorates contributes disproportionately via taxes 
and the postmaterialist part of their core electorate is willing to pay more. For Social Democratic parties 
from net-paying countries, it may be sufficient to include some calls for further market orientation by way 
of ‘blurring’, rather than risking long-term credibility by making themselves the champions of 
liberalisation. In fact, Green parties do not even have an incentive for blurring, since their electorates tend 
to be postmaterialist and identify with Europe more strongly, while not be the champions of ‘greening’ 
(frame F3) would put their credibility as environmentalists at risk. 
While thus Left-wing parties (across families) from net-paying countries are not pushed towards 
defection in the way Right-wing parties from net-recipient or state-capitalist countries are, some Left-wing 
parties might be more interventionist than one would expect from a purely ideological perspective. This is 
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the case for those Left-wing parties that do not have their origins in a strong, urbanised labour movement, 
which applies to Irish Labour (cf. Holmes 1996) as well as to the Italian Partito Democratico, which is 
partly a creation of former Christian Democrats. These parties risk losing votes by advocating a policy that 
runs counter to their directly concerned farming electorates, while not risking punishment by the rest of 
their voters, since they come from countries benefitting massively from CAP (Ireland) or characterised by 
an interventionist tradition. 
The ToT thus provides the basis for a highly differentiated expectation concerning the frame 
usage that will be observed, the strategic considerations behind and the overall structure of conflict 
resulting from it. In that sense, it is different from the overly simplifying predictions of the cleavage 
approach or liberal intergovernmentalism. At the same time, it limits itself to the interaction between 
structural conditions, strategic options and party goals. Government participation at the national level 
should not matter for framing considerations on CAP, since coalition partners do neither depend on 
uncertainty reduction via national administrations to the same extent due to the certainty of distributional 
effects. Opposition parties should be influenced by the lobbying efforts of their respective national 
governments even less – unlike the bicameral theory would predict. For the same reason, the ToT would 
not expect COMAGRI membership to matter beyond underlying self-selection for membership that 
however coincides with party goals, which contrasts with Ringe’s PPC. While objective national interests 
are expected to play a role, as Bailer et al. predict, it is their interplay with ideology and national traditions 
that should prove decisive for defection according to the ToT. 
Arguably, the overlap of the observable implications of the ToT with extant theories is biggest – 
for this case – with the 3G2P approach, as both the overall result (considerable but not total 
territorialisation) as well as the explanation (party goals) appear similar. However, the ToT does not 
assume that office-seeking plays an important role. This can be tested based on the impact on frame usage 
of, on the one hand, EPG membership as the basis for intra-EP office-seeking, and, on the other hand, 
party family membership as the basis of policy-seeking. The assumption that vote-seeking matters due to 
politicisation would be supported, amongst others, if parties put generally more emphasis on the policy-
dimension compared to the debate on Europeanised welfare. This is because certainty of distributional 
effects implies that justifications are less important than policy suggestions, because voters know already 
which policies deliver for them and do not depend as much on the provision of causal narratives in order 
to identify their own preferences. It should thus still be possible to establish, even among those seemingly 
similar approaches, which one provides the better explanation of the PFA results discussed in the next 
section. 
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5.4 Results and discussion 
In this section, the results of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) are presented and discussed with regard to the 
theoretical expectations specified in the preceding one. It is found that, when all case knowledge is taken into 
account and the caveats of equating territory-bound behaviour with national interests in purely distributional terms 
are corrected, the structure of conflict is more territorial than ideological. While this could be expected based on 
several extant theories as well, the csQCA conducted on the micro-level in terms of framing strategies shows that no 
single condition can explain defection, and that neither government participation at the national level nor 
COMAGRI membership appear decisive for the decision to defect. Instead, as was expected according to the 
theoretical framework developed specifically in Chapter 2, it is mainly Right-wing parties from net recipient and state 
capitalist countries who defect, rather than Left-wing parties from net-paying countries. Exceptions in the latter 
regard confirm the rule, namely that defection is the strategy of choice only if there is electoral pressure for the 
temporary surrender of policy-seeking, in that only centre-Left parties having electoral ties to the farming world (due 
to national or party-specific historical developments) opt for defection. Other parties can just stick to their 
ideological predilections or limit themselves to blurring regarding the cross-national distribution, depending on the 
degree of nationalism in their core electorates. Noteworthy, however, the role played by national traditions in terms 
of the type of capitalism is stronger than expected, as the behaviour of Italian parties demonstrates: it even appears 
to partly replace that of more objective national interests. Finally, the comparison of the PFA with roll-call data 
shows that, if taking into account the precise de facto subject and timing of a vote, the PFA results are corroborated. 
This comparison hence also shows, however, that voting data do not represent the underlying structure of conflict in 
an ideal manner. Voting data, secondary literature and survey data suggest, however, that there is something special 
about Italy and its citizens concerning agricultural policy indeed, of which the type of capitalism is likely to be at least 
one component. 
Case-specific data-set and reliability 
For the purpose of analysing how national party delegations express and justify their policy preferences on 
the 2013 Reform of the CAP, 157 press releases or other forms of text (e.g. manifesto passages) issued by 
34 parties could be collected, resulting in 2,292 codings in terms of quasi-sentences attributed to the 
various frames and their dimensions. Accordingly, the parties issued an average number of about 4.6 press 
releases on the issue, containing an average number of about 67.4 codings per party. The reliability test 
conducted on the case-specific codebook (based on the above identification of four CAP-related policy 
frames) produced results ranging from acceptable to excellent by all standards at the level of frames (see 
Table 33) – indeed better than for Europeanised welfare, while the more fine-grained measurement at the 
level of dimensions within these frames should be viewed with some caution. Thus, the finding that the 
policy dimension is referred to most frequently by the MEPs (see Table 34) would be in line with the 
argument that certainty of distributional effects decreases the effectiveness of the other dimensions for 
convincing voters, but should not be overrated. 
Table 33: Reliability scores for the codebook on the 2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy 
Level: frames dimensions 
Round: 1 2 1 2 
% 78.43 90.43 61.89 70.33 
kappa 0.677 0.861 0.543 0.642 
alpha 0.676 0.882 0.541 0.642 
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Table 34: distribution of codings across dimensions 
 F1 % F2 % F3 % F4 % total % 
norm 296,0 35,0 48,0 21,1 305,0 28,6 49,0 32,2 698,0 30,5 
cons 148,0 17,5 55,0 24,1 85,0 8,0 32,0 21,1 320,0 14,0 
cogn 45,0 5,3 29,0 12,7 76,0 7,1 34,0 22,4 184,0 8,0 
pol 350,0 41,4 96,0 42,1 607,0 56,9 37,0 24,3 1090,0 47,6 
total 839,0 99,3 228,0 100,0 1073,0 100,6 152,0 100,0 2292,0 100,0 
 
At the same time, it should be recalled that the reliability test itself was merely a rough indication of the 
reproducibility of the findings produced by means of PFA with rather limited resources. More specifically, 
with regard to CAP it should be noted that one coder has reported difficulties in understanding the 
substantive aspects of agricultural economics underpinning the various frames as a source of uncertainty 
in terms of coding. This problem was not, however, present for the other two coders, who in fact 
achieved better reliability scores for both frames and dimensions. It could be noted that disagreements 
among coders were comparatively high with regard to press releases issued by UKIP as well as generally 
with regard to those issued by Irish parties. These systematic disagreements might be a first indication of a 
subsuming strategy on the part of these actors and should therefore be further examined below. 
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Macro-level: overall structure of conflict and descriptive summary of frame usage 
Table 35: Percentage of quasi-sentences attributed to the various frames within each party’s statements 
Party 
classic 
(Frame 1) 
liberalisation 
(Frame 2) 
multifunctionality 
(Frame 3) 
anti-centralisation 
(Frame 4) 
F UMP 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
I PD 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F FN 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F MoDem 87.5 0.0 12.5 0.0 
IRE SF 84.4 0.0 6.3 9.4 
IRE FG 72.2 0.4 21.7 5.7 
F FdG 69.9 0.0 29.4 0.6 
D CDU/CSU 68.4 2.6 23.7 5.3 
IRE Lab 65.0 5.0 30 0.0 
IRE FF 57.6 0.0 9.1 33.3 
I FdI/AN 56.7 0.7 6.0 36.6 
I FI 53.8 0.0 42.3 3.8 
I Tsipras 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 
A NEOs 0.0 75.0 25.0 0.0 
D FDP 7.6 74.6 10.2 7.6 
UK Cons 5.4 69.0 11.6 14.0 
D AfD 7.7 46.2 30.8 15.4 
I Verdi 0.0 0.0 100 0.0 
D B90 5.1 0.0 94.9 0.0 
A Gruene 6.1 0.0 93.9 0.0 
F Verts 5.3 0.9 93.9 0.0 
UK Greens 10.0 0.0 90.0 0.0 
A SPOE 3.4 6.9 89.7 0.0 
D LINKE 7.9 2.6 89.5 0.0 
D SPD 0.0 11.9 88.1 0.0 
F PS 32.0 1.0 65.5 1.5 
UK LibDem 25.0 12.5 62.5 0.0 
A OEVP 33.3 5.6 61.1 0.0 
UK Lab 0.0 47.4 52.6 0.0 
IRE Greens 41.7 0.0 50 8.3 
total 36.9 9.9 46.6 6.6 
D NPD 22.2 0.0 44.4 33.3 
A FPOE 19.2 0.0 26.9 53.8 
UKIP 3.8 3.8 19.2 73.1 
UK BNP 0.0 25.0 0.0 75.0 
 
At first sight, the results of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) seem to confirm the expectation that the 
overall structure of conflict is mixed, in that Irish, French, and Italian parties seem to cluster together, 
while most Social Democratic, Green and far Right parties also do. If the index of territorialisation is 
calculated as defined earlier, based on who acts exactly in line with one’s ideology as defined by party 
family membership (see Chapter 3) and objective national interests (here: net payers vs net recipients), the 
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result would be just slightly more territorialised in comparison to Europeanised welfare, namely -11.7 
(welfare: -33.3), and thus would still be more ideological than territorial. As a closer inspection of the 
frame usage by each party will show, however, this result deserves some reconsideration: it supports the 
theory of territorialisation, but arguably questions the operationalisation of the index of territorialisation. 
By considering who uses frame F1, for instance, it becomes clear that, as one would expect, 
most French and Irish parties – with the notable exception of the Greens in both cases, and French 
Socialists – use this frame predominantly. This is precisely what one might expect, given that both 
countries are net recipients of the CAP, and that in the Irish case, also ‘working class’ parties might be 
inclined to compete for the votes of farmers and the rural population.35 Rather surprisingly, however, all 
Italian parties (except the Greens) prefer this frame. This rather clearly would seem to express a territorial 
pattern, albeit one which is not captured by the current operationalisation of parties behaving according to 
their objective national interest, since Italy is a net payer to the CAP. The fact that the German 
CDU/CSU uses the classic frame and thereby defects from the ideologically more consistent liberalisation 
frame can be understood as the expression of a territorial interest, but as a regional one: all press releases 
issued in 2013 by the CDU/CSU delegation were written by (or in the name of) CSU-member Albert 
Deß. This branch of the German centre-Right can only be voted for in Bavaria, the region that is the 
biggest agricultural producer within Germany. Hence, liberalisation cannot be in the territorial interest of 
the CSU, while its defection to frame F1 should be seen as an expression of this territorial interest. 
Comparing the manifestos of the nation-wide CDU with that of the CSU and with its press releases, it is 
indeed confirmed that the CDU puts much more emphasis on market orientation (frame F2), just as 
would be expected. Noteworthy, in the case of Italy, the support for a classic CAP does not appear as an 
expression of a regional – Southern – interest, in that even the regionalist Lega Nord (not in the sample 
but considered for triangulation here) uses this frame predominantly. 
The usage of frame F2 by the German Liberals and the British Conservatives is in line with both 
their ideology and nationality, while in the case of the Austrian Liberals (NEOs) only the former applies. 
Both frames F2 and F4 correspond to a German national interest as a net payer, but still the Right-wing 
populist AfD has opted in favour of frame F2, although the anti-centralisation frame F4 would seem to fit 
its ideology better. At the same time, considering this as an instance of defection from an ideological 
family might seem exaggerated. Rather, it seems that the AfD, meanwhile to be classified as an RWP 
party, might not yet have developed this profile in 2013, but rather presented itself as a Liberal alternative 
to the FDP. 
The multifunctionality frame (F3), with its call for a ‘greening’ of the CAP amongst others, is 
used by literally all Green parties in the sample, as was expected due to the absence of a goal conflict for 
these parties. Moreover, the Austrian Christian Democrats make use of this frame rather than the 
ideologically consistent frame F2, which however is in line with the peculiar Austrian national interest (i.e. 
net beneficiary only due to multifunctional orientation of the CAP). Furthermore, Social Democratic 
                                                     
35 This is due to the aforementioned belated industrialisation of Ireland, cf. Holmes (1996). 
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parties from both net recipient and net paying countries use this frame, with the exception of those two 
members of this family which I have attributed a ‘farming electorate’ for reasons explained earlier. 
Noteworthy, the British Liberal Democrats make use of this frame predominantly, too, which 
would seem to contradict both their Liberal ideology (in line with frame F2 rather) and the British national 
interest. Taking into account, however, that George Lyon, the author of the respective press releases, is a 
farmer and Scotsman, the picture is different: There is evidence that the Scottish ‘national’ interest in the 
2013 Reform stood against further liberalisation (Swinbank 2015), and Scotland constitutes a separate 
electoral district within the UK concerning European elections. Lyon’s defection may thus be considered 
an expression of the Scottish rather than the British national interest, but is in line with the theory of 
territorialisation. 
Surprisingly also, the German extreme Right party, the NPD, also uses the multifuncaitonlity 
frame (F3) rather frequently. Since this party often uses the anti-centralisation frame (F4) in line with its 
ideology as well, and since in fact all policy dimension statements made by this party call for less 
centralisation, I will not consider it as defecting, but as acting both in line with the German national 
interest and its far Right ideology. Indeed, all far Right parties not mentioned this far mainly use frame F4, 
while no other party uses this frame predominantly. 
‘Correcting’ the territorialisation score in line with the foregoing considerations on regional 
interests in combination with electoral incentives and the territorial pattern in the framing efforts of Italian 
parties is not arbitrary, but indeed is making the best of a small-N research design. Accordingly, the 
territorialisation score for the 2013 Reform of CAP should be set to 8.8, with the positive amount 
indicating that the structure of conflict is more territorial than ideological (see Table 36). These 
considerations are therefore also taken into account in the following discussion of framing strategies. 
Table 36: The structure of conflict on CAP in numbers (*=corrected for case knowledge) 
Parties framing in line with… …ideology: … territory: 
Absolute number 20 16 
Percentage 58.8 47.1 
Index of territorialisation -11.7 
Parties framing in line with… ...ideology: ...territory* 
Absolute number 20 23 
Percentage 58.8 67.6 
Index of territorialisation* 8.8 
Micro-level: analysis of defection 
As is implied in the degree of territorialisation discussed above, defections in the case of CAP are much 
more numerous than they were in the case of Europeanised welfare. Thus, even if the pattern could be 
explained by national interests or ideology in simple terms or a combination of the two, it would be 
difficult to grasp this by eyesight alone. Looking at the Truth Table below, which includes only the 
conditions national interest (“netpayer_adapted”, taking into account the special cases of Bavaria and 
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Scotland) and ideology as a general Left-Right scheme (“Left”), it becomes clear that more precise 
approaches will be needed: none of the four possible configurations is free of contradictions. This basic 
model should thus be extended by conditions considered relevant by extant theoretical approaches and 
eventually, those considered relevant by the ToT. 
Table 37: Truth Table CAP; conditions: basic, outcome: defection 
Conditions outcome Case ID 
netpayer_adapted Left defection party 
0 0 C 
F UMP, F FN, F MoDem, 
IRE FG, D CDU/CSU,  
IRE FF, A NEOs,  
UK LibDem, A OEVP,  
A FPOE 
1 1 C 
I PD, I Tsipras, I Verdi, 
D B90, UK Greens, 
D LINKE, D SPD, 
UK Lab 
0 1 C 
IRE SF, F FdG, IRE Lab, 
A Gruene, F Verts,  
A SPOE, F PS,  
IRE Greens 
1 0 C 
I FdI/AN, I FI, D FDP, 
UK Cons, D AfD,  
D NPD, UKIP, UK BNP 
 
The bicameral theory, for instance, considers governmental lobbying as decisive for defection in line with 
the national interest. While clearly the fact that literally no country is entirely united indicates that no 
national government manages to convince all parties of defection in line with the national interest, one 
might expect that at least the governing parties defect (if for reasons of ideology they do not act in line 
with the national interest per chance already). Thereby, however, a large number of cases is still not 
accounted for. Moreover, the solution term can hardly be interpreted plausibly: the defection by the Italian 
Partito Democratico, as a governing party, towards a more interventionist frame would not make sense, as 
the country is a net payer. 
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Table 38: Truth Table CAP; conditions: basic + 'gov', outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
netpayer_adapted Left gov defection party 
0 0 0 C 
F UMP, F FN, 
F MoDem, IRE FF, 
A NEOs, A FPOE 
1 1 1 1 I PD 
0 1 0 0 
IRE SF, F FdG,  
A Gruene, F Verts,  
IRE Greens 
0 0 1 1 
IRE FG,  
D CDU/CSU, 
UK LibDem,  
A OEVP 
0 1 1 C 
IRE Lab, A SPOE,  
F PS 
1 0 0 C 
I FdI/AN, D AfD,  
D NPD, UKIP,  
UK BNP 
1 0 1 C 
I FI, D FDP,  
UK Cons 
1 1 0 C 
I Tsipras, I Verdi,  
D B90, UK Greens,  
D LINKE, D SPD, 
UK Lab 
 
Table 39: Complex solution CAP; conditions: basic + 'gov', outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
NETPAYER_ADAPTED * LEFT * GOV  I PD 
+netpayer_adapted * left * GOV IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, UK LibDem, A OEVP 
 
The literature on EP committees suggests that some committees, especially the agricultural committee 
COMAGRI, is a venue for special interests. If this is combined with Ringe’s PPC theory, according to 
which MEPs depend on their respective experts in the committee, national party delegations who have a 
representative in COMAGRI might be more easily led towards supporting farmers’ interests and defect 
accordingly. Hence, one might also include COMAGRI membership (“comagri_any”) as further 
condition, rather than government participation, to complete the picture. Thereby, however, none of the 
defections is consistently explained. 
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Table 40: Truth Table CAP; conditions: basic + COMAGRI_any, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
netpayer_adapted Left COMAGRI_any defection party 
0 0 1 C 
F UMP, F FN,  
F MoDem, IRE FG,  
D CDU/CSU,  
IRE FF,  
UK LibDem,  
A OEVP, A FPOE 
1 1 1 C 
I PD, D B90, D SPD, 
UK Lab 
0 1 0 0 
IRE SF, A Gruene,  
IRE Greens 
0 1 1 C 
F FdG, IRE Lab,  
F Verts, A SPOE, 
 F PS 
1 0 1 C 
I FdI/AN, I FI,  
D FDP, UK Cons, 
UKIP 
1 1 0 C 
I Tsipras, I Verdi,  
UK Greens,  
D LINKE 
0 0 0 0 A NEOs 
1 0 0 0 
D AfD, D NPD,  
UK BNP 
 
Marks’s distributional model would suggest, that the intra-national distributional effects matter, so that 
one might exchange the simple ideological Left-Right with a more nuanced distinction of parties serving 
farming interests versus those who do not. This model would further suggest controlling for national 
traditions such as the type of capitalism. While arguably this model fares better than the others, four 
contradictory Truth Table rows remain. At least, however, the solution term produced seems 
interpretable, in that the parties covered would defect if they are framing parties AND a. act in line with 
an interventionist tradition or b. the national interest as net recipients of the CAP. 
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Table 41: Truth Table CAP; conditions: basic + ‘state capitalism’, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
netpayer_adapted farming electorate state capitalism defection party 
0 1 1 1 F UMP 
1 1 1 1 I PD, I FI 
0 0 1 C 
F FN, F MoDem,  
F FdG, F Verts,  
F PS 
0 0 0 C 
IRE SF, A NEOs,  
A Gruene, A SPOE,  
UK LibDem,  
IRE Greens,  
A FPOE 
0 1 0 1 
IRE FG,  
D CDU/CSU,  
IRE Lab, IRE FF,  
A OEVP 
1 0 1 C 
I FdI/AN, I Tsipras, 
I Verdi 
1 0 0 C 
D FDP, D AfD,  
D B90, UK Greens,  
D LINKE, D SPD, 
UK Lab, D NPD, 
UKIP, UK BNP 
1 1 0 0 UK Cons 
 
Table 42: Complex solution CAP; conditions: distribution model, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
FARMING ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM F UMP, I PD, I FI 
+ netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE 
F UMP, IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE Lab, IRE FF,  
A OEVP 
 
However, this should not come as a surprise. For what I have argued when reviewing this theoretical 
approach in detail in Chapter 2 was not that the distributional model is ‘wrong’, but simply that it is 
incomplete and must be added by a more precise micro-level explanation to become really accurate. 
Similarly, this truth table is further insightful with regard to the argument by Bailer et al. about ‘objective’ 
national interests concerning conflict in the Council: clearly, objective interests do seem to matter, but an 
accurate account of defection in the EP requires the inclusion of some not so objective elements such as 
national traditions or ideologies for their own sake (policy-seeking). At the same time, the theory of 
territorialisation foresees that indeed, national traditions might make the step towards defection easier 
because it reduces the risk of credibility loss for a party. Admittedly, however, the fact that the effect of 
national traditions could be strong enough to replace an objective national interest is rather surprising. In 
any case, this combination of conditions still leaves more cases unexplained than it can account for. 
Hence, in line with the theory of territorialisation, it seems worthwhile including a condition that 
takes into account that parties weight their various policy goals against each other. Along these lines, then, 
one or more ideological conditions should be included that operationalise the value of ideology for its 
own sake (rather than in purely distributional terms). In order not to inflate the overall number of 
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conditions, I reintroduce the simple Left-Right distinction here first. This reduction seems appropriate in 
the present context, because Right-wing opposition to CAP can be both related to its interventionism or 
its supranationalism and the absence of a Left-wing ideology (‘Left’) should thus cover both centre-Right 
and far Right parties’ ideological motives for acting against CAP. 
Table 43: Truth Table CAP; conditions: ToT, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
netpayer 
_adapted 
Left 
farming 
electorate 
state capitalism defection party 
0 0 1 1 1 F UMP 
1 1 1 1 1 I PD 
0 0 0 1 1 F FN, F MoDem 
0 1 0 0 0 
IRE SF,  
A Gruene,  
A SPOE,  
IRE Greens 
0 0 1 0 1 
IRE FG,  
D CDU/CSU, 
IRE FF,  
A OEVP 
0 1 0 1 0 
F FdG, F Verts, 
F PS 
0 1 1 0 1 IRE Lab 
1 0 0 1 1 I FdI/AN 
1 0 1 1 1 I FI 
1 1 0 1 0 I Tsipras, I Verdi 
0 0 0 0 C 
A NEOs,  
UK LibDem,  
A FPOE 
1 0 0 0 0 
D FDP, D AfD,  
D NPD, UKIP, 
UK BNP 
1 0 1 0 0 UK Cons 
1 1 0 0 C 
D B90,  
UK Greens,  
D LINKE,  
D SPD, UK Lab 
 
Table 44: Complex solution CAP; conditions: ToT, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
left * STATE CAPITALISM F UMP+F FN, F MoDem, I FdI/AN, I FI 
+ NETPAYER_ADAPTED *  
FARMING ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM 
I PD, I FI 
+ netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE * 
state capitalism 
IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVP, IRE Lab 
 
This step halves the number of contradictory configurations. It further produces a new solution term that 
is absolutely in line with the theory of territorialisation: Only Right-wing parties from countries with 
interventionist traditions decide to defect in order not to brake too far away from what their voters might 
perceive of as ‘normal’, while Left-wing parties do not defect since for ideological reasons they already 
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favour at least some intervention (frame F1 or F3) anyway. Nevertheless, two contradictory truth table 
rows remain, which can be interpreted in two different ways and treated accordingly. 
A first possibility is that the theory of territorialisation, which would consider just national 
interests, national traditions, policy-seeking (ideology) and vote-seeking (here: farming electorate) as 
sufficient for explaining defection on CAP, is incomplete and should be added by further conditions, such 
as those already mentioned (government participation, COMAGRI membership). The following three 
Truth Tables do so, first adding only government participation, then COMAGRI membership and finally 
both of them. 
Table 45: Truth Table CAP; conditions: ToT + gov, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
netpayer 
_adapted 
Left 
farming 
electorate 
state 
capitalism 
gov defection party 
0 0 1 1 0 1 F UMP 
1 1 1 1 1 1 I PD 
0 0 0 1 0 1 
F FN,  
F MoDem 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
IRE SF,  
A Gruene, 
IRE Greens 
0 0 1 0 1 1 
IRE FG,  
D CDU/CSU, 
A OEVP 
0 1 0 1 0 0 
F FdG,  
F Verts 
0 1 1 0 1 1 IRE Lab 
0 0 1 0 0 1 IRE FF 
1 0 0 1 0 1 I FdI/AN 
1 0 1 1 1 1 I FI 
1 1 0 1 0 0 
I Tsipras,  
I Verdi 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
A NEOs,  
A FPOE 
1 0 0 0 1 0 D FDP 
1 0 1 0 1 0 UK Cons 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
D AfD,  
D NPD, 
UKIP,  
UK BNP 
1 1 0 0 0 C 
D B90,  
UK Greens,  
D LINKE,  
D SPD,  
UK Lab 
0 1 0 0 1 0 A SPOE 
0 1 0 1 1 0 F PS 
0 0 0 0 1 1 UK LibDem 
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Table 46: Complex solution CAP; conditions: ToT + gov, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
netpayer_adapted * left * FARMING ELECTORATE * 
gov 
F UMP, IRE FF 
+ NETPAYER_ADAPTED 
 * FARMING ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM 
* GOV 
I PD, I FI 
+ left * farming electorate * STATE CAPITALISM * 
gov 
F FN, F MoDem, I FdI/AN 
+ netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE * 
state capitalism * GOV 
IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, A OEVP, IRE Lab 
+ netpayer_adapted * left * state capitalism * GOV IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, A OEVP, UK LibDem 
 
Table 47: Truth Table CAP; conditions: ToT + COMAGRI_any, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
netpayer 
_adapted 
Left 
farming 
electorate 
state 
capitalism 
COMAGRI_a
ny 
defection party 
0 0 1 1 1 1 F UMP 
1 1 1 1 1 1 I PD 
0 0 0 1 1 1 
F FN,  
F MoDem 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
IRE SF,  
A Gruene, 
IRE Greens 
0 0 1 0 1 1 
IRE FG,  
D CDU/CSU, 
IRE FF,  
A OEVP 
0 1 0 1 1 0 
F FdG,  
F Verts, F PS 
0 1 1 0 1 1 IRE Lab 
1 0 0 1 1 1 I FdI/AN 
1 0 1 1 1 1 I FI 
1 1 0 1 0 0 
I Tsipras,  
I Verdi 
0 0 0 0 0 0 A NEOs 
1 0 0 0 1 0 D FDP, UKIP 
1 0 1 0 1 0 UK Cons 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
D AfD,  
D NPD,  
UK BNP 
1 1 0 0 1 0 
D B90,  
D SPD,  
UK Lab 
1 1 0 0 0 C 
UK Greens,  
D LINKE 
0 1 0 0 1 0 A SPOE 
0 0 0 0 1 C 
UK LibDem, 
A FPOE 
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Table 48: Complex solution CAP; conditions: ToT + COMAGRI_any, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
left * STATE CAPITALISM * COMAGRI_ANY F UMP, F FN, F MoDem, I FdI/AN, I FI 
+ NETPAYER_ADAPTED *  
FARMING ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM * 
COMAGRI_ANY 
I PD, I FI 
+ netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE * 
state capitalism * COMAGRI_ANY 
IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVP, IRE Lab 
 
Table 49: Truth Table CAP; conditions: ToT + gov + COMAGRI_any, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
netpayer 
_adapted 
Left 
farming 
electorate 
state 
capitalism 
gov AGRI_any defection party 
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 F UMP 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I PD 
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
F FN,  
F MoDem 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
IRE SF,  
A Gruene, 
IRE Greens 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
IRE FG,  
D 
CDU/CSU, 
A OEVP 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
F FdG,  
F Verts 
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 IRE Lab 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 IRE FF 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 I FdI/AN 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 I FI 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
I Tsipras,  
I Verdi 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 A NEOs 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 D FDP 
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 UK Cons 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D AfD,  
D NPD, 
UK BNP 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
D B90,  
D SPD,  
UK Lab 
1 1 0 0 0 0 C 
UK Greens,  
D LINKE 
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 A SPOE 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 F PS 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 UK LibDem 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 A FPOE 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 UKIP 
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Table 50: Complex solution CAP; conditions: ToT + COMAGRI_any, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
netpayer_adapted * left * FARMING ELECTORATE * 
gov * COMAGRI_ANY 
F UMP, IRE FF 
+ NETPAYER_ADAPTED * FARMING 
ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM * GOV * 
COMAGRI_ANY 
I PD, I FI 
+ left * farming electorate * STATE CAPITALISM * 
gov * COMAGRI_ANY 
F FN, F MoDem, I FdI/AN 
+ netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE * 
state capitalism * GOV * COMAGRI_ANY 
IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, A OEVP, IRE Lab 
+ netpayer_adapted * left * state capitalism * GOV * 
COMAGRI_ANY 
IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, A OEVP, UK LibDem 
 
As can be seen by adding conditions separately at first, the COMAGRI condition does not help to reduce 
the number of contradictory configurations at all, while the government participation condition reduces 
but one. More importantly, however, this effect is not plausible in terms of its interpretation at all: the 
Liberal Democrats, who defect while the Austrian NEOs and FPÖ, similar in conditions, did not, are now 
part of a separate configuration due to their participation in the UK government. If it was indeed 
government participation that leads the LibDems to defect, why then do they defect away from their 
coalition partner (the Conservatives), and away from a frame (liberalisation) that actually meets their 
ideological predilections AND the (overall) British national interest? This argument can then equally be 
applied to the fact that adding both these conditions has the same effect as just adding the “gov” 
condition. 
As the analysis of necessity suggests, none of the conditions included is individually necessary.36 
This also applies to the COMAGRI condition, albeit according to Ringe’s PPC approach, committee 
expertise is what allows parties to defect in the first place, because only in this way they can make their 
own, independent judgement. The theory of territorialisation, by contrast, provides that distributional 
effects of policies such as CAP are so certain and hence obvious, that expertise is less required here since 
both MEPs and citizens can be expected to have clear policy preferences. In sum, all that is achieved by 
adding these conditions of relevance according to theories other than the ToT itself, therefore, is an ever 
more complex solution term, and configurations that in ever more cases describe just one party. 
Fortunately, then, there is a second way for explaining and, subsequently, handling the 
remaining contradictory configurations, even if only those conditions expected to matter according to the 
theory of territorialisation are included. This alternative explanation for the remaining contradictions is 
that the conditions included are simply not sufficiently fine-grained in their operationalisation. Rather than 
splitting up these conditions further, I prefer to account for the contradictions individually, while for the 
computerised analysis I code them as ‘0’ (‘good practice’ no. 5 and 7 regarding contradictory 
                                                     
36  DIE LINKE defects without having a COMAGRI member, a fact which because of the contradictory 
configuration is not depicted in the solution term. 
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configurations according to Rihoux and Meur (2009, 49)), and then move on to the simplification of the 
solution that was obtained nonetheless. 
The first contradictory truth table row, as was already mentioned, includes the Austrian FPÖ 
and NEOs (not defecting) and the British Liberal Democrats (defecting). Arguably, the lack of defection 
on the part of FPÖ and NEOs could be due to the fact that Austria is not a net recipient because of the 
direct payments (pillar 1) to farmers it receives, but only (and barely so) due to the regional development 
funds (pillar 2). The Austrian national interest would thus correspond to frame F3 (multifunctionality), not 
F1 (classic). NEOs and FPÖ, ideologically preferring frame F2 (liberalisation) and F4 (anti-centralisation), 
respectively, might stick to their respective frames and just blur with frame F3, because the substantive 
gap between these frames and F3 is not as big as between F1 – interventionism and supranationalism – on 
the one hand and F2 and F4 on the other hand. Indeed, in their turn, the LibDems do not defect to frame 
F1 outright, but to frame F3, which might be seen as a party internal compromise between Scottish pro-
farming interests (represented by their expert George Lyon) and their Liberal ideology. 
As for the second contradiction between the defection of DIE LINKE on the one hand and the 
non-defection of German and British Greens and Social Democrats, the problem might be that the 
ideological condition (‘Left’) does not differentiate sufficiently between the different party families and 
their ideological predilections. After all, Greens and Social Democrats should ideologically prefer the 
multifunctional frame F3, which at least provides environmental and other public goods for their core 
electorates, even if they might lose out in cross-national terms. If DIE LINKE stuck to frame F1, 
however, it would not offer its core electorate anything in distributional terms, while the farmers in 
Germany will not even consider voting for them anyway – at least not as long as the CDU/CSU caters 
them, that is. The defection of a far Left party from a non-interventionist, net paying country thus 
becomes understandable for vote-seeking reasons, in line with the theory of territorialisation. 
With the contradictory configurations being accounted for individually and in line with the 
theory of territorialisation, I can thus turn to the prospects of simplifying the complex solution following 
the theory of territorialisation, without adding further conditions. This simplification is achieved by 
including so-called logical remainders as ‘simplifying assumptions’, a classic and important feature of 
(cs)QCA (Rihoux and Meur 2009, 59–65; Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 151–77). Logical remainders 
are to those logically possible combinations of conditions that are not covered by the data and which, if 
excluded, limit the potential for Boolean minimisation (and vice versa). Note, however, that by restricting 
the analysis to four dichotomous conditions concerning 34 cases, the number for such remainders is 
relatively small, as only 16 (i.e. 24) are logically possible anyway. 
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To repeat, the so-called complex or conservative solution (because it sticks to observed data only) obtained above 
was: 
Table 51: Complex solution CAP; conditions: ToT, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
left * STATE CAPITALISM F UMP, F FN, F MoDem, I FdI/AN, I FI 
+ NETPAYER_ADAPTED *  
FARMING ELECTORATE *  
STATE CAPITALISM 
I PD, I FI 
+ netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE * 
state capitalism 
IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVP, IRE Lab 
 
By having the software (Tosmana, R-package QCA) include any logical remainders that could work as 
simplifying assumptions, the so-called ‘parsimonious’ solutions are produced: 
Table 52: Parsimonious solution CAP (1); conditions: ToT, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE 
F UMP, IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVP, 
IRE Lab 
+ left * STATE CAPITALISM F UMP, F FN, F MoDem, I FdI/AN, I FI 
+ LEFT * FARMING ELECTORATE I PD, IRE Lab 
Simplifying assumptions: 
netpayer_adapted{0}Left{1}farming electorate{1}state capitalism{1} + 
netpayer_adapted{1}Left{1}farming electorate{1}state capitalism{0} 
 
Table 53: Parsimonious solution CAP (2); conditions: ToT, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
netpayer_adapted * FARMING ELECTORATE 
F UMP, IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVP, 
IRE Lab 
+ left * STATE CAPITALISM F UMP, F FN, F MoDem, I FdI/AN, I FI 
+ FARMING ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM F UMP, I PD, I FI 
Simplifying assumptions: 
netpayer_adapted{0}Left{1}farming electorate{1}state capitalism{1} 
 
The software suggests minimizing the complex solution formula by making either one or two simplifying 
assumptions (i.e. assuming that either one or two additional cases were observed), arriving at two different 
simplified solution formulas. Both of these solutions involve substantial simplification, in that each part of 
the solution now only requires two conditions to explain the presence of the outcome. It is now up to the 
researcher to decide, in how far these simplifying assumptions are plausible and in how far it should be 
necessary to restrict their selection based on theoretical arguments so as to create the so-called 
‘intermediate’ solution. 
The first of the simplifying assumptions, which in fact is included in both possible versions of 
the parsimonious solution, would imply the existence of a party characterised by an origin in a net-
recipient state, Left-wing ideology, a farming electorate and an interventionist national background, which 
would then decide to defect. Assuming that such a party were, for instance, a centre-Left party defecting 
from F3 to F1, does seem quite plausible in theory, and in practice there might even be such a case in one 
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of the other net recipient countries. This assumption, therefore, does not seem far-fetched and might in 
principle be used to reduce the complexity of the conservative solution. 
The second of the simplifying assumptions, which is included in just one version of the 
parsimonious solution, would imply the existence of a party characterised by an origin in a net-paying 
state, Left-wing ideology, a farming electorate and an non-interventionist national background, which 
would then decide to defect. This, however, seems barely plausible already by itself: If such a party existed 
and would want to do a service to its farming electorate, by defecting it would risk acting against both the 
national interest and the national tradition, or vice versa acting in line with the latter but against the 
former. It is hard to imagine how such party would react, and this assumption should therefore not be 
adopted blindly, nor should the corresponding first version of the parsimonious solution. In fact, this first 
couple of simplifying assumptions would lead us to conclude that their Left-wing ideology is a key element 
in the defection of Irish Labour and the Partito Democratico, which does not really make sense. 
By contrast, the second couple of simplifying assumptions can do with just one – plausible – 
simplifying assumption, leading to a solution that makes perfect theoretical sense: parties would 
accordingly defect if they have reason do so based on both cross- as well as intra-national distributional 
effects (which would cover the majority of cases), if they are Right-wing parties from state capitalist 
countries who do not wish to act against a national tradition too much, or if both intra-national 
distribution (farming electorate) and national tradition point towards advocating a strong CAP. Indeed, 
this is the same result as when making the following directional expectations to arrive at an intermediate 
solution, namely that the conditions net-recipient, Right-wing, farming electorate, and state capitalism are 
conducive to defection. To this solution, one should then add the individual explanations for DIE 
LINKE and the Liberal Democrats, namely that a. a far Left party from a net-paying country would also 
defect (e.g. if the UK had a relevant party of this sort, it would probably use F3 rather than F1), and that 
b. a Right-wing party without a farming electorate from non-interventionist but net recipient country will 
not defect to frame F1, but only make the step to F3. 
All of this would then still be covered by the theory of territorialisation, with a minor caveat, 
however: The ToT did not predict that the national tradition in terms of the type of capitalism could have 
an effect that basically equals that of the national interest, which is also expressed by the fact that net-
payer or net-recipient status is not a necessary condition. Since this effect is driven mainly by the Italian 
parties, I will take up this point again in the discussion of external evidence. Noteworthy, however, none 
of the extant theories did expect this to be the case either. Hence, when it comes to defection, the theory 
of territorialisation still seems to provide the most accurate account of what is observed. 
Micro-level: further framing strategies 
I now turn to the other framing strategies, especially those which often might be used to avoid outright 
defection or to keep one’s credibility while defecting nonetheless, namely ‘blurring’ and ‘subsuming’. Since 
these strategies would not seem to constitute an equally dramatic step as defection does, they are more 
difficult to predict a priori, so that it might already be a considerable achievement if at least some broader 
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patterns can be understood by the same theoretical framework. In principle, one might expect similar 
conditions to play a role when it comes to blurring, for instance, but that the presence of fewer conditions 
is required to make the step. Yet, if one leaves it at the four conditions used to explain defection, the 
number of contradictory configurations is relatively high. 
Table 54: Truth Table CAP; conditions: ToT, outcome: blurring_wide 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
netpayer 
_adapted 
Left 
farming 
electorate 
state capitalism blurring_wide party 
0 0 1 1 0 F UMP 
1 1 1 1 0 I PD 
0 0 0 1 0 F FN, F MoDem 
0 1 0 0 C 
IRE SF,  
A Gruene,  
A SPOE,  
IRE Greens 
0 0 1 0 1 
IRE FG,  
D CDU/CSU, 
IRE FF,  
A OEVP 
0 1 0 1 C 
F FdG, F Verts, 
F PS 
0 1 1 0 1 IRE Lab 
1 0 0 1 1 I FdI/AN 
1 0 1 1 1 I FI 
1 1 0 1 C I Tsipras, I Verdi 
0 0 0 0 1 
A NEOs,  
UK LibDem,  
A FPOE 
1 0 0 0 1 
D FDP, D AfD,  
D NPD, UKIP, 
UK BNP 
1 0 1 0 1 UK Cons 
1 1 0 0 C 
D B90,  
UK Greens,  
D LINKE,  
D SPD, UK Lab 
 
This might be read as an indication that the theory of territorialisation is weaker for explaining blurring 
than it is for explaining defection, which, given the nature of blurring I just described, would not be 
surprising. Noteworthy, however, all of the contradictory truth table rows involve Green parties. Indeed, I 
have noted above already that Green parties might be special among the parties of the Left. This is 
because the Social Democrats and far Left parties also have working class voters with rather nationalist to 
think about, which this does not apply to Green parties, who have the most postmaterialist and 
postnationalist electorate. It might thus be worthwhile specifying the membership in the Green party 
family as a separate condition for blurring: 
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Table 55: Truth Table CAP; conditions: ToT refined, outcome: blurring_wide 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
netpayer 
_adapted 
Green Left 
farming 
electorate 
state 
capitalism  
blurring 
_wide 
party 
0 0 0 1 1 0 F UMP 
1 0 1 1 1 0 I PD 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
F FN,  
F MoDem 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
IRE SF,  
A SPOE 
0 0 0 1 0 1 
IRE FG,  
D CDU/CSU, 
IRE FF,  
A OEVP 
0 0 1 0 1 1 F FdG, F PS 
0 0 1 1 0 1 IRE Lab 
1 0 0 0 1 1 I FdI/AN 
1 0 0 1 1 1 I FI 
1 0 1 0 1 1 I Tsipras 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
A NEOs,  
UK LibDem, 
A FPOE 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
D FDP,  
D AfD,  
D NPD, 
UKIP,  
UK BNP 
1 0 0 1 0 1 UK Cons 
1 1 1 0 1 0 I Verdi 
1 1 1 0 0 0 
D B90,  
UK Greens 
0 1 1 0 0 C 
A Gruene, 
IRE Greens 
0 1 1 0 1 0 F Verts 
1 0 1 0 0 C 
D LINKE,  
D SPD,  
UK Lab 
 
By doing so, the number of contradictions is reduced by its half, leaving only two. These contradictions 
can be rather easily made sense of, however. In the case of the truth table row including DIE LINKE, the 
German SPD and UK Labour, the argument would reflect the earlier one about the special status of the 
far Left. Recall, that DIE LINKE already defected to F3 in order to offer at least something to its 
electorate. If, as a far Left party, it now blurred its own framing with liberalisation arguments (F2), 
however, it would put its credibility at considerable risk. By contrast, for New Left parties from net paying 
countries, such as the SPD and UK Labour, making some liberalisation arguments to please those voters 
inclined to be upset about money flows to Brussels makes perfect sense. Hence, if the operationalisation 
Left-wing ideology is refined even further, the theory of territorialisation still applies. As for the 
contradictory configuration including the Austrian and Irish Greens, the exception might confirm the rule: 
While all Green parties have been assumed to be quite pro-European, the Irish Greens are known to be 
comparatively Eurosceptic within this family (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002, 984). It might therefore 
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be the case that they also want to offer something in terms of the Irish national interest, and hence blur 
with frame F1. 
Looking at the complex solutions based on this Truth Table for blurring or its absence, some 
patterns can indeed be derived: 
Table 56: Complex solution CAP; conditions: ToT refined, outcome: blurring_wide 
Solution terms Cases covered 
green * left * state capitalism 
IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVP, A NEOs, 
UK LibDem, A FPOE, D FDP, D AfD, D NPD, UKIP, 
UK BNP, UK Cons 
+ NETPAYER_ADAPTED * green * left 
I FdI/AN, I FI, D FDP, D AfD, D NPD, UKIP,  
UK BNP, UK Cons 
+ netpayer_adapted * green *  
FARMING ELECTORATE * state capitalism  
IRE FG, D CDU/CSU, IRE FF, A OEVP, IRE Lab 
+ green * LEFT * farming electorate *  
STATE CAPITALISM 
F FdG, F PS, I Tsipras 
 
Table 57: Complex solution CAP; conditions: ToT refined, outcome: NOT blurring 
Solution terms Cases covered 
netpayer_adapted * green * left * STATE CAPITALISM F UMP,  F FN, F MoDem 
+ NETPAYER_ADAPTED * GREEN * LEFT * 
farming electorate 
I Verdi, D B90, UK Greens 
+ GREEN * LEFT * farming electorate *  
STATE CAPITALISM 
I Verdi, F Verts 
+ NETPAYER_ADAPTED * green * LEFT * 
FARMING ELECTORATE * STATE CAPITALISM 
I PD 
+ netpayer_adapted * green * LEFT * farming electorate 
* state capitalism 
IRE SF, A SPOE 
 
Firstly and most clearly, Green parties refrain from blurring indeed, choosing a uni-dimensional strategy 
instead. By contrast, those centre-Left parties who do not defect rather add some elements of other 
frames to their ideologically preferred frame F3, choosing this in line with their national interest. Thus, as 
was already mentioned, SPD37 and Labour (UK) add some liberalisation arguments, the French PS some 
classic CAP rhetoric, and the Austrian SPÖ does not blur because F3 is also in line with its national 
interest. On the far Left, most parties blur with frame F3, indicating that while in favour of market 
intervention, they are not careless about the environmental consequences of the classic CAP. Concerning 
the far Right, it seems that their ideologically preferred frame F4 (anti-centralisation) is complemented 
with other frames, so as to broaden their arguments substantively towards something more ‘positive’ than 
just anti-EU sentiments. 
In terms of territorial patterns, it can be noted that the defecting Italian Right still blurs its F1 
framing with F3 (the Centre-Right Forza Italia) or F4 (the RWP Alleanza Nazionale), while the French 
Right does defect to F1 full scale. This might be explained by the fact that both countries are shaped by 
                                                     
37 Numerically, the SPD does not reach the 20 per cent threshold for a blurring strategy. Its statements on cutting 
direct payments do offer arguments for calibrating this case in this manner. 
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state capitalist tradition, but one (Italy) is a net payer, while the other (France) is a net recipient. Where 
national interest and tradition overlap, as in the French case, there is no need for blurring. This finding 
relativises the surprising strength of the effect national traditions seemed to have on defection in a manner 
that brings it even closer to the theory of territorialisation. 
Since making simplifying assumptions without disposing of a sufficiently precise theoretical 
argument on blurring would not seem worthwhile, I now turn to the observation of the final strategy, 
namely subsuming, instead. While this is even harder to predict as it is built on parties’ creativity, some 
first inductive hunch could be derived from lower reliability scores regarding UKIP in particular and Irish 
parties more generally. Concerning UKIP, it can indeed be noted that it argues against EU membership 
generally and against the Common Agricultural Policy in particular, but then suggests a number of policies 
that, apart from the level of governance, are in line with frame F3 (direct payments, environmental public 
goods). This act of subsuming has been the source of disagreement among coders. As for Irish parties, it 
can generally be noted that there framing often normatively draws on the ‘Irish farming family’, which – 
especially in context – could be coded as a reference to almost all of the frames except frame F2. This is 
because it touches upon some sense of nationalism, farming as such but also farming on a small scale. 
This arguably very comprehensive normative basis does not, however, change the fact that in terms of 
policy in particular, all Irish parties are indeed favouring a strong, Europeanised CAP in line with the 
countries objective national interest. 
Inasmuch as patterns are discernible, then, the analysis of blurring in particular confirms the 
theory of territorialisation, as the conditions identified according to it can account for these patterns. The 
true significance of blurring as a means or relativising national interests, as it was used most clearly by 
Social Democratic parties, will become even clearer when comparing it to the voting results on CAP 
reform as a source of external validity. This is the task of the next subsection. 
Beyond the PFA: external validity of the findings 
It would be beyond the scope of this study to analyse all votes ever recorded in the process of the 
negotiations on the CAP. There are, however, at least three research projects (Hix 2013; Nissen 2014; 
Olper and Pacca 2015) including processed roll-call data. Two of these (Hix 2013; Nissen 2014) include 
votes on resolutions determining the EP’s position more or less on the overall reform package, while third 
is focused on the aspect of Common Market Organisation (Olper and Pacca 2015). The study by Hix has 
the further advantage of disaggregating the votes by national party delegations, while the one by Olper and 
Pacca at least analyses EPG cohesion and country cohesion. 
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Table 58: Decision on the Opening of, and Mandate for, Interinstitutional negotiations on Financing, Management 
and Monitoring of the CAP. Motion for a resolution. Vote: proposal for decision. Own compilation based on Hix 
(2013, pp. 27-36) 
 Germany Austria UK Ireland France Italy 
GUE/NGL - NA -
38
 -
39
 - NA 
Greens/EFA - - - NA - NA 
S&D - - - + + + 
ALDE + NA + + + +
40
 
EPP + + NA + + + 
ECR NA NA + NA NA +
41
 
EFD NA NA - NA 0
42
 -/+
43
 
NI NA -
44
 0
45
 NA -
46
 NA 
 
 
Figure 10: Graphical illustration of votes on CAP the Decision on the Opening of, and Mandate for, 
Interinstitutional negotiations on Financing, Management and Monitoring of the CAP by EPG. 
Source: Hix 2013, 19. 
 
At first sight, it might seem at odds with the results of the PFA, that cohesion within the centre-Right is 
so much higher than within the S&D group, and that the far Left GUE/NGL should be against the 
majority of the EPP also they were both found to use frame F1 predominantly and especially that the 
ECR, dominated by the British Conservatives should be in agreement with the rather pro-CAP EPP. This 
difference between the RCV data and the PFA only lasts as long as one does not take into account that in 
their press releases, manifestos etc. subjected to the PFA, parties were free to comment on whatever 
aspect of the CAP and that the whole end phase of the CAP negotiations was included, with all kinds of 
decisions being up for comments, while the vote on the resolution was taken at a particular point in time 
and referred to a particular negotiated outcome. 
                                                     
38 Sinn Féin 
39 Socialist party 
40 Italia dei Valori, not in the sample for PFA. 
41 Conservatori e Social Riformatori, not in the sample for PFA. 
42 Mouvement pour la France, not in the sample for PFA. 
43 “Io amo Italia” and Lega Nord, both not in the sample for PFA. 
44 FPÖ 
45 BNP 
46 Front National 
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This particular negotiated outcome did not include a position the budget – already decided 
elsewhere – and mainly focused on changes related to those policies attributed to the policy dimension of 
the multifunctional frame F3, most notably ‘greening’. The majority in the EP, however, had agreed on a 
substantial watering down of the earlier ‘greening’ provisions right before the vote analysed by Hix (cf. 
Erjavec, Lovec, and Erjavec 2015, 226; Gravey 2015). This vote, therefore, must be understood in its 
precise institutional and temporal context, much unlike the press releases analysed by PFA. Doing so 
would mean to consider it as a vote on the watering down of the greening to the benefit of farmers. 
Accordingly, the more a party was in favour of greening even at the expense of farmers, the 
more it would vote against the resolution. This is why all Green parties vote against it, first of all. The far 
Left GUE/NGL would be expected to be in favour of market regulation, albeit not as a favour towards 
farmers particularly and, as was noted in the analysis of blurring, would want to achieve greening at the 
same time. The S&D ‘rebels’ are precisely those parties from net-paying and non-statist capitalism countries 
that would place much more emphasis on greening and would rather see markets liberalised a bit more 
(from the UK, Germany, Austria). On the other side of the political spectrum, most Right-wing parties – 
including the British Conservatives – can at least agree on their opposition to greening, while the far Right 
agrees simply on opposition to everything when it comes to votes. What the comparison of the PFA with 
this particular voting result shows, then, is two points: First, once the vote is put in its more precise 
context, it corroborates the results of the textual analysis. Second, it therefore also shows why votes are to 
be considered inferior to textual analysis as a measure of the structure of conflict, because rather than 
depicting the conflict underlying the whole policy issue, they already internalise institutional parameters 
and negotiated outcomes (cf. Chapter 3). 
The EPG and country cohesion scores computed by Olper and Pacca (2015, 371–72) based on 
data from VoteWatch.eu for the aspect Common Market Organisation can, in fact, be more directly 
compared to the PFA results, because they specifically refer to one particular aspect captured mainly by 
support for or opposition to policies from frame F1, namely market intervention. It is in line with the 
findings of the PFA, at the macro-level, that country cohesion is found to be slightly higher on average 
than EPG cohesion (0.68 to 0.64 on Hix et al.’s agreement index) and eventually also with theory of 
territorialisation, that the two families found to use this classic frame mostly, namely the pro-farming EPP 
and the pro-interventionist GUE/NGL should be the most cohesive groups on these issues – the former 
for vote-seeking reasons, the latter for policy-seeking reasons, while the S&D would be highly split across 
net paying/ recipient or (not-)state capitalist countries. The scores for country cohesion also confirm the 
PFA results, with the strongly interventionist Italy and France, as well as the generally anti-interventionist 
UK display the highest cohesion, while Germany or Austria turn out to be highly split, as is also the net 
recipient but liberal capitalist Ireland. 
Erjavec et al. (2015, 226) further lend empirical support to the country-level preferences on the 
CAP budget. As they note: 
Net contributors such as Germany and the UK wanted to see the CAP budget significantly curbed. 
Germany and the UK also opposed capping. Conservative member states such as France, Italy and Spain 
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were strongly against any reduction in the CAP budget. Member states that traditionally received larger 
amounts of rural development supports, such as Austria, were worried that Pillar II would be sacrificed 
during the negotiations. 
The interesting point is, however, that while most of these preferences correspond to objective national 
interests in terms of budgetary redistribution, this does not apply to Italy, as I have already noted above. 
A final issue to be addressed here by means of external evidence, therefore, is whether the idea 
of ‘objective’ national interests determined by budgetary redistribution was flawed. One argument could 
be that it is still more or less in Italy’s objective national interest to have a strongly interventionist CAP, 
because 51 per cent of its 1,620,900 farm holdings have less than 2 hectares (DG Agriculture and Rural 
Development 2014, 5), and hence might not be able to survive without market intervention. Still, provided 
farming subsidies in whatever form were still allowed at the national level, Italy would be financially better 
off from a decentralised CAP (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2013, 49). Yet another explanation might see 
corruption, clientelism or at least strong lobbyism at work. 
It does not seem, however, that Italian politicians are acting against public opinion in Italy when 
advocating a strong CAP, to the contrary: support for CAP spending is consistently high in Italy, whereas 
outright critique of it is conspicuously low according to Eurobarometer data, lower even than it is in 
France (European Commission 2010; 2014a). Given the comparison with France, however, the type of 
capitalism alone would also not quite seem to account for the Italian attitude towards CAP. Arguably, it is 
small farm sizes, and hence a widespread knowledge that farmers are in need of public support to survive, 
in conjunction with a public preference for market intervention due to a respective national tradition that 
lead to this result. In any case, the measurement by means of PFA regarding Italian parties is confirmed, 
as are, by and large, the theoretical arguments made in this respect. 
5.5 Conclusion on the 2013 Reform of the CAP 
Across the decades of European integration, the Common Agricultural Policy has involved the most 
large-scale cross-national redistribution – at least until the Crisis, and this distribution has become 
increasingly visible and foreseeable (i.e. certain). Hence, if the theory of territorialisation holds, the latest 
reform of the CAP should demonstrate the limits of parties’ ability and willingness for avoiding defection. 
That said, the CAP involves considerable distribution also between the shrinking group of farmers on the 
one hand, and the rest of society on the other hand. The theory of territorialisation does not just provide, 
then, that defection concerning CAP reform will be ‘more likely’ than it is for other cases. Instead, it 
stipulates much more precisely, which parties will defect, as well as which parties can rely on other framing 
strategies to avoid defection. 
Like the preceding chapter, the present one confirms both the theoretical expectations as well as 
the usefulness of the approach taken for evaluating them. First of all, the detailed description of the 
characteristics of CAP as a case shows that national interests are at stake indeed, but that there is more at 
stake intra-nationally as well, and how difficult it is to frame around the existence of these distributional 
5. The 2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy 
219 
effects. Second, the identification of policy frames on CAP demonstrates, how much more complex the 
debate on CAP is then just about the question of spending more or less on farming subsidies. Only in this 
manner is it possible to precisely account for parties’ strategies. Third, the impact of (un)certainty becomes 
visible in the distribution of statements across frame dimensions, with concrete policy suggestions 
featuring much more prominently in the debate. Fourth, the theory of territorisaliation can do more than 
correctly predicting the territorialised structure of conflict over CAP, but it takes the PFA in combination 
with the conceptions of framing strategies (rather than ‘positions’) to show the value added in terms of 
increased precision of micro-level explanations: as was expected based on the ToT, parties from net-
recipient countries, who further have a farming electorate to cater, decide in favour of defection, while 
others use the simultaneous presence of intra-national distribution by limiting themselves to blurring, 
whereas Green parties, due to the specific combination of postmaterialism and postnationalism within 
their core electorate, can apply their ideological prism. Interestingly, vote-seeking interests seem to reach 
beyond a purely distributional logic and towards national traditions, as is indicated by the behaviour of 
Italian national delegations in the sample. Subsuming again appears as a prominent strategy among far 
Right parties, who instead of blindly arguing for decentralisation of the policy try to bring this in line with 
more broadly accepted values and causal narratives. Fifth, the comparison of the PFA results shows in 
how far voting records are shaped by negotiation dynamics rather than a reflection of the underlying 
conflict, which in turn underlines Bailer et al.’s (2015) critique of aggregating voting records within or even 
across policy areas. 
With regard to the societal rationale behind the present study, namely the question, in how far 
the EP is ‘immune’ to national interests so that strengthening it can address the EU’s dual crisis of 
legitimacy, the glass is both half empty and half full. It is half empty because the EP is not entirely 
immune to national interests. In fact, even national traditions that are not based on similarly rational 
considerations as net payments to the CAP budget, might induce MEPs to leave their transnational 
ideologies behind temporarily. It is half full also, however, because as soon as there are intra-national 
distributional effects, these are likely to find their expression as well. With politicisation and the 
involvement of the EP in the policy area, however, it thus also does not appear any longer that the CAP is 
shaped by farmers’ special interests alone. 
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6. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
This chapter presents the third and final case study on conflict in the Post-Crisis European Parliament intended for 
evaluating the theory of territorialisation (ToT) presented earlier and is meant in particular to contrast the impact of 
presumably ‘national’ interests with that of the factual presence of intra-national distribution. First, some background 
information on the content and conduct of EU trade policy in general, the so-called Common Commercial Policy 
(CCP), and then more specifically on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is provided, 
focusing on the most controversial elements of the latter. Thereby, it will be possible to understand its features as a 
case and corroborate its earlier classification as part of the case selection in Chapter 3. Most importantly, it is shown 
that this issue is characterised mainly by intra-national distributional effects, while cross-national distribution is 
deemed absent, albeit trade policy has traditionally been thought of as a policy area where ‘national interests’ are 
crucial. Before precise observational implications derived from extant theories and the ToT can be contrasted, the 
policy frames that might be used by the various national party delegations are identified (Section 2). Three such 
frames – a neoliberal, a protectionist, and an anti-globalisation frame – are identified by drawing on extant discourse 
analyses on globalisation and EU trade policy. The third section then first specifies the impact of TTIP for the 
sample of parties at the country level, before then spelling out the observable implications derived from extant 
theories and the ToT. Thereafter, Section 4 discusses the results of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) conducted on 
the basis of the pre-identified frames in terms of the emerging structure of conflict and individual parties framing 
strategies (defection, blurring, subsuming). As it is found, the structure of conflict is first and foremost ideological, 
just as it would be expected based on the ToT. In fact, the ToT also seems to provide the most consistent approach 
for explaining individual parties’ behaviour in terms of defection, not to mention other framing strategies concerning 
which extant theories would remain silent. Empirically, this means that producer-friendly parties on the Right will 
defect from their neoliberal ideologies in case the gains expected at country-level are comparatively low. Their 
defection appears to take the direction of the respective national tradition, which seems to be of even greater 
importance for understanding the behaviour of Right-wing populists. By contrast, parties of the Left as well as of the 
extreme Right tend to stick to their ideologies, since the predominance of intra-national distribution in this policy 
area spares them any major goal conflict between policy and votes. While the results of the PFA at this point are 
largely in line with the roll-call votes so far, only the vote on the eventually negotiated outcome will show whether 
the rhetorical defection by Austrian and French centre Right parties was merely cheap talk. As is concluded in 
Section 5, the case of TTIP shows, that even policy issues classically associated with national interests are not 
territorialised in the EP; provided that intra-national distributional effects resulting from them are mainly intra-
national and barely cross-national. On top of this, national traditions, while explicitly part of the theory of 
territorialisation, once more seem to be quite significant, albeit not dominant, even after decades of European 
integration and decades of a Common Commercial Policy. Amongst others, this has also led to the fact that classic 
protectionist ideas are still firmly rooted in the minds of some countries’ populations and their representatives. In 
this sense, then, TTIP might not have changed trade policy forever, as some commentators claim, while their 
argument that trade policy has become much more politicised would seem to be supported. In fact, the involvement 
of the EP in this policy area certainly reinforces this trend, as it allows for more differentiated representation that 
also depicts disagreement within countries. 
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6.1 The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and TTIP 
In this section, background information on the EU’s trade policy is provided, covering the development of trade 
policy towards the inclusion of so-called non-tariff barriers to trade and investment related aspects in terms of 
content, as well as the new role for the EP under the Lisbon Treaty, demonstrated by the experience with ACTA in 
terms of conduct. Next, the key elements of TTIP are briefly summarised, focusing on the most controversial points 
in terms of remaining agricultural tariffs, convergence of regulatory standards, public procurement and investor 
protection. Thereafter, the earlier classification of TTIP is reconfirmed, namely as a case characterised by high 
politicisation, pre-election timing, rather high – albeit partly ‘created’ – certainty of distributional effects, which are 
essentially intra-national rather than cross-national. Finally, I shortly review the issue-specific literature on conflict 
over trade policy, which traditionally has considered it as a non-politicised conflict between liberals and 
protectionists, while newer research has often observed a turn towards more ideological, consumer-vs.-producer 
kinds of conflict followed closely by civil society. 
Content and conduct of the CCP in general 
While put into practice only by the late 1960s, the trade policy of the EU – referred to as the Common 
Commercial Policy – was established already with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. It can be seen as a 
consequence of the customs union, which itself relates to the removal of intra-European tariffs. Smith 
(2007) distinguishes two aspects of the CCP, namely trade promotion and trade defence. The former 
includes the numerous trade agreements the EU has concluded, which can be bilateral (e.g. with Russia), 
interregional (e.g. with ASEAN) or multilateral in the context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
The latter, trade defence, enables the EU to address whatever it perceives as ‘unfair’ trade practices such 
as dumping or barriers to EU exports. To address such issues, the EU frequently works through the 
dispute settlement of WTO. However, as Smith notes: “Trade and partnership agreements also include 
procedures for dealing with trade disputes, as a matter of routine, and sometimes linkages are made with 
other areas of external policy such as those on human rights and development policy” (ibid., 2007, 228). 
While so-called Investor-State-Dispute-Settlements (ISDS) as a feature of trade policy might thus be less 
of a novelty than it might appear to some in the debate on TTIP, there are two more general kinds of 
trends in EU trade policy, one in terms of content and the other in terms of conduct, that must be briefly 
discussed here in order to prepare the ground for understanding TTIP. 
Before doing so, however, it might be worth noting that yet another trend, expected and 
frequently feared by observers, has not been realized after all: the development of a so-called ‘Fortress 
Europe’ (Hanson 1998). This concept captures the concept of a number of commentators in the early 
1990s that the completion of the European Single Market within the EU would lead to less openness 
towards the rest of the world (ibid. rn1998, 56). As Hanson notes, however, “fortress Europe has not 
been built” (ibid.). Instead, he argues, further integration has rather achieved the opposite because of an 
institutional bias towards liberalisation (ibid.). Similar fears of a protectionist backlash were voiced again in 
the context of the global financial crisis (Siles-Brügge 2013), yet once more the actual development rather 
went into the opposite direction, as the new wave of trade agreement initiatives triggered by the 
Commission’s 2006 Global Europe communication has by no means been stopped by the crisis (Siles-
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Brügge 2013; Ville and Orbie 2014). Instead, the number of free trade agreements concluded by the EU 
continuously expanded. 
In fact, alongside their number, it was also the scope of free trade agreements that was 
expanded, making external trade arrangements more similar to what the Single Market was internally: Just 
like the Single Market is more than a classic Free Trade Area (FTA) that simply abolishes tariffs on goods, 
international trade agreements as concluded by the EU increasingly also tend to include not just trade in 
goods but also in services, just as they increasingly address so-called non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) 
resulting also from differences in regulatory standards, e.g. environmental legislation or from failure to 
protect intellectual property rights (Husted and Melvin 2007, 181-196, 224-230; Smith 2007, 228–29). It is 
this change in scope which can have important consequences for the structure of conflict, which is 
exemplified by the case of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). 
ACTA was meant to address infringements of intellectual property rights (IPR) in terms of 
counterfeit goods and online piracy more effectively, which had not been achieved within the WTO 
framework (Dür and Mateo 2014; Matthews 2012). Yet, ACTA eventually failed as it was rejected by a 
large majority of the EP (ibid.). This appears astonishing to academic observers, as business groups had 
had signalled outright support for the agreement from the very beginning. However, a strong anti-ACTA 
campaign was organized by a number of social movements, claiming that ACTA favoured copyright 
holders – producers – massively over citizens, or consumers (Dür and Mateo 2014, 1202). Apparently, 
MEPs were influenced by this public campaign. Chen (2015) finds that, in accordance with the producer-
versus-consumers character of the conflict, ideological orientations became the most important 
determinant of MEP voting behaviour on the issue, rather than national economic interests. ACTA thus is 
a case in point against the long-standing picture of trade policy as being dominated by national economic 
interests of no importance to the wider society, as traditional accounts of trade policy would have assumed 
(cf. Moravcsik 1993, 488–91; Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 12, 133), and likewise against the accordingly 
predicted outcome of a territorially structure conflict over trade policy issues. 
Noteworthy, this is not to say that territorial interests would not influence MEPs on trade policy 
issues at all. Kleinmann, for instance, finds them to be a crucial determinant of MEP positions on the 
2011 trade agreement with Korea (ibid. 2011, 21–24). Indeed, it would run counter to the theoretical 
framework presented here, if the conflict regarding a particular trade agreement were ideologically 
structured in the face of definite and obvious cross-national distribution. Yet, in order to predict the 
structure of conflict regarding a particular trade agreement such as TTIP, it needs to be considered, in 
how far cross-national distribution among Member States and/or intra-national distribution e.g. between 
consumers and producers will result from the implementation of this particular agreement. 
Before taking a closer look at TTIP, however, ACTA should be considered here again as an 
example of recent developments in EU trade policy, this time not regarding the changing content of trade 
policy, but regarding its conduct. For in fact, the failure of ACTA was not only about the controversy over 
the content of the agreement, successfully shaped by citizen groups (cf. Dür and Mateo 2014). First, 
obviously, the fact that the EP struck down ACTA was preconditioned by the fact that it had the power 
6. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
223 
to do so. This, in turn, was due to the legal changes on trade policy-making brought about by the Treaty 
of Lisbon (Articles 207 and 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in particular). 
These provisions still make trade policy an exclusive competence of the EU and attribute a 
strong role to the Commission, namely that of negotiating on behalf of all Member States. It is thus up to 
the Council to provide the Commission with an official mandate for the negotiations. What has changed, 
however, is that the EU can now also adopt autonomous acts on trade in services, commercial aspects of 
intellectual property, and foreign direct investment, as well as that trade in cultural/audiovisual, 
educational and social/health services can now be part of EU trade agreements. The latter services are 
subject to unanimity voting in the Council, and thus have only partly been removed from Member State 
control. More important from the perspective of this paper, however, is that all trade agreements now 
need to be ratified by the European Parliament, and the Commission is obliged to keep the EP informed 
by reporting to it and by transferring documents (for a step-by-step overview of the procedure as well as 
of the Treaty changes, see European Commission DG Trade 2011 and European Commission DG Trade 
2013, respectively). What the failure of ACTA shows, then, is not only that the EP is aware of its powers 
and willing to use them. It further becomes clear that it is ready to use these formal powers to extend its de 
facto influence: the EP complained about not being properly informed in the course of the ACTA 
negotiations and demanded a stronger role for MEPs in the process, or otherwise it would not give its 
consent (cf. Matthews 2012). In other words, it used its new formal role as a veto-player in order to 
informally and indirectly obtain a seat at the negotiation table. 
In sum, there seem to be two main lessons to be learned from recent developments in EU trade 
policy which might be meaningful with regard to TTIP. First, of course, as for the CAP, inter-institutional 
power games might at times be involved. Yet, on the one hand, ACTA already served the EP for flexing 
its muscles, so that this might play less of a role for TTIP. On the other hand, by focussing explicitly on 
policy-related statements via the coding scheme to be developed, it should be possible to distinguish inter-
institutional from intra-institutional contestation. Second, there were indeed instances of politicisation in 
trade policy that would seem to contradict classic assumptions on societal mobilisation in this policy area. 
This seems to apply more to a case like ACTA, where fundamental rights of citizens were pitched against 
economic interests leading to a largely ideologically structured conflict, and less to a case like the EU-
Korea FTA, where some classically some industries won at the expense of others involving ‘national 
interests’. In order to gradually explain what the intra-institutional conflict over TTIP is like, then, the next 
subsection discusses, what is at stake in TTIP. 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership... 
In the preceding subsection, it was already pointed out that the concept of ‘trade policy’ nowadays goes 
way beyond the question of raising or removing tariffs by increasingly including so-called NTBs (see also: 
Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 3–5). Already the titling of TTIP seems to suggest that this is yet another 
step, albeit in the same direction, as the terms of ‘investment’ and ‘partnership’, seem to carry much more 
far-reaching implications than the once discussed Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA). Indeed, 
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DeVille and Siles-Brügge argue: “What is novel about TTIP is the degree of ‘deep liberalisation’ being 
sought. Negotiators are explicitly seeking to align EU and US regulatory policies as much as possible” (Ville 
and Siles-Brügge 2015, 5 my emphases). Similarly, the Congressional Research Service points out that the 
negotiators “seek new or expanded commitments in areas such as regulatory coherence and ‘21st century 
issues’, including state-owned enterprises – issues either not discussed or only modestly discussed in prior 
FTAs” (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 3). In this subsection, it is discussed what is on the TTIP agenda, focusing 
on those points that are most controversial and/or relevant. 
While there is some variation when it comes to attributing more concrete elements to each of 
them, three broad areas or ‘pillars’ of TTIP are commonly listed, namely ‘market access’, ‘regulatory issues’ 
and ‘trade-related rules’ (cf. Akhtar and Jones; Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 7–8). Next to tariffs, the area 
of ‘market access’ includes the further opening of government procurement markets, which indirectly also 
limit market access, as well as issues of data privacy and cross-border data flows (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 
6). ‘Regulatory issues’ concern the removal of NTBs arising from differences in regulatory standards (ibid. 
2014, 7). The third area, trade-related rules, most notably covers the aspects of entry conditions for 
investors, the protection of their investment, and the settlement of potential investor-state disputes 
(Investor-State Dispute Settlement, ISDS) as well as Intellectual Property Rights (ibid. 2014, 8–10). 
Whereas the TTIP agenda might be summarised as briefly as this, in practice there is, of course, an 
immense amount of detail behind this, so in the following I focus on what is generally considered 
controversial. 
On average, tariffs between the EU and the US are negligible, with a few but not unimportant 
‘peaks’ in the domain of agriculture. They are thus frequently considered a ‘low-hanging fruit’ in these 
negotiations (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 6). This does not mean, however, that market access is generally an 
easy matter for the negotiators, as government procurement for instance in the area of audiovisual 
industries – the famous ‘cultural exception’ – is quite sensitive (ibid.). Indeed, this is arguably the reason 
why this particular sector has been outside the EU’s competence in trade policy prior to the Lisbon Treaty 
and even now remains subject to unanimity voting in the Council, as was pointed out above.  
In the area of regulatory cooperation, one finds the much repeated examples on car safety 
regulations, which by and large lead to similarly high standards but do so by different means and thus 
imply ‘unnecessary costs’ for producers (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 8). Yet, there frequently are diverging 
public preferences when it comes to regulatory standards on both sides of the Atlantic, embodied in the 
EU’s precautionary principle that contrast with a science-based, cost-benefit approach to risk management 
on the US side (ibid. 2014, 7).47 Prominent examples such as the regulation of Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs) – largely banned within the EU, or hormone-treated beef, are again to be found in 
the domain of agriculture but are not limited to it, as the case of ‘fracking’ shows (ibid.). In fact, some 
have argued that even the variation in car safety standards actually reflects deeper divergence in public 
                                                     
47  The precautionary principle holds that regulators must protect citizens from potentially adverse effects of a 
product, even if these effects have not yet been scientifically proven Ville and Siles-Brügge (2015, 44–45). 
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preferences (Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 79–80). While on a global scale, standards in the EU and the US 
might be generally – albeit not equally – high (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 7), the devil is obviously in the 
detail. 
The same holds for trade-related rules. For while both the EU and the US have rather open 
investment regimes, there is disagreement regarding the shape of a ‘neutral’ forum for Investor State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS). The controversy culminated in the ‘pause’ announced by the European 
Commission with regard to this aspect of the negotiations, with a view to holding a public consultation 
first (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 9). Similarly, both parties to the agreement insist on the protection of 
intellectual property rights, but for the EU this includes so-called geographical indications (GIs) (e.g. only 
Parmesan cheese from the Italian region of Parma may receive this label), protected ‘only’ under 
trademark law in the US. Otherwise, the US argue, GIs lead to “national treatment issues and adversely 
affects trademarks and widely accepted generic products” (ibid. 2014, 9–10). None of the three areas, 
therefore, is free from controversy. 
On top of this, there is the issue of data privacy, which arguably cuts across the three pillars just 
discussed. This issue became more prominent even than it had been at the time of ACTA, ever since the 
event referred to by the Congressional Research Service as “the unauthorized disclosure of classified 
information related to National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance activity since June 2013” (Akhtar and 
Jones 2014, 6), better known in Europe as the ‘Snowden Affair’ or ‘NSA Affair’. The latter may have 
strengthened the tendency of national governments towards requirements for on-shore data-processing or 
locating the respective physical infrastructure on national territory, thereby impinging on market access 
(ibid.); but it might further weaken all arguments build on the ‘sameness’ of EU and US values (Ville and 
Siles-Brügge 2015, 44–51). Given that apparently there is sufficient potential for conflict in TTIP, it is 
considered next, in how far this potential can be thought of in terms of the conditions based on which 
this case was selected. 
... and its characteristics as a case 
One of these conditions for case selection at the macro-level of policy issues was that the issues selected 
all are of interest not just for political elites, but also for the broader masses of citizens (i.e. politicisation), 
for only then would the vote-seeking assumption made with regard to a post-Crisis EP apply. TTIP, 
clearly, is politicised in this sense, which is why it was selected by Hix (2013) and Nissen (2014), 
respectively, as one of the ‘key votes’ of the legislative period. Indeed, the “strong public interest” in the 
issue was one of the reasons for the European Commission to launch a public consultation on TTIP with 
a special focus on ISDS as early as March 2014, in which close to 150,000 people took part (DG Trade 
2014). Meanwhile, the ‘Stop TTIP’-Initiative claims to have gathered no less than 3,284,289 signatures, 
originally intended for a European Citizens’ Initiative, against TTIP (Stop TTIP). In sum, there can hardly 
be any doubt that TTIP is one of the most politicised policy issues in the history of the EU. 
TTIP also fits the other two conditions to be held constant for the purposes of the present 
study. First, in terms of timing, the debate on TTIP started in the run-up to the 2014 European elections: 
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In February 2013, EU and US presidents announced the launch of negotiations in a joint announcement, 
with EU Member States agreeing to their start in June 2013, and the first five negotiation rounds (out of 
thirteen so far) took place before the election (DG Trade 2016). For its part, the EP adopted a resolution 
supporting the opening of the negotiations in May 2013 (Nissen 2014, 36), showing thereby that it would 
take its new role under the new Lisbon Treaty rules seriously again, as it already did in the case of ACTA 
(see above). Thereby, then, also the condition of EP competence is fulfilled. 
TTIP was selected as a case, because next to these constant criteria, it was said to be 
characterised by high intra-national and low cross-national distributional effects of rather high certainty, 
thereby meaningfully completing the selection of policy issues. Obviously, TTIP is not a scheme for direct 
redistribution among Member States or nationals of Member States such as the preceding cases of 
Europeanised welfare and the Common Agricultural Policy. There is no immediate budgetary implication. 
Nevertheless, theoretically, it is of course possible that only some Member States benefit from a trade 
agreement, while others would incur losses. This is not true, however, for TTIP, at least not according to 
the economic studies trying to predict its impact. According to Felbermayr, Heid et al., for instance, all 
countries would benefit in terms of increases in real GDP per capita, independent of the exact shape of 
the eventual agreement (tariff abolition only or ‘deep’ liberalisation) (ibid. 2013, 21–26). This finding is 
confirmed also by country-level studies (for the present sample of countries; see Centre for Economic 
Policy Research 2013 for the UK; Felbermayr et al. 2013b for Germany; Fontagné, Gourdon, and Jean 
2013 for France; Thelle et al. 2015 for Ireland; Della Rocca et al. 2013 for Italy; Francois and Pindyuk 
2013 for Austria). Moreover, Felbermayr, Heid et al. conclude that TTIP would not foster divergence in 
terms of real income among the Member States. In other words, no country would lose at the aggregate 
level. 
These findings notwithstanding, it seems worth noting that some countries gain more than 
others. Using the Felbermayr, Heid et al. data again, the following picture emerges: At the upper end of 
the scale, there are countries such as the Ireland or the UK, with predicted per capita increases in real 
income of 6.93 and 9.70 per cent, respectively, with the UK being second only to Luxemburg. At the 
lower end of the scale, there are France and Austria, with predicted per capita increase in real income of 
merely 2.64 and 2.71 per cent, respectively, with only the Czech Republic gaining even less out of TTIP. 
Germany and Italy can each expect gains of 4.68 and 4.92 per cent, in this order (ibid. 2013, 24). 
Felbermayr , Heid et al. literally draw a line between the countries gaining disproportionately from TTIP 
in terms of status quo income per capita in relation to increases in trade. They conclude that, since rich 
countries (high income per capita) gain relatively little compared to poorer countries, TTIP leads to 
convergence within the EU. Thus, what might be good news for the cohesion of the EU as a whole can 
be considered as a moderate kind of cross-country redistribution. Within the present sample of countries 
France and Austria fall below this line, the others remain above it (ibid. 2013, 23). They note, however, 
that even in the case of France, gains should be “clearly notable” (ibid. 2013, 25). Thus, all countries in the 
EU as well as in the present sample will be TTIP-winners, and so cross-national distribution resulting 
from TTIP in this sense should not be as decisive as in the case of CAP. 
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From this purely economic perspective, then, there should be no aggregate and literally national 
interest against TTIP anywhere in the EU. This does not exclude, of course, the possibility of creating 
winners and losers within the countries. Classically, one would think here of various sectors of the 
economy. In the case of TTIP, there indeed seems to be variation in the evaluation of TTIP across sectors 
(e.g. European Commission 2013b, 37–39). First, one might try to figure out in how far the broader 
sectors – agriculture, industry, and services – are affected. Here, a study by Fontagné et al. predicts gains 
for the latter two, whereas agriculture will be negatively affected (Fontagné, Gourdon, and Jean 2013, 11). 
This holds both for the EU as a whole as well as for the ‘big three’, i.e. France, Germany and the UK. In 
fact, France, traditionally considered a protectionist player especially because of its agricultural sector, 
would lose much less than the other two, while at the same time, the French industry stands to gain more 
(ibid. 2013, 10–11). Even within one of these overarching sectors, some particular industries might gain 
while others lose: In Ireland, for instance, the dairy sector is considered as a winner from TTIP, while the 
beef sector will lose out, resulting in a very slim loss for Irish agriculture overall (Thelle et al. 2015). At the 
EU level, a similar picture emerges for the industrial sector, where motor vehicles stand to gain at the 
expense of electrical machinery (European Commission 2013b, 40–41). The numbers concerning the 
expected growth due to TTIP within each country may, therefore, be considered as a rough indication 
regarding the ratio (in terms of economic weight) between economic winners and losers from TTIP. 
While distributional effects between economic sectors might be of particular relevance with 
regard to trade policy, usually one would think here of conflicts between classes in terms of capital versus 
labour, or, along the lines of ‘new politics’, consumer versus producers (cf. Marks 2004). With regard to 
the former, it is worth noting that the EU and the US are comparatively similarly in terms of labour costs 
and productivity, as Felbermayr, Larch et al. point out, so that they do not expect strong effects in terms 
of wage competition (ibid., 2013a, 10). This arguably reduces part of the potential for conflict between 
capital and labour when it comes to TTIP. Moreover, TTIP is predicted to lead to an increase in 
employment also, which largely parallels the increases in GDP, and these jobs shall be better paid 
(Felbermayr et al. 2013a, 17; Felbermayr, Heid, and Lehwald 2013, 34–41). These arguments 
notwithstanding, labour standards and labour rights might indirectly come under pressure as a result of 
TTIP, for instance as the US have not signed a number of conventions in the International Labour 
Organisation framework (Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 144–45). At this point, an overlap exists between 
the dimensions of capital versus labour and consumers versus producers, to which I now turn. 
It was already mentioned that the area of ‘regulatory cooperation’ is a highly controversial field. 
What is more, however, is that this is considered by practically all studies providing an outlook on the 
potential costs and benefits as the key element of TTIP (Centre for Economic Policy Research 2013; Della 
Rocca et al. 2013, 5; Felbermayr, Heid, and Lehwald 2013, 42; Fontagné, Gourdon, and Jean 2013, 1; 
Kinnmann and Hagberg 2012, 1–2). Hence, Akhtar and Jones report: “Regulatory issues are widely 
regarded by many stakeholders as the core of the T-TIP negotiations, potentially ‘making or breaking’ the 
agreement” (ibid. 2014, 7). While the question of regulatory issues thus seems to be the central aspect for 
shaping the structure of conflict on TTIP, the question is how exactly it will do so. 
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A Swedish study points out what exactly the dilemma is here: “Although these rules are in place 
for good reasons, such as protecting consumers’ health, the environment, or national security, they can 
create unnecessary barriers to trade” (Kinnmann and Hagberg 2012, 2). Whereas the authors of the study 
are optimistic that these barriers can be reduced so as to reap the benefits of more trade without giving up 
their original purpose (ibid.), it becomes clear from this statement that those who would benefit 
economically from the reduction in NTBs stand opposed to those who so far were either directly 
protected by the particular standard in question or at the very least have been part of a collective decision 
to set up these standards in accordance with a very particular public preference or commonly held value 
(cf. also Akhtar and Jones 2014, 7). These standards, as was already mentioned, differ on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Yet of course also within each of the trading blocks, those parties representing producer groups 
will have a positive opinion on reducing NTBs and will thus face opposition from those who represent 
consumers, environmental interests etc.  Indeed, this is precisely what is found by De Ville and Siles-
Brügge (2015), and it is a pattern that extends to most of the other contentious areas such as regulation in 
services, public procurement and investment/investor protection. The links between those aspects of the 
producer versus consumer conflict will be pointed out in more detail when discussing the policy frames 
on TTIP, but it already becomes clear here that the side one takes with regard to this cleavage will shape 
the structure of conflict in decisive ways. 
Before this background, DeVille and Siles-Brügge argue that the conflict on TTIP, in contrast to 
earlier conflicts over trade policy, is not a distributive conflict, but a normative one (ibid., 2015, 132–36). 
It might appear, then, that such a normative conflict is outside the theoretical framework provided in the 
present study, as this is built largely on the concept of distributional effects. There is, however, a twofold 
answer to this concern. On a conceptual level, it must be noted that the definition of what constitutes a 
distributional conflict used by Gary Marks, on whose work much of the present study is built, is wide 
enough to consider the conflict on regulatory cooperation in TTIP as a distributive one. As Marks points 
out: “Distribution (or allocation) of values involves who is allowed to do what as well as who gets what” 
(ibid., 2004, 248). Regulatory standards obviously are about who is allowed to do what. 
Moreover, on a substantive level, it also becomes clear that regulatory standards are about costs 
and benefits and thus also involve the question of who gets what. If, for instance, producers of food 
products containing Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) indeed were granted market access in the 
EU, consumers preferring GMO-free food products would have information costs when trying to avoid 
GMOs. Similarly, the debate on ISDS is not just about who is allowed to do what (Is the investor no 
longer allowed to carry out a certain way of production because of a new regulation or is the state in 
question violating the rights of this investor?) but eventually also about who gets what (Does the investor 
have to bear the cost resulting from the new regulation or does the state have to compensate the losses 
incurred by the investor?). As a result, the fact that the conflict over TTIP is centred on the question of 
regulatory standards does not mean that the present theoretical framework does not capture this, as in 
terms of its effects, this conflict is still about distribution. 
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At the same time, the following section identifying the policy frames on TTIP demonstrates 
exactly what DeVille and Siles-Brügge mean here: for whereas the main difference between what I refer to 
as the ‘neoliberal’ frame and the ‘protectionist’ frame lies in the causal narratives they include regarding the 
consequences of free trade for the national economy (which for both is normatively what trade policy 
should be about), the main difference between the neoliberal frame and the ‘anti-globalisation’ frame is 
found on the normative dimension: while anti-globalists may not necessarily deny the growth potential on 
TTIP, they disagree that this is what trade policy should be all about in the first place. 
Based on the above considerations, then, it would seem that it was appropriate to attribute low 
cross-national but high cross-national distributional effects to this case. Yet, as has been shown in the 
chapter on ‘welfare tourism’, the mere potential of distributional effects may not have the same effect as 
these distributional effects can have if they are certain. As the certainty of distributional effects resulting 
from TTIP was considered to be ‘high’ in the discussion of case selection at the macro level (see Chapter 
3), this should be reviewed here in some more detail as well. 
After all, TTIP is not in place yet. Hence, firstly, one might question of course whether the 
pessimistic visions of, amongst others, pro-consumer NGOs will actually come true. This will depend on 
the outcome of the political process and that indeed can hardly be foreseen at this point. This ‘political’ 
uncertainty, however, would be part of every political debate to some extent, as the whole point of arguing 
in favour or against a certain policy is that it changes this outcome. Importantly, this is different from the 
debate on Europeanised welfare, because in this case, there was legal (what are the rights of migrants and 
which kinds of national-level restrictions are allowed?) and economic (in how far does welfare act as an 
incentive for intra-EU migrations?) uncertainty in addition. 
Legal uncertainty is less of a concern for TTIP arguably, since the framework of the CCP is not 
new and the competences of the EU and the Member States in this field are rather clear, which since 
ACTA would also seem to apply to the role of the EP. It must be noted here, however, that the certainty 
of distributional effects resulting from TTIP in economic terms has been called into question: In fact, 
predicting the benefits of TTIP has been referred to as an exercise in “managing fictional expectations” by 
DeVille and Siles Brügge (2015, 17–37). They heavily criticise the way that so-called computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models, used in almost all of the predictive studies cited above, reduce the actual 
complexity concerning the impact of trade agreements and point to one alternative study that comes to 
very different results, while acknowledging that this one might be exaggerating in its own turn. Clearly, 
inasmuch as these predictions should be considered as uncertain, so should be the distributional effects in 
terms of varying amount of gains from TTIP within and across countries. 
Before this background, four points concerning the studies predicting TTIP impacts deserve 
notice. First, economists have become increasingly aware of the critique of CGE modelling and have 
reacted to the critique, for instance in the studies by the ifo institute and the one by the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung already cited (Felbermayr et al. 2013a and Felbermayr, Heid, and Lehwald 2013, respectively). 
Their results might thus be somewhat more trustworthy, which is another reason for using the 
Bertelsmann study for drawing a line between winners and ‘losers’ (i.e. those who do not gain as much) 
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from TTIP. Second, an Italian study that explicitly does not use CGE modelling comes arrives at results 
that do not differ decisively from those studies that do (Della Rocca et al. 2013). Third, there arguably is a 
mainstream consensus here that TTIP will benefit all parties involved and that CGE modelling adequately 
demonstrates this. The Commission thus is arguably right when they argue that CGE modelling as used 
for the impact assessment it has conducted is “state of the art” (quoted in Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 34). 
This differs from the debate on welfare tourism, where it was neither clear, in how far welfare payments 
actually act as a pull factor for migrants, nor what the overall effect of migration on national welfare 
systems is or could be. Fourth and related, the studies cited almost all are commissioned by national 
governments, as apparently it is the best guess available in order to create some degree of certainty. As a 
result, anyone who at least puts some faith in mainstream – albeit neoliberal – economics and its 
established ways of creating certainty would have to take the predictions they make as a basis for framing 
policy preferences on TTIP. In sum, not only does it still seem appropriate to consider the distributional 
effects of TTIP as mainly intra-rather cross-national, but also as rather certain. 
Extant research on CCP and TTIP 
The aforementioned characteristics make TTIP valuable as a case within the overall study on conflict in a 
post-Crisis European Parliament. In addition, however, TTIP is quite clearly also an interesting case for its 
own sake within the literature on EU trade policy, which I shall briefly review here without claiming 
completeness. Classic trade theories are usually summarised as expecting a conflict between protectionist 
(those who expect to lose from trade) and liberal (those who expect to win) forces, with protectionist 
forces always having the stronger motive to mobilise and hence more impact (cf. Moravcsik 1993, 488–91 
Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 12, 133). Yet, as was already mentioned, Hanson (1998) generally finds 
protectionist forces much weaker in their policy impact than classic theories would expect them to be, 
which he attributes to an EU institutional contexts creating a pro-liberalisation bias. While Moravcsik 
(1993; 1998) would not necessarily expect the same policy outcome as these classic theories, he would 
expect a similar line of conflict, the exact shape of which would be determined by domestic producers 
directing their national governments. Kleinmann (2011) indeed points to the relevance of such producer 
interests becoming national interests and thereby changing the outcome in the EU-Korea trade agreement, 
towards a less radically liberal one. By contrast, Siles-Brügge suggest a constructivist explanation for what 
he considers a very neoliberal EU-Korea trade agreement, in that neoliberal ideas prevailing in the EU are 
said to have overruled the very same (automobile) producer interests that Kleinmann finds to shape the 
agreement. 
Interestingly, while all of these studies still mainly suggest a conflict between protectionists and 
liberals, conflict on the new generation of trade agreements is often found to be less territorial – given, 
arguably, the intra-national distributional effects – and along a different line, namely between pro-industry 
and pro-consumer/citizen parties. This was observed for the case of ACTA, as was already noted above 
(Chen 2015; Dür and Mateo 2014). A recent publication by deVille and Siles-Brügge (2015) on TTIP itself 
comes to a similar conclusion, arguing even that the face of trade policy and, with it, conflicts over trade 
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policy have generally changed. The present study may thus either corroborate these findings or serve to 
call them into question, and thereby speaks to the wider literature on EU trade policy. In fact, its main 
asset for doing so could consist in a much more explicit methodological approach than it was used by 
deVille and Siles-Brügge. Amongst others, this approach might help to uncover what could be called 
protectionism in disguise, which uses pro-consumer arguments to hide protectionist motivations: As 
Kleinmann notes, opposition to Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), for instance, could potentially 
constitute such a case and be driven either by genuine concern for consumer interests or agricultural 
protectionism (ibid. 2011, 26). The difference between the two will become clear the next subsection, 
when the first step in analysing the policy frames used in the TTIP debate is made by identifying the 
policy frames available. 
6.2 Identification of possible policy frames on TTIP 
In this section, the possible policy frames to be used by the MEPs on TTIP are identified, so that they can serve as 
the basis for the coding step of the Policy Frame Analysis. This identification of frames could, at the time, not be 
based on already existing discourse analyses on TTIP, but rather had to be built on discourse analysis of globalisation 
supporters and opponents in general, as well as specifically for EU trade policy. These were then thought further 
with regard to the controversial items of TTIP presented earlier. Three possible frames were identified in this 
manner. The first one would generally be considered as ‘neoliberal’, stressing the need – and TTIP’s potential – for 
economic growth, hampered so far by barriers of trade of all kinds, and calling for quick and deep liberalisation. The 
second policy frame consists of classic protectionist arguments, with a normative focus on the national, viewing trade 
as a zero-sum game and hence doubting the causal narratives of classic economics, and hence suggests exemptions 
from liberalisation for strategically selected sectors. The third frame would usually be referred to as ‘anti-
globalisation’, while more positively it might also be called ‘consumerist’, in that it values consumer protection and 
other regulatory standards above economic growth, and perceives of the regulatory convergence intended by modern 
trade agreements as a threat. In its moderate version, it hence calls for democratic safeguards ion trade negotiations, 
and only conditionally approves of TTIP, whereas the radical version calls for a total abandonment of the whole 
project. 
How the policy frames were identified 
The preceding section has shown that a “Fortress Europe”, i.e. an internally liberal but externally 
protectionist EU, has never been created (Hanson 1998, 56). Instead, the EU has concluded a number of 
bilateral trade agreements since the 1990s. In fact, even in times of the economic crisis that struck Europe 
around the turn of the last decade, the EU has rather opened its markets and engaged in ever more free 
trade agreements. However, this does of course not mean that FTAs have gone uncontested. In order to 
prepare the analysis of the structure of conflict over TTIP, this section will thus contrast the various 
policy suggestions and their respective justifications – i.e. the policy frames – that are usually provided 
with regard to EU FTAs and hence are likely to be made with regard to TTIP as well. 
In order to identify possible frames used on TTIP a priori, I proceed as follows. First, as for the 
other cases, it is helpful to draw on existing literature from the domain of discourse analysis. Free trade is 
a key feature of what is usually referred to as ‘globalisation’, a domain in which numerous discourse 
analyses have been undertaken. What is of interest here is not so much the question, what the concept of 
globalisation means to various actors, but rather what various actors think of it in terms of support or 
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resistance. In this sense, the works of Hay and Rosamond (2002) as well as Hay and Smith (2010; 2005) 
provide some first insights. 
When it comes to moving closer to the more specific issue of free trade in order to eventually 
arrive at more concrete policy frames used regarding TTIP, more targeted discourse analyses are 
considered. Unfortunately but unsurprisingly, it turns out that the dominant, pro-free trade discourse has 
been studied and deconstructed in much more detail than its counterparts. The works of scholars such as 
Siles-Brügge (2013) or De Ville and Orbie (2014) are thus interesting here with regard to what is 
commonly referred as ‘neoliberalism’, but do not devote a similar degree of attention to its discursive 
opponents.48 Together with textbooks on basic international economics they can thus provide a good idea 
of the dominant free trade frame but not more. 
The ideational archenemy of neoliberalism, namely protectionism, may nowadays not be part of 
the political mainstream in many countries any longer, but this does not meant that this is equally the case 
everywhere and for everyone (cf. Hanson 1998, 66). Given its age, the school of thought behind 
protectionism has been the subject of works on the history of economic thought (e.g. Brue and Grant 
2007), which can thus be used as a starting point. Husted and Melvin (2007, 196–212) provide a rather up-
to-date overview of protectionist arguments, while distinguishing between “valid” and “invalid” ones. 
While their representation of modern protectionist thought must be taken with a pinch of salt, their work 
forms the basis of what I refer to as the ‘protectionist’ frame. 
Actual, openly advocated protectionism may appear anachronistic or naïve to many, given the 
seemingly irreversible nature of economic globalisation. In addition, an important portion of potential 
free-trade opponents are unlikely to sign up to its nationalist underpinnings. The new opponents of what 
they refer to as ‘neoliberalism’ often choose not to follow the classic paths of representative democracy 
and instead formed the so-called anti-globalisation movement. Their arguments can be found mostly in 
the part of the social movement literature devoted to this particular movement. This does not mean, 
however, that their arguments would not be known and hence available for adoption and adaptation by 
classic political parties. In order to reflect the heterogeneity of the movement and its arguments, I 
distinguish between a moderate and a radical version of what I call the anti-globalisation frame(s). This 
line is drawn based on the degree of belief in representative democracy (cf. Sporer 2009), be it national or 
supranational and on the partly related degree of optimism concerning the contingency of globalisation 
(Hay and Rosamond 2002). While the literature on the social movement usually finds a resounding silence 
on the part of the movement of concrete policies, this will be different once the focus is on a particular 
policy such as TTIP. 
Of course it also needs to be discussed here, in how far the fact that TTIP is not any FTA but 
one between the EU on the one hand and the US on the other hand impacts on the ways actors argue 
about it. This, in turn, hinges on the question, in how far EU-US relations as a matter of foreign policy 
                                                     
48 The piece written by Siles-Brügge and DeVille (2015) specifically on TTIP was not available yet at the time of 
writing this section and developing the respective codebook yet. 
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proper can be linked with trade policy. In the past, for instance, the EU has been known to make trade 
agreements with developing countries dependent on human rights, good governance and similar 
conditions (cf. Manners 2002). It might seem far-fetched to expect a similar conditionality vis-à-vis the 
much more democratic United States. Yet, I point out below that the public debate triggered by Edward 
Snowden with regard to ‘Prism’ and other spying activities offers at least some potential for issue linkage 
which I shall discuss with regard to each free trade frame. 
 
Possible policy frames on TTIP 
What is referred to as ‘neoliberalism’ today is, in fact, “a more radical and more policy-oriented form of 
classic liberalism” as it was represented by John Locke and Adam Smith (Schröder 2015, 22). This classic 
reasoning was taken up, in theoretical terms, by economists such as von Hayek, von Mises and Friedman, 
and in political practice by the Conservative politicians Margret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, contrasting 
equally with Keynesian theory and practice (ibid.). This usage of the term ‘neoliberal’ must be 
distinguished from the line of thought forwarded by those economists who referred to themselves as 
‘neoliberals’ such as Rüstow, Eucken or Röpke and who, in contrast to the foregoing economists and 
politicians, call for a strong state able to organize markets (ibid.). Since the usage of the label in the first 
manner is much more common and is used in the literature on the respective discourse (Siles-Brügge 
2013; Ville and Orbie 2014; Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015), it is taken up here to describe the dominant 
frame on trade policy. Defining ‘neoliberalism’ as an updated classic liberalism is not only a conceptual 
clarification, but also helps to identify those aspects of the frame that are often taken for granted but must 
be spelled out in order to sort descriptions of a neoliberal trade discourse into the various dimensions of a 
possible neoliberal frame on TTIP. 
The most genuine source of neoliberal thought, namely the central piece by Adam Smith, is 
entitled “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” and quite clearly points to the 
normative basis of this frame as the goal of policy-making, namely the accumulation of (material) wealth. 
As a theory of economic growth and development (Brue and Grant 2007, 79), Smith’s work in large parts 
also still influences the causal narratives and policy suggestions behind the neoliberal frame. Before 
discussing these, it is noted here that indeed those who are considered as proponents of a neoliberal frame 
on trade policy, such as the EU Commissioner for trade, Karel De Gucht, define the goal of trade policy 
as follows: 
In times like these, trade policy ... has an even bigger role to play. It must be an engine of economic 
growth and job creation and a driver for economic reforms to enhance the EU’s economic efficiency. 
(quoted in Ville and Orbie 2014, 10) 
In addition to growth and labour effects, free trade is assigned the capacity of leading to ‘consumer 
benefits’ in terms of lower prices and product choice, resulting in ‘triple benefit’ (cf. Siles-Brügge 2013, 
605). Often literally linked to this triple benefit is the goal of ‘competitiveness’, which, while arguably also 
a cause of growth, job creation and consumer benefits, frequently becomes an end in itself (ibid. 2013, 
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610). Before discussing the other dimensions, it is briefly considered here, what this set of goals means 
with regard to alternative normative considerations. 
Some have argued that neoliberals ignore the pursuit of collective goals as a public task (cf. Ville 
and Orbie 2014, 3). This, however, appears only partially appropriate. After all, a key notion in (neo)liberal 
thought is the Smithean idea of a harmony of interests, according to which the simple pursuit of self-
interest in a free market is the best way towards achieving the collective social good of economic growth 
(Brue and Grant 2007, 68). In other words, within the neoliberal frame, there is no contradiction between 
the individual and the collective here, so that indeed protecting the individual’s self-interest is the same as 
pursuing the collective good. The precondition is simply that the prioritized common good is economic 
growth. 
Clearly, then, a lack of growth as observed – by definition – in times of economic recession or 
crisis, would be problematic. Indeed, this is also how Commissioner De Gucht, cited earlier as a 
neoliberal, describes the EU’s current situation: “These are challenging economic times for Europe with 
low growth, high unemployment and gaping deficits in Member States’ public finances.” Similarly, he has 
spoken of a “double economic challenge” and has argued “We have, on the one hand, to address our 
structural weaknesses on the supply side in order to increase our growth potential and, on the other hand . 
. . to consolidate our public finances” (as quoted in Ville and Orbie 2014, 10–11). Noteworthy, he points 
here to the Member States’ fiscal situation, thereby excluding the classic, Keynesian answer to a lack of 
growth. Moreover, he does not speak of, for instance, a double challenge in terms of climate change and 
economic recession, or of rising inequality. 
As Grant and Brue efficiently summarise it, the aforementioned idea of ‘harmony of interests’ 
“implies that intrusion by government into the economy is unneeded and undesirable” (ibid., 2007, 68), 
from Smith’s perspective. In fact, he considers market intervention an act of presumption on the part of 
the governing. Smith himself already extended this conclusion to international trade by rejecting any 
domestic monopoly building and arguing instead: “If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity 
cheaper than we can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, 
employed in a way in which we have some advantage” (Smith, Wealth of Nations, pp. 354-355, quoted in 
Brue and Grant 2007, 69). Similarly, another classical proponent of free trade, David Ricardo assumes in 
his famous theory of comparative advantage, that the labour units ‘freed’ in the comparatively inefficient 
domestic sector can be put to use more efficiently in the sector where the country in question enjoys a 
comparative (in Smith case: absolute) advantage (Brue and Grant 2007, 114–16). Without going into the 
details of the neoliberal causal narrative, it thus already becomes clear why even the harm done to less 
competitive sectors within the EU would not constitute a problem for the advocates of the neoliberal 
frame on trade (Ville and Orbie 2014, 3). Nonetheless, while policy-makers often take for granted the 
exact causal relations behind growth and free trade on the one hand and lack of growth and protectionism 
on the other, they shall briefly be summarised in the following paragraph. 
In very simple terms, the idea behind Smith’s theory of absolute advantage and Ricardo’s theory 
of comparative advantage can be brought down to the notion of division of labour: just like increases in 
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productivity achieved by specialisation lead to economic growth within a country, so specialisation of 
countries in certain sectors will lead to economic growth for both trading partners under free trade. Each 
country will be able to produce more at lower costs, will be able to sell surpluses abroad and will have 
access to cheap imports of those products for which it is not specialised (Brue and Grant 2007, 79-81, 
114-116). Note that this perspective considers the outcome as a win-win situation, since all countries 
participating in free trade enjoy these advantages, which is perfectly in line with the ‘harmony of interests’ 
within countries. The flipside of this argument is that any impediment to free markets both within and 
across countries makes nations forego these advantages, so that instead of growth they will face continued 
recession. 
Indeed, modern advocates of free trade argue exactly along these lines. Siles-Brügge finds 
references to the concept of ‘comparative advantage’ in strategy papers of DG Trade (ibid., 2013, 604). 
The idea is that market access quickens necessary adaptation needed sooner or later anyway (ibid., 2013, 
604; see also Hay and Rosamond 2002, 13), increasing ‘competitiveness’ of European firms (Ville and 
Orbie 2014, 4). Thereby, free trade will lead to growth, job creation and consumer benefits as stated 
already in the foregoing quotes by Commissioner De Gucht. Two quotes by Catherine Ashton not only 
include the aforementioned flipside argument but also shows the degree of self-evidence with which this 
causal narrative is presented: “[w]e all know that protectionism makes recovery harder” and, in another 
speech: “[a] protectionist backlash, as part of a rescue package or otherwise, could potentially worsen this 
downturn” (quoted in Ville and Orbie 2014, 8). Noteworthy, the classic underlying theories are formulated 
as economic laws – and hence should be universally applicable, irrespective of the trading partner in 
question. 
By now it should be obvious that the neoliberal frame is the frame that most outspokenly 
favours TTIP. Not only will both sides always win from free trade anyway, however small these gains may 
be, given the already low tariffs between the EU and the US. It is also the fact that this frame likewise 
rejects what it considers ‘murky’ behind-the-border policies that nevertheless inhibit trade (Siles-Brügge 
2013, 605). As I have argued in the preceding section, TTIP indeed is mainly about the removal of so-
called Non-Tariff-Barriers (NTBs), which from a neo-liberal free market perspective are harmful. Within 
this frame, the otherwise controversial Investor-State Dispute Settlements (ISDS) would appear absolutely 
appropriate as a tool against future protectionism – even of the more subtle kind – and may be 
understood as a further element of “protection of traders from the arbitrary exercise of state power” 
(Lang quoted in Ville and Orbie 2014, 3). 
The ‘prism’ affair and its successors are unlikely to dampen the support for TTIP in any way for 
the simple fact that those values which might be threatened in the Snowden affair – be they data 
protection ideals or national security – are in no way linked to the neoliberal frame on trade. Some 
neoliberals might indeed reject US spying against EU citizens and firms, but they will not change their 
mind on TTIP because of it. As I will show in due turn, this might be different for the other frames. 
While (neo)liberals condemn protectionism as the source of all evil, protectionism itself was 
itself partly a reaction to classic liberalism represented by Smith and Ricardo. Like (neo)liberalism, 
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protectionism as a line of thought can be traced back to a school of economists and one scholar in 
particular, namely the so-called German Historical School more generally and Friedrich List, in person. 
List generally challenged the universal applicability of liberal economic theories, advocating an alternative 
course of trade policy for Germany. As Grant and Brue note, however, his ideas were better received in 
the US than in Germany (ibid., 2007, 198), while nowadays France is considered as the final stronghold of 
protectionist thought (Hanson 1998, 66). Nevertheless, his criticism of liberalism reaches beyond the level 
of eventual policy suggestions. 
First, on the normative dimension, List challenges the notion of ‘harmony of interests’, arguing 
instead that “the immediate private interests of certain members of the community do not necessarily lead 
to the highest good of the whole”, as Grant and Brue note (ibid. 2007, 199). Noteworthy, the good of the 
nation was ranked above that of the individual (ibid.). As soon as the harmony of interests is dissolved in 
favour of the collective, however, the automatisms proclaimed by liberal theory disappear – and the good 
of ‘the nation’ has to be defined other than by the individual pursuit of wealth. 
This view leads to a much more strategic perspective on trade. Indeed, List had criticised Smith 
and other classic liberals for ignoring politics. For instance, he argued that it may be worthwhile giving up 
‘value’ in the short term, in terms of foregoing cheap imports due to tariffs, with the long-term goal of 
building up its own manufacturing industry. This, in turn, “not only secures to the nation an infinitely 
greater amount of material goods, but also industrial independence in case of war” (List quoted in Brue 
and Grant 2007, 200). In other words, it matters to have your own manufacturing industry within the 
confines of your nation state. 
Arguably, the discussion on TTIP is hardly about having manufacturing industries, as the 
respective participating countries on both sides of the Atlantic have long since left the pre-industrial stage 
of economic development. Nevertheless, it might still be desirable to keep certain sectors of the economy 
in a state that are of wider political relevance. A military industry constitutes the most obvious example, 
and one which, according to Husted and Melvin, would even be accepted by Smith (ibid., 2007, 202). Yet 
the discussion on the CAP has shown that also self-sufficiency in food supplies can be a political objective 
that might involve trade policy instruments for its achievement. More recently even, the absence of a 
European alternative to Google, Facebook etc. has been deplored (cf. Rahn, Mawad, and Rach 2013). 
With Airbus, a historical precedent of a European effort for breaking an American monopoly exists 
(Husted and Melvin 2007, 210). In principle, however, the range of sectors that should be kept within the 
country for political reasons is open to discussion, so that the protectionist normative dimension might 
have bias towards securing existing jobs rather than aiming for the creation of new ones. Indeed, 
employment more generally in terms of existing jobs is a value regularly evoked also by modern 
protectionists, as is the general spirit of patriotism or, rather, nationalism included in List’s work (Husted 
and Melvin 2007, 197). While the goal of keeping certain domestic industries mainly relates to the 
disharmony of interests between nations, the potential disharmony within nations is another aspect worth 
considering in the discussion of protectionisms normative dimension. Yet, politically defined national 
goals such as a ‘fair’ distribution of income might are thinkable as well (Husted and Melvin 2007, 201). 
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Before this background, unfettered competition can be problematic, as it may involve the loss of certain 
industries which the nation as a whole might have a certain interest of keeping and the loss of attached, 
existing jobs. Such competition may be considered harmful and threatening. 
For protectionists, it is the unqualified application of the liberal free trade doctrine – e.g. an all-
encompassing version of TTIP – that leads to this harmful or unfair competition, as it disregards not only 
the political dimension of trade but also the fact that different nations have different starting conditions: 
in the historical example of List’s analysis of economic development in Germany, for instance, it may well 
be that Germany would in principle be capable of developing its own manufacturing industry, but will only 
very slowly or never achieve this under conditions of free trade (Brue and Grant 2007, 198–200). It is this 
inequality in starting conditions that justifies the label of ‘unfair’ competition. That said, even in sectors 
where a nation is not likely to ever catch up with potential trading partners, national strategic interests 
would normatively justify protection. 
To a certain extent, then, comparative advantages are not given but contingent upon certain 
political decisions. Only a country that already has reached the desired level of competitiveness, such as 
Britain at the time, will argue in favour of unfettered free trade (Brue and Grant 2007, 198–99). Otherwise, 
a nation should prefer protection, at least in selected sectors. Regarding TTIP, protectionists will thus call 
for a number of exemptions, that is, for the exclusion of certain sectors from the agreement. They might 
not, however, necessarily oppose TTIP per se. Exemptions may refer to the abolition of tariffs, but also to 
other means of protecting key sectors such as subsidies. However, it must be noted here that NTBs in the 
form of regulatory standards may have an effect that resembles the effect of a tariff or government 
subsidy, but that the introduction of such regulatory standards is highly unlikely to be justified by means 
of a protectionist frame. This is because it would rhetorically be much more efficient to consider such 
standards as worthwhile in itself, as I shall demonstrate below when discussing the anti-globalisation 
frame. 
Before doing so, however, the particular application of protectionism vis-à-vis the United States 
needs to be discussed. More generally, it might be argued that some of the strategic aims of protectionism 
could be of lesser importance here, as both the US and most EU Member States are joined in the NATO 
defence community. At the same time, this has traditionally not prevented some states such as France 
from striving for a certain degree of independence in defence matters. In case of the US, however, 
strategic considerations have reached beyond the military sector, as for instance also cultural independence 
(normative) from US ‘cultural imperialism’ (constitutive) has been called for (Hay and Rosamond 2002). 
The US cultural dominance would arguably be eased by the removal of current barriers to trade in this 
sector (be they tariffs or supply-side subsidies), and indeed it would seem plausible to argue that starting 
conditions are hardly the same here (cognitive) (see also: Akhtar and Jones 2014). More recently, the 
‘prism’ scandal might be used in order to justify not necessarily opposition to TTIP as such, but instead 
the strategic goal of building up European alternatives to Google etc., which consequently would 
necessitate exemptions from TTIP in this particular area (see also: Akhtar and Jones 2014). 
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Finally, agriculture might constitute a field for protectionist exemptions. In general, the removal 
of trade barriers contrasts to some extent with existing policy within the EU: it becomes more important 
to subsidies an uncompetitive sector that is exposed to competition than one that is not (cf. Husted and 
Melvin 2007, 206–7, who discuss this for the US case). More specifically, the widespread application of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in food production constitutes a field where, the EU is not on a 
par with the US, so that ‘unfair’ competition is likely to be bemoaned here. Doing so would constitute an 
instance of protectionist framing, if and only if this is done in terms of the harm it does to the EU’s 
agricultural industry. Noteworthy, there is a thin – and mainly analytical – line here between GMO-
opposition for protectionist reasons and the rejection of GMO-food as such, which would be part of the 
anti-globalisation frame(s) to be discussed in the next subsection.49 
Tariffs may constitute the most obvious form of protectionism, while regulatory standards as in 
the case of GMOs may constitute a hidden but factual form of protectionism. ‘Hidden’ protectionism, 
however, implies that the insistence on certain regulatory standards is framed in non-protectionist terms 
and thus by definition is not considered to be part of the protectionist frame just outlined. In between the 
open protectionism in terms of tariffs and hidden, regulatory protectionism the – at least in the EU – 
increasingly popular practice of geographical indications (GIs) is situated, a well-known example being 
Parmesan cheese from the Italian region of Parma (cf. Akhtar and Jones 2014, 9). While such labels are 
used in the US might just be common food names, their usage is regulated in the EU (cf. ibid). At a 
national level, ‘made in’ labels perform a similar function: they do not financially discourage consumers 
from buying cheaper, imported products, as tariffs would, but constitute a justification for potentially 
higher prices in terms of an appeal to patriotism or, at least, to non-rational images and connotations (cf. 
Husted and Melvin 2007, 197). Husted and Melvin count such labels among protectionist policies (ibid.), 
and this be extended to GIs here. 
It is true, of course, that GIs share some features with regulatory standards. Moreover, they are 
commonly justified as bits of information to the consumer. Nonetheless, they should be counted as 
protectionist policies for two reasons. Firstly, the actual benefit arising from them to consumers is itself 
debatable, since they do not necessarily imply better quality or safety, while their benefit to the existing 
domestic industry is beyond doubt (cf. Akhtar and Jones 2014, 9). Yet, in contrast to hidden protectionism, it 
is not only their effect that justifies their categorization as protectionist. It is, secondly, their link to 
nationalist-protectionist norms that makes work: the individual is implicitly asked to forgo a cheaper price 
in the short run for the greater good of the nation, just as List would have postulated. 
As with the notion of ‘neoliberalism’, the label ‘anti-globalisation movement’ was put on the 
participants by others rather than the name they chose for themselves. The imposed label is misleading, as 
in fact the anti-globalisation movement and those who take up its ideas in representative politics are not 
against globalisation in principle (Ayres 2004, 22). Moreover, as the ‘anti-globalisation’ label stresses the 
opposition of the movement to something, it has a pejorative and slightly negative touch to it. It may 
                                                     
49 In practice, this may be a typical instance of hiding protectionist motivations behind anti-globalist framing. 
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indeed be true that the policy dimension of the frame(s) going under this label here is mainly defined by its 
opposition to, in this case, TTIP. Yet, the discussion of the normative dimension shared by both the 
moderate and the radical version of the frame shows that proponents of the frame are certainly in favour 
of something. 
As Ayres (2004) notes by analyzing how the movement frames its critique of neoliberal 
globalisation, what the movement turns against is “the current WTO-dominated rules-based system that 
focused mostly on promoting trade and investment liberalisation, while remaining silent on consumer, 
labor, environmental or human rights concerns” (ibid., 2004, 22). Similarly, Sporer (2009) notes that key 
actors within the movement such as Attac call for “a global trade regime that prioritizes the interests of 
developing countries, socially disadvantaged and the environment” (ibid., 2009, 44). Much rather than 
constituting direct policy suggestions, these statements summarise the values of the movement. 
These values can now be contrasted with those of the preceding frames: in contrast to 
protectionism, on the one hand, the focus is not on the well-being of one particular nation here, as in fact 
the well-being of e.g. developing countries is explicitly included. Moreover, priority is clearly given to 
consumers, whose interests are clearly ranked above those of domestic producers even, while 
protectionism may involve short-term sacrifices on the part of consumers. Neoliberalism, on the other 
hand, aims for consumer benefits just as much as for the well-being of producers (‘harmony of interests’), 
yet it is limited to the economic, material well-being in terms of cheap prices and product choice. 
This is not to say that the anti-globalisation movement totally disregards material conditions. 
Yet, for the case of TTIP, post-material aspects such as consumer safety and human rights are likely to 
take centre stage for proponents of the anti-globalisation frame, where current standards will determine 
the perceptions of potential costs of liberalisation (Akhtar and Jones 2014, 10): With regard to consumer 
safety standards, proponents of this frame will stress the European distinctiveness in terms of the so-
called precautionary principle, which for instance is behind the widespread rejection of GMOs in Europe. 
Stretching the concept of human rights, proponents of the frame will stress differences in attitudes on 
data protection, using the ‘prism’-affair as an illustration. Similarly, rights to provision of certain public 
services, such as water supply as in the ‘Right to water’ campaign might be demanded. That said, it is of 
course possible that other standards are invoked as well, whether they are actually higher than the US 
counterparts or not. 
In general, of course, any threat to the aforementioned standards or to the future capacity of 
setting such standards constitutes a problem. Such a problem might be referred to as a ‘democratic deficit’ 
(cf. Ayres 2004; Sporer 2009). As was already noted, globalisation and even free trade may not necessarily 
be a problem in this sense, but the current way most trade agreements are conceptualized (including the 
WTO regime) is (cf. Ayres 2004). A Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is not a problem as 
such either. They are potentially problematic inasmuch as they disregard importance of social, 
environmental, consumer safety and human rights concerns, which is the reason why – a certain general 
heterogeneity within the movement notwithstanding – ‘neoliberalism’ is univocally considered problematic 
from an anti-globalisation perspective (Ayres 2004, 15–18; Schröder 2015, 21–23). Indeed, the above 
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discussion of neoliberalism as a policy frame on free trade in general and TTIP in particular helps to 
understand this opposition: not only are these values at best secondary from a neoliberal perspective, but 
what may constitute a valuable regulatory standard for critics of globalisation is precisely what for 
neoliberals may constitute a ‘non-tariff barrier’ to trade (NTB). The removal of such NTBs is what, in 
fact, is the core of TTIP, much rather than the abolition of the few remaining tariffs (Akhtar and Jones 
2014; Kinnmann and Hagberg 2012). Those who particularly appreciate the regulatory status quo are likely 
to perceive this as a risk: At best, they lose the kind of standard they consider ideal and are used to (such 
as, for instance, the precautionary principle). This, of course, is a judgement that is independent of the 
factual effectiveness of standards. At worst, they face a lower level of standards as a kind of lowest 
common denominator. Any such risk will be denied by neoliberals, as they might not consider the same 
issues as valuable standards, but simply as non-tariff barriers to trade. 
For judging whether a problem arises in the context of the TTIP negotiations, two lines of 
argument from an anti-globalisation perspective are thinkable, a moderate and a radical one. The 
distinction between the two hinges on the question, in how far the representative institutions of nation-
states or even the supranational EU, in combination with civil society, are capable of securing such 
regulatory standards in a globalised economy or not. This categorization reflects earlier analyses of the 
anti-globalisation movement that have pointed to varying degrees of radicalism within the movement 
(Ayres 2004, 27; Eschle 2004; Starr and Adams 2003, 20) and related variation in the degree of optimism 
and pessimism concerning the capacity of the state and politics more generally to control globalised 
capitalism (Ayres 2004, 27; Hay and Rosamond 2002; Sporer 2009, 10–52). 
From a moderate perspective, a democratic deficit in the context of TTIP will arise if a. 
representative institutions such as the EP and civil society are not sufficiently involved in the process of 
negotiation, for if they were, they would represent consumer interests and consequently would keep 
regulatory standards safe and b. if the agreement itself provided for a future weakening of democratic 
institutions, e.g. by installing a non-democratic, private Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). From a 
radical perspective, a democratic deficit in the context of TTIP will arise even if producers cannot prevent 
Member States or the EU from regulating on legal grounds, since the way free trade agreements are 
negotiated is always disadvantageous to consumers, so that standards definitely will be lost along the way 
and since a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ might lead to a de facto democratic deficit in the long run. 
Both moderate and radical critics of globalisation would agree that the existing standards as well 
as the capacity of setting new ones must be upheld – but as I already argued, this is essentially a value 
commitment without any particular policy implication concerning TTIP. Given the difference in terms of 
the causal narratives just presented, the concrete policy suggestions from moderates and radicals also 
differ. Moderates will oppose certain aspects of TTIP such as secret Commission mandates, private ISDS 
or the abolition of a particular standard but will conditionally support it (logically, if e.g. there are no 
private ISDS). Radicals, by contrast, sure of the loss it involves, will unconditionally oppose TTIP. 
The fact that TTIP is not about any FTA but about an FTA with the US is likely to be of 
particular relevance to critics of globalisation, since they consider the US as a hegemonic power in global 
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politics and economics, spreading and enforcing neoliberal policies globally (Schröder 2015, 23–24). In 
general, TTIP may thus be considered as an attempt to further impose neoliberal policies on Europe, first 
by directly addressing certain standards and by impeding future regulation by means of private ISDS, 
before which powerful US companies might outperform European states. As was already mentioned, the 
‘prism’ scandal might not only be considered as a proof of differing values on the other side of Atlantic. 
For radicals, it will constitute another argument for stopping the negotiations on TTIP immediately. 
Moderates, by contrast, might want to use TTIP to achieve general concessions in the realm of data 
protection. As economic growth is not their value priority but standards such as data protection are, the 
link is easily made, as both the scandal and TTIP – the latter at least potentially – are problematic for 
similar reasons. 
Noteworthy, the frames thus identified largely correspond to the discourses on TTIP as 
analysed by Ferdi DeVille and Gabriel Siles-Brügge (2015), but are derived from earlier literature. That 
said, the argument made by some proponents of TTIP that TTIP will help to set global standards in the 
future (ibid., 2015, 38–61) was subsumed later under the neoliberal frame, as it did not seem to follow its 
own logic theoretically and empirically coincided with frame F1 being used. An advantage of an open-
minded and deductive approach (insofar as it was not derived from the exact matter to be studied) to 
frames on trade policy was the explicit inclusion of the possibility that also classic protectionist arguments 
might be made with regard to TTIP. As is shown in the next section, this was important with regard to the 
observable implications of the various theoretical approaches. Table 59 summarises the policy frames thus 
derived, while a detailed codebook including the observable instances typical for each frame is found in 
Annex II. 
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Table 59: Summary of possible policy frames on TTIP 
frame  What sort of values 
do you need in order 
to see this as a 
problem? 
(Normative 
dimension)  
What is the problem? 
(Constitutive 
dimension)  
What has led to the 
problem? 
(Cognitive 
dimension)  
What should be done 
about the problem? 
(Policy dimension)  
Neoliberalism, 
Frame 1  
Economic growth, job 
creation  
Double crisis: 
economic stagnation 
and public deficits  
Protectionism makes 
economic recovery 
harder, while free  trade 
is the only policy that 
does not increase debt  
TTIP as soon and as 
‘ambitious‘ as possible  
Protectionism, 
Frame2  
Existing jobs in 
domestic industries; 
patriotism and 
national/European 
interests  
Unlimited free trade 
threatens certain 
domestic industries  
Unfair competition  Exemption of certain 
sectors; geographical 
indications  
Anti-
Globalisation, 
Frame 3(A&B)  
High standards for 
environmental 
protection, consumer 
safety and human rights  
TTIP might reduce the 
level of standards  
A: secret negotiations 
inhibit democratic 
control needed to 
protect standards; ISDS 
inhibit future regulation  
 
B: TTIP negotiations 
are beyond democratic 
control anyway; once it 
is there, race to the 
bottom  
A: conditional approval 
of TTIP – EP and civil 
society involvement, no 
ISDS 
 
B: no TTIP!  
6.3 Observable implications of the theoretical framework for the case 
In this section, the observable implications of extant theories vis-à-vis those of the theory of territorialisation (ToT) 
are spelled out. In order to prepare this, however, it is first of all necessary to specify what the case characteristics of 
TTIP mean for the sample of parties at the country level, thereby demonstrating also that there is sufficient variation 
in this regard: Among the six countries selected, there are those who, compared to the EU as a whole, can expect 
average (Germany and Italy) or even high economic gains from TTIP (Ireland and the UK), but also those who 
expected to gain very little (France and Austria). In addition, there is variation in national traditions of capitalism, 
which can be expected to influence perceptions of what is ‘normal’ in trade agreements. Before this background, 
theories coming from a more International Relations perspective on trade would expect a territorial structure of 
conflict between TTIP winners and ‘losers’ (in relative terms), whereas those from a Comparative Politics tradition as 
well as EP-specific ones (with the exception of the Council-focussed bicameral approach) would predict a territorial 
structure of conflict. The latter also applies to the ToT, while it is built on different and usually more specific 
assumptions about the goals and framing strategies of national party delegations. According to this theory, only 
French and Austrian parties from the Conservative/Christian Democratic and the Liberal family will have incentives 
to defect, since substantial parts of their electorate stand to lose from the intra-national distributional effects of 
TTIP, whereas all other parties have largely overlapping ideological and vote-seeking reasons to be sceptical or 
supportive of TTIP due to the predominance of intra-national distribution. 
Specification of case characteristics for the sample of countries 
Since this study merely covers six out of (meanwhile and so far still) 28 EU Member States, and in order 
to prepare the ground for spelling out the observable implications of the various theoretical approaches 
discussed next, it is necessary here specify the case characteristics for the six countries selected, i.e. 
Germany, Austria, France, Italy, the UK and Ireland. Before this background, it will then also be possible 
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to assure that both sides of a potential cross-national distribution are represented. While in the present 
case cross-national distribution is not to be expected, there still is some variation here in terms of how 
much each country might gain from TTIP, which might influence the balance of intra-national 
distribution, and national traditions in economic policy, namely the type of capitalism, might also play a 
role. 
In order to establish the variation in the degree of TTIP gains, I will draw on the study by 
Felbermayr, Heid et al. (2013) already mentioned above. There are at least two reasons for doing so. First, 
as they provide country-level predictions for each and every Member State based on the same model, they 
are more comparable than country-level data drawn from different studies, using various definitions of 
what constitutes an ‘ambitious’ or ‘modest’ scenario for TTIP in terms of negotiation outcomes, i.e. the 
exact extent to which tariffs will be abolished or in how far TTIP will go beyond tariffs and will also 
remove NTBs. Second, while lacking deeper knowledge of economic modelling the quality of such 
predictions is difficult to judge, Felbermayr, Heid et al. at least demonstrate awareness of the general 
difficulties associated with the conventional ‘computable general equilibrium’ (CGE) modelling 
(Felbermayr, Heid, and Lehwald 2013, 5), i.e. the approach criticised by de Ville and Siles-Brügge (ibid. 
2015, 21). Yet, it is still possible to consider in more detail potentially contradictory findings with regard to 
individual countries when pointing out the exact observable implications later, at a point when it can also 
be discussed in how far this will indeed make a difference in terms of frame choice. 
In fact, however, most country-specific studies come to qualitatively similar results (e.g. Della 
Rocca et al. 2013; Francois and Pindyuk 2013; Thelle et al. 2015), with one exception: a study 
commissioned by the UK governments holds: “The EU as a whole is expected to benefit more from 
liberalisation since the removable barriers are higher” (Centre for Economic Policy Research 2013, 31). In 
other words, it appears from this study that the UK gains comparatively little from TTIP, in contrast to 
the finding of the Bertelsmann study. Nevertheless, it still seems safe to assume here that, if British parties 
were guided exclusively by the national interest in terms of TTIP-driven economic growth for their 
country, they would still favour the neoliberal frame F1: on the one hand, other studies including 
predictions for the UK would consider the UK among the main winners from TTIP (Della Rocca et al. 
2013; Fontagné, Gourdon, and Jean 2013). On the other hand, it must be noted that the same study 
concludes: 
For the UK, national income and GDP are expected to increase by between £4 and £10 billion annually, 
depending on the scenarios, with the highest increase taking place under the most ambitious scenario, 
which incorporates the highest reduction in NTBs . . . The primary message is that NTBs are critical to 
UK gains. . . Overall, the scope for benefits for the UK hinges on the level of ambition. A more 
ambitious agreements yields greater gains in terms of output, wages, and investment. (Centre for 
Economic Policy Research 2013, 47) 
An ‘ambitious agreement’ is precisely what is called for on the policy dimension of frame F1, which is also 
what UK MEPs were expected to use if they were driven by the assumption that their country were 
among those countries gaining the most from TTIP. Hence, even if the UK-specific study were 
considered more trustworthy for some reason, any expectation concerning frame choice based on the 
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economic impact of TTIP should be the same for the UK. Inasmuch as the study by Felbermayr, Haid et 
al. is considered, then, there seems to be ideal variation within the selection of countries, in that there are 
two countries in the sample that are ranked at the top end (UK, Ireland), two in the middle and close to 
the EU average (Germany, Italy) and two countries at the bottom end winning the least from TTIP 
(Austria, France). 
A similarly high degree of variation is found with regard to the type of capitalism, as was 
mentioned earlier already and as is recalled again in Table 60. This national tradition could be relevant with 
regard to TTIP in the sense that those economies where the state usually interferes the most are least apt 
to liberalisation and vice versa. In fact, the two kinds of possible country-level influences also vary with 
each other two some extent, albeit the expected top winners from TTIP are both liberal capitalist 
countries. If there is any territorial pattern related either to the degree of gains resulting from TTIP or the 
type of capitalism, then, it should still be possible to recognise this focussing on national party delegations 
from this set of countries only. 
Table 60: Gains from TTIP per country (Source: Felbermayr, Heid, and Lehwald 2013) and the type of capitalism 
prevailing in the country (Source: Schmidt 2005) 
country Expected percentage 
increase in real income per 
capita 
Relatively high or low gains 
from TTIP50 
Type of capitalism 
UK 9.70 High Liberal 
Ireland 6.93 High Liberal 
Italy 4.92 High Statist 
Germany 4.68 High Managed 
Austria 2.71 Low Managed 
France 2.64 Low Statist 
EU27 4.95 N.A. N.A. 
 
Observable implications of earlier approaches 
Before spelling out the observable implications of the theory of territorialisation presented in Chapter 2, I 
will first discuss the predictions for the structure of conflict and individual parties’ framing strategies based 
on the extant theoretical literature reviewed in detail in the same chapter. Before turning to the EP-
specific ones and eventually to the explanations common in the area of trade policy generally and with 
regard to TTIP in particular, I will start with the more general theories of conflict in EU politics, because 
these usually offer rather clear cut predictions with which the other theories can be contrasted easily. 
Independent of the issue actually, the cleavage approach by Marks and Wilson would imply an 
ideological structure of conflict, not affected by any particular distributional effect changing any party’s 
vote-seeking considerations. Accordingly, at one extreme pole, namely fully in support of TTIP and hence 
using frame F1 predominantly, one would expect to find party families who occupy the economic Right 
on the classic Left-Right scale, because a general belief in the forces of the free market and everything 
                                                     
50 For an explanation of this categorisation, see section 2. 
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which follows from it in terms of policies such as free trade fits this frame perfectly. This applies to 
Christian Democratic Conservative parties since the 1980s as well as Christian Democratic parties (cf. 
Festenstein and Kenny 2005). In fact, it seems plausible to draw on an analogy here between support for 
European integration when it was still very much a market-building project and was strongest within this 
party family, and the creation of a Transatlantic market (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Marks and 
Wilson 2000). It further applies, of course, to parties from the Liberal family. 
At the other extreme pole, one would expect to find those parties who do not value at all the 
main promise made by TTIP, namely economic growth. This applies to parties characterised by what is 
called a ‘post-materialist’ ideology, and parties belonging to the family of Green parties usually do so 
(Festenstein and Kenny 2005, 327–31). Since on the one hand, these parties do not appreciate what TTIP 
shall do according to its proponents while on the other hand, they are the ones who simultaneously put 
the strongest normative emphasis on health and environmental standards presumably threatened by the 
agreement, resistance to TTIP should be rather strong among Green parties. Accordingly, they will use the 
anti-globalisation frame F3 and potentially even its radical variant. Finally, as pacifists and critics of global 
inequality, they are arguably sceptical of new forms of Transatlantic cooperation, which even according to 
its supporters is directed against other regions in the world. 
The latter point – a sceptical attitude towards Transatlanticism – also might be made with regard 
to former Communist parties on the far Left of the political spectrum, and such parties likewise place 
great emphasis on regulation of consumption (Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 417–18). Noteworthy also, 
when trying to characterise the lines of though behind anti-globalisation movements, the notion of ‘neo-
marxism’ is regularly used (e.g. Ayres 2004; Eschle 2004). Thus, frame F3 should also offer fitting lines of 
argument to the far Left, also or even especially in its radical form, since they might not fully trust existing 
institutions to steer TTIP appropriately. By contrast, frame F1 is certainly not an option for far Left 
parties, as it implies too much of a stretch for these parties if they suddenly started praising the blessings 
of the free market. The protectionist frame F2 is also not as compatible with far Left ideology as frame F3 
is. On the one hand, the far Left will arguably be sceptical of free trade as a win-win for everyone and as 
an automatic creator of jobs, and thus they might make use of the cognitive dimension of frame F2 (unfair 
competition etc.) and even aspects the normative one (loss of jobs). On the other hand, however, frame 
F2 implies a nationalist attitude that is as such not compatible with leftist internationalism, and the 
emphasis on the protection of national industries, i.e. producers, would also be at odds with such parties’ 
general ideas of friends and foes. 
On the non-centrist Right, one would surprisingly expect to find a similar mix of frames, namely 
a combination of anti-globalist and protectionist arguments. While the far Right and far Left might, by 
definition, be thought of as very much opposed, it is not uncommon to find these ‘strange bedfellows’ 
when it comes to issues of globalisation (cf. e.g. Leggewie 2003, 54-58). However, the exact focal points 
between the respective ideology and the frames are different. Extreme Right parties will, for instance, 
reject TTIP simply because they want to shut off their country from the rest of the world. To this end, 
they would point to the risks TTIP might imply for the national economy and national interests and thus 
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would emphasise precisely those elements of a frame F2 line of argument that the far Left will neglect. In 
addition, they would simply and totally reject TTIP, which corresponds to the policy dimension of the 
radical version of frame F3. 
Those parties referred to here as populist Right might be nationalist in the sense that they 
emphasise national identity, as Vassallo and Wilcox point out (ibid., 2006, 419). They also note, however, 
that such parties have tried to widen their programmatic portfolio by taking a more Right-wing position 
on economic issues than nationalist (or even nationalsocialist) parties usually do or did (ibid., 2006, 420). 
While classic protectionism might be less prominent among these parties compared to the extreme Right, 
then, frame F1 should not be the frame of choice either, as it involves too much internationalism. Rather, 
a pattern discovered earlier with regard to European integration as a project of market making would seem 
to be mirrored here, as Hooghe Marks and Wilson argue that the far Right opposes it because of the loss 
of sovereignty (TTIP: loss of regulatory capacity) (2002, 976–77). Concerning TTIP, far Right (including 
populist) parties could link to frame F3 by stressing the distinctiveness of European values or by 
lamenting an alleged loss of regulatory sovereignty given the removal of NTBs and private ISDS. 
By contrast, the trust in existing institutions should be much higher on the centre Left, i.e. 
among Socialists and Social Democrats. Moreover, they have come to accept the core principles of the 
market economy, albeit the move towards the centre on the economic Left-Right might have been more 
pronounced in some countries, notably Germany and the UK, than it has been in others (Vassallo, F. & 
Wilcox, C. 2006, 418). Indeed, a Green critique of these parties has often been that they are still 
materialist, as they do not totally reject economic growth (Festenstein and Kenny 2005, 331). At the same 
time, Socialists take up some elements of post-materialism (Vassallo, F. & Wilcox, C. 2006, 418). The 
expectation, from a purely ideological perspective, is thus that they should adhere to the moderate version 
of frame F3, which does not reject TTIP totally but is sceptical of some of its features that do not fit well 
with regulated capitalism preferred by the centre-Left. This would repeat once again an old pattern: 
Socialists and Social Democrats equally opposed European integration at a time when it seemed to lead to 
liberalisation only, but came to actually appreciate it when it started to involve the possibility of re-
regulation (Marks and Wilson 2000). Thus, they should not approve of TTIP if it involves a weakening of 
existing regulation by means of democratic institutions or might impede it in the future. 
As Moravcsik (1993; 1998) would assume a producer bias on issues such as trade policy, and 
since further he would not expect governments – or, in this case, MEPs – to differ in their reaction to 
industry pressure along party lines, liberal intergovernmentalism would expect the structure of conflict 
over TTIP to be territorial. That said, the question is how the potential disagreement among some 
producer groups will play out within the countries in the sample. If those producers have a chance of 
dominating the domestic preference formation anywhere, this only applies to those countries where the 
minority of losers is comparatively large. Accordingly, MEPs from the UK, Ireland, Italy, and Germany 
should definitely be convinced by the pro-TTIP producer groups and should use frame F1 primarily, 
while only in France and Austria there is a possibility that anti-TTIP producers can convince MEPs to 
argue against TTIP. Noteworthy, the main issue in TTIP, namely regulatory cooperation, would not play 
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any role for the structure of conflict, as producer interests would be assumed to outweigh the more 
diffused societal interests on trade issues. Hence the frame of choice for Austrian and French MEPs 
would be the protectionist frame F2, but not the pro-consumer frame F3. 
Both the distribution model (Marks 2004) as well as postfunctional theory (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009) as its extension would imply an ideologically structured conflict on TTIP, with parties 
framing choices being similar to what I have pointed out for the cleavage approach. In these cases, 
however, the driving force behind the structure of conflict would consist in the direction of distributional 
effects (i.e. intra-national), reinforced respectively by the bias towards ideologically structured conflict in 
parliamentary arenas. A more fine-grained prediction concerning individual parties is not possible based 
on these theories, since the exact mechanism by which distributional effects translate into policy 
preferences expressed by political actors is not provided. 
Given that there is no national interest in the strict sense here (unlike in the case of CAP), the 
3G2P approach (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007) could be interpreted as expecting that MEPs, for reasons 
of intra-EP office-seeking, would rather vote with their EPG rather than defecting along national lines. 
Hence, the structure of conflict would be ideological, albeit EPG membership should be more decisive 
than ideology, that is, inasmuch as these two do not coincide anyway. The PPC approach (Ringe 2010) 
would expect an ideologically structured conflict as well, since MEPs are generally taken to have little 
incentive for defection and will rely on the information provided by expert MEPs, which in this case 
should be the members of the INTA committee responsible for trade policy. At most, those national party 
delegations who have an expert of their own in the INTA committee who further gives in to ‘constituency 
interests’ could be expected to defect. 
By contrast, the final of the EP-specific approaches, the bicameral theory (Costello and 
Thomson 2014), would expect MEPs to give in to lobbying by national governments as representatives of 
‘the’ national interest, when such interests are salient and the government isolated in the Council of the 
EU. Accordingly, the structure of conflict should be rather territorial here, since the French government 
in particular has always been rather isolated on the question of audio-visual industries in the EU’s trade 
policy (see above). French parties should thus be particularly prone to defection, using frame F2 as an 
argument. 
Finally, as was already mentioned, there are contrasting expectations with regard to more trade-
policy specific accounts of conflict. Classic trade theories would expect protectionists to oppose liberals 
(frame F1 vs frame F2), whereas DeVille and Siles-Brügge (2015) would claim that TTIP as an instance of 
a new kind of trade policy is not about protectionism or liberalisation anymore, but about more 
‘normative’ issues such as consumer protection vs. economic growth (frame F1 vs. frame F3). 
Noteworthy, the latter is not really an explicitly formulated theory, but still the explanation for their 
findings on TTIP. Table 61 below summarises these observable implications found in the extant literature, 
which can then be contrasted with the theory of territorialisation developed in Chapter 2. 
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Table 61: Observable implications of extant (theoretical) approaches, applied to TTIP 
Theory Predicted structure of conflict Causal narrative 
General theories on conflict in EU politics 
Cleavage approach (Marks & Wilson 
2000) 
ideological parties’ domestic habits, lack of 
citizen preferences on EU issues 
Distribution model (Marks 2004) ideological distributional effects are intra-
national 
Liberal intergovernmentalism territorial producer bias 
Postfunctionalism (Hooghe & 
Marks 2009) 
ideological distributional effects are intra-
national 
EP-specific theories 
3G2P theory (Hix, Noury et al. 
2007) 
ideological Office-seeking within the EP 
PPC approach (Ringe 2010) ideological Defection only with INTA member: 
Expert MEPs give in to 
constituency interests, others just 
follow experts 
bicameral theory (Costello & 
Thomson 2014) 
territorial Lobbying by national governments 
in line with national interests 
Policy-specific theoretical arguments 
Classic trade theories territorial Losers from TTIP are louder, 
manage to convince ‘their’ MEPs 
De Ville & Siles-Brügge (2015) ideological (no F2) Trade policy – and hence conflict in 
this area – is about values 
 
Observable implications of the theory of territorialisation 
Like most, but clearly not all, of the above theories, the theory of territorialisation (ToT) would expect the 
conflict on TTIP to be ideologically structured. In case of the ToT, this expectation is based on the idea 
that national party delegations to the EP as representatives of their respective national parties will wage 
their various goals against each other. Their policy-seeking goals would be met best by framing the issue in 
the manner predicted also by the cleavage approach. Unlike the cleavage approach, however, the ToT 
would also expect them to take their vote-seeking goals into account as well, due to politicisation. Vote-
seeking in EU politics is always bound to a particular national electorate, but since the distributional 
effects in the present case are primarily intra-national, there is not much room for territorialisation: parties 
are much more likely to disagree within each country along similar lines, namely with parties drawing on 
support from those voters valuing the material benefits expected from TTIP – mostly producers – versus 
those drawing on support mostly from those fearing the not directly material costs of ‘regulatory 
convergence’ – mostly consumers. 
In Chapter 3 I have noted the ideological main tenets of each party family as well as their core 
electorates inasmuch as such core electorates still exist (cf. also Detterbeck 2011, 75–82). Accordingly, for 
most parties there should not be a goal conflict between policy and votes here, since the parties 
ideologically in favour of free markets and free trade, namely the so-called economic Right consisting of 
the Christian Democratic and Conservative family, the Liberal family and the some extend the RWP 
family, tend to attract the votes of producers and materialists, while those on the economic Left favouring 
consumer protection and market intervention for ideological reasons also tend to attract the votes of 
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consumers and post-materialists. Without such goal conflict, there is no incentive for ‘defection’, so that 
the structure of conflict will be ideological indeed, with most parties using the frames most in line with 
their respective ideology (as was pointed out in detail in the foregoing discussion of the cleavage 
approach). 
The observable implications based on the ToT will thus contrast with those approaches 
predicting a territorial structure of conflict. In addition, however, they differ from those simply predicting 
a generally ideological structure, in that the exceptions to this rule can be rather concretely specified a 
priori. For in some cases, there will be a goal conflict between policy- and vote-seeking. This is because 
parties on the economic Right will usually not thrive on the votes of producers alone, while they would 
not give up on their support without need for doing so. When discussing the distributional effects of 
TTIP, it was noted not only that there will be distribution between consumers and producers, but also 
between various sectors of the economy or particular industries. The fact that (parts of) the agricultural in 
Europe is expected to be disadvantaged by TTIP may still be acknowledged by pro-farming parties by 
blurring their ideologically preferred F1 framing with some agricultural protectionism – either openly or 
indirectly. Yet, the smaller the number of producers gaining from TTIP becomes in comparison to those 
who lose from it, the more attractive defection will be for parties of the economic Right. Thereby, they 
could then appeal to voter groups beyond producers as well as to the losing producers, while blurring in 
the opposite direction. Moreover, since there are various frames in which to express and justify their 
scepticism on TTIP, they could choose the one most likely to resonate with voters due to its overlap with 
national traditions. Noteworthy, the goal conflict regarding TTIP is not ‘symmetric’, as the economic Left 
parties do not face the same conflict in countries gaining a lot from TTIP. This because their core 
electorates – consumers and postmaterialists – might suffer losses from an F1-version of TTIP anyway, so 
that defection would not pay-off electorally. 
Concretely, this would mean that defections could be expected on the part of the members of 
the economic Right party families from those countries barely gaining from TTIP overall, i.e. Austria and 
France. In the latter case, framing in line with the national tradition would mean making use of the 
protectionist frame F2 mostly, while in the former case frame F3 should be preferred as it does not 
challenge the economic advantages of free trade as much. This would distinguish the observable implications 
of the ToT from those approaches expecting a conflict between protectionists and liberals, as well as from 
those who consider classic protectionism dead. Moreover, cohesion would thus neither be a matter of 
EPG membership, as the 3G2P theory would suggest indirectly, nor would it be pre-conditioned by 
INTA access: after all, most of the studies concerning the economic impact of TTIP were published in 
2013 already, which should be just one illustration of the fact that information on TTIP is easily accessible 
outside the respective EP committee. Given that hence the predictions based on the ToT can be rather 
clearly contrasted at the micro-level even with those theories predicting the same or a similar overall 
structure of conflict at the macro-level, it should now be possible to evaluate the ToT against these extant 
approaches in the following section. 
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6.4 Results and discussion 
In this section, the results of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) are presented and discussed with regard to the 
theoretical expectations specified before. It is found that the structure of conflict is indeed mostly ideological, while 
some defections are observed nonetheless. The systematic analysis of these defections by means of csQCA lends 
further support to the theory of territorialisation (ToT) at the micro-level, in that with one exception, only the parties 
expected to defect actually do so. Yet, this unexpected defection by UKIP is accounted for at least partly by the 
national tradition condition suggested by the ToT, a condition that also explains the direction of defection for the 
other parties. By contrast, the extant theoretical approaches, even where they cannot be rejected right away, generally 
leave a number of questions open. This pattern applies all the more to the analysis of blurring and subsuming 
strategies, which the extant approaches, developed for and tested by analysis of roll-call votes, do not consider at all. 
While the analysis of blurring generally supports the role of the various conditions in relation to vote-seeking as 
provided for by the ToT, the finding that UKIP further makes use of a subsuming strategy to avoid any goal conflict 
further eliminates the explanatory gap left by the analysis of defection for good. Finally, external validity of these 
findings is provided in various ways. First, the identification of frames and the broader structure of conflict are 
largely confirmed by literature on TTIP published meanwhile. Moreover, voting results also show an ideological 
structure of conflict. Noteworthy, while defections in terms of voting are still missing even from those parties 
expected to defect by the ToT, this difference can be understood based on the fact that a defection in voting by the 
French and Austrian centre Right would only make sense once there is a final outcome of the negotiations. By 
contrast, since specific votes on the matter of ISDS have already been held, the meaning of conditional support on 
the part of the S&D group becomes clear and is in line with the findings of the PFA. 
Case-specific data-set and reliability 
For the purpose of analyzing how national party delegations express and justify their policy preferences on 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 191 press releases and other forms of text 
(e.g. manifestos) issued by 33 parties51 could be collected, resulting in no less than 1,800 codings in terms 
of quasi-sentences attributed to the various frames and their dimensions. Accordingly, the parties have 
issued an average number of about 5.8 press releases on the issue in the time frame considered, containing 
an average number of about 52.9 codings per party.52 Compared to the case of CAP, more press releases 
thus contained statements related to TTIP, but often only a few sentences were dedicated to the issue, 
which is arguably due to the wide range of topics that can be somehow linked to TTIP and its effects. The 
reliability test conducted on the issue-specific codebook (itself based on the above identification of the 
three TTIP-related policy frames) produced excellent results by all standards at the level of frames as well 
as acceptable results at the level of dimensions within these frames already in the first round after the 
general training (see Table 62). Since Cohen’s kappa as well as Krippendorff’s alpha account for agreement 
beyond chance, these very good results cannot be due to the increased chances of agreement for a smaller 
number of frames identified. Rather, this improvement would seem to demonstrate the fact that three 
frames with four dimensions each (i.e. 12 different codes in total) were easier to memorize and apply 
correctly for the student assistants employed as additional coders for the test. Noteworthy, the high 
                                                     
51 The MEPs of the Italian Right-Wing Populist Fratelli d’Italia/Alleanza Nazionale did not issue press releases on 
the issue nor did they mention it in their manifesto, nor could any other statement from a comparable source be 
found that would have been published prior or at least shortly after the 2014 European elections. 
52 In the cases of UK Labour and the Italian Partito Democratico, press releases issued after the election were used 
due to inaccessibility of the respective websites at the time of data collection, while triangulating them with pre-
election national-level sources and the manifestos no relevant differences in framing could be noticed. 
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reliability scores throughout do not seem to provide first (numerical) indications in terms of which parties 
might be ‘subsuming’, i.e. creatively re-inventing existing frames or developing new ones. 
Table 62: Reliability scores for the codebook on TTIP 
Level frames dimension 
Round 1 1 
% 92.88 78.08 
kappa 0.885 0.719 
alpha 0.885 0.719 
 
Unlike in the case of CAP, then, the results of the PFA can also be interpreted at the level of dimensions 
within the frames. On average, the numbers show that the policy dimension was referred to most, which 
indicates that parties devoted most attention to expressing their policy preferences directly and 
comparatively less attention to justifying it. Interestingly, however, parties using frame F1 mostly stress the 
potential benefits of TTIP (F1 norm) and the causal narrative behind it more often than their support for 
an ‘ambitious’ agreement, which might indicate that they felt a greater need to justify their policy 
preference and/or were less keen on stressing the details of the policy itself (e.g. support for ISDS). As a 
whole, the idea that the conflict on TTIP was primarily of a ‘normative’ nature does not receive support 
by the results of the PFA in terms of the distribution of codings across dimensions. 
 
Table 63: Distribution of codings across dimensions of the policy frames 
dimension F1 % F2 % F3 % total % 
norm 139.0 41.2 73.0 26.5 186.00 15.7 398.0 22.1 
cons 21.0 6.2 59.0 21.5 266.00 22.4 346.0 19.2 
cogn 96.0 28.5 34.0 12.4 267.0 22.5 397.0 22.1 
pol 81.0 24.0 109.0 39.6 469.0 39.5 659.0 36.6 
total 337.0 100.0 275.0 100.0 1188.0 100.0 1800.0 100.0 
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Macro-level: overall structure of conflict and descriptive summary of frame usage 
Table 64: Percentage of quasi-sentences attributed to the various frames within each party’s statements 
code/party F1: neoliberalism F2: protectionism F3: anti-globalisation 
UK LibDem 100.0 0.0 0.0 
UKIP 100.0 0.0 0.0 
UK Cons 100.0 0.0 0.0 
D FDP 100.0 0.0 0.0 
IRE FG 94.2 1.9 3.8 
D CDU/CSU 69.4 11.1 19.4 
IRE FF 65.0 5.0 30.0 
I FI 55.2 44.8 0.0 
F FN 0.0 75.0 25.0 
F PS 0.0 58.6 41.4 
F UMP 37.7 50.0 12.3 
IRE Lab 0.0 0.0 100.0 
I Tsipras 0.0 0.0 100.0 
A Grüne 0.0 0.0 100.0 
UK Greens 0.0 0.0 100.0 
UK BNP 0.0 0.0 100.0 
I Verdi 0.0 0.0 100.0 
D SPD 1.4 2.1 96.6 
A SPÖ 4.8 0.0 95.2 
F FdG 0.0 6.9 93.1 
D B90 0.0 7.5 92.5 
UK Lab 10.1 0.0 89.9 
A FPÖ 0.0 13.9 86.1 
F Verts 0.0 15.4 84.6 
IRE Greens 1.3 15.6 83.1 
I PD 13.0 8.7 78.3 
D AfD 25.0 0.0 75.0 
IRE SF 0.0 29.6 70.4 
A NEOs 20.7 10.3 69.0 
D NPD 0.0 33.3 66.7 
D LINKE 0.0 34.0 66.0 
A ÖVP 32.8 11.8 55.5 
F MoDem 2.8 44.4 52.8 
 
As can be quickly discovered by looking at the above table on frame usage, it is indeed only parties that 
can be counted among the economic Right that use frame F1, the frame calling for and justifying a quick 
and ambitious EU-US trade agreement. Since it is further only French parties that make use of frame F2, 
there also appears to be at least some territorial element involved. It can thus also be held at this point, 
that classic protectionism as expressed by this frame is not entirely absent from the debate, which 
contrasts with the findings by De Ville and Siles-Brügge discussed earlier. The score of -27.27 on the 
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territorialisation index confirms this impression of a largely ideological conflict (see Table 65). At the same 
time, there must accordingly be five parties that do not frame in line with their ideology. 
Table 65: The structure of conflict on TTIP in numbers 
Parties framing in line with… …ideology …territory 
Absolute number 28 19 
Index of territorialisation: -27.27 
 
Staying at the descriptive level but zooming in closer, it becomes clear that, while only parties from 
families attributed to the economic Right make use of frame F1, but not all of them do. Moreover, the 
British representative of the RWP family, UKIP, uses frame F1 not just predominantly, but exclusively. 
This should be considered as an instance of defection at this point, because it does not seem to involve 
any element of nationalism in protectionist or identity terms. 
By contrast, the fact that the French Parti Socialiste is among the parties mainly using frame F2 
might not be considered as a defection. After all, protectionism does not generally collide with Socialist 
ideology as much as e.g. neoliberalism (frame F1) would, and French and Belgian French-speaking 
Socialists are generally considered as “traditionally the most protectionist among all S&D members” 
(Frantescu 2015), so that this may count as historically-grown, intra-ideological variation. In addition, the 
party uses the expected frame F3 quite often, and indeed calls for F2 policies only in the context of a 
special role for the audio-visual sector, which indeed borders the frame F3 also qualitatively. It must be 
noted, however, that if one considered the PS to be defecting, this ‘most likely case’ for the bicameral 
theory – MEPs of a governing party defecting on an issue of high salience regarding which the national 
government is isolated in the Council – would be in line with this theory. Below I will discuss, in how far 
the bicameral theory can be said to hold beyond this most likely case and explain other defections as well. 
The French Liberal party MoDem, however, exclusively uses frames that seem to contradict a 
Liberal ideology and barely refers to the neoliberal frame F1 and should hence be considered defecting 
rather clearly. Similarly, albeit not to the same extent, it seems to contradict the ideological outlook of the 
French UMP, as well as the Austrian ÖVP (Christian Democratic / Conservative) and the Liberal NEOs 
that they use the neoliberal frame F1 only secondarily, while devoting more than half of their statements 
to those frames expressing some reservations regarding TTIP. In addition, the anti-globalisation frame F3 
is used by all Green, Social Democratic, far Left and far Right (RWP and extreme) parties. Finally, it 
should be noted at least at the descriptive level, that the radical version of frame F3 is never used by Social 
Democratic parties, but is used by most Green, far Left and far Right parties. 
Micro-level: analysis of defection 
The fact that there are defections – 5 out of 33 parties defect – already shows that the structure is not 
simply ideological, as some of the above theories would expect. It is further not really territorialised, 
otherwise the index of territorialisation would be positive. This point is further supported by the analysis 
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of defection. At least three conditions need to be included in order to demonstrate this, namely one for 
the relative amount of gains expected from TTIP and at least two for distinguishing the various party 
families and their ideologies concerning this issue: Unlike for Europeanised welfare and CAP, a simple 
Left-Right distinction will not do, since not only interventionism, but also nationalism are at odds with the 
kind of globalisation TTIP stands for (cf. Kriesi 2012, 20–22). A csQCA including these three conditions, 
then, leads to the following Truth Table and complex solution (see Table 66).  
Table 66: Truth Table TTIP; conditions: basic, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
countryTTIPloser econRight nationalist defection party 
0 1 0 0 
UK LibDem,  
UK Cons, D FDP, 
IRE FG,  
D CDU/CSU,  
IRE FF, I FI 
0 1 1 C UKIP, D AfD 
1 0 1 0 F FN 
1 0 0 0 
F PS, A Gruene,  
A SPOE, F FdG,  
F Verts 
1 1 0 1 
F UMP, A NEOs,  
A OEVP, F MoDem 
0 0 0 0 
IRE Lab, I Tsipras,  
UK Greens, I Verdi, 
D SPD, D B90,  
UK Lab,  
IRE Greens, I PD, 
IRE SF, D LINKE 
0 0 1 0 UK BNP, D NPD 
1 1 1 0 A FPOE 
 
Table 67: Complex solution TTIP; conditions: basic, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * ECONRIGHT * nationalist  F UMP, A NEOs, A OEVP, F MoDem 
 
First, it should be noted that Left-wing parties, even from those countries gaining a lot, do not defect. 
This is why the structure of conflict is not as territorialised as some theories would suggest. For instance, 
following Moravcsik’s idea of a producer bias, Left-wing parties should have listened to their producers, 
especially in the UK (expected to gain the most). Second, only the centre-Right from ‘losing’ countries 
defects clearly (i.e. without contradictions). This is what the theory of territorialisation would provide, for 
only those parties have a sufficient vote-seeking incentive for defection due to their particular core 
electorate. Third, however, one contradictory configuration remains, namely between two RWP parties, 
the German AfD and the British UKIP, both of which come from countries that are expected to gain a 
lot from TTIP. UKIP; however, defected from an ideological course that, due to its nationalist aspects, 
would generally be less enthusiastic about free trade than UKIP’s line of argument of TTIP seems to be. 
Unless this contradiction is due to the process of dichotomising the conditions used thus far – a point to 
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which I shall return below – it would thus appear that theories considering distributional effects and 
ideology only cannot fully account for defection here. 
One way ahead would thus consist in considering slightly more sophisticated accounts of 
defection involving the addition for further conditions. Indeed, there are at least three approaches noted 
above, namely the bicameral, the PPC, and the theory of territorialisation, that would provide for such 
additional conditions. Hence, these three will be discussed here one after another first, before finally 
discussing the usefulness of integrating them into one model (i.e. the so-called ‘perspectives approach’, cf. 
Berg-Schlosser and Meur 2009a, 25–28). 
The bicameral approach seems to imply that national governments are the actual defenders of 
national interest and lobby MEPs from their own and other parties on issues salient to them, especially if 
further they are isolated in the Council. One might therefore argue, that – at the very least – the governing 
parties themselves might defect from their ideology for the sake of the national interest. If the condition 
of government participation is added, however, the contradictory configuration does not disappear. 
Logically, since neither UKIP nor the AfD is part of the government, adding this condition cannot 
remove the contradiction in their behaviour. What is more, government participation does not seem to 
play any explanatory role, not even in the complex solution: 
Table 68: Truth Table TTIP; conditions: basic + gov, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
country 
TTIPloser 
econRight nationalist gov defection party 
0 1 0 1 0 
UK LibDem,  
UK Cons,  
IRE FG,  
D CDU/CSU 
0 1 1 0 C UKIP, D AfD 
0 1 0 0 0 
D FDP, IRE FF, 
I FI 
1 0 1 0 0 F FN 
1 0 0 1 0 F PS, A SPOE 
1 1 0 0 1 
F UMP,  
A NEOs,  
F MoDem 
0 0 0 1 0 
IRE Lab, D SPD, 
I PD 
0 0 0 0 0 
I Tsipras,  
UK Greens,  
I Verdi, D B90,  
UK Lab,  
IRE Greens,  
IRE SF,  
D LINKE 
1 0 0 0 0 
A Gruene, 
F FdG, F Verts 
0 0 1 0 0 
UK BNP,  
D NPD 
1 1 1 0 0 A FPOE 
1 1 0 1 1 A OEVP 
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Table 69: Complex solution TTIP; conditions: basic + gov, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * ECONRIGHT  
* nationalist  
F UMP, A NEOs, A OEVP, F MoDem 
 
Nevertheless, it could still be the case that the defecting parties, while (apart from the ÖVP) not in 
government themselves, give in to the lobbying by their respective national governments, led by Social 
Democratic parties (PS and SPÖ, respectively). Indeed, the protectionism the UMP and the Front 
National subscribe to is also found in the rhetoric of the PS on TTIP, and literally all Austrian parties use 
frame F3 mostly, the frame preferred by the SPÖ. Similarly, UKIP could be taken to follow the 
government led by the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, both of which prefer frame F1. 
While noting just briefly again that there is hardly a conceivable reason why MEPs should 
actually give in to the lobbying by their national governments rather than challenging them, there are 
country-specific empirical counterarguments as well: First, while the French Greens (Verts) and the Front 
de Gauche by far prefer F3-based arguments over protectionist (F2) ones and thus remain in line with 
their respective ideologies, the defecting UMP and the FN surpass the PS in their protectionism: The 
UMP, for instance, wants to exempt the military industry from TTIP as well, not just audio-visuals, while 
the FN wants to exempt everything from TTIP (i.e. unconditionally rejects it) and wants a full-scale return 
to a protectionist trade policy. Second, as for the defecting Austrian parties, it mainly does not make sense 
to assume that the NEOs were lobbied by the SPÖ government, since at the time of analysis they did not 
even have MEPs yet but were simply campaigning. Third, if it were not for other conditions rather than 
governmental lobbying, why would the UK government manage to win UKIP over in favour of TTIP, 
but would fail to do so regarding Labour and the Greens, for instance? In sum, therefore, the bicameral 
theory does not seem to be supported by the empirical facts either: Rather than governmental lobbying 
acting as an independent force, it seems that exactly those parties are successfully lobbied towards 
defection by the national governments who have other reasons to defect anyway. 
Next, one might wonder in how far the role of expert MEPs had an influence on the prospects 
for defection. This, at least, would be one way of interpreting the Perceived Preferences Coherence 
approach developed by Ringe (for a detailed discussion and critique, see Chapter 2). Having access to the 
expert committee – here: INTA – would thus be necessary in order to defect, for otherwise parties would 
tend to rely on the information provided by the expert MEPs from the same EPG rather than from the 
same country. 
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Table 70: Truth Table TTIP; conditions: basic + INTA, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
country 
TTIPloser 
econRight nationalist INTA defection party 
0 1 0 1 0 
UK LibDem,  
UK Cons,  
D FDP, IRE FG,  
D CDU/CSU, 
IRE FF, I FI 
0 1 1 1 1 UKIP 
1 0 1 1 0 F FN 
1 0 0 1 0 
F PS, A Gruene,  
A SPOE, F FdG, 
F Verts 
1 1 0 1 1 
F UMP,  
A OEVP,  
F MoDem 
0 0 0 1 0 
IRE Lab, D SPD,  
D B90, UK Lab, 
I PD, D LINKE 
0 0 0 0 0 
I Tsipras,  
UK Greens,  
I Verdi,  
IRE Greens,  
IRE SF 
0 0 1 0 0 
UK BNP,  
D NPD 
1 1 1 0 0 A FPOE 
0 1 1 0 0 D AfD 
1 1 0 0 1 A NEOs 
 
Table 71: Complex solution TTIP; conditions: basic + INTA, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * ECONRIGHT  
* nationalist 
F UMP, A NEOs, A OEVP, F MoDem 
+ countryttiploser * ECONRIGHT  
* NATIONALIST * INTA 
UKIP 
 
Indeed, the contradictory configuration can be resolved in this manner, since the AfD did not have an 
INTA member at the time (in fact, it did not even have MEPs yet), while UKIP had access to expert 
information. Nevertheless, a number of points against the plausibility of this explanation can be made. 
First of all, INTA membership is not a necessary condition for defection. While four of the five parties 
defecting did have a member in the INTA committee, the Austrian NEOs defected without such 
privileged access, indeed even without having any MEP yet. Second, it is not as surprising that the NEOs 
– apparently – were still able to make their own expertise-based judgement on TTIP, since, amongst 
others, scientific studies on the potential impact of TTIP were already available at the time. Third, the fact 
that so many of the defecting parties had their own INTA member may well be due to the self-selection 
among committee members I have discussed earlier, in that parties of the economic Right might generally 
be very interested in having a member in this committee that is so important to their core electorate of 
producers. At the same time, 23 out of 33 parties in the sample had some connection to INTA (i.e. 
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members or substitute members), so that in fact it is highly likely to have one for any party. Interestingly, 
while this ratio would make INTA a good candidate for a trivial necessary condition (i.e. the fact that the 
condition is always present when defection occurs is simply due to it being present all the time, cf. 
Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 144–48), it is indeed necessary for explaining UKIP only, while from the 
causal path regarding the other parties it can be removed by Boolean minimisation even in the complex 
solution. Finally, the fact that parties such as UK Labour or Irish Labour do not defect – despite having 
access to the same expertise, and despite the high gains to be expected in both countries – is hard to 
explain without a more sophisticated account of ‘constituency interests’ than the one offered by the PPC. 
In general, the theory of territorialisation does offer such an account, and with regard to the set 
of relevant conditions, it holds that national traditions – here: the type of capitalism – should be taken into 
account, as such traditions might explain intra-ideological variation and might reduce the loss of credibility 
that might otherwise come with defection. In the present case, it seems helpful to distinguish countries 
with a liberal type of capitalism from those with statist or managed capitalism, since the openness towards 
free trade is strongest in the former and the preference for market regulation stronger in the latter two. 
Table 72: Truth Table TTIP; conditions: ToT, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
country 
TTIPloser 
liberal. 
capitalism 
econRight  nationalist defection party 
0 1 1 0 0 
UK LibDem,  
UK Cons,  
IRE FG, IRE FF 
0 1 1 1 1 UKIP 
0 0 1 0 0 
D FDP,  
D CDU/CSU,  
I FI 
1 0 0 1 0 F FN 
1 0 0 0 0 
F PS, A Gruene,  
A SPOE, F FdG, 
F Verts 
1 0 1 0 1 
F UMP,  
A NEOs,  
A OEVP,  
F MoDem 
0 1 0 0 0 
IRE Lab,  
UK Greens,  
UK Lab,  
IRE Greens,  
IRE SF 
0 0 0 0 0 
I Tsipras, I Verdi,  
D SPD, D B90,  
I PD, D LINKE 
0 1 0 1 0 UK BNP 
1 0 1 1 0 A FPOE 
0 0 1 1 0 D AfD 
0 0 0 1 0 D NPD 
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Table 73: Complex solution TTIP; conditions: ToT, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
countryttiploser * LIBERAL.CAPITALISM * 
ECONRIGHT * NATIONALIST 
UKIP 
COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * ECONRIGHT * nationalist  F UMP, A NEOs, A OEVP, F MoDem 
 
If a condition capturing the type of capitalism in this manner is added, the contradiction between the AfD 
and UKIP is resolved: UKIP would now be defecting because the liberal national tradition would provide 
the another argument for defection: it would thus in the economic interest of the country – after all, the 
gains expected for UK are particularly highs – while suggesting a course that is in line with the national 
tradition softens the move away from more exclusive forms of nationalism. Moreover, within the UK, the 
fact that Labour and the Greens are neither nationalist nor part of the economic Right would explain the 
difference in behaviour. Furthermore, outside the UK, the type of capitalism also guides the defection of 
the other four parties: given that part of their core electorate – the louder one – will suffer from TTIP and 
their respective national tradition is statist (France) or managed (Austria) capitalism, they move away from 
frame F1 towards the protectionist frame F2 in the case of France, expressing scepticism of free trade and 
free markets, or towards frame F3 in the case of Austria, expressing not so much doubts about free trade 
in terms of the economic causal narratives behind it but about the new generation of trade agreements 
with their focus on regulatory convergence. In sum, the theory of territorialisation does not only offer a 
solution terms free of contradictions, but also a convincing account once the qualitative details on the 
defecting and non-defecting parties are taken into account. 
Noteworthy also, the theory of territorialisation applies to all parties, irrespective of their EPG, 
in that the Austrian NEOs – ceteris paribus – behave no different from Liberal parties already part of 
ALDE within the EP, for instance, while the difference between AfD (not in EP) and UKIP (EFD) could 
hardly be due to differences in EPG membership. This can be seen as an argument against the 3G2P 
approach, where intra-EP office-seeking should make EPG membership a key factor. 
Before concluding this subsection, it seems worthwhile checking in how far the various 
theoretical approaches discussed separately above might speak to each other, that is, if government 
participation, INTA membership and type of capitalism complement each other or in how far one or two 
can be taken out of the solution. As one might expect, a Truth Table including all of these conditions does 
not include any contradictory configurations. Noteworthy, however, the inclusion of six conditions means 
that there will be 26=64 logically possible combinations of conditions, which clearly cannot be covered 
empirically with 33 cases. 
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Table 74: Truth Table TTIP; conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
country 
TTIPloser 
liberal. 
capitalism 
econRight nationalist INTA gov defection party 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
UK 
LibDem, 
UK Cons, 
IRE FG 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 UKIP 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 D FDP, I FI 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
D 
CDU/CSU 
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 IRE FF 
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 F FN 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
F PS,  
A SPOE 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
F UMP,  
F MoDem 
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 IRE Lab 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I Tsipras,  
I Verdi 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
A Gruene,  
F FdG,  
F Verts 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
UK Greens, 
IRE Greens, 
IRE SF 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 UK BNP 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
D SPD,  
I PD 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
D B90,  
D LINKE 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 UK Lab 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 A FPOE 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 D AfD 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 A NEOs 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 D NPD 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 A OEVP 
 
The analysis of necessity reveals that there is only one single condition that consistently is present for all 
instances of defection, namely the “economic Right” condition Table 75. 
Table 75: Analysis of Necessity TTIP (inclusion score = 1.0), outcome: defection 
Condition(s) Coverage 
ECONRIGHT 0.357 
INTA+gov 0.152 
nationalist+gov 0.152 
nationalist+INTA 0.172 
 
Its relevance expressed in terms of coverage, however, is rather low, which generally is considered as an 
indication of trivialness of necessary conditions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 144–48). Noteworthy, 
however, this might also just be due to the fact that simply there are not many cases of defection (5) in the 
overall set, so that the number of parties having an ideology that is generally attributed to the economic 
Right (14) is necessarily rather high by comparison. Not overrating this numerical criterion, therefore, the 
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fact remains that all defecting parties share this feature. The disjunction INTA+gov also consistently 
covers all cases of defection, but given that INTA alone is present for 23 out of 33 cases, its relevance can 
be deemed definitely low. 
Before this background, it does not seem surprising that the complex solution for this Truth 
Table is indeed quite complex: Where before there was one term for four of the five parties, there are now 
to possible paths, combining economic gains, type of capitalism, ideology with either national opposition or 
INTA membership, and one additional path explaining only UKIP by including all conditions (see Table 
76). In fact, there is some overlap between the first two expressions, so that the solution can be rewritten 
(see Table 77). 
Table 76: Complex solution TTIP; conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * liberal.capitalism * 
ECONRIGHT * nationalist * gov 
F UMP, F MoDem, A NEOs 
COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * liberal.capitalism * 
ECONRIGHT * nationalist * INTA 
F UMP, F MoDem, A OEVP 
countryttiploser * LIBERAL.CAPITALISM * 
ECONRIGHT * NATIONALIST * INTA * gov 
UKIP 
 
Table 77: Complex solution TTIP rewritten; conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * liberal.capitalism * 
ECONRIGHT * nationalist * (gov+INTA) 
F UMP, F MoDem, A NEOs, A OEVP 
countryttiploser * LIBERAL.CAPITALISM * 
ECONRIGHT * NATIONALIST * INTA * gov 
UKIP 
 
This – factually identical – way of writing it shows more clearly that the main part corresponding most 
clearly to the theory of territorialisation remains decisive and still covers most cases. Whether the addition 
of (gov+INTA) is indeed necessary can be questioned, given the foregoing analysis of their relevance. 
Given that 43 of the 64 logically possible combinations of conditions cannot be covered by the 
33 parties in the sample, the inclusion of logical remainders might be useful. The most parsimonious 
solution possible (i.e. the one that includes whatever logical remainder that, if an empirical case, would 
allow for a shorter solution term) reads as follows: 
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Table 78: Parsimonious solution TTIP (1), conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
countryttiploser * NATIONALIST * INTA UKIP 
COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * ECONRIGHT  
* nationalist 
F UMP, F MoDem, A NEOs, A OEVP 
Simplifying assumptions: 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{1} 
 
Number of Simplifying Assumptions: 12 
 
Table 79: Parsimonious solution TTIP (2), conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * ECONRIGHT  
* nationalist 
F UMP, F MoDem, A NEOs, A OEVP 
LIBERAL.CAPITALISM * ECONRIGHT  
* NATIONALIST 
UKIP 
Simplifying assumptions: 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{0}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{0}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{0}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{0}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} 
 
Number of Simplifying Assumptions: 12 
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Table 80: Parsimonious solution TTIP (3), conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * ECONRIGHT  
* nationalist 
F UMP, F MoDem, A NEOs, A OEVP 
LIBERAL.CAPITALISM * NATIONALIST * 
INTA 
UKIP 
Simplifying assumptions: 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{0}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} 
 
Number of Simplifying Assumptions: 12 
 
Table 81: Parsimonious solution TTIP (4), conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * ECONRIGHT  
* nationalist 
F UMP, F MoDem, A NEOs, A OEVP 
ECONRIGHT * NATIONALIST * INTA UKIP 
Simplifying assumptions: 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{0}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{0}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{0}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{0}INTA{1}gov{1} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{0} + 
countryTTIPloser{1}liberal.capitalism{1}econRight{1}nationalist{1}INTA{1}gov{1} 
 
Number of Simplifying Assumptions: 12 
 
In practice, then, there are four equally parsimonious solutions, each of which would require 12 
simplifying assumptions. It can be noted that indeed one term has been one identified earlier, which 
covers the centre Right parties from France and Austria, while there is variation only concerning the right 
path for explaining UKIP: it is either explained in line with the PPC – with INTA membership as the 
decisive element next to ‘econRight’ and ‘nationalism’ – or in line with the ToT, with liberal capitalism 
playing the same role. 
Noteworthy, however, some of the simplifying assumptions would seem to run counter to the 
main finding of the analysis of necessity, namely that being part of the economic Right is a necessary 
condition for defection. In order to exclude this and other theoretically implausible simplifying 
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assumptions, it is helpful to incorporate so-called ‘directional expectations’ into the computerised analysis 
and arrive at what is called an ‘intermediate solution’. Here, I indicate that 
- generally, the country being a TTIP loser is conducive to defection, 
- as is being part of the economic Right, 
- parties from non-liberal capitalist countries are more likely to defect, 
- nationalist parties generally will not defect, 
- INTA membership is conducive to defection (in line with PPC), 
- Governing parties in general are more prone to defection. 
The resulting intermediate solution reads as follows: 
Table 82: Intermediate solution TTIP, conditions: comprehensive approach, outcome: defection 
Solution terms Cases covered 
CONTRYTTIPLOSER * liberal.capitalism * 
ECONRIGHT * nationalist 
F UMP, F MoDem, A NEOs, A OEVP 
LIBERAL.CAPITALISM * ECONRIGHT * 
NATIONALIST * INTA 
UKIP 
 
This is very close the solution obtained in the analysis of the conditions considered based on the ToT 
only. However, in the case of UKIP, committee membership would still be considered a part of the 
explanation, this time next to the type of capitalism. In sum, then, the ToT certainly explains the biggest 
part and does not leave and contradictory configurations. Nevertheless, some elements of PPC cannot be 
ruled out technically here, albeit considered on its own, Ringe’s PPC approach leaves many more open 
questions than the ToT did. 
While exact predictions regarding the other strategies for resolving goal conflict, namely blurring 
and subsuming, are more difficult to predict, analyzing them in the next subsection might complete the 
picture. The analysis of the broader patterns in blurring, for instance, can provide some indications 
regarding the role played of the various conditions. As for subsuming, it should be noted that UKIP – 
amongst others – has been found to apply this strategy extensively regarding the other issues analysed so 
far, the same party that in this case would appear as rather special. Accordingly, one might check for acts 
of subsuming on the part of UKIP that could foster the understanding of this case of defection.53 
Micro-level: Analysis of further framing strategies 
Indeed, while it is generally not easy to predict blurring and even more so subsuming, it is close to 
impossible based on the theories other than the ToT: On the one hand, the vote-seeking element in the 
ToT would make such nuanced framing entirely plausible. On the other hand, arguing that access to 
expert knowledge leads a party to let just some of its statements point in a different (or even 
contradictory) direction, or that governmental lobbying does only partly influence the way a party 
                                                     
53 In practice, of course, the subsuming strategy applied by UKIP was also clearly visible during the process of hand-
coding. 
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expresses and justifies its policy preferences, does not make much sense without the idea of 
simultaneously pursued party goals. Hence, I limit the analysis to the conditions included in the ToT and 
thereby evaluate the plausibility of its underlying assumptions. 
Table 83: Truth Table TTIP; conditions: ToT, outcome: blurring_wide 
Conditions Outcome Case ID 
country 
TTIPloser 
liberal. 
capitalism 
econRight  nationalist defection party 
0 1 1 0 C 
UK LibDem,  
UK Cons,  
IRE FG, IRE FF 
0 1 1 1 0 UKIP 
0 0 1 0 C 
D FDP,  
D CDU/CSU,  
I FI 
1 0 0 1 1 F FN 
1 0 0 0 C 
F PS, A Gruene,  
A SPOE, F FdG, 
F Verts 
1 0 1 0 1 
F UMP,  
A NEOs,  
A OEVP,  
F MoDem 
0 1 0 0 C 
IRE Lab,  
UK Greens,  
UK Lab,  
IRE Greens,  
IRE SF 
0 0 0 0 C 
I Tsipras, I Verdi,  
D SPD, D B90, 
 I PD, D LINKE 
0 1 0 1 0 UK BNP 
1 0 1 1 0 A FPOE 
0 0 1 1 1 D AfD 
0 0 0 1 1 D NPD 
 
Table 84: Complex solution TTIP; conditions: ToT, outcome: blurring_wide 
Solution terms Cases covered 
liberal.capitalism * econright * NATIONALIST F FN, D NPD 
countryttiploser * liberal.capitalism  
* NATIONALIST 
D AfD, D NPD 
COUNTRYTTIPLOSER * liberal.capitalism  
* ECONRIGHT * nationalist 
F UMP, A NEOs, A OEVP, F MoDem 
 
The above TruthTable including the conditions from the ToT and the outcome of ‘blurring’ in the widest 
sense (i.e. mixing statements from various frames) includes a number of contradictory configurations. It 
can be argued, however, that these are not due to a lack of explanatory capacity on the part of the theory, 
but due to the rather rough operationalisation at this point. Rather than, however, blowing up the model 
by including refined conditions or turning to multi-value QCA (cf. Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser 2009), I 
will first explain the pattern identified by excluding any contradictory configurations and then to 
qualitatively account for the latter. 
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First, it appears that extreme Right parties from non-liberal countries blur their frames by 
mixing anti-globalisation and protectionist statements, which makes perfect sense in that they would 
ideologically be expected to reject TTIP for both its cosmopolitan and its market liberal aspects. 
Noteworthy, the fact that the UK BNP does not make protectionist argument further supports the idea 
that the type of capitalism is influential in terms of the nuances of supporting or rejecting TTIP: In fact, 
protectionism thus seems as an absolute taboo in the liberal UK. 
Second, blurring seems to serve the nationalist Right in non-liberal countries to differentiate 
their opposition to TTIP: the RWP AfD mixes frame F3 with elements of frame F1, acknowledging the 
idea of free trade in principle, but disapproving of TTIP, while the extremist NPD rejects TTIP for both 
protectionist and anti-globalist reasons. In other words, the nationalist element that unites both is the 
reason for eventually rejecting TTIP, while their stances on market intervention are different. 
A third group of blurring parties consists of those centre Right parties found to be defection 
earlier. By means of blurring, they apparently try to please those parts of their electorate set to win from 
TTIP after all, and at least partly they follow their ideology by doing so. Again, it might be argued that this 
behaviour can only be understood by referring to conflicting goals. 
The first two contradictions can be resolved, albeit not completely, once the centre Right is 
differentiated further, in that the Irish Fianna Fáil is found to express some reluctance towards TTIP in 
terms of GMOs and hormone treated beef along the lines, however, of frame F3. Similarly, the 
CDU/CSU insists on keeping up EU standards on foodstuffs. It thus seems that these parties take up the 
case of agricultural protectionism, albeit disguising it as pro-consumerism, which makes sense vote-
seeking wise for parties with a farming electorate losing from TTIP, but accordingly not for Liberal 
parties. 
The fact that, unlike the parties in the same configuration (or the same row of the TruthTable), 
the French PS mixes F3 framing with a considerable degree of frame F2 becomes understandable as a 
result of the type of capitalism and the concrete threat to the French audio-visual sector, whose protection 
is not the same as that of, say, the arms industry. This is because one would expect people involved in the 
cultural sector to vote for a Left-wing party such as the PS. This Left-wing case of protectionism might 
thus be an exception, but one which confirms the general rule that vote-seeking causes parties to deviate – 
in this case not too far – from their ideology, especially if such a step is in line with a given national 
tradition. 
Finally, the last two contradictions again do follow more of a pattern than it appears in the first 
place, because both are due to the framing of two far Left parties from non-state capitalist countries (the 
LINKE and Sinn Féin) being more protectionist than that of Greens, Social Democrats and the far Left 
from countries with a state capitalist tradition. Here, the fact that these parties differ from the centre Left 
is easily understandable: The far Left logically is more sceptical of markets than the centre Left, especially 
since New Left ideas took hold within Social Democracy. Moreover, in contrast to the Greens, the far 
Left might also try to attract some more materialist voters. It might be argued, however, that the Lista 
Tsipras (usually under the label of the Rifondazione Commuista) from state capitalist Italy should be at 
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least as protectionist, but it sticks to frame F3 only. Unless this is seen as the odd one out here, one might 
argue that the LINKE and Sinn Féin simply saw more of a need to directly question the economic causal 
narrative on TTIP, coming from countries that are usually not protectionist and that stand to gain 
considerably from the agreement. 
In sum, blurring can be understood largely in terms of vote-seeking: parties blur when they want 
to remain attractive to voters having distributional interests that differ from the ones they cater with their 
predominant frame, or to attract votes from those adhering to a particular national tradition. Vote-seeking 
is, however, not a part of the theories of conflict in EU politics developed prior to the Crisis, but a core 
component of the theory of territorialisation developed here. 
The analysis of subsuming, at last, solves the final puzzle that even the theory of 
territorialisation could only partly account for, namely the apparent defection of UKIP. This defection, 
albeit partly understandable given the high expected gains for UK producers and the liberal type of 
capitalism, would nevertheless appear as a rather crude step. This is because using the neoliberal, pro-
TTIP frame F1 might yet scare off a good number of UKIP’s core electorate that tends to lose from or 
feel threatened by globalisation projects such as TTIP, as well as by European integration. 
Since the press releases on TTIP were hand-coded, however, it also could be noted that, while 
UKIP’s statements resemble the neoliberal frame best, they were still set in a larger context and thereby 
subsumed under UKIP’s general, RWP/Eurosceptic agenda, captured amongst others in the following 
excerpt by its MEP Roger Helmer on the delegation’s website: 
There is, of course, the issue of the various trade deals that the EU has struck, and in which we participate 
as members.  When we leave, will be still have a free trade deal with, say, Korea?  What about the 
Transatlantic free-trade deal with the USA, currently in the early stages of negotiation?  But we can 
credibly argue that outside the EU we might have had a free trade deal with the States twenty years ago – 
and on terms that would not be biased to account for French protectionism. 
Thereby, they present themselves as the guardians of supposed British economic interests as well as of a 
British national tradition of free trade, packed into a critique of the EU to please their nationalist voters at 
the same time. By means of this creative act of subsuming, therefore, they are able to remove any traces of 
goal conflict. Noteworthy, the MEP issuing the two press releases considered for analysis here has not 
been a member of INTA since 2004, which again confirms the idea that access to information needed for 
taking differentiated positions on politicised and certain issues such as TTIP is not contained in expert 
committees alone and is therefore not a necessary condition for defection. 
Beyond the PFA: external validity of the findings 
The work by De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2015), published only in October 2015, focuses on the arguments 
made by TTIP supporters and opponents, and the analysis of these arguments largely supports the 
selection of policy frames identified for the purpose of the Policy Frame Analysis (PFA). What is more, 
however, it also confirms the importance of a neoliberal (here: F1) and an anti-globalisation or pro-
‘standards’ frame (here. F3) as opposed to classic protectionism. At the same time, it must be noted that 
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the more systematic analysis of selected parties across six countries reveals that classic protectionism is not 
entirely out of the debate. Moreover, it could be shown here how protectionism can still find its way into 
the debate in a hidden form, namely in terms of pro-consumerist arguments eventually serving to protect 
a particular industry through the backdoor. 
 
Figure 11: Voting results on the resolution 23rd May 2013 to start the negotiations (all MEPs). Source: Hix 2013, 26. 
The results of the vote regarding an EP resolution on the start of trade and investment negotiations with 
the US show that only Green parties, far Left and far Right parties voted against TTIP from the start, i.e. 
unconditionally, and that overall, EPGs voted cohesively and hence ideologically rather than territorially. 
This result corresponds to the more detailed results of the PFA presented in Annex III, which show that 
the radical version of frame F3 (F3B) is used by parties from these families only, but not by the Socialists. 
Unlike a ‘yes’ vote might seem to imply, however, the S&D group was thus not simply ‘in favour’ of 
TTIP. Considering more carefully the content of the vote, namely the starting of negotiations, it should be 
seen as support for just that. This, then, would correspond to the usage of frame F3A as found by the 
PFA. 
Indeed, the debate on ISDS further demonstrates the conditions attached by the S&D/ Socialist 
party family. After all, this party family and the EPG founded from it voted against ISDS as provided for 
in the early stages of the negotiation, and made its support for TTIP conditional on such changes (Robert 
2015). If meanwhile there are some internal divisions within the S&D group on the sufficiency of the 
changes to the ISDS suggested so far (ibid.), this should be seen as the result of a strategic move from the 
camp of TTIP supporters rather than as an expression of the underlying structure of conflict. Quotes by 
Conservative and Christian Democratic MEPs further show that these parties are quite in favour of not 
only TTIP but also of ISDS in principle (Levy-Abegnoli 2015), which confirms the importance of 
ideological divisions within the EP. It further demonstrates that, just because there was a majority against 
the earlier form of ISDS, this does not mean that there was resistance from ‘the’ EP as a noble ‘advocate 
of the citizens’. 
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Table 85: Voting results on the resolution of 23rd May 2013 to start the negotiations, sample of parties only, based 
on Hix (2013, 27–36) 
 Germany Austria UK Ireland France Italy 
GUE/NGL - NA 54 -
55
 - NA 
Greens/EFA - - -
56
 NA - NA 
S&D + + + + 0 + 
ALDE + NA + + 0 +
57
 
EPP + + NA + + +
58
 
ECR NA NA + NA NA +
59
 
EFD NA NA 0
60
 NA n/a
61
 -/+
62
 
NI NA -
63
 n/a
64
 NA -
65
 NA 
 
A closer look at the more detailed voting results by national party delegations regarding the resolution 
from May 2013 further demonstrates that, where F3A arguments are added by protectionism, as in the 
case of the PS and MoDem, scepticism of TTIP is also higher, leading these parties to abstain from the 
vote. Voting records also show that the Alleanza Nazionale, the one party from which I could not find 
press releases or other textual statements on the issue from 2013 to May 2014, did not take part in the 
vote, which might indicate that they either had not found a position on the issue or did not find it 
important. Meanwhile, however, they frame the issue very much like the ToT would expect it from an 
RWP party from a state capitalist country, i.e. mixing anti-globalisation rhetoric and protectionism 
(Alleanza Nazionale/ Fratelli d'Italia 2016). 
There is, however, one aspect of the vote on the resolution as well as on later votes – including 
that on ISDS – that at first sight seems to fit neither the ToT, nor the results obtained by PFA, namely the 
votes by the ÖVP and the UMP. After all, these were parties expected (by the ToT) and found (by PFA) 
to defect from the EPP. Regarding the vote on the starting of the negotiations, one might argue that 
neither of these parties has reason to vote against TTIP unconditionally – after all, the UMP just calls for 
the exemption of some sectors from the agreement, and the ÖVP just wants to draw some ‘red lines’. 
Moreover, it has been noted in various news outlets that resistance against TTIP does exist within both 
parties (for the UMP, see Ulrich 2014; for the ÖVP, see apa / ep 2015; red / APA 2015). As one 
journalistic commentator notes, the UMP votes in favour of TTIP – but “discretely” so (Clavel 2014). In 
fact, while some Austrian and French producers being part of the UMP’s and the ÖVP’s core electorate 
stand to win from TTIP and the losses of the others will depend on the exact outcome of the 
                                                     
54 Sinn Féin 
55 Socialist party 
56 Green party only, SNP and Plaid Cymru not considered here. 
57 Italia dei Valori, not in the sample for PFA. 
58 Only Forza Italia (Popolo della Libertà); n/a for FdI/AN! 
59 Conservatori e Social Riformatori, not in the sample for PFA. 
60 UKIP 
61 Mouvement pour la France, not in the sample for PFA. 
62 “Io amo Italia” and Lega Nord, both not in the sample for PFA. 
63 FPÖ 
64 BNP 
65 Front National 
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negotiations, there is no reason for these parties to vote against TTIP yet. Instead, they can just blur their 
position in the way they do, namely by acknowledging TTIP’s positive potential (frame F1) while devoting 
a lot of attention to potential problems with the agreement. At this stage, therefore, ‘yes’-votes do not 
contradict the finding of the PFA or the assumptions of the ToT. If, however, a negotiated outcome is 
achieved that does not take up these concerns at all, and if they still voted in favour of TTIP then, this 
would be more difficult to explain based on the ToT. 
6.5 Conclusion 
As the case of TTIP shows, even policy issues classically associated with national interests are not 
territorialised in the EP; provided that intra-national distributional effects resulting from them are mainly 
intra-national. Yet, the case also shows how even certainty – one might say socially constructed – can 
impact on party’s cost-benefit calculations regarding defection. For although the eventual distributional 
effects of TTIP are not empirically known yet, actors appear to behave as though the standardized 
economic predictions were certain. On top of this, national traditions, while explicitly part of the theory of 
territorialisation, once more seem to be quite significant – even after decades of European integration and 
decades of a Common Commercial Policy. Amongst others, this has also led to the fact that classic 
protectionist ideas are still firmly rooted in the minds of some countries’ populations and their 
representatives. In this sense, then, TTIP might not have changed trade policy for good, as some 
commentators claim, while their argument that trade policy has become much more politicised would 
seem to be supported. 
Also this final case study thus corresponds to the expectations for structure of conflict based on 
the theory of territorialisation. Indeed, the ToT is supported also at the micro-level of party delegations, in 
that only those parties really defect that would be expected to do so. The exception of UKIP confirms the 
rule rather than contradicting it, given its complementary subsuming strategy. The finding that this party 
uses this strategy was preconditioned not only on the conceptual tool in terms of framing strategies 
included in the theory, but also again by the methodological decisions – here: hand-coding – made for this 
study. Similarly, the fact that the ToT was supported as much at the micro-level regarding the defection 
strategies is largely based on the highly nuanced textual analysis capturing the differences between 
conditional and definite approval (and rejection). At least the early roll-call votes on TTIP seem to present 
a rather different picture at first sight and may thus be misleading if used as the sole source of data. In 
fact, however, the most rational strategy for parties ideologically in favour of TTIP while trying to protect 
their core electorate from some negative effects may not be to vote against the opening of negotiations, 
but rather to achieve exemptions at a later stage before their conclusion. This example would seem to 
demonstrate, then, that while roll-call votes are a preferred source of data for large-N studies, contextual 
knowledge of the political process might be even more needed for their correct interpretation with regard 
to certain questions. 
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Regarding the societal rationale of the present study, one might argue that the case of TTIP 
shows in particular the much more differentiated way of interest representation via the EP. For what 
might feature as ‘the’ British national interest in the Council, for instance, actually might be rejected by a 
considerable number of UK citizens nonetheless. In the Council, their voices go unheard, whereas in the 
EP they can be expressed by certain party delegations and, as the vote on ISDS shows, might become an 
important part of majority eventually. The respective citizens are effectively represented here as 
consumers, rather being ignored as British nationals. It might have been appropriate that national 
governments listened primarily to producers on trade policy issues when most citizens were indifferent 
about them. Representation via the EP not only allows more citizens to be represented effectively 
(notwithstanding, of course, the possibility of being outvoted), but it also reinforces the politicisation of 
trade policy issues and potentially other issues, since it means that parties not relying on producers’ 
support as much will publicly appeal to further groups of citizens. Last but not least, it seems that a 
conflict that is not about ‘national’ interests in the strict sense is not presented as one. Instead, groups of 
Europeans might feel on the same side as consumers or producers transnationally. 
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7. Conclusion 
7.1 Research question, theory and approach 
The point of departure for the present study was the societal rationale of a quest for better European 
governance in the face of multiple crises the European Union (EU) faces today, in particular the 
suggestion to strengthen the role of supranational parliamentary institutions such as the European 
Parliament (EP) in it. This suggestion was based on the widely spread narrative that ‘national interests’ 
regularly hamper effective decision-making, because national policy-makers talking to national electorates 
in these terms would hardly have a chance to compromise and focus on common European solutions. 
Such national interests are generally supposed to be of lesser importance or ‘relativised’ in the EP, which 
on top of this is considered more legitimate in terms of democratic input. 
Before this background, the academic rationale for the present study could be identified, in that 
the normative argument for a strengthening of the EP to some extent lacks a solid empirical basis. For it is 
rather well established that, first of all, conflict in the EP is largely structured along ideological, not 
national (or: territorial) lines, while it is precisely the aforementioned national interests that occasionally – 
yet not necessarily – reduce the ideological cohesion on certain issues. Accordingly, the exact 
combinations of conditions under which such ‘defection’ eventually happens could be considered unclear, 
even more so since some of the general conditions under which the Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) make their decisions have been changing in recent years due to socio-economic (the eurozone 
crisis, here: the Crisis) and constitutional (the Lisbon Treaty) developments. 
These developments have reinforced a process of politicisation of EU politics that arguably 
started in the early 1990s, with the end of the so-called ‘permissive consensus’. Since then, political 
representatives concerned with EU politics are increasingly forced to justify their policy preferences on 
European integration and EU politics vis-à-vis a growing number of more or less informed, but generally 
interested, citizens. While the political communication of national political actors in terms of national 
interests is criticised, little is known about the way in which MEPs give reasons for their decisions, 
especially after the Crisis. In sum, therefore, the question under what conditions exactly MEPs express and justify 
their policy preferences in such a way that the resulting structure of conflict in a Post-Crisis EP is territorial rather than 
ideological was considered to deserve further attention. 
Looking first for EP-specific theoretical explanations apt for addressing this research question 
in the extant literature, it was found that these explanations suffered from a number of shared 
shortcomings – in addition to those specific to each of them – when it comes to this question in 
particular. First of all, these theories, especially the most established ones, were developed to explain the 
usual picture of ideologically structured conflict. By contrast, they may not be entirely silent on exceptions 
to the rule, but they still are much less elaborate and precise in this respect. Second, they were largely built 
on pre-Crisis assumptions in terms of a lack of politicisation, so that vote-seeking would barely play a role. 
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Third, they tended to work with rather vague notions of ‘national interests’, which often were not 
precisely defined and might include strictly materialist, rational aspects of a policy in terms of 
distributional effects as well as the regulatory status quo or national traditions. Finally and arguably related, 
they were not suited for explaining the manner in which MEPs communicate with their voters and how 
they ‘give reasons’ for their decisions. Hence, it was argued that in order to address the present research 
question, a new theoretical framework should be developed. 
What I referred to as a ‘theory of territorialisation’ (ToT) then defined territorialisation of 
conflict as the macro-level result of individual actors’ ‘defection’, i.e. a behaviour that is at odds with one’s 
ideological convictions for the sake of national motivations (interests, traditions). Concerning the EP, 
defection was considered at the level of national party delegations, which are assumed to act cohesively 
and as ‘true’ representatives of their respective national parties. While these assumptions have a rather 
solid empirical foundation in the literature, they had the further advantage that the theory to be developed 
could be built on a reconfiguration of extant theories on political parties and their goals, national parties 
and European integration, as well as on theories of parties’ strategic communication in two-dimensional 
spaces (Left-Right and territorial). 
What this theory holds then, in a nutshell, is the following. First, national party delegations in 
the EP are assumed to be intrinsically motivated for policy-seeking in line with the general convictions 
they share, i.e. ideology, while electoral success (vote-seeking) is instrumental to policy. They thus 
constantly weigh the two goals against each other and will defect (i.e. discard ideology-based policy-
seeking) only if vote-seeking pressure is considerable. Since votes are always territorially bound in EU 
politics, high cross-national distributional effects as the basis of any ‘objective’ national interest may in 
principle constitute such vote-seeking pressure, as most voters will rather want their own country to win 
from EU policies than subduing to a common European cause. Defection will be eased by national 
traditions pointing in the same direction as the national interest, since they reduce the risk of losing 
credibility when ‘betraying’ one’s ideological convictions by hiding the instrumental character of defection. 
However, vote-seeking pressure is preconditioned by politicisation – if voters are not interested, their 
views need not be taken into account. Also, if distributional effects are uncertain, parties can safely present 
competing, ideologically shaped interpretations of ‘the’ national interest. Finally, intra-national distribution 
can be stressed in order to divert from cross-national effects, depending on how the former affect specific 
core electorates. The fact that, in a next step, the ToT points out how exactly parties can use this freedom 
and play a rather active role in structuring the conflict is one of the strengths of this theory. 
Second, then, the ToT points out how national party delegations might try to convince voters of 
their ideologically determined policy preferences, rather than simply responding to the preferences of 
voters. In doing so, they will generally frame the policy issue by means of so-called policy frames 
consisting of four dimensions, namely norms and goals, problem definitions and labels, causal narratives, 
and suggestions for policies as a ‘solution’ to the problem. Under uncertainty, they can focus on the first 
three dimensions in terms of an ideologically inspired justification and use this to suggest the kind of 
policy they prefer for ideological reasons anyway (uni-dimensional or ‘prism’ strategy). This is because 
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under uncertainty, causal narratives in particular cannot be empirically evaluated by affected voters yet, 
hence they compete on rather equal par with each other, and so will the according policy ‘solutions’. 
By contrast, under certainty, high cross-national distribution makes some policy suggestions 
much less appealing to the electorate, so that parties might give in and defect for the sake of national 
interests. Intra-national distributional effects usually reinforce patterns that have shaped party systems at 
the domestic level, so that parties do not face goal conflict: producer interests a party represents, for 
instance, mostly overlap with a preference for free markets. This also means, however, that as soon as 
cross- and intra-national distributional effects are simultaneously present, goal conflict will not concern all 
parties equally: some might avoid all too harsh electoral pressures by focusing on ‘their’ share of the 
electorate in terms of intra-national distribution, provided this part is less directly concerned by the cross-
national aspect. In order not to lose the other part entirely, they may then opt for a so-called ‘blurring’ 
strategy, where they acknowledge some of the arguments belonging to policy frames in line with the 
national interest rather than their ideology, while still emphasising another, ideologically compatible frame. 
Blurring can also be used in a less easily predictable manner to generally broaden a party’s 
electoral appeal beyond the core electorate, if for instance it takes up the frame in line with a national 
tradition – giving voters something they are used to – or to cover up one’s defection by including at least 
some arguments in line with the ideology without using them predominantly. In a manner that is even less 
foreseeable, parties might ‘subsume’ some arguments clearly belonging to a particular frame under a 
higher-order logic or creatively recombine arguments. Noteworthy, however, while the creativity required 
for applying this strategy makes its usage hard to predict, it also requires effort on the part of its users and 
hence will not be applied on a broad scale. 
Third, the theory acknowledges that various institutional variables might intervene with 
defection in principle, but in the particular context of the usually work in the same direction as the general 
goals of MEP’s national parties. That is, as long as some scope conditions such as politicisation and timing 
(within the legislative and electoral circle) are considered. It also means, however, that the core of the ToT 
as developed based on assumptions about national parties can in principle be applied to other EU 
institutional settings. 
The third chapter of the study then reviewed possible ways of evaluating this theoretical 
framework as used in the extant literature. It was noted that most of the extant literature tends to a. 
analyse large numbers of policy issues at the macro-level, b. more or less artificially creates large numbers 
of observations at the micro-level by analysing the behaviour of individual MEPs rather than the 
extremely cohesive national delegations, and c. if at all, uses large amounts of textual data to be feasibly 
analysed only with computerised techniques. If however the present research question is to be answered 
adequately, the focus should rather a. lie on just a handful of policy issues promising to provide insights to 
the exceptional cases of defection/territorialisation due to their reputation of involving ‘national interests’ 
allowing for the latter to be operationalised and empirically identified in a valid manner, b. on national 
party delegations as cohesive entities whose general goals can be theorised and whose various 
characteristics in terms of ideology, country interests and traditions, can be known precisely, and c. on a 
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small sample of texts that can be analysed by means of hand-coding, which will allow for direct 
comparison across languages that in turn comes with the focus on direct MEP-to-voter communication. 
The rest of the chapter thus presented concrete decisions for the present study in terms of 
research design, case and data selection. First it was argued, that a selection of just three policy issues, 
namely the debate on welfare access for intra-EU migrants, the 2013 Reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) would allow for in-depth 
knowledge of the substantive background for these cases required for the valid identification of possible 
national interests and traditions, while covering the kinds of issues offering the highest potential for 
insights on the rather exceptional phenomena of defection/territorialisation: While these issues share a 
general reputation of involving ‘national interests’, a high degree of politicisation, took place in the run-up 
to the 2014 European elections and in policy areas where the EP will have an actual say eventually due to 
the Treaty of Lisbon, they vary with regard to their scope, direction and certainty of distributional effects 
identified earlier as structural conditions shaping conflict in European politics. Second, the focus on 
national party delegations from all party families (if available) but from just six countries – Germany, 
Austria, the UK, Ireland, Italy, and France – was meant to guarantee feasibility (acquiring case knowledge, 
language proficiency), while at the same time including diverging distributional interests regarding the 
three issues as well as displaying variation in the relevant national traditions. Parties of relevance in the 
2014 European elections from these countries were then attributed to the various ideological families 
based on a rather detailed consideration of their ideological core beliefs rather than labels, EPG 
membership or historical origins, because only in this manner would policy-seeking be distinguishable 
from serving core electorates or national traditions later. Given the rather small-N number of cases also at 
the micro-level (34 parties) in combination with assumptions of causal complexity inherent to the ToT 
(e.g. defection is always expected to be based on the presence/absence of more than one country- or 
party-level condition), I have further suggested to evaluate the micro-level aspects of the ToT (i.e. 
expectations concerning party strategies) by means of a crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(csQCA). In order to, finally, measure the framing strategies of the parties in the sample I have argued for 
a Policy Frame Analysis (PFA) of the press releases issued by the national party delegations to the EP 
(whenever possible) as a most direct way of measuring the reasons MEPs give vis-à-vis their electorates. 
The following three case study chapters (4, 5, 6) then implemented these design decisions: First, 
the characteristics of the case in question were discussed in some detail, so as to corroborate the earlier 
classification based on which the case was selected. Thereafter, the possible policy frames that might be 
used were identified based on secondary literature. Before this background, it was then possible to 
formulate observable expectations as to who would use which frame to what extent and what this would 
mean for the overall structure of conflict, contrasting extant theories with the ToT developed in Chapter 
2. The fourth section of each case study chapter then included the results of the PFA, described first at 
the macro-level and then analysed in detail in terms of QCA at the micro-level, while discussing them with 
regard to the foregoing observable implications. Next, the results of the PFA were compared to external 
evidence, i.e. vote-seeking evidence in particular, while taking into account the differences between the 
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kinds of data. This was followed by a conclusion concerning the role of the case within the overall study 
as well as within the issue-specific literature. 
7.2 Main findings: Differentiated representation rather than territorialisation 
Starting with the case study on Europeanised welfare, it was found that uncertainty indeed allows parties 
to mainly focus on the justification aspect of the policy frames in line with their respective ideologies, 
although there at least was potential for cross-national distribution. This was shown, on the one hand, by 
the fact that almost all parties used exactly the frame they were expected to use from an ideological 
perspective. On the other hand, it was shown by the distinction at the level of frame dimensions, that is, 
with the policy dimension of each frame being referred to comparatively less frequently than the other 
dimensions. While the latter result as such had to be taken with a pinch of salt given rather low reliability 
scores at this level of measurement, it was externally supported by the fact that the most controversial 
votes on the respective EP resolution were held on the question, whether the abuse of welfare systems by 
intra-EU migrants was ‘alleged’ or not. This also demonstrates that, unlike some theories would claim, this 
finding was not simply due to the fact that this particular policy issue fitted into general attitudes on 
welfare or migration; rather, national party delegations – especially on the centre Left – would actually be 
very careful about how far exactly they go when calling for a measure that according to some might run 
counter to the national interest. 
Some defections were noted nonetheless, albeit not to be expected by the ToT a priori: national 
delegations from parties who take part in national governments as junior coalition partners, who do not 
control the social affairs ministry, and who have a national tradition in terms of social democratic or 
liberal welfare were found to defect. Interestingly, these parties defected towards the ideological position 
of the coalition partner, rather than towards any potential national interest based on cross-national 
distribution. At least in this sense, then, these exceptions confirm the rule, while none of the other 
theories would have expected this precise result either. Instead, at least half of the extant theories may 
have guessed the overall result – ideologically structured conflict – correctly, but would have failed to 
produce similarly precise and empirically supported expectations concerning the way it comes about. 
With regard to the 2013 Reform of the CAP, the ToT also provided a more accurate 
explanation than its competitors, in the sense of naming exactly who would give in to the national interest 
and who would resist. Here, the high and certain cross-national distribution meant that some parties, 
especially those counting farmers among their core electorates, opted for defection by framing the issue in 
a way that would policy-wise bring the highest amount of subsidies to their home country. Given the 
simultaneous presence of intra-national distribution, however, parties of the Left mostly could focus on 
the public goods farming subsidies might help to provide if targeted accordingly, merely ‘blurring’ in terms 
of the respective national interest. The fact that Green parties relied on the most environmentalist frame 
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exclusively across all countries simply underlines this general picture, since they have not only the most 
post-materialist but also a post-nationalist electorate. 
At the same time, it had to be noted that Italian parties seemed to act counter to the country’s 
role as a net-payer on CAP, in that they all called for a ‘strong’ CAP (with the notable exception of the 
Greens). While certainly the many small Italian farm holdings imply that a rather large number of voters is 
dependent on subsidies, this alone does not explain support for this form of interventionism. Rather, it 
would seem that in this particular case, the statist type of capitalism prevailing in Italy strongly shapes 
perceptions. This is not entirely at odds with the ToT, but it is different from the expectations in terms of 
degree. Noteworthy, most extant theories – including policy specific ones – would not account for this 
behaviour even remotely, in that they tend to focus on the distributional aspect alone. Hence, once more 
the ToT might not be the only theory accounting for the overall structure of conflict, which in this case is 
rather territorial than ideological, but it does so more precisely regarding the details. 
Concerning the case of TTIP, it could be shown that MEPs are neither per se noble advocates of 
consumers or even ‘ordinary citizens’, nor are they generally subject to a ‘producer bias’. Rather, the intra-
national distribution between consumers and producers expected as a result of the removal of so-called 
non-tariff barriers to trade leads parties to fall into well-known cleavages mirroring domestic politics. Only 
where even the benefits to producers are comparatively small will producer-friendly parties replace the 
neoliberal frame in line with their ideologies by a frame expressing scepticism of TTIP in a way that fits 
the respective national tradition on trade policy. It is due to these traditions also that classic protectionism 
still exists in countries such as France or Italy, and only where it never was as prominent is it replaced by 
its new, ‘hidden’ forms. Clearly, however, trade policy today is not about national interests in the strict 
sense necessarily, and if this is accounted for in terms of identifying distributional effects correctly, the 
ToT will be able to explain for the resulting structure of conflict and micro-level strategies in detail. 
Nevertheless, one observation on TTIP, namely the unexpected framing strategy of UKIP, at 
first seemed to demonstrate the importance of national traditions as a sufficient condition for defection in 
their own right, rather than simply ‘easing’ or ‘directing’ defection caused by distributional effects in the 
first place. At the same time, the fact that this party was found to be once more making use of a 
subsuming strategy by contextualising a TTIP-specific frame so as to attract globalisation losers and free 
trade supporters alike would not even have been conceptually captured by extant theories of conflict in 
the EP. This strategy, which has barely been mentioned in the summary of the findings so far, will be 
considered in some detail now, thereby introducing the list of findings across all three cases. 
For indeed, across cases, UKIP and other parties on the far Right (Right-Wing Populists and 
extreme Right) appeared as the ‘masters of subsuming’, in that this group of parties (and their MEPs 
where applicable) most creatively combined existing frames or put them into a new, often broader 
context. Thereby, they would then generally focus on lines of argument that are widely accepted – often 
because they corresponded to prevailing national traditions – rather than making the kinds of arguments 
one would typically associate with nationalism. Interestingly, this might even mean that they forward 
arguments that at times would seem stand against the material interests of their core electorates, e.g. in the 
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case of CAP. In this sense, national traditions might serve as an alternative kind of ‘cue’ for the least 
informed segments of the electorate, suggesting that the best policy is the way ‘we’ always used to handle 
things. 
As for the usefulness of distinguishing RWP and extreme Right parties, it can be noted that 
subsuming is used by both, but even more extensively so by RWP parties. The extreme Right BNP still 
seems focussed on catering an extremist electorate, whereas the presumably equally extreme NPD also 
tries sending out broader appeals. In Germany and the UK, the direct comparison between RWP and 
extreme Right often shows RWP parties as more economically liberal, whereas the French FN and the 
Italian AN more frequently seem to make interventionist arguments in line with their national tradition of 
state capitalism. That said, the public discussion on the AfD website with regard to TTIP by means of 
‘open letters’ among the members shows the difficulty of combining nationalism and economic liberalism 
on some issues. In sum, identifying subsuming as a strategy used extensively by these parties certainly 
helps to understand the recent successes of RWP parties across Europe. At the same time, it might just 
temporarily cover some inner contradictions within these parties as well as hiding difficulties of 
demarcation towards the extreme Right, so that it might also be expected the ideological basis of the far 
Right as a whole remains very much in flux. 
Taken together, the three case studies also provide ample empirical evidence that the basic 
assumption of politicisation causing vote-seeking to enter MEPs’ calculation is largely corroborated: it 
seems to be reflected in the decision whether to defect or not, in the way MEPs make very nuanced 
arguments in terms of blurring or subsuming to achieve wider acceptance, and the way in which they 
distribute their arguments across the dimensions of frames. While this assumption more or less constitutes 
a scope condition for the ToT, the latter’s further causal narratives seem to hold as well: MEPs in their 
national party delegations behave as actors, who are not just passively adapting to alleged preferences of 
voters, but rather try to shape them as much as possible, and who how to frame policy issues in such a 
way that they can pursue their policy-seeking goals without losing votes, and, finally, are rational enough 
to give preference to vote-seeking when it seems unavoidable. In doing so, they seem to behave as true 
representatives of their national parties, as triangulation of press releases with manifestos did not show any 
major differences, nor did the framing strategies parties not yet in the EP require different explanations 
from those already in. 
It might be argued, of course, that this vote-seeking only applies to direct textual 
communication but eventually is nothing but ‘cheap talk’. In reply, one might point to anecdotal evidence 
in terms of the ÖVP delegation exposing an SPÖ MEP right away when she – allegedly – voted against 
the greening provisions she had supported verbally earlier. Indeed, due to institutions such as 
VoteWatch.eu, MEPs engaging in cheap talk of such kind risk making themselves an easy target. More 
generally, however, it could be shown that MEPs generally do vote the way they talk – provided, however, 
that each vote is understood for what it is: it often concerns just one aspect of the policy issue, it is always 
about a negotiated outcome that can be supported or not, a compromise often just crafted with the 
purpose of achieving some kind of majority. In fact, rather than supporting potential ‘cheap talk’ as an 
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argument against textual analysis, the direct comparison between voting data and textual data would seem 
to highlight the shortcomings of the former beyond the well-known strategic bias. For the outcome of 
single votes requires much more detailed knowledge of the policy process than the analysis of the 
underlying structure of conflict, only to then reduce the eventual measurement to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
Roll-call analysis applied across votes also involves the reduction political behaviour to positions, 
a path generally avoided in the present study and exchanged for the measurement of framing strategies. A 
blurring strategy, for instance, might still be noticed even if aggregated into a position, but it might be 
taken for a policy preference that constitutes a compromise. Instead, however, rather than compromising 
in concrete policy terms, a blurring strategy often just means to generally acknowledge a number of norms 
in order to please certain voters. Such differences matter, for it is the analysis of these strategies that 
actually help to explain the predominance of ideology in the EP and the resulting, highly differentiated 
ways of representation. Due to these strategies, then, the EP may not be entirely immune to national 
interests, but at least defection or even full-scale territorialisation should remain rare even after the Crisis: 
MEPs will express and justify their policy preferences in manner that overall leads to a territorial structure 
of conflict, if the issue in question is politicised, distributional effects are cross-national but not intra-
national and if these effects can be estimated with certainty. 
7.3 Wider contribution and limitations of this study, call for further research 
The theory of territorialisation (ToT) was developed with a view to theoretically addressing the research 
question identified in the Introduction. On the one hand, the results discussed in the empirical chapters 
suggest that this goal was largely achieved, the desirability of further tests notwithstanding. On the other 
hand, however, the concrete empirical results have raised further questions. Some of these questions shall 
be discussed here. 
First, with regard to the case study on Europeanised welfare, it has been argued that the 
uncertainty consists partly in a lack of concrete empirical knowledge regarding the scope of the problem 
of ‘welfare tourism’ perceived by some. This begs the question, in how far it is possible to achieve 
certainty over time, whether this is equally possible for all kinds of policy issues / actors, and whether it 
can be created willingly. A first indication concerning the latter aspect might be found within the third 
case study (i.e. TTIP), where scientific estimations on winners and losers seem to carry explanatory 
potential for the structure of conflict. Another question is, then, in how far a gradual creation of certainty 
influences the structure of conflict over time. Do actors change their frames accordingly, for instance, in 
case ‘welfare tourism’ should eventually outweigh the benefits of migration for welfare systems? Finally, 
one might ask, whether it is equally possible to create uncertainty, for instance by challenging a potential 
scientific consensus. Further research should try to address these questions conceptually as well as 
empirically. For a start, it might extend the time frame of the study on welfare tourism beyond the present 
scope. 
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Second, the findings on CAP, regarding Italian parties and citizens in particular, raise questions 
about the exact role of national traditions as opposed to much more material national interests. By 
separating the two at least conceptually, the present study has attempted to clarify this relationship in 
principle, but in its exact observable implications has only partly been correct. In terms of theory, one 
might thus rethink the notion of national interests in connection to distribution, as it has partly been done 
here already with regard to the intra-national distribution resulting from TTIP (corporate profits vs. 
consumer protection). Maybe, for instance, the distinction between material national interests and non-
material traditions is less necessary than expected. If this is the case, then operationalisation in terms of 
net-payers and net-recipients also regarding other policies or the EU budget at large is even more 
problematic than I have argued Chapter 2 anyway. Alternatively, one might suggest further small-N 
studies, e.g. involving process tracing, on selected cases allowing for a separation of interests and tradition. 
Noteworthy, not only the theoretical answer to the research question was limited, but also the 
research design and methods employed to evaluate it. The justifications behind most of the research 
design, methodological and data selection decisions made for the present study were often intertwined 
with each other, while a common thread was to contrast with the extant state of the art – many issues, 
many parties, huge data sets of roll-call votes. Thereby, it was possible amongst others to show how 
important it is to correctly identify national interests if one is to distinguish them from national traditions, 
which in turn requires focusing a small number of policy issues or to demonstrate the availability and 
richness of textual data included in press releases. In sum, the common goal of contrasting with the extant 
literature was not pursued because the insights gained in the state of the art should be generally discarded, 
but so as to produce added value as efficiently as possible by complementing these approaches. 
Consequently, further research might then also bridge the findings of the present study and the 
extant literature by, for instance, comparing voting behaviour and content of press releases for a larger 
number of issues, provided the latter are issued within the same language and hence can be analysed by 
means of computerised textual analysis. However, a qualitative-comparative design or the usage of Policy 
Frame Analysis cannot be recommended per se. After all, as I have discussed in the respective chapter, 
each individual decision usually came with a number of trade-offs, yet it was with regard to the purposes 
of the present study that these trade-offs could be reasonably compensated. 
While thus the present study can merely provide a tentative and limited answer to the research 
question, it has also delivered results that might be of interest beyond this narrow question. As was 
mentioned in Chapter 2, for example, a theory of territorialisation based on national parties as key actors 
in principle can be applied to, or could at least constitute a starting point for, the study of conflict in other 
EU institutions, since national parties also provide the respective staff and hence wield influence there. 
Nevertheless, researchers doing so should consider, in how far these institutional environments – unlike 
the EP – provide incentives for agency drift rather than loyalty, and whether accordingly the ToT as 
developed here applies or can be fruitfully extended. 
Apart from literature on other EU institutions, the insights gained here could feed back into the 
literature on political parties. One contribution of the study could be found in the manner of studying part 
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positions on very concrete issues in EU politics rather than ‘European integration’ as an overall package, 
as it was often done in the respective literature so far. In this manner, for instance, it was shown that far 
Left parties often considered ‘Eurosceptic’ in the this literature, may on some issues make very 
constructive and, more interestingly, pro-European policy suggestions (e.g. non-discrimination in welfare 
matters), while they seem to oppose primarily those EU policies that they would oppose also if these were 
national level policies (e.g. TTIP). This contrasts with the calls on the far Right for policies that either 
involve disintegration or national concerns in an opportunistic manner (other insights on the far Right 
were already discussed above). 
Even beyond the area of EU politics, the transfer of concepts used to study party strategies in 
two-dimensional spaces to the level of framing of individual policy issues might feed back into the 
Comparative Politics literature it came from, in terms of the question in how far the structural conditions 
identified as relevant in EU politics also interact with party strategies in these policy spaces. The empirical 
findings produced might further be used as a starting point for studies measuring the effectiveness of 
framing, as part of a research agenda on which there is an emerging body of literature already. 
7.4 A final chance? 
What conclusions, then, can be drawn from these empirical findings with regard to the goal of improving 
European governance by means of strengthening the role of the European Parliament? On the one hand, 
it might indeed be argued that the EP is apt to relativise national interests in various ways. On the other 
hand, it is definitely not immune against their impact. Indeed, to some extent it does not even take more 
or less objective – i.e. distributional – interests for territorialisation, as already national traditions partly 
may split ideological families. Given that vote-seeking seems to matter, a change in electoral rules towards 
European lists might appear as a necessary additional condition for banning national interests from the 
EP. At the same time, the example of Belgium suggests, that a lack of identification with a certain level of 
government will still lead to territorialisation and grid-lock eventually. Changing identification, however, 
does not appear as an easy task. Indeed, it took nation-states taken for granted to today a lot of time and 
effort to achieve this, and it often required means that would not seem to sit well with liberal democracy. 
Admittedly also, the absence of territorialisation does not imply absence of conflict. 
Accordingly, while national interests are often identified as a source of gridlock, it cannot be guaranteed 
based on the present study that their absence guarantees absence of gridlock. In the United States, for 
instance, gridlock is regularly caused on more or less ideological grounds between different institutions 
dominated by different parties respectively. If avoiding gridlock is the goal, it will thus be necessary to 
further take into account the overall institutional constellation of the EU, an aspect that the present study 
has neglected. There is, however, a difference between ideologically and territorially induced gridlock: the 
former does not question the very existence of the polity. 
7. Conclusion 
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Hence, I argue, the insights gained by the present study in principle provide arguments for 
increasing the role of the EP at the expense of intergovernmental institutions. First of all, the fact that the 
representation of European citizens via the EP is so highly differentiated seems desirable. On the one 
hand, the fact that it mirrors potential disagreement within countries means that, unlike in the (European) 
Council with country’s being represented as a collective actor, in the EP it is not falsely suggested that 
there is but one French, German, or Italian position. Thereby, one source of reproduction of national 
identities is reduced, which might help identification with the EU in the long run. On the other hand, 
however, as long as most Europeans strongly identify with their nation-state, it would seem legitimate that 
on issues including high cross-national distributional effects or touching strongly on particular national 
traditions, these are actually represented to exactly the degree they deserve. The representation in the EP 
as it is thus would seem to correspond well to the complexity of conflict in EU politics. 
Even if, however, the increase of EP competences seems desirable, it is quite another question 
whether it is politically feasible at all. After all, could it not be that Europe is long since past the point 
when the strengthening of the EU’s supranational institutions was supported, or at least would have been 
tolerated, by its citizens? Indeed, while it might be argued that representation via the EP is highly 
differentiated, thereby respecting national interests and traditions where appropriate, citizens will hardly be 
convinced by this and other complex arguments – the ‘Brexit’ debate is a case in point. Noteworthy, what 
the ‘Leave’ campaign in this debate was particularly good at, was framing: Creatively recombining classic 
Left-wing value (the National Health Service) with a Right-wing diagnosis and policy (costs of EU 
membership, Brexit) has arguably turned out as a winning formula. Nevertheless, creative framing need 
not be the monopoly of the Eurosceptics. In fact, the pro-active development of the ‘multifunctionality’ 
frame in the domain of the Common Agricultural Policy shows how creativity in terms of framing can 
also work even in the presence of pro-territorialisation incentives. It is this kind of creativity that 
advocates of European integration have been lacking in recent years, but which might be even more 
urgently needed than institutional adaptations. 
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Annex I 
I.1 General coding instructions 
The general coding procedure 
The definition of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) considers a quasi-sentence as “an argument – 
that is, the verbal expression of one political idea or issue” (Budge et al. 2001). In order to both adapt the 
definition for the purpose of analysing policy frames and to specify what is actually a very vague idea, 
quasi-sentences shall be defined here – corresponding to the four dimensions of a policy frame – as the 
verbal expression of either a normative commitment, a problematisation, a causal narrative or a policy 
suggestion. 
For the CMP, a quasi-sentence may be identical with a natural sentence, but does not necessarily 
have to, in which case the natural sentence has to be broken up (ibid. 2001, 165-167). Consider first the 
CMP example: 
“Because we want freedom, we need strong military forces.” 
Now consider the explanation in line with the CMP’s definition of a quasi sentence: “These are two quasi-
sentences, because there are two political goals, that is, freedom and strength of military forces, which can 
be transformed into two quasi-sentences” (ibid. 2001, 167). Also following the definition used in the 
present paper, one might count two units here, as the statement includes both a normative commitment 
(freedom) and a policy suggestion (strong military forces). Thus the natural sentence would be coded as 
two observations of a hypothetical militarist frame Fx, subdivided into one observation of the latter’s 
normative dimension and one of its policy dimension. What is missing here of the frame would be the 
constitutive and cognitive dimensions, but they could be easily imagined so as to complete the example:  
“The Russian activities in Ukraine threaten freedom in the Western world as a whole. If the Western 
world shares any ideal, then it is certainly that of freedom. Had the Western powers not weakened their 
military capacities under budgetary constraints, it would have kept Russia at bay. In fact, we need strong 
military forces more than ever now.” 
Breaking these up into quasi-sentences as defined above would lead to the following categorisation: 
“The Russian activities in Ukraine threaten freedom in the Western world as a whole.” 
 constitutive dimension 
While the reference to “freedom” certainly alludes to the normative dimension of this hypothetical frame, 
what is stressed here is the fact that this is threatened by Russian forces. Dividing this sentence further 
would also make it grammatically incomplete. Under such circumstances, a sentence that as a whole 
belongs to one and the same frame should not be subdivided and instead be attributed to the dimension 
that forms the bigger part of the sentence. By contrast, the following is a purely normative commitment: 
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“If the Western world shares any ideal, then it is certainly that of freedom.” 
 
 normative dimension 
 
 “Had the Western powers not weakened their military capacities under budgetary constraints, it would 
have kept Russia at bay.” 
 
 cognitive dimension 
Here now, a policy element might seem implicit in the sentence, but since it stays within the same frame 
and since the bigger part of the sentence explicitly provides a causal narrative, it makes more sense to code 
it all as an instance of the cognitive dimension of Fx. 
“In fact, we need strong military forces more than ever now.” 
 
 policy dimension 
At the same time, however, it is important to stress here that, as soon as an actor switches to another 
frame within one sentence, this must necessarily be separated and coded as two quasi-sentences. In 
deciding which frame to choose, it is always more important to focus on what is made explicit and 
corresponds to the observable instances of a frame listed in the codebook rather than interpreting whether 
there implicitly is an allusion to another frame. 
The classification procedure of quasi-sentences is conducted analogous to the CMP in most 
respects (as pointed out in Budge et al. 2001, 168-173). Most importantly, just as the CMP provides 
‘definitions’ for each category, codebooks are provided for policy frames on welfare tourism, CAP, and 
TTIP respectively, which include an explanation of the logic of each frame, observable instances and 
concrete examples with regard to each dimension of each frame. Moreover, it seems advisable to proceed 
paragraph by paragraph, after having read through the press release in total. 
When dealing with problems and difficulties, it likewise seems advisable to benefit from the 
CMP’s decades of experience (cf. ibid. 2001, 170-173): 
 In general, all quasi-sentences should be coded, even more so if they seem to include some 
kind of positioning aspects. Then it should be checked, which category (here: frame and 
dimension), and its observable instances as explicitly listed in particular, is the one that the 
sentence in question seems to fit best given the alternatives. 
 Only if indeed two categories seem to fit equally well should context be taken into account, 
and only thereafter should other more ‘interpretative’ approaches be considered. 
 Yet, some quasi-sentences may not fit any category more than any other. They should be 
coded as “off-topic/non-substantial”. This may be the case, for instance 
 if a press release refers to several topics, or – regarding the case of Europeanized 
welfare – if a press release refers to immigration or even welfare for migrants, but 
would rather seem to apply to third country (i.e. non-EU) nationals. Similarly, 
statements on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) may be connected to the issue 
of agriculture, but since GMOs are regulated via legislative processes independent from 
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the legislative proposals on CAP reform made by Commissioner Ciolos, statements on 
GMOs are “off-topic” 
 if a political actor is only describing the procedure (e.g. informing the reader of the next 
session of the committee), without making any indication regarding his or her position 
on the substance of the meeting 
 if a political actor is merely trying to discredit the political opponent without positioning 
himself or herself in doing so with regard to the substantive issue at stake (e.g. “The 
[opponent] should not be trusted, because he is married for the second time already.”) 
 Usually, quasi-sentences considered “off-topic/non-substantial” by the main coder have 
been set to italics in the data-set prepared for the reliability test. Coders should read 
these lines nonetheless for contextualization purposes as well as to ignore his 
categorization in case of strong disagreement. 
 If, however, a political actor only cites an opponent’s framing in order to express his or her 
discontent, such sentences should be coded as instances of the frame that the code uses 
himself, if opposition to such framing is not already explicitly attributed to any other frame 
anyway. In this sense, the basic rule of coding primarily by using matching texts to the 
codebook rather than using context or interpretation does not apply. 
 If more than one category might apply even after having checked the codebook thoroughly, 
contextual features such as the heading might be taken into consideration, most notably the 
sentences to follow. 
 Policy Frame Analysis might be described as a method situated between classic content 
analysis and discourse analysis. Yet, “interpretation” should only be applied as a means of 
last resort, filling the gap between the observed reality and the codebook. This is to say that, 
whenever the codebook instructions offer a category that is closer to the observed text than 
any other, this is the category of choice – not the one that the actor in question “actually 
means”. 
 Similarly, it is not for the individual coder to interpret, whether the quasi-sentence in 
question really constitutes a normative statement or causal narrative as such; instead, he or 
she should rely on the codebook for this purpose, and should categorise the quasi-sentence 
according to the “observable instances” indicated therein. 
 The coding of the frame is always more important than the coding of the dimension. 
 If – and only if – none of the above rules help to arrive at a situation where a quasi-sentence 
fits one category (Frame+Dimension) better than any of the others, it should be coded as 
“unclear”. Sentences coded temporarily as “unclear” should be returned to at the end of the 
process of coding the respective press release, and again at the end of the coding process. 
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The Coding Sheet 
Below, it is shown how the aforementioned example would be coded in the provided coding forms66: 
- Quasi-sentences are separated by “//” 
- At the margin, the codes corresponding to the quasi-sentences in the respective line of text are 
listed, in the order of their appearance, and separated by a comma. 
- Coders are asked to indicate what they consider to be the predominant frame used at the level of 
the press releases by impression and by number. These might differ from each other in cases 
where a lot of text was devoted to an aspect that at the same time did not appear as the most 
decisive parts. 
- Coders can and should not any problems and uncertainties underneath the table. 
 
Table 86: Illustration of a coding sheet used in the reliability test 
Coder (name): 
1 
Text:  Coding 
(frame + dimension) 
“The Russian activities in Ukraine threaten freedom in the Western world as a 
whole. // If the Western world shares any ideal, then it is certainly that of 
freedom // Had the Western powers not weakened their military capacities 
under budgetary constraints, it would have kept Russia at bay. // In fact, we 
need strong military forces more than ever now. // The Parliament will vote on the 
issue by September 2020.” 
Fx cons 
Fx norm 
Fx cogn  
 
Fx pol 
non-substantial 
 
Predominant / secondary frame by impression Fx / none 
Predominant / secondary frame by number Fx /none 
Problems: … 
 
 
I.2 Reliability test: procedure 
There is general agreement in the literature, that content analyses should be subjected to reliability tests as 
a matter of good practice (Krippendorff 2004; Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002; Neuendorf 
2002; Rustemeyer 1992). The analysis of policy frames as I conduct it here certainly also shares some 
features with the rather interpretativist tradition of discourse analysis, but it should be precisely at the 
point of reliability and the possibility of reproducing the findings obtained that it should be closer to such 
classic content analysis. Large research projects often include inter-coder reliability tests in the sense that it 
must be assured that the various coders involved apply the codebook in a reliably similar manner, so that 
                                                     
66 Such forms were used for the purposes of the reliability test. The main analysis was done, however, using the 
software MaxQDA for practical reasons. 
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the eventual results – e.g. across countries – are actually comparable. By contrast, all coding results were 
produced by one and the same coder as the author of the study, and the reliability test conducted was 
meant to only make sure the method applied is reliable to the point that the results could be reproduced 
by other scholars using the same codebook after the receiving training. 
Hence, it was necessary to hire additional coders (3 BA-level students in political science, hired 
based on language proficiency where applicable), otherwise not involved in the research project, by means 
of workshops, to introduce them to the method of Policy Frame Analysis in general (4 hours) as well as to 
the respective substantive backgrounds and codebooks in theory and practice, i.e. in a pilot study (7-7.5 
hours per case study), and to have them code a sample of texts (2.5-5 hours per coder per case). The 
limited number of hours available for each codebook was due to budgetary and, to a lesser extent, time 
constraints. Thus, the sample of texts had to be as small as possible, which as a general rule of thumb 
means 10 per cent of the overall data set (Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002). At the same time, it 
had to be assured that the sample would be representative of the overall data-set. 
The only reasonable way for sampling in this case was at the level of documents rather than 
coding units, because the context of a quasi-sentence matters in content analysis. At the same time, it 
seemed reasonable to distribute the work rather equally across coders and cases for practical reasons, to 
include documents covering all languages (four in total), all countries (six) and the whole breadth of the 
ideological spectrum. Given the rather small number of documents per case study and codebook (66 for 
Europeanized welfare, 157 for CAP, 191 for TTIP), drawing a 10 per cent random sample would not have 
guaranteed fulfilling all of these criteria, and might have included documents with very few codable units. 
Instead, therefore, 4 documents were selected per country, always including the main parties of the Left 
and Right plus some further parties on the fringes (where, for instance, a far Left party was included from 
Germany, a far Right party would be included from Austria, a Green one from Ireland and a Liberal one 
from the UK etc.). In order to avoid cherry-picking in the selection process (in the sense of choosing only 
those texts that were ‘easy’ to code), I always selected the document per party that included the highest 
number of coded units. This would not simply constitute a clear-cut criterion, but would also guarantee 
that a sample constituting 10 per cent of the overall data set at the level of documents would definitely 
correspond to at least 10 per cent of all codings. 
The sample of documents used for the pilot study (during the workshop) were selected 
according to similar criteria, with the difference that the documents selected per party were those with the 
second highest number of codings, thereby keeping the sample for the pilot and the eventual test separate. 
In addition, any party or country information were removed from the documents used for the pilot study, 
so that a discussion of the pilot results as a part of the workshop would not allow coders to willingly or 
unwillingly memorize how to ‘correctly’ code the statements of a given party. 
For Round 1 of the actual reliability test, then, each coder had to code 8 documents from 8 
different parties, covering at least 2 languages and 2 countries, resulting in a sample of 24 documents per 
case study/codebook and corresponding to about 36 per cent of the overall data set on welfare, about 15 
per cent for CAP and 12 per cent for TTIP. As for the codebooks on welfare and CAP, the reliability 
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scores were not yet satisfying after Round 1, one coder (for practical reasons) was asked to code another 
set of texts in addition, which in Round 1 had been given to one or both of the other two coders. For this 
Round 2 of the test, the respective coder would receive further training and an up-dated codebook based 
on his own Round 1 results, without, of course, being provided with any information as to his/her 
colleague had coded the respective texts in Round 1. The test had to be ended after Round 2 for 
budgetary reasons. Noteworthy, conducting several rounds of tests with further training and codebook 
revisions is common practice in content analysis, and indeed the advice is to continue testing and revising 
the codebook until acceptable levels of reliability are reached (Neuendorf 2002, 133–34). In the present 
case by and large, this applied after Round 2, in the case of TTIP even after Round 1. 
The coders were asked to code the documents in their respective sample in line with the general 
coding instructions as well as the respective case-specific codebook (see above and Annex II, respectively) 
document by document. Most importantly, they had to assign the quasi-sentences corresponding to the 
frames and their dimensions to the respective codes (e.g. F1norm). In addition, they were asked to 
calculate the predominant and secondary frame used in the document as well as to assign the document as 
a whole to a particular frame based on their overall impression. In order to calculate reliability scores, the 
codings assigned to a respective passage of text by the main coder (i.e. the author of the study) and the 
respective assistant coder were compared pair wise. This was done at the level of frames (Do both coders 
attribute the statement to the same policy frames?) as well as at the level of dimensions of these frames 
(Do they also agree on the dimension?). By comparing the result for each document as a whole (at the level 
of frames only), it was assured that potential disagreements on unitisation would not be as significant as to 
change the overall balance in terms of the predominant and secondary frame used by a party. 
Reliability scores were first calculated, in terms of percentage agreement only, for each 
document included in the test sample. Thereby, it could be checked whether there were substantial 
differences agreement scores for one particular party, party family or country. Where, for instance, 
disagreements were particularly high, this might be used as a first indication of a subsuming strategy, 
because the creative recombination or re-contextualisation of a particular line of argument that 
characterises this framing strategy would necessarily make coder disagreement more likely. Thereafter, I 
calculated the agreement indices ‘Cohen’s kappa’ and ‘Krippendorff’s alpha’ for each assistant coder vis-à-
vis the main coder by means of the respective STATA commands (‘kap’ and ‘krippalpha’), so as to identify 
potential problems related to just one coder, before calculating these indices for the whole sample per 
case/codebook. The test results and their interpretation regarding the thresholds for each index are 
presented in Chapter 3. 
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Annex II 
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II.1 Codebook: frames on Europeanised welfare 
Frame F1 
Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
Normative 
(Why is it a 
problem?) 
 
F1 norm 
National identity and national culture are goods 
worth protecting as such. There is a national 
community whose value is above the individual’s. 
 
References to national identity and 
community 
 
National identity and community as 
something to be vulnerable, worth 
protecting 
 
NB: social order (“Sozialer Friede”) 
should be coded F4 norm 
 
“Je crois que le Front National est le meilleur défenseur de 
l’identité française et de tous les peuples. »  
(transl. : « I think that the Front National is the best defender of 
the French identity and of all peoples ») 
Constitutive 
(What is the 
problem?) 
 
F1 cons 
Welfare, as such, is not a problem from this 
perspective, as it is acceptable to share within the 
national community (although there might be 
reasons to exclude some unworthy of the 
community). Immigration, however, is a problem 
AS SUCH. It would change national culture and 
identity, even beyond material facts. 
Immigration as bad as such 
 subcode: warning that Roma are 
allowed to access 
 
NB: as soon as it is only about a “too 
much” of immigration (numbers, 
masses etc.), F4 cons should be used 
 
Threat to jobs for nationals, ‘stealing’ 
of jobs, links between a negative job-
market situation and migration 
 
Immigration brings criminals into the 
country 
 
Cultural diversity as s.th. undesirable, 
warning of differences in lifestyle 
“The migration problem is an EU problem.” 
 
„Die Vorhut einer, vor allem von Roma geprägten, rumänisch-
bulgarischen Zuwandererwelle stellt zahlreiche [Adj.anderesLand2] 
Kommunen bereits heute vor größte Probleme.“ 
 
 
 
„With one million young people unemployed and public services 
stretched to the limit…” 
 
„…// und offen die Nöte der von nicht integrierbaren 
Zuwandererströmen betroffenen Mittelund Westeuropäer 
anspricht, die längst nicht beim Verdrängungswettbewerb auf dem 
Arbeitsmarkt enden." 
 
“Notwithstanding the rhetoric of our elected politicians who wax 
lyrical about the "enrichment" that immigration has bestowed 
upon Britain and the British people, the British public are painfully 
aware of the negative reality of enforced multiculturalism.” 
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Frame F1 
Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
 
Cognitive 
(What causes 
the problem?) 
 
F1 cogn 
The source of the problem is the access of 
immigrants due to open borders and free 
movement, which so far are imposed necessarily by 
EU membership. 
 
Free movement (indirectly: EU 
membership)/ open borders as the 
cause of the immigration problem 
 
NB: as soon as free movement is not 
identified as a cause of the problem 
as such, but just its “wrong 
handling”, use F4 cogn 
 
„Mit der vollen Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit für Bürger dieser 
Staaten, die mit Jänner 2014 in Kraft tritt, // wird sich diese 
Problemlage dramatisch verschärfen.“ 
 
 
“…, due to our membership of the EU, we cannot even deport 
those who are convicted.” 
Policy  
(What should 
be done?) 
 
F1 pol 
The policy from this perspective is: stop 
immigration, deny access. (Of course immigrants 
also do not have the same rights, but this is 
secondary here.) 
 
Stop immigration TOTALLY, not 
just a bit 
 
Self-portrait as an anti-immigration 
party 
 
In short: no access, no rights for 
migrants 
 
NB: any qualified opposition to 
immigration should be coded F4 pol 
“The British National Party says that immigration to the UK 
should be stopped, full stop.” 
 
„Wir bedanken uns bei Herrn Scheuer für die Bereitung des 
politischen Bodens, auf dem am 25. Mai außerhalb Bayerns die 
NPD als einzige authentische Anti-Zuwanderungspartei ernten 
wird.“ 
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Frame F2 
Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
Normative 
(Why is it a problem?) 
 
F2 norm 
All humans are – or 
should be- totally 
equal. This is 
embodied in EU 
citizenship and the 
principle of non-
discrimiantion. 
 
Reference to free movement as a fundamental right 
 
Reference to fundamental rights more generally 
 
Reference to legal principles, rights, values of the EU 
 
"Das heißt, der freie Personenverkehr ist nicht nur ein 
Grundrecht, . . .“ 
 
„Freizügigkeit ist ein grundsätzliches Recht für die Bürger 
der Europäischen Union, für das ich von Anbeginn 
gekämpft habe.“ 
 
“Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit ist ein Grundrecht und geht in 
zwei Richtungen: . . ." 
 
„Es ist völlig klar, dass eine Diskriminierung der Bürger anderer 
EU-Länder nicht erlaubt sein darf, // dies würde gegen 
europäisches Recht und europäische Prinzipien verstossen.“ 
 
„Das ist ein rechtliches Grundprinzip, das natürlich auch 
hier gilt", so [Person] weiter.“ 
Constitutive 
(What is the problem?) 
 
F2 cons 
Discrimination is a 
problem, because it 
denies the above 
rights. 
 
Discrimination on the basis of nationality as a problem 
 subcode: discrimination of Roma 
 
restrictions on free movement in any way (admission & rights), or 
even discussing welfare tourism as an act of discrimination 
 
"Heute haben wir eindeutig klargestellt, dass eine 
diskriminierende Einschränkung des Rechts auf 
Freizügigkeit, wie sie Cameron oder Seehofer fordern, mit 
dem Europaparlament nicht zu machen ist.“ 
 
 
Cognitive  
(What causes the 
problem?) 
 
F2 cogn 
The source of 
discrimination is 
nationalism, racism, 
xenophobia. 
 
Nationalism, racism, xenophobia lead to discrimination 
 
Reference to right-wing party discourse as nationalist, populist, 
vote-seeking opportunist 
 
NB: only if the right-wing, populist, nationalist etc. origins are 
spelled out, F2 cogn. Otherwise F5 cons. 
“Die Mitgliedstaaten sind einem populistischen Reflex 
erlegen.“ 
 
„//. . .  die die populistische Debatte um Freizügigkeit in 
der EU, wie sie von [anderePerson] und der [anderePartei] 
angestoßen wurde,// verurteilt.“ 
 
„Mit hysterischen Parolen am rechten Rand nach 
Wählerstimmen zu fischen, hilft hier niemanden“, so 
[Person] und [Person] abschließend.“ 
 
Policy  
(What should be done?) 
There should be 
both unlimited 
‘No’ to restrictions on free movement 
 
„Ich rufe die Kommission auf, sich die Umsetzung der 
Freizügigkeitsrichtlinie in den einzelnen Staaten noch 
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Frame F2 
Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
 
F2 pol 
access and rights 
for migrants. 
 
No discrimination 
 
checking welfare entitlements individually 
 
Treating EU-migrants as nationals 
 
In short: no limits on access, no limits on rights for migrants 
 
Free movement must be respected by everyone 
 
Free movement must be enforced by the COM 
einmal genau anzusehen // und falls nötig konsequent 
Vertragsverletzungsverfahren einzuleiten." 
 
“. . . and to make clear that no opt-out, or derogation, from 
the EU's commitment to freedom of movement is 
possible." 
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Frame F3 
Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
Normative  
(Why is it a problem?) 
 
F3 norm 
Individuals should enjoy as much 
freedom as possible, which is usually 
achieved by the market rather than 
the state. Markets are valued also for 
their efficiency. The single market 
for labour is worth protecting, 
therefore. 
Economic efficiency 
 
Personal economic gains 
 
NB: as soon as this is about rights in any way, 
use F2 norm 
 
General economic gains of the internal market, 
e.g. in terms of growth 
 
NB: as soon as there is a link to the welfare 
state, the social system: use F5 norm; for UK 
sources, note that fiscal system and welfare 
systems are identical! 
 
“We have an open and liberal jobs market in Britain - which the 
Conservatives used to believe in.” 
 
“Die Europäische Union soll den Menschen eine Perspektive 
bieten, die die Chancen des europäischen Binnen- und 
Arbeitsmarkt nutzen wollen.” 
 
 
„. . . sondern kurbelt auch die Wirtschaft an und spült Geld in 
die Staatskassen", so [Person].“ 
Constitutive  
(What is the problem?) 
 
F3 cons 
Welfare states entail inefficiency, 
because too much welfare acts as a 
disincentive for taking up 
employment. Moreover, generous 
welfare must be financed by high 
taxes, which reduces individual 
freedom. ‘Welfare tourism’ means 
inefficiency. 
Problematising quite explicitly the additional 
welfare spending 
 
NB: any more general problematisation using 
concepts such as “welfare tourism”, “benefits 
tourism” “mass immigration” or 
“Armutsmigration” should be coded F4; in 
other words: if the insistence on the existence 
of a problem is rather diffuse, use F4 
 
Stressing the burden on tax payers and the 
general budget 
 
“Gauland wörtlich: „Bereits jetzt steigt die Einwanderung in 
unsere Sozialsysteme” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“But it is important, with budgets under strain...” 
Cognitive  
(What causes the problem?) 
 
F3 cogn 
Too generous welfare arrangements 
(in general and for migrants) sets the 
wrong incentives. 
The prospect of receiving welfare in a host 
member state is a (wrong) incentive for 
migration 
 
NB: by contrast, F4 should be used whenever the 
cause of the problem is not framed in economic terms, 
but rather legal terms: the cause of the 
“Einen sicheren Anspruch auf die, im europäischen Vergleich 
relativ hohe deutsche Sozialhilfe zu haben, stelle einen 
ungeheuren Anreiz für bedürftige Bürger der gesamten EU dar, 
so der stellvertretende AfD-Sprecher weiter.“ 
 
„It is important we ensure that people who go to other EU 
states do so for the right reasons – that is, to work.” 
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Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
problem is then that states or the EU do not 
regulate the issue 
 
 
"We must co-operate to address the key factors that drive 
people to abuse the system –“ 
 
“It is in the words of immigration specialists a significant pull 
factor.” 
 
Policy  
(What should be done?) 
 
F3 pol 
Hence, if it occurs, it is welfare for 
migrants that must be limited, not 
migration. If welfare cannot be 
reduced in general, then it should be 
at least welfare for migrants which is 
curtailed. 
 
Free movement of labour, market-based 
 
Restrictions on welfare entitlements 
 
NB: going beyond status quo in doing so, 
otherwise F5 cogn 
 
No change in the rules of Schengen or 
restrictions on admission 
 
In short: access yes, rights no 
 
NB: as above, in relation to F4: as soon as the 
policy to prevent “welfare tourism” is rather 
unspecified and hence either explicitly 
includes or at least does not exclude 
restriction of access (e.g. in terms of deporting 
people, prohibiting access), use F4 rather than 
F3 
„Freizügigkeit soll der Öffnung des Arbeitsmarkts für EU-
Bürgern dienen und nicht den Sozialtourismus fördern.“ 
 
"Wie in [anderesLand] sollte es auch in [Land] 
Unterstützungsleistungen wie Arbeitslosengeld für EU-
Ausländer erst nach drei Monaten geben", hielt [Person] fest.“ 
 
“. . . or that these announcements should be a precursor of 
changes in the freedom of movement of labour, which is 
fundamental to the single market.” 
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Frame F4 
Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
Normative  
(Why is it a 
problem?) 
 
F4 norm 
Order matters. In general, too much change is a 
potential threat to order. Tradition is preferable over 
change, therefore. Rewards must be built on past 
achievements. 
 
(social) order, “sozialer Friede” 
 
Public confidence in the existing order 
 
“. . . die den sozialen Frieden in Europa nachhaltig 
gefährden könnte.” 
 
“Not least because abuse erodes public confidence.” 
 
Constitutive  
(What is the 
problem?) 
 
F4 cons 
Too much of poverty is a threat to order. Hence, 
welfare is acceptable. But it must not be redistributive, 
otherwise it would change the existing order. Migration 
brings change, hence it is viewed with some suspicion. 
Welfare migration is problem if it means too much 
migration and redistribution. Welfare benefits for 
migrants are problematic because they blur the lines 
between nationals and non-nationals, questioning the 
nation-state as the dominant mode of social order. 
 
Welfare for migrants as undeserved, 
unjustified 
 
Mass immigration puts stress on 
society, is a ‘challenge’ 
 subcode: mass immigration of 
Roma 
 
NB: contrast to F1: it is the number that 
makes it a problem 
 
Welfare tourism as a ‘real’ concern 
 
There is a problem with welfare 
tourism (Sozialtourismus, 
Armutsmigration) that cannot be 
ignored 
 
NB: this may be largely unspecified 
here, whereas for F3 it would be 
focused on the welfare aspect 
 
Disregard of those who deny the 
existence of the problem 
 
 
 
 
„. . . dann ist mit einem drastischen Anstieg der 
Zuwanderung von Roma aus diesen beiden Ländern zu 
rechnen", warnte [Person].“ 
 
 
 
 
 
„Dabei wies der [Partei] Europaabgeordnete darauf hin, 
dass es falsch sei, das Problem des Sozialtourismus aus 
Gründen der politischen Korrektheit, weil es sich bei den 
Betroffenen um Roma handle, zu leugnen. //“ 
 
„This initiative shows that Conservatives are working on a 
range of fronts to address people's real concerns over 
migration and benefits tourism.” 
 
“Die aktuelle Diskussion in Europa über 
Armutseinwanderung ist notwendig.“ 
 
 
Cognitive  
(What causes the 
problem?) 
 
F4 cogn 
Open borders (access) and de-stratification (equal 
rights) can be causes of welfare migration if handled 
unwisely. 
 
Totally unrestricted or insufficiently 
controlled free movement in terms of 
admission and rights 
 
 a wrong way of handling free 
„Und wenn mit 1. Jänner 2014 die Übergangsfristen für 
rumänische und bulgarische Staatsangehörige fallen, // dann 
ist mit einem drastischen Anstieg der Zuwanderung von Roma aus 
diesen beiden Ländern zu rechnen", warnte [Person].“ 
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Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
movement leads to welfare tourism 
and mass immigration 
 
A “lax” approach to free movement 
leads to welfare tourism and abuse 
 subcode: especially attractive for 
Roma 
 
NB: free movement does not 
necessarily lead to problems, that 
would have to be coded F1 cogn 
 
“Conservatives are concerned that the inflexible approach 
could be used to restrict Britain's right to set its own rules 
on key aspects such as access to benefits, healthcare and 
housing.“ 
 
“. . . et une gauche laxiste qui participe activement à faire de 
l’Europe une Passoire.” 
 
Policy  
(What should be 
done?) 
 
F4 pol 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F4 pol 
Both restrictions on free movement or stratification 
measures might thus be thinkable to address welfare 
migration. 
 
Fight welfare tourism (without further 
specification) 
 
prevent full access for Romania and 
Bulgaria before it starts 
 
An end to “uncontrolled” immigration, 
e.g. by limiting numbers 
 
NB: Unlike F1 pol, always only 
qualified opposition to immigration 
 
changes to existing legislation in the 
form of further restrictions of free 
movement – including access to 
countries – must be considered 
 
openness to “reform” and stricter 
legislation 
 
Member States must be given the 
possibility to address the problem and 
must use this potential to the full, e.g. 
„Die [Land] Bundesregierung müsse dem Beispiel des 
[anderePerson, anderesLand] folgen und Maßnahmen gegen 
den Sozialtourismus aus anderen EU-Staaten ergreifen, 
forderte der [Partei] Delegationsleiter im Europäischen 
Parlament, [Person].“ 
 
"Freedom of movement is an important principle, // which 
is why it cannot be a completely unqualified one. 
 
“But a complete halt to migration within the EU is not the 
answer either.” 
 
“. . . muss auch darüber debattiert werden, wir dies 
verhindert werden kann.” 
 
 
 
„Es ist sicherlich richtig, dass Sozialmissbrauch in [Land] 
viel strenger geahndet werden muss.“ 
 
 
 
 
 327 
Frame F4 
Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
by interpreting Directive 2004/38 in 
the strictest way possible 
 
Use existing legislation in order to 
deport those who “abuse” the system, 
deny them re-entry 
 
NB: F5 cogn just says that existing 
laws suffice to prevent abuse 
 
Sub-code: solve Roma-problem 
elsewhere, not here 
 
In short: both limitations on access 
and on rights are thinkable and asked 
for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
„Denn eines muss klar sein: Das Roma-Problem an die 
wohlhabenden Mitgliedstaaten wie [Land] abzuschieben, 
kann keine Lösung sein", schloss [Person], der kürzlich 
diesbezügliche Anfragen an die EU-Kommission gestellt 
hat.“ 
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Frame F5 
Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
Normative 
 (Why is it a 
problem?) 
 
F5 norm 
 
Solidarity and equality as incorporated in the welfare 
state 
The welfare state’s functioning „Gesundheitssystem, Krankenhäuser und Pflege würden ohne 
Zuwanderer von einem Tag auf den anderen nicht mehr 
funktionieren", erinnert [Person].“ 
 
Constitutive  
(What is the 
problem?) 
 
F5 cons 
Welfare can lead to more equality (also materially), is 
based on solidarity. Welfare thus is almost a value as 
such. Immigration as such is not opposed. Welfare 
for immigrants is even desirable in the name of 
solidarity and universalism. Welfare migration would 
only be a problem, if it meant a threat to the welfare 
state or social standards in general. 
 
Welfare tourism as a ‘myth’, and 
those who talk about it are just trying 
to provoke panic 
 
Reference to “so-called”, “alleged” 
(angeblich) welfare tourism 
 
Welfare tourism is not a problem 
 
‘Stay calm’, factual approach to the 
issue 
 
"Wir brauchen Informationen statt Panikmache." 
 
„This contradicts the common perception promoted by some 
politicians and newspapers. //” 
 
 
„Deshalb gibt es in [Land] kein wesentliches Problem mit 
'Sozialtourismus'.“ 
 
“This has polarised views unnecessarily and led to a debate based 
on supposition rather than fact.” 
Cognitive 
 (What causes the 
problem?) 
 
F5 cogn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F5 cogn 
Migrants, however, also tend to contribute to the 
welfare states as a whole, and therefore there is not a 
problem. 
 
Migrants make a net contribution to 
the welfare system 
 
Stressing benefits of migration for 
the welfare state 
 
NB: F3 if the general economic or 
financial gain of migration is 
stressed, without any reference to the 
welfare state; for UK sources, note 
that fiscal system and welfare 
systems are identical! 
 
Existing EU law is sufficient; 
Member States are given the 
possibility to address outright abuse 
and can use this potential 
"Die Statistik zeigt deutlich, dass Ausländer mehr ins [Adj.Land] 
Sozialsystem einzahlen als sie daraus erhalten.“ 
 
„Unter dem Strich profitiert das [Adj.Land] Sozialsystem sogar 
von Zuwanderern //; nicht nur durch die Einzahlungen, sondern 
auch durch die vielen Sozial- und Pflegedienstleistenden"“ 
 
„He also highlights the finding that EU migrants actually pay 
more in taxes than they cost in benefits, . . . ” 
 
“Man müsse anerkennen, dass “mobile Arbeitnehmer zum 
Wirtschaftswachstum beitragen 
 und Nettozahler in den Sozialsystemen sind”, betont die 
Europaparlamentarierin.“ 
 
„Das EU-Recht ermöglicht aber nicht nur die Freizügigkeit, 
sondern auch die Verhinderung von Missbrauch.“ 
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Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
 
NB: as soon as the usage of these 
laws is specified beyond “preventing 
abuse” towards limiting access for 
migrants (deportation, denial of re-
entry etc.) – F4 pol! 
 
„Die Mitgliedstaaten könnten nach europäischem 
Freizügigkeitsrecht durchaus den Zugang zu Sozialhilfen 
beschränken, damit Leistungen nicht unangemessen in Anspruch 
genommen würden.“ 
Policy  
(What should be 
done?) 
 
F5 pol 
As long as there is no threat to the welfare state, 
some welfare tourism is acceptable. Before limiting 
access or cutting welfare, welfare states should be 
strengthened to cope with welfare tourism. 
 
No need for enhanced EU legislation 
 
Help local authorities who are 
confronted with large-scale 
immigration, using existing or even 
additional financial means 
 
NB: F4 pol if the idea is to help them 
to punish “abusers” 
“Dort wo einige wenige Städte besonders belastet sind, weil die 
Zuwanderung ärmerer Menschen sich konzentriert, ist es an den 
Mitgliedsstaaten den betroffenen Menschen und den Kommunen 
mit Geldern aus den EU-Strukturfonds und von nationaler 
Ebene zu helfen.“ 
 
“Es ist der Bund, der Ländern und Gemeinden bei der 
Bewältigung aktueller Probleme unter die Arme greifen und 
gleichzeitig EU-übergreifend aktiv werden muss", meint 
Schwentner.“ 
 
Off-topic for welfare 
The following topics are sometimes discussed in the same press release, but should in general be disregarded: 
- migration from outside the EU, i.e. third countries; 
- the referendum in Switzerland 
- posted workers (Entsendung von Arbeitnehmner, travailleurs détachés) 
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Short version: 
frame What sort of values do you need in order 
to see this as a problem? 
(Normative dimension) 
What is the problem? (Constitutive 
dimension) 
What has led to the problem?  
(Cognitive dimension) 
What should be done about the 
problem? (Policy dimension) 
F1 National identity and community Immigration as the influx of ‘others’ is a 
problem as such 
Free movement policy Stop immigration 
F2 Fundamental Rights, equality Discrimination is the actual problem Nationalism, thinking in terms of nation-
states, populism, xenophobia 
No more discrimination based on nationality 
F3 Individual freedom Inefficient welfare arrangements increase 
tax burden 
Unconditional welfare sets the wrong 
incentives 
Allow free movement for efficient 
allocation of resources, restrict welfare 
F4 Stability, order, tradition welfare tourism is a real concern as it 
questions existing social order 
(redistributive potential, elimination of 
status national/non-national) 
Loss of control over migrant rights Restrict welfare for migrants and/or 
restrict migration 
F5 Solidarity and equality, as embodied in 
the (national) welfare state 
Fundamental threats to the historical 
achievement of the welfare state – as this 
is not happening, there is no problem! 
Migrants may contribute to the social 
system 
Strengthen local authorities were 
necessary, otherwise no need for action 
 
  
 331 
II.2 Codebook: frames on 2013 Reform of the CAP 
Frame F1: Classic frame 
Dimension Logic Observable instances Examples 
Normative 
 (Why is it a 
problem?) 
 
F1 norm 
As Rhinard points out – and explains before the historical 
background of the post-war era – food security was the 
central rationale of this frame (p. 70). The link of food 
security to the well-being of farmers is more historical than 
logical: at a time when farmers’ well-being mattered for the 
economic rationale of food-security, it also carried a 
considerable political importance, as farmers made up a 
central political force (percentage of the population, capacity 
for mobilization) as well (Rhinard and other references, 
basically every reference that says something on early CAP 
history). Nonetheless, the logical overlap between these two 
aims consists in attributing the status of an end in itself to 
the act of producing food. In recent years, issue of food 
security has seen a twofold update: On the one hand, a 
globalized perspective on agriculture challenges the self-
evident way in which food security is considered in Europe 
today (Bréhon, 2011, pp. 7-8) In this context, it has also been 
pointed out that the alternative, food dependence, is morally 
problematic: in the case of global shortages, rich European 
countries would still be able to import food at the expense of 
poorer regions (Bréhon, 2011, p. 7). On the other hand, food 
security is now also framed in qualitative terms rather than 
quantitative terms (Bréhon, 2011, p. 9). Thereby also the act 
of producing food obtains renewed prestige. At the same 
time, alternative value bases for CAP such as 
‘multifunctionality’ (see below), ecological aspects of it in 
particular, as well as competitiveness are rejected as 
secondary or too complex for achieving popular support 
(Bréhon, 2011, pp. 7-11). 
 
Food, food production and farmers‘ well-being as 
central to agricultural policy, ranked above other 
considerations 
 
CAP is made for farmers 
 
Farmers’ well-being and incomes 
NB: stressing the needs of #national# AND 
European farmers or farmers in general (F4: only 
national) 
NB: rural communities = F3! 
 
Stressing food security, food safety 
 
Stressing self sufficiency in terms of food supply, 
independence from global markets 
 
New: global food supply 
 
Policy must work in daily practice, on the ground; 
„praxisorientiert“ (as farmers are the practitioners) 
“The commission needs to be more 
mindful of the effects of dipping into the 
Agricultural Budget, // the reality is that 
any measures which impact on the incomes of 
farmers // or reduces the stability of the 
agricultural sector // has wider implications 
for the local communities and rural 
economy, // of which farmers are the 
backbone. //” 
 
« Die Landwirte in der EU brauchen klare 
Regeln und verlässliche Rahmenbedingungen für 
eine der wichtigsten Aufgaben für die Gesellschaft 
- bei einer nachhaltigen 
Landbewirtschaftung die Ernährung für über 
500 Millionen Verbraucher in der Europäischen 
Union zu sichern.“ 
 
„“This refocusing of policy needs to be carefully 
monitored and is subject to a mid-term review to 
ensure that at farm level the measures are 
workable // and that they deliver for the 
environment and the climate,” she said. 
//” 
Constitutive  Anything that impinges on the production of food as such as Farmers are in trouble  
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Frame F1: Classic frame 
Dimension Logic Observable instances Examples 
(What is the 
problem?) 
 
F1 cons 
 
 
F1 cons 
well as on farmers as the actors entrusted with the honorable 
task of producing food, in either quantity or quality, is 
therefore problematic. Bréhon, for instance, deplores what 
he calls “The almost total abandonment of food” (2011, p. 8) 
in describing the situation prior to the 2013 Reform. 
 
Challenges to /demands on farmers are stressed 
 economic 
 administrative 
 
Challenges to the profession (also: lack of people 
entering the job) 
 
„Das Parlament hat sich für eine gerechte 
// und praxisorientierte Agrarreform 
ausgesprochen, // die die europäische 
und deutsche Landwirtschaft fit für die 
Zukunft macht // und den neuen 
Herausforderungen gerecht wird.“ 
 
“The current agreement is overly complex, 
administratively cumbersome // and it will 
lead to upheaval such as remapping // 
for very little environmental gain. //  
 
“The CAP agreement reached today 
between the European Parliament, 
Council and Commission will remove 
uncertainty for farmers, according to 
[person], [region], MEP, one of the key 
negotiators in the reform talks. //” 
 
« . . . and will help to address the 
persistent problem of too few young 
people in farming,” she said.” 
Cognitive 
 (What causes the 
problem?) 
 
F1 cogn 
Noteworthy, such problems are inherent in agricultural 
production. In that sense, agriculture has been considered as 
an industry apart, with ‘special’ needs (cf. Rhinard, 2010, p. 
70). After all, agriculture is subject to force majeure in terms of 
weather conditions, which confronts producers with 
considerable uncertainty about production conditions. While 
uncertainty may affect other industries as well, farmers 
further need to plan production very much in advance. At 
the same time, demand for food tends to remain rather 
stable, so that even if prices drop, consumers will not buy 
more food while farmers cannot reduce production quickly 
enough (Ackrill, 2000, pp. 20-21; Altomonte & Nava, 2005, 
Agriculture is exposed to force majeur, and, 
nowadays, speculation 
 
Farming is special, a particularly demanding 
profession 
 
Insecurity of farming lies in the problem of planning 
ahead given particular factors such as the weather 
 
or, nowadays, price volatility on global markets, 
caused e.g. by financial speculation on food 
 
 
 
“… it is the responsibility of the EU to 
act collectively rather than targeting the 
Budget of one particular sector such as 
agriculture, particularly as it is a sector 
vulnerable to market conditions.” 
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Frame F1: Classic frame 
Dimension Logic Observable instances Examples 
p. 258). If left to itself, agriculture may hence be much less 
attractive than other professional activities, which means that 
without intervention, jobs in (European) agriculture may get 
replaced (Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 258). Logically, if too 
few people decide in favour of an occupation in agriculture, 
food production in Europe would be threatened. While these 
causal narratives have a long tradition, recent developments 
in world markets seem to provide them with new relevance 
in that price volatility is expected to develop into “an 
increasingly regular phenomenon” (d’Oultremont, 2011, p. 
10; cf. also Bianchi, 2011, p. 16; Mahé, 2012, p.3), partly due 
to financial speculation (Bianchi 2011, p. 16). The crises in 
the dairy sector are cited as an example from which ‘lessons’ 
should be learned (ibid., p. 14). Indeed, in a recent volume of 
‘The European Union Explained’ issued by the European 
Commission, this classic frame stressing the uncertainty as a 
problem particular to agriculture and explaining it by 
reference to climate- and weather-dependency is still cited 
(European Commission 2014b, p. 7). Hence, this frame is 
arguably far from dead, although it has lost its former 
dominance in shaping policy. 
“This reserve was put in place for a 
reason - namely to provide security for 
farmers across the EU //and there is very 
real concern that issues such as the price volatility 
in the beef sector and dairy sector in particular 
may create issues for farmers // who may 
need these funds next year. //” 
 
Policy  
(What should be 
done?) 
 
F1 pol 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Classically, three policy solutions are suggested by advocates 
of this frame, grouped under the heading of Common 
Market Organizations (CMOs): guarantee prices, tariffs, 
quotas and export subsidies. Of these, the guarantee or target 
price is certainly the most essential element, whereas the 
others are more or less supporting the feasibility of its 
application. By fixing prices, the uncertainty confronting 
farmers under market conditions is considerably reduced, 
and they now have an incentive to produce sufficient 
amounts (or even to overproduce by finding ways of 
increasing production, as the target price is set above the 
market price) (Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 259). Tariffs are 
set on agricultural products entering the common market in 
order to avoid an influx of cheap food from outside, thereby 
Generally strong CAP, coupled payments, tariffs, 
quotas or at least high direct payments 
 
Strong CAP 
 
Opposition to budget cuts 
 includes downplaying current amounts of 
spending 
 
Opposition to liberalisation 
 
Support of quotas, tariffs, export subsidies (at least 
prolong their use) 
 all quotas supposed to end 2015 according to 
 
 
 
 
 
“… it is the responsibility of the EU to act 
collectively rather than targeting the Budget of one 
particular sector such as agriculture, particularly 
as it is a sector vulnerable to market 
conditions.” 
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Dimension Logic Observable instances Examples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F1 pol 
serving the principle of Community preference (Altomonte 
& Nava, 2005, p. 258; Fouilleux, 2013, p. 310). While prices 
could be kept at the target level by buying up and storing 
surpluses (Fouilleux, 2013, p. 310), the surpluses could also 
be avoided by setting quotas or by refunding exports (i.e. 
making European food competitive on a global level) 
(Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 259; Matthews, 2011; p. 10). 
These instruments have been under massive critique for 
decades due to the burdens they impose on consumers and 
tax payers (who have to pay directly or indirectly for target 
prices), on non-EU countries (not least on developing ones 
who are hampered massively in their development due to the 
fact their only competitive sectors are effectively hampered 
from exporting to the EU) (Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 
260), and on the environment (Rhinard, 2010, pp. 71-73). 
Nevertheless, in the debate on the 2013 Reform, they have 
seen a revival in the form of a ‘safety net’ consisting mainly 
of a new Special Reserve for market interventions in times of 
food crises (d’Oultremont, 2011, p. 10; Mahé, 2012, p. 3, pp. 
35-37). As a whole, both the values and the reasoning as well 
as the policy solutions of this frame appear to carry relevance 
beyond the history books. Just because the reforms so far 
have indicated a move away from this frame, this does not 
mean that it continues to shape the conceptions of the CAP 
in the hearts and minds of some actors. At the same time, 
even the most ardent supporters of this frame will not 
necessarily suggest a return to the ‘old’ CAP. Next to a 
probably extensive ‘safety net’, they are likely to generally 
support a ‘strong’ CAP, rejecting budgetary cuts. On the one 
hand, some proponents of this frame in the literature, most 
notably Bréhon (2011), seem to consider the current way of 
justifying and applying direct payments as somehow 
‘unworthy’ of the noble task of food production. That is 
because such direct payments are consciously ‘decoupled’ 
from food production, not actually rewarding this activity. 
COM; 2017 eventually – achieved by F1 supporters 
 
Support of market intervention of any kind, i.e. 
support of CMO 
 
Pro historic references or at least slow transitions 
 i.e. opposition to flat rate area payment 
 
protecting farmers: from too harsh demands, e.g. in 
terms of greening, from world markets 
NB: opposition to equal application of greening across 
countries should be coded F4 
 
call for delays on and exceptions from greening 
 
what farmers have done so far for the environment – 
under pillar 2 – should be taken into account for 
greening obligations 
 
support of the “safety net” / Crisis mechanism, make 
it as strong and applicable as possible 
 
support of “young farmers” scheme 
 
support of “active farmers” 
 
actively foster innovation / modernisation in farming 
technology 
NB: of course statements that are more extreme but 
share the same spirit – e.g. not just suggesting to 
delay the abolition of quotas, but not to abolish them 
– is also F1 pol 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
„We are also unhappy with the 
introduction of an additional 'greening 
penalty' in the Horizontal Regulation for 
those who do not carrying out their 
'greening' requirements under pillar 1.” 
 
“Although we did manage to delay this 
penalty for the first two years, we were 
not able to prevent an eventual 25% 
penalty.” 
 
 
 
 
 
„Bedauerlich ist, dass die [andere 
Parteien] die Anrechnung der 
Agrarumweltmaßnahmen in der 2. Säule 
abgelehnt haben“ 
 
“The MEP said she was particularly 
pleased that support for young farmers 
has been strengthened during the talks.” 
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Dimension Logic Observable instances Examples 
Along these lines, one might attribute the 2013 Reform 
proposal for limiting direct payments to ‘active farmers’ to 
this first frame. On the other hand, however, within the 
current system they are likely to prefer what is referred to as 
‘Pillar I’ over ‘Pillar II’, as the latter has always been meant to 
fund those aspects of farming that go beyond food 
production, which means that from the perspective of the 
classic frame, it lacks legitimacy and diverts resources from 
where they should actually be allocated. By contrast, direct 
payments under the first pillar have replaced price support, 
and so the minimum supporters of the classic frame would 
want to achieve is there subsistence, preferably historical 
levels. 
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Frame F2: Liberalisation 
Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
Normative 
 (Why is it a 
problem?) 
 
F2 norm 
If the classic frame mainly considers agriculture as a policy apart, a CAP-specific version of the 
supposed meta-frame may challenge exactly this by evaluating, analyzing and treating CAP like 
any other policy. Before this background, it seems plausible to consider works comparing 
policies and policy-making in the EU (Wallace, Wallace, and Pollack 2005) and on the 
economics of these policies in particular (Altomonte & Nava, 2005) in order to distill a 
‘liberalisation frame’ specifically regarding CAP. Indeed, when introducing CAP as an EU 
policy, Elmar Rieger (in: Wallace et al. (2005)) makes great effort to stress its anti-marketness 
and anti-liberal foundations (ibid., pp. 162, 196, respectively). As he points out: 
 
Unlike other welfare-state institutions, agricultural measures typically fuse production – that is, 
output-increasing- with income-related goals, making it hard to separate distributive and 
regulatory dimensions, and in ways that defy the application of normal economic efficiency criteria. 
This is still true for the new regime of ‘decoupled’ farm aid. (ibid., p. 164; emphasis by the 
author) 
 
The idea of ‘normal economic efficiency criteria’ can accordingly be considered as the 
normative foundation of the liberalisation frame before which the CAP is to be evaluated and 
on which the right kind of CAP would have to be founded. 
References to 
efficiency as the goal 
of agricultural policy 
 
farmers as 
entrepreneurs 
 
big farms are better 
(because they are 
more efficient) 
“Die GAP soll auf diesem Wege effizienter 
werden im Hinblick // auf eine 
wettbewerbsfähige // und nachhaltige 
Landwirtschaft und // einem lebendigen 
ländlichen Raum. //“ 
 
„Die Wirtschaftlichkeit eines Betriebs muss 
künftig stärker in den Vordergrund 
gestellt werden“ 
 
Constitutive  
(What is the 
problem?) 
 
F2 cons 
In order to capture the constitutive dimension of this frame, one might re-cite a quote from 
The Economist (29 September 1990) that describes the CAP as ‘the single most idiotic system 
of economic mismanagement that the rich western countries have ever devised’. In other 
words, the problem with CAP consists in the policies adopted in this policy area, especially 
under the classic frame, which do not follow ‘normal economic efficiency criteria’ and hence 
entails social costs that are unacceptably high. 
Complaints about 
‘waste’ of public 
money and market 
distortions 
 
wasteful subsidies 
 
overproduction 
 
waste of taxpayers’ 
money 
 
artificially high 
consumer prices 
 
„The Commission has failed to get to 
grips with inefficient farming methods in 
other EU countries // and many wasteful 
subsidies, including those to “tobacco 
growers” still remain”  
Cognitive 
 (What causes 
So what, according to this frame, has caused this problem? One more time, Rieger’s work, 
actually more of a textbook kind, quite obviously exemplifies this frame:  
References to the laws 
of supply and demand 
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Frame F2: Liberalisation 
Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
the problem?) 
 
F2 cogn 
 
 
F2 cogn 
 
CAP planning is premised on a view of a ‘general’ European interest and notions of a basic 
incentive structure common to all farmers. It shares this feature with state socialism, where the 
diversity of interests, not properly taken into account in the planning process, spontaneously 
makes itself felt when individual farmers make decisions most convenient for them. CAP 
decisions have been made as if these objective economic laws did not apply in agriculture. 
Therefore, ‘post-decision surprises’ are a constant feature, because economic laws continue to 
function. (ibid., p. 176) 
 
In order to complement this causal narrative, one has to be familiar with these ‘objective 
economic laws’, usually elaborated in a classic social cost analysis using a supply and demand 
curve (cf. Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 258). The argument is that classic CAP policies place a 
burden on consumers who pay the “difference between the smaller quantity actually consumed 
at the politically determined domestic target price (PT) and the higher quantity eventually 
available for consumption without price intervention, at price P0 or, without tariff protection, at 
price PW.”, while on top of that taxpayers have to pay for the export subsidies (ibid.). In 
addition, these export subsidies and tariffs harm third-country producers and eventually hamper 
free trade, causing further indirect harm to efficiency. Direct payments, the policy suggested by 
the multifunctionality frame discussed below, are more efficient and hence preferred over 
market interventions. Nevertheless, direct payments may keep farm business in the market that 
would otherwise not be economically viable, that is, which are inefficient (Rieger, 2005, p. 172; 
Mahé, 2011, pp. 30-31; d’Oultremont, 2012, p. 15). What is implied here is that a farm which is 
not working efficiently is also not worth supporting. Obviously, these causal narratives are not 
always told in all detail in political statements; yet, references to the ‘wrong incentives’ set by 
existing policies in terms of public spending may be seen as instances of the cognitive 
dimension of this frame. 
 
 
 ‘butter mountains’ 
talk 
 
subsidies lead to 
overproduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 “The continuation of coupled payments 
is regrettable as these lead to over production 
which is not related to market demand.” 
 
 
Policy  
(What should 
be done?) 
 
F2 pol 
 
 
 
On the policy dimension, subsidies of any kind – even direct payments – must therefore 
eventually be abolished, and even direct payments are considered problematic with regard to 
‘normal’ economic efficiency criteria (Rieger, 2005, p. 166). Such a policy of budgetary discipline 
has coincided in time with the rise of the liberalisation frame (Ackrill, 2000, p. 87), but further 
would be valuable regarding efficiency, as all government spending must be based on taxes, 
which in turn, are likely to hamper the Pareto efficient allocation of resources. Of the other 
policy tools considered in CAP, and with regard to the 2013 Reform in particular, the so-called 
‘greening’ is probably not endorsed – at least not actively promoted – by proponents of this 
Reduce subsidies / 
CAP budget 
 
reduce budget, 
especially for pillar 1 
 
private money for 
agricultural investment 
 
 
 
„// auch könnte das EU-Budget drastisch 
gekürzt // und nicht zuletzt ein wichtiger 
Beitrag zum Abbau der Brüsseler 
Zentralbürokratie geleistet werden", 
schloss [Person].“ 
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Frame F2: Liberalisation 
Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F2 pol 
frame. Environmental objectives of the CAP might be considered at odds with efficiency: After 
all, they limit the free choice of the farmer-entrepreneur to allocate resources in a market-
oriented – and hence efficient – manner. Inasmuch as the ‘capping’ is concerned, large farms 
are often considered more efficient (cf. Mahé, 2011, pp. 30-31), so that capping might punish 
exactly those enterprise that do their job ‘best’. At the same time, it could be argued that 
efficient farms do not need any further support, so that if they receive direct payments they do 
not need, the support system would be inefficient (d’Oultremont, 2012, p. 15). This 
contradiction, however, only exists as direct payments are not a policy of choice for proponent 
of the liberalisation frame anyway. Indeed, further market orientation is the general line of 
policy following from this frame. During the debate on the 2013 Reform, advocates of the 
liberalisation frame will thus call for a further reduction in direct payments, will support the 
expiry of the quota system and will fight the creation of a ‘safety net’ and of Producer 
Organisations (cf. d’Oultremont, 2011, pp. 9-10). Finally, it must be noted, that the 
liberalisation frame does not reject all of the features of CAP: after all, free trade in agricultural 
goods as provided for in the Single Market project would appear desirable. 
instead of public 
money 
 
opposition to and 
complaints about 
protectionist and 
interventionist 
measures 
 
critical of any kind of 
Common 
Organisation of 
Markets, CMO 
 against target 
prices, quotas, export 
subsidies etc. 
 against Producer 
Organisations 
NB: opposition to 
intervention in terms 
of e.g. environmental 
regulation = F1 pol! 
 
In favour of a CAP 
that is “market 
oriented”, free market 
CAP 
 
opposition to capping 
 
opposition to “double 
funding” 
 
“The continuation of coupled payments 
is regrettable…” 
 
“But that cannot disguise the fact that 
what is left is still not good - a backwards 
step in many ways to interventionism and 
statism.” 
 
„Irritiert durch die Finanz- und 
Wirtschaftskrise greift man aus Angst vor der 
Zukunft in die Mottenkiste alter 
Agrarmaßnahmen und glaubt, // dass man aus 
Brüssel mit planwirtschaftlichen Mitteln wie 
Interventionen und öffentlicher Lagerhaltung in 
der Lage wäre, // bei Krisen den gesamten 
Weltmarkt beeinflussen zu können.“ 
 
„Wir können und wollen die geplante 
Rückkehr zu einer Landwirtschaft mit 
verfehlten Produktionsanreizen, 
Quotensystemen und übertriebener Absicherung 
durch den Staat nicht mittragen.“ 
 
“Exportsubventionen sind ein völlig 
veraltetes Instrument der GAP und 
dürfen auf keinen Fall - auch nicht bei 
fallenden Agrarpreisen – wieder 
eingeführt werden; //“ 
 
„Der Ansatz zur gemeinsamen 
Marktorganisation ist zu protektionistisch 
gefasst // und läuft dem 
marktorientierten Ansatz der letzten 
Agrarreform zuwider; //“ 
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Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
 
“It would be a huge step backwards for 
the process of gradually reforming the 
CAP towards a market-based system.” 
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Frame F3: Multifunctionality 
Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
Normative 
 (Why is it a 
problem?) 
 
F3 norm 
The multifunctionality frame and the classic frame have in common 
that they both value farming. Yet, while in the classic frame the act 
of farming is valuable as such, i.e. as food production, the 
multifunctionality frame values farming as a means for the 
production not just of food but also of other, public goods. These 
consist in the maintenance of the countryside, including both rural 
traditions but also the preservation of the natural environment 
(Rhinard, 2010, pp. 71-75). 
Emphasis on the environment, fairness, public 
goods 
 
‘public money for public goods’ talk 
 
in contrast to F1: well-being of rural areas rather 
than farmers themselves 
 
transparency of payments 
 
(a safe) environment as a public good 
 
Fairness, equality 
 
Environmental sustainability 
 
Organic farming as valuable 
 
Small farmers better than big ones 
NB: farmers more generally: F1 norm! 
NB: small farmers still not to be exempted from 
greening, see F3 pol! 
„Wir [Partei] haben immer deutlich gemacht, 
dass ein Paradigmenwechsel, der die Vergabe 
von Subventionen für den Schutz und den Erhalt 
von Umwelt, Natur und anderer öffentlicher Güter, 
das sogenannte "Greening", wichtig ist.“ 
 
“Wenn wir schon so viel öffentliches Geld in 
die Landwirtschaft stecken, dann können wir 
auch eine gewisse nachhaltige Entwicklung 
für den ländlichen Raum verlangen.“ 
 
„protection of rural communities, in the EU 
and elsewhere in the world, //” 
 
“[Person] ist stolz darauf, dass [Land] EU-
Spitzenreiter in der Bio-Produktion ist.“ 
 
„Direktzahlungen dürfen nicht bloß eine 
Einkommensunterstützung für die Betriebe 
sein, // sondern müssen vor allem an soziale 
und ökologische Ziele geknüpft werden.“ 
Constitutive  
(What is the 
problem?) 
 
F3 cons 
However, often there is not only a shortage of these positive 
externalities of farming, but farming may even harm the 
environment (negative externalities). If farming is not a value as 
such but should actually produce public goods rather than reducing 
them, this is obviously problematic. 
Emphasis on pollution caused by farming 
 
current farming practice as destructive, non-
sustainable (also outside Europe) 
 
current agricultural policy is not fair among 
farmers, inequality (references to new/old 
Member States in particular) 
NB: “unfairness” regarding own country’s 
farmers (only) should be coded F4 
 
 
“At the moment, our agricultural systems are 
degrading the natural resource base of soil 
water and biodiversity” 
 
“The status quo, industrial scale 
monocultures and intensive production 
systems, result in huge external costs relating 
to our health and the environment – this 
must be changed. //” 
Cognitive 
 (What 
Advocates of the multifunctionality frame argue that overly 
intensive farming practices are the cause of the negative externalities 
Market pressure or misled subsidies 
 
 
 
 341 
Frame F3: Multifunctionality 
Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
causes the 
problem?) 
 
F3 cogn 
of farming (ibid., p. 71). Yet, as was argued above, intensive farming 
was precisely what the classic instruments of CAP were meant to 
achieve. At the same time, the multifunctionality frame recognizes 
that the farmers have “special needs” (ibid., p. 75), i.e. they require 
public funding to survive – which they deserve provided that they 
produce the desired public goods in addition to food itself. 
farmers need some public support to deliver the 
public goods they produce which the market 
does not reward 
 
big farms need less support, because it is easier 
for them to survive while producing public 
goods 
“Das muss durch besondere Förderung auch 
so bleiben, // denn die Marktpreise spiegeln die 
wahren Kosten nicht wieder.“ 
 
„Economies of scale mean bigger farms need 
less support so we need to target public 
funds to where they are needed.” 
Policy  
(What 
should be 
done?) 
 
F3 pol 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From a multifunctionality perspective, however, simply abolishing 
all subsidies and leaving farmers to free competition is not the 
solution, since the market does not pay for the desired public goods, 
it may be argued (European Commission, 2014, p. 4). In order to 
produce the desired public goods, farming must be subsidized – 
without, however, fostering the negative externalities resulting from 
excessive production. Hence, the multifunctionality frame 
propagates the concept of ‘decoupling’, that is, of paying farmers 
directly, independent of the food they produce. From the 
perspective of this frame ‘decoupling’ does not mean, what Rieger 
(2005) takes it to mean, namely that “farmers obtain payments 
irrespective of what – and how much – they produce” (ibid., p. 178) 
– for farmers are actually paid for what they produce, namely public 
goods next to food. In order to obtain direct payments, farmers 
have to comply with environmental, food quality and animal welfare 
standards. As was mentioned before, the direct payments constitute 
the so-called ‘pillar 1’ of the CAP. Under the old system of the 
Single Payment Scheme, however, direct payments were still largely 
a reward for earlier food production records and at best indirectly 
related to public good. Hence, the structural funds forming ‘pillar 2’ 
of the CAP are even more central to this frame, as these funds were 
more targeted at the multiple other functions of agriculture. More 
recently, the proposals for the 2013 Reform have somewhat blurred 
the borders between the two pillars, (cf. Mahé, 2012), as a ‘greening’ 
of the first pillar was suggested, which meant that 30 per cent of the 
national envelopes would have to be directly made conditional on 
even stricter environmental conditions. As a consequence, direct 
payments would be more in line with the logic of this frame. Most 
Greening, (financially) strong pillar 2, capping, 
convergence 
 
pro convergence in terms of direct payments 
per hectare across and within countries,  
 hence also for abolishing historic references 
quickly 
 pro small farmers’ scheme etc., pro capping 
NB: support for small farmers does not mean 
that they can be exempted from greening 
NB: please always code internal and external 
convergence as two separate policies! 
 
direct payments only on conditions, esp. 
greening 
 
calls for “real” greening 
 
opposition to all kinds of “watering down” the 
greening suggestions 
 no exceptions – apart from organic farming 
(“Bio”), which should be greening by definition 
 
calls for specific elements of greening such as 
crop diversification/rotation, etc. 
 
publish records of payments, call for 
“transparency” 
“We think money should be more fairly 
distributed within // but also between 
Member States. //” 
 
“Mein Fazit lautet: Zwar haben wir den Fuß 
in der Tür für eine umweltgerechtere 
Landwirtschaft, aber von einem echten 
Greening sind wir noch meilenweit entfernt“ 
 
“As part of our work on CAP reform, the 
[EPG] group have been stressing the need 
for these greening measures to be mandatory, 
as opposed to some of the other political 
groups who are calling for voluntary 
measures only, via a menu approach.” 
 
„Leider sind die ursprünglichen Ziele des so 
genannten Greenings wie schon im 
Parlament so auch in den Beschlüssen der 
Agrarminister der EU nur noch als 
Überschrift erhalten geblieben.“ 
 
„Die von uns [Partei]-Europaabgeordneten 
geforderte Maximalfördersumme pro Betrieb 
von 100.000 Euro wurde leider nicht 
angenommen, hier hat sich die 
Agrarindustrielobby durchgesetzt” 
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Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F3 pol 
other innovations of the 2013 Reform, next to those discussed 
already in the discussion of the classic frame, are also very much in 
line with the idea of multifunctionality. The so-called internal 
convergence – implied in ‘capping’ and the small-farmers scheme – 
mentioned above makes sense insofar as the production of the 
desired public goods would not seem to grow proportionally to the 
size of a farm business. Similarly, the concept of ‘equity’ with regard 
to the Single Farm Payments (i.e. the ‘ungreened’, standard part of 
the direct payments) makes sense within this frame: so far, the SFPs 
are lower in some member states than they are in others (most 
importantly in the new member states). However, one might argue 
that the production of the agriculture-related public goods should be 
equally valued in all parts of the EU (cf. d’Oultremont, 2011, p. 2; 
d’Oultremont, 2012, p. 15). By contrast, from a classic frame 
perspective, historic production accounts may be considered a fair 
basis for the distribution of payments both across and within 
countries. From a liberalisation perspective, direct payments should 
be abolished anyway, and yet if they persist, they should arguably 
not distort competition and should thence be the same across 
countries (cf. d’Oultremont, 2012, p. 15). In sum, while the 
multifunctionality frame that may have started as a lowest common 
denominator, it has become a logic of its own, and it has dominated 
the 2013 Reform agenda. Noteworthy, that does not mean that all 
actors are equally supportive of it. 
 
less support for bigger farms, i.e. capping 
 
opposition to re-nationalisation and to flexibility 
at the national level 
„Auch Kleinlandwirte dürfen nicht von 
diesen Mindeststandards befreit sein, wenn 
sie Beihilfen erhalten wollen. //“ 
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Frame F4: Anti-Centralisation 
Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
Normative 
 (Why is it a 
problem?) 
 
F4 norm 
Like the multifunctionality frame, this frame would be based on the 
value of farming in terms of public goods. While there is some 
variation regarding the extent to which the following applies, 
however, several scholars argue that (some of) these public goods 
are much more local in nature than they are European (Mahé, 2012, 
pp. 48-50; Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 272; Rieger, 2005, pp. 174-
175). This implies that also the demand for these public goods 
would be local, and hence arguably dependent on local 
circumstances of local farmers and rural populations. It is the 
specific needs of ‘our’ farmers and rural areas, then, which forms 
the normative basis of this frame. 
‘our’ farmers  
NB: contrast to F1: focus on #national# 
farmers specifically, rather than 
European and national or farmers in 
general 
 
‘our’ (national) needs 
„Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung spezifisch 
deutscher Wirtschaftsstrukturen sehen wir uns 
dabei insbesondere der Förderung und dem Schutz des 
mittelständischen Gewerbes sowie der heimischen 
Landwirtschaft vor weiterer Zentralisierung und 
Gängelung durch die Brüsseler EU-Zentrale 
verpflichtet.“ 
 
 
Constitutive  
(What is the 
problem?) 
 
F4 cons 
Following this logic, the EU might not be able foster the provision 
of these public goods in the best possible manner. In other words, 
there might be a problem in terms of a mismatch between the level 
of public goods provision, a ‘distance’ between ‘Brussels’ and the 
respective localities would exist. 
Diagnosing a mismatch between the 
current practice of the Common, 
European Agricultural Policy and 
national-level needs 
 
Talk about ‘distant’ decisions made in 
‘Brussels’ 
„Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung spezifisch 
deutscher Wirtschaftsstrukturen sehen wir uns 
dabei insbesondere der Förderung und dem 
Schutz des mittelständischen Gewerbes sowie der 
heimischen Landwirtschaft vor weiterer Zentralisierung 
und Gängelung durch die Brüsseler EU-Zentrale 
verpflichtet.“ 
 
Cognitive 
 (What causes 
the problem?) 
 
F4 cogn 
This distance could then lead to a gap in terms of local knowledge 
about the special needs of the local farming population, local 
geography and would imply a long chain of top-down delegation 
open to mismanagement and intransparent channels of subsidy 
allocation (Altomonte & Nava, 2005, p. 276; Rieger, 2005, pp. 174-
175). As a result, the justification for steering direct payments from 
the EU-level is undermined (Mahé, 2012, pp. 48-50; Altomonte & 
Nava, 2005, p. 272; Rieger, 2005, pp. 174-175). 
Regions of Europe are too different to 
be steered by ‘Brussels’ 
 
- Member States know their countries 
better, can thus do better policy 
 
- Farming across EU is too heterogeneous to 
be handled centrally 
 
- ‘our’ agriculture is special 
 
- hence: EU cannot do it right, full stop 
 
 
 
 
„Die Mitgliedstaaten sind weitaus besser in der 
Lage zu beurteilen, wo die Schwerpunkte zu setzen 
sind . . .“ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
„Aber aufgrund jahrzehntelanger 
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Dimension Logic Observable instances examples 
Fehlentwicklungen ist die Landwirtschaftspolitik 
der Europäischen Union schlichtweg 
unreformierbar.“ 
Policy  
(What should 
be done?) 
 
F4 pol 
In policy terms, the consequence would accordingly be partial or 
even total re-nationalization of agricultural policy, more indirectly 
referred to as ‘flexibility’. Provided that this does not entail the 
abolition of all subsidies, however, this might in turn lead to serious 
distortions of competition on the common market for food; for 
after all, different member states might not want or not be able to 
grant the same amounts of subsidies to their respective farming 
communities. Hence, giving up EU-financing of the CAP also 
means to give up an important element of the Single Market, and, 
eventually, of European integration (cf. d’Oultremont, 2011, p. 3; 
European Commission 2014b, p. 6). 
Re-nationalization, ‘flexibility’, reduction 
of centralization 
- re-nationalization of agricultural policy, 
also indirectly by leaving EU 
- e.g. territorially “flexible” approach to 
greening 
NB: general opposition to (strict) 
greening should be coded F1 pol 
favouring country-level solutions 
“Deshalb müssen neue Wege eingeschlagen 
werden, weshalb die Verantwortung für diesen 
Bereich wieder in die Hände der Mitgliedstaaten zu 
legen ist", betonte [Person]. //“ 
 
„Somit trete immer deutlicher zutage, wie 
dringend eine Renationalisierung der Agrarpolitik 
sei, so der [Partei] EU-Mandatar.“ 
 
Off topic: 
- statements on (admission of) genetically modified organisms (GMOs); this is a different issue, with different characteristics and a distinct set of legislation 
 GMOs not to be confused with German acronym for Common Market Organisation (Gemeinsame Marktordnung) 
- statements on the new status of the European Parliament as a co-legislator on CAP or the conflict/power balance between EP and Council 
- procedural statements 
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Short version: 
frame What sort of values do you need in 
order to see this as a problem? 
(Normative dimension) 
What is the problem? (Constitutive 
dimension) 
What has led to the problem?  
(Cognitive dimension) 
What should be done about the 
problem? (Policy dimension) 
classic (F1) Food production, food safety, 
farming as an end in itself, farmers 
well-being 
Economic uncertainty of farming, 
nowadays in the form of extreme 
price volatility 
Farming is special, an industry apart 
that cannot be made subject to 
market laws because of weather 
conditions and rigidity of demand; 
food speculation enhances the 
problem 
Market intervention or at least 
generous recompensation in terms of 
direct payments; safety net as third 
pillar; extra support for young 
farmers; ‘active farmers’ condition 
Liberalisation (F2) efficiency Market distortions and their social 
cost 
Market intervention (including direct 
payments, which keep unprofitable 
businesses in the market) of any kind 
reduces efficiency  
Liberalisation, no more subsidies (cut 
CAP budget down to zero) 
Multi-functionality 
(F3) 
Environment; social justice; 
development; equity 
 farming as a means for public 
goods 
Farming externalities (too many 
negative ones, while the positive ones 
remain unrewarded) 
Caused by: wrong subsidies BUT 
ALSO market failure, as markets do 
not pay for public goods such as the 
environment 
Direct payments and Pillar 2 
 greening 
 capping 
 convergence (internal & external) 
Anti-centralisation (F4) The specific needs of ‘our’ farmers – 
local public goods 
CAP as a pan-European policy The EU cannot get things right; 
reason: because it does not know 
local circumstances 
Nationalisation of subsidies, 
flexibility 
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II.3 Codebook: frames on TTIP 
Frame 1: neoliberalism 
 Logic Observable Instances Examples 
Normative 
 
F1 norm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most genuine source of neoliberal thought, namely the central piece by 
Adam Smith, is entitled “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations” and quite clearly points to the normative basis of this frame as the 
goal of policy-making, namely the accumulation of (material) wealth. At the 
centre of Smith’s work is thus a theory of economic growth and development 
(Grant & Brue, 2007, p. 79), which in large parts also still influence the causal 
narratives and policy suggestions behind the neoliberal frame. Before 
discussing these, it is noted here that indeed those who are considered as 
proponents of a neoliberal frame on trade policy, such as the EU 
Conmmissioner for trade, Karel De Gucht, has defined the goal of trade policy 
as follows: 
 
“In times like these, trade policy ... has an even bigger role to play. It must be 
an engine of economic growth and job creation and a driver for economic 
reforms to enhance the EU’s economic efficiency.” (quoted in De Ville and 
Orbie, 2013, p. 10) 
 
In addition to growth and labour effects, free trade is assigned the capacity of 
leading to ‘consumer benefits’ in terms of lower prices and product choice, 
resulting in ‘triple benefit’ (cf. Siles-Brügge, 2013, p. 605). Often literally linked 
to this triple benefit is the goal of ‘competitiveness’, which, while arguably a 
cause of growth, job creation and consumer benefits, occasionally becomes an 
end in itself (ibid., p. 610). Before discussing the other dimensions, it is briefly 
considered here, what this set of goals means with regard to alternative 
normative considerations. 
Some have argued that neoliberals ignore the pursuit of collective goals as a 
public task (cf. DeVille & Orbie, 2013, p. 3). This, however, appears only 
partially appropriate. After all, a key notion in (neo)liberal thought is the 
Smithean idea of a harmony of interests, according to which the simple pursuit 
of self-interest in a free market is the best way towards achieving the collective 
social good of economic growth (Grant & Brue, 2007, p. 68). In other words, 
 
Stressing that TTIP will lead to more jobs and 
economic growth 
 
Stressing advantages for industry/producers, 
including small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) 
 
Emphasizing consumer benefits in terms of 
lower prices and choice 
 
Emphasizing property rights, rights of 
investors 
 
“In times like these, trade policy ... has an 
even bigger role to play. It must be an 
engine of economic growth and job 
creation and a driver for economic reforms 
to enhance the EU’s economic efficiency.” 
 
“[Person], [party] MEP for [region], has called 
for a strong harmonisation of business 
regulations to be prioritised in the ongoing 
EU-US trade or Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Agreement (TTIP) negotiations, 
// in order to boost SME growth. //” 
 
“In einer mit 23 Ja-Stimmen gegen nur 5 
Nein-Stimmen (eine Enthaltung) 
angenommenen Resolution gaben die 
Europaabgeordneten ihre Unterstützung für 
ein "umfassendes" Handels- und 
Investitionsabkommen mit den USA, // das 
neue Arbeitsplätze schaffen und vor allem 
kleinen und mittelständischen 
Unternehmen zugute kommen soll. //“ 
 
„TTIP could lead to a €250 billion or 2 
percent increase in EU GDP - equating to 
an annual extra €500 per European family, 
and the creation of over 2 million jobs 
across Europe.” 
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Frame 1: neoliberalism 
 Logic Observable Instances Examples 
 
 
 
F1 norm 
within the neoliberal frame, there is no contradiction between the individual 
and the collective here, so that indeed protecting the individual’s self-interest is 
the same as pursuing the collective good. The precondition is simply that the 
prioritized common good is economic growth. 
Constitutive 
 
F1 cons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clearly, then, a lack of growth as observed – by definition – in times of 
economic recession or crisis, would be problematic. Indeed, this is also how 
Commissioner De Gucht, cited earlier as a neoliberal, describes the EU’s 
current situation: “These are challenging economic times for Europe with low 
growth, high unemployment and gaping deficits in Member States’ public 
finances.” Similarly, he has spoken of a “double economic challenge” and has 
argued “We have, on the one hand, to address our structural weaknesses on 
the supply side in order to increase our growth potential and, on the other 
hand . . . to consolidate our public finances” (as quoted in DeVille & Orbie, 
2013, pp. 10 & 11). Noteworthy, he points here to the Member States’ fiscal 
situation, thereby excluding the classic, Keynesian answer to a lack of growth. 
Moreover, he does not speak of, for instance, a double challenge in terms of 
climate change and economic recession, or of rising inequality. 
 
 
(Economic crisis as) lack of growth 
 
Double crisis: economic stagnation and 
public deficits 
 
Europe falling behind by international 
comparison 
 
Denying that TTIP is about abolishing 
standards: it is about removing (harmful) 
NTBs 
 
 others are just trying to discredit this 
promising project, thereby risking growth 
 
Ridiculising particular regulatory standards 
 
References to the absence of growth in the 
Crisis 
 
Harm to less competitive sectors is not 
problematic 
 
ISDS are not a problem 
 
 
US spying: 
 the problem consists in others using this 
against TTIP, thereby risking growth 
 insisting that the two issues are separate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“New economic forces such as China and 
India continue to grow, increasing world 
competition and shaping the world 
economy.” 
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F1 cons 
(spying might be a problem, TTIP is not) 
 
Cognitive 
 
F1 cogn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F1 cogn 
 
 
As Grant and Brue efficiently summarise it, the aforementioned idea of 
‘harmony of interests’ “implies that intrusion by government into the economy 
is unneeded and undesirable” (ibid., 2007, p. 68), from Smith’s perspective. In 
fact, he considers market intervention an act of presumption on the part of the 
governing. Smith himself already extended to international trade by rejecting 
any domestic monopoly building and arguing instead: “If a foreign country can 
supply us with a commodity cheaper than we can make it, better buy it of them 
with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in 
which we have some advantage” (Smith, Wealth of Nations, pp. 354-355, 
quoted in Grant & Brue, 2007, p. 69). Smith assumes here, as does another 
classical proponent of free trade, David Ricardo, in his famous theory of 
comparative advantage, that the labour units ‘freed’ in the comparatively 
inefficient domestic sector can be put to use more efficiently in the sector 
where the country in question enjoys a comparative (in Smith case: absolute) 
advantage (ibid., pp. 114-116). Without going into the details of the neoliberal 
causal narrative, it thus already becomes clear why even the harm done to less 
competitive sectors within the EU would not constitute a problem for the 
advocates of the neoliberal frame on trade (DeVille & Orbie, 2013, p. 3). 
Nonetheless, while policy-makers often take for granted the exact causal 
relations behind growth and free trade on the one hand and lack of growth 
and protectionism on the other, they shall briefly be summarised in the 
following paragraph. 
In very simple terms, the idea behind Smith’s theory of absolute advantage and 
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage can be brought down to the notion 
of division of labour: just like increases in productivity achieved by 
specialisation lead to economic growth within a country, so specialisation of 
countries in certain sectors will lead to economic growth for both trading 
partners under free trade. Each country will be able to produce more at lower 
costs, will be able to sell surpluses abroad and will have access to cheap 
imports of those products for which it is not specialised (Grant & Brue, 2007, 
pp. 79-81; pp. 114-116). Note, that this perspective considers the outcome as a 
win-win situation, since all countries participating in free trade enjoy these 
advantages, which is perfectly in line with the ‘harmony of interests’ within 
 
Stressing necessity of TTIP for getting out of 
the recession and making the most of 
‘unused’ potential 
 
TTIP makes EU more competitive 
 
Stressing the helpfulness of adaptive 
pressures 
 
uselessness of protectionism (setting wrong 
incentives) 
 
explaining lack of growth / growth potential 
from TTIP by pointing to useless NTBs 
 
regulation as ‘obstacles’ 
 
Stressing the importance of trade and exports 
for the EU or individual Member States 
 
TTIP as a policy ‘for free’, without costs 
(especially in fiscal terms, hence helping to 
solve the public debt aspect of the crisis) 
 
Emphasizing the current trade volume and 
potential volume of the newly created market 
 
In contrast to normative dimension: not just 
stressing the benefits, but also HOW these 
will be created by TTIP 
 
ISDS as common practice / pointing to 
“We all know that protectionism makes 
recovery harder.” 
 
“Trade is a vital element of our economic 
recovery // and TTIP can begin to set 
high global trading standards, beyond those 
which countries such as China would advocate.” 
 
“It is not enough to simply resist 
protectionism: we must also continue to open 
up markets to trade and investment.” 
 
„Der Außenhandelsausschuss, der dem 
endgültigen Abkommen seine Zustimmung 
erteilen muss, bevor dieses in Kraft treten 
kann, unterstrich, dass ein 
Freihandelsabkommen für die EU und die 
USA unerlässlich sei, // um das bisher 
brachliegende Potential eines integrierten 
transatlantischen Marktes zu nutzen.“ 
 
„[Land] ist eine Exportnation.“ 
 
„Alle Verzögerungen würden Europas 
Wachstumspotential schaden.“ 
 
„Die Abschaffung von Zöllen und nicht-
tarifären Handelsschranken ist ein Programm 
für Wachstum und Arbeitsplätze, // das uns 
so gut wie nichts kostet", so [Person] und 
[Person].“ 
 
„Wir haben die historische Möglichkeit, 
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F1 cogn 
countries. The flipside of this argument is that any impediment to free markets 
both within and across countries makes nations forego these advantages, so 
that instead of growth they will face continued recession. 
Indeed, modern advocates of free trade argue exactly along these lines. Siles-
Brügge finds references to the concept of ‘comparative advantage’ in strategy 
papers of DG Trade (ibid., 2013, p. 604). The idea is that market access 
quickens necessary adaptation needed sooner or later anyway (ibid., p. 604; see 
also Hay & Rosamond, year, p. 13), increasing ‘competitiveness’ of European 
firms (DeVille & Orbie, 2013, p. 4). Thereby, free trade will lead to growth, job 
creation and consumer benefits as stated already in the foregoing quotes by 
Commissioner De Gucht. Two quotes by Catherine Ashton, not only includes 
the aforementioned flipside argument but also shows the degree of self-
evidence with which this causal narrative is presented: “[w]e all know that 
protectionism makes recovery harder” and, in another speech: “[a] 
protectionist backlash, as part of a rescue package or otherwise, could 
potentially worsen this downturn” (quoted in DeVille & Orbie, 2013, p. 8). 
Noteworthy, the classic underlying theories are formulated as economic laws – 
and hence should be universally applicable, irrespective of the trading partner 
in question. 
 
experience with ISDS in other trade 
agreements 
 
TTIP as a precedent for future (even more) 
trade agreements and global trading rules 
 
einen Milliarden-Markt zu schaffen.“ 
 
“However, for SMEs currently trading with 
the US, complying with technical rules 
and regulations is cited as the most 
pressing concern, followed by the lack of 
regulatory information. // Differences in 
US States' regulation, customs rules and 
limited market access are all greatly 
limiting factors for European and 
[national] businesses. // 
 
“However, the limitations imposed on our 
companies due to the lack of regulatory 
convergence are far too great.” 
 
„Den größten Gewinn erhoffen sich die 
Verhandlungsparteien allerdings durch die 
Abschaffung nicht-tarifärer 
Handelshemmnisse und der Angleichung 
technischer Normen.“ 
 
“An EU-US trade deal would be a unique 
opportunity to stimulate the [country] 
economy and create thousands of jobs // 
without spending a penny of taxpayers’ 
money.”//” 
 
„The reduction of non-tariff barriers and the 
cutting of red tape, for example, will enable 
our businesses to grow and become stronger 
players on the highly competitive global stage. 
//” 
Policy Hence, it should be obvious now that the neoliberal frame is the frame that   
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F1 pol 
most outspokenly favours TTIP. Not only that both sides always win from 
free trade anyway, however small these gains may be, given the already low 
tariffs between the EU and the US. It is also the fact that this frame likewise 
rejects what it considers ‘murky’ behind-the-border policies that nevertheless 
inhibit trade (Siles-Brügge, 2013, p. 605). As I have argued in the preceding 
section, TTIP indeed is mainly about the removal of so-called Non-Tariff-
Barriers (NTBs), which from a neo-liberal free market perspective are harmful. 
Within this frame, the otherwise controversial Investor-State Dispute 
Settlements (ISDS) are absolutely appropriate as a tool against future 
protectionism – even of the more subtle kind – and may be understood as a 
further element of “protection of traders from the arbitrary exercise of state 
power” (Lang quoted in DeVille & Orbie, 2013, p. 3). 
The ‘prism’ affair and its successors are unlikely to dampen the support for 
TTIP in any way. This is not only because they are so much in favour of the 
project itself. Nor is the argument that the United States of America, generally 
viewed with a certain degree of scepticism by the opponents of neoliberalism, 
will by contrast be considered an ideational partner by neoliberals the only 
reason. It is also the simple fact that those values which might be threatened in 
the Snowden affair – be they data protection ideals or national security – are in 
any way linked to the neoliberal frame on trade. Some neoliberals might indeed 
reject US spying against EU citizens and firms, but they will not change their 
mind on TTIP because of it. As I will show in due turn, this might be different 
for the other frames. 
General support for TTIP/ free trade in 
general, unqualified 
 
Support for TTIP even if US does not prove 
“friendly” on other issues 
 
Emphasis on an ambitious, comprehensive 
agreement 
 
Calls for signing TTIP quickly 
 no delays, .e.g.  due to ‘unrelated’ spying 
scandal 
 
Supporting a TTIP that includes ISDS 
“[Party] MEPs have welcomed the launch of 
negotiations over a comprehensive trade deal 
between the EU and US earlier today. //” 
 
 
 
„Die Abgeordneten betonten, ein Abkommen 
müsse "ambitioniert" und für beide Seiten 
bindend sein.“ 
 
„Die Verhandlungen müssen nun so schnell 
wie möglich beginnen.“ 
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Normative 
 
F2 norm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, on the normative dimension, List challenges the notion of ‘harmony of 
interests’, arguing instead that “the immediate private interests of certain 
members of the community do not necessarily lead to the highest good of the 
whole”, as Grant and Brue note (ibid., 2007, p. 199). Noteworthy, the good of 
the nation was ranked above that of the individual (ibid.). As soon as the 
harmony of interests is dissolved in favour of the collective, however, the 
automatisms proclaimed by liberal theory disappear – and the good of ‘the 
nation’ has to be defined other than by the individual pursuit of wealth. 
This view leads to a much more strategic perspective on trade. Indeed, List 
had criticised Smith and other classic liberals for ignoring politics. List, for 
instance, argued that it may be worthwhile giving up ‘value’ in the short term, 
in terms of foregoing cheap imports due to tariffs, with the long-term goal of 
building up its own manufacturing industry. This, in turn, “not only secures to 
the nation an infinitely greater amount of material goods, but also industrial 
independence in case of war” (List quoted in Grant & Brue, 2007, p. 200). In 
other words, it matters to have your own manufacturing industry within the 
confines of your nation state. 
Arguably, the discussion on TTIP is hardly about having manufacturing 
industries, as the respective participating countries on both sides of the 
Atlantic have long since left the pre-industrial stage of economic development. 
Nevertheless, it might still be desirable to keep certain sectors of the economy 
in a state that are of wider political relevance. A military industry constitutes 
the most obvious example, and one which, according to Husted and Melvin, 
would even be accepted by Smith (ibid., 2007, p. 202). Yet the discussion on 
the CAP has shown that also self-sufficiency in food supplies can be a political 
objective that might involve trade policy instruments for its achievement. More 
recently even, the absence of a European alternative to Google, Facebook etc. 
has been deplored (reference). With Airbus, a historical precedent of a 
European effort for breaking an American monopoly exists (Husted & Melvin, 
2007, p. 210). In principle, however, the range of sectors that should be kept 
within the country for political reasons is open to discussion, so that the 
protectionist normative dimension might have bias towards securing existing 
jobs rather than aiming for the creation of new ones. Indeed, employment 
more generally in terms of existing jobs is a value regularly evoked also by 
 
References to national/European interests 
NB: values are F3 norm! 
 
The well-being of domestic  
economy/producers 
(including the cultural industry/services, 
artists) 
NB: valuing culture as such (not its producers) 
is F3 norm! 
 
Protect jobs that exist rather than risk them 
with the uncertain prospect of creating new 
ones 
 
Be independent in some sectors rather than 
depending on trade 
 
Patriotism 
 
It is better to consume domestic goods than 
foreign ones 
 
Domestic producers should be preferred 
 
NB: the concept of the nation here can be 
extended to include the supranational Europe 
“Ziel der EU muss aber sein, die 
europäische Wirtschaft gegenüber 
unlauterer Konkurrenz zu schützen, // auch 
wenn dies den Dogmen eines ungehinderten 
Freihandels widerspricht", betonte [Person]. 
//“ 
 
“Die EU wird insbesondere zu klären haben, 
ob eine transatlantische Freihandelszone 
überhaupt im Interesse Europas liegt.“ 
 
"Anders als in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik hat 
sich Brüssel bisher nicht gescheut, in Wirtschaftsfragen 
europäische Interessen, // etwa durch 
Verhängung von Schutzzöllen, // zu 
verteidigen.“ 
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F2 norm 
modern protectionists, as is the general spirit of patriotism or, rather, 
nationalism included in List’s work (Husted & Melvin, 2007, p. 197). While the 
goal of keeping certain domestic industries mainly relates to the disharmony of 
interests between nations, the potential disharmony within nations is another 
aspect worth considering in the discussion of protectionisms normative 
dimension. Yet, politically defined national goals such as a ‘fair’ distribution of 
income might are thinkable as well (Husted & Melvin, 2007, p. 201). 
Constitutive 
 
F2 cons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before this background, unfettered competition can be problematic, as it may 
involve the loss of certain industries which the nation as a whole might have a 
certain interest of keeping and the loss of attached, existing jobs. Such 
competition may be considered harmful and threatening then. 
 
Free trade is a threat to “the nation”, its 
‘interest’ 
 US: EU and US interest are not 
identical 
NB: conflict (US) producers and (EU) 
consumers is F3! 
 
Free trade as a threat to jobs 
 
Threat to (sectors of) domestic industry by 
imported goods 
Threat to EU agricultural sector by American 
GMO-friendly producers 
NB: simply allowing GMOs to be sold is F3 
cons; F2 cons only if it is explicitly termed as 
a threat to domestic industry/producers 
 
Imports risking to replace domestic goods 
 
US: spying is economically motivated 
(German: “Wirtschaftsspionage”) 
 
 
 
„Daß es der US-Regierung ausschließlich 
um eigene Interessen geht, sollte 
spätestens die NSA-Affäre verdeutlicht 
haben, // der zufolge mit dem geplanten 
Freihandelsabkommen Wirtschaftspionage in 
noch größerem Ausmaß möglich wäre.“ 
 
 
 
 
“[Party] [person] said this morning he is 
concerned about the loss of [national] 
jobs if a European free trade treaty is agreed 
with the US. //” 
 
“Jobs could be lost as a result of these 
proposals . . . “ 
 
“This could put [national] farmers out of 
business // as a result of food being 
imported from industrial and intensive US 
farms. //” 
 
„Daß es der US-Regierung ausschließlich um 
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F2 cons eigene Interessen geht, sollte spätestens die 
NSA-Affäre verdeutlicht haben, // der 
zufolge mit dem geplanten 
Freihandelsabkommen Wirtschaftspionage 
in noch größerem Ausmaß möglich wäre.“ 
 
Cognitive 
 
F2 cogn 
It is the unqualified application of the liberal free trade doctrine – e.g. an all-
encompassing version of TTIP – that leads to this harmful or unfair 
competition, as it disregards not only the political dimension of trade but also 
the fact that different nations have different starting conditions: in the 
historical example of List’s analysis of economic development in Germany, for 
instance, it may well be that Germany would in principle be able of developing 
its own manufacturing industry, but will only very slowly or never achieve this 
under conditions of free trade (Grant & Brue, 2007, p. 198-200). It is this 
inequality in starting conditions that justifies the label of ‘unfair’ competition. 
That said, even in sectors where a nation is not likely to ever catch up with 
potential trading partners, national strategic interests would normatively justify 
protection. 
To a certain extent, then, comparative advantages are not given but contingent 
upon certain political decisions. Only a country that already has reached the 
desired level of competitiveness, such as Britain at the time, will argue in 
favour of unfettered free trade (Grant & Brue, 2007, pp. 198-199). Otherwise, 
a nation should prefer protection, at least in selected sectors. 
 
 
Foreign producers do not play fair; unfair 
competition 
 e.g. due to the fact that American 
agricultural producers use GMOs and overly 
intensive production methods 
 they use technologies that should not be 
used 
 
“This could put [national] farmers out of 
business // as a result of food being 
imported from industrial and intensive US 
farms. //” 
 
Policy 
 
F2 pol 
 
 
 
 
 
Regarding TTIP, protectionists will thus call for a number of exemptions, that 
is, for the exclusion of certain sectors from the agreement. They will not, 
however, necessarily oppose it. Exemptions may refer to the abolition of 
tariffs, but also to other means of protecting key sectors such as subsidies. 
However, it must be noted here that NTBs in the form of regulatory standards 
may have an effect that resembles the effect of a tariff or government subsidy, 
but that the introduction of such regulatory standards is highly unlikely to be 
justified by means of a protectionist frame. This is because it would 
 
Keep tariffs 
 
Exempt certain sectors/industries/services of 
the economy from TTIP 
 e.g agriculture, audiovisual sector, military 
industry 
NB: exemption for the health sector in terms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"Anders als in der Außen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik hat sich Brüssel bisher nicht 
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F2 pol 
 
rhetorically be much more efficient to consider such standards as worthwhile 
in itself, as I shall demonstrate below when discussing the anti-globalisation 
frame. 
Before doing so, however, the particular application of protectionism vis-à-vis 
the United States needs to be discussed. More generally, it might be argued 
that some of the strategic aims of protectionism could be of lesser importance 
here, as both the US and most EU Member States are joined in the NATO 
defense community. At the same time, this has traditionally not prevented 
some states such as France from striving for a certain degree of independence 
in defense matters. In case of the US, however, strategic considerations have 
reached beyond the military sector, as for instance also one’s own cultural 
industry (normative) has received particular protection (Hay & Rosamond, 
year, p. ). The US cultural sector would arguably benefit from the removal of 
current barriers to trade in this sector (be they tariffs or supply-side subsidies), 
and indeed it would seem plausible to argue that starting conditions are hardly 
the same here (cognitive) (see also: Congressional Research Service, 2014). 
More recently, the ‘prism’ scandal might be used in order to justify not 
necessarily opposition to TTIP as such, but instead the strategic goal of 
building up European alternatives to Google etc., which consequently would 
necessitate exemptions from TTIP in this particular area (see also: 
Congressional Research Service, 2014). 
Finally, agriculture might constitute a field for protectionist exemptions. In 
general, the removal of trade barriers contrasts to some extent with existing 
policy within the EU: it becomes more important to subsidies an 
uncompetitive sector that is exposed to competition than one that is not (cf. 
Husted & Melvin, 2007, pp. 206-207, who discuss this for the US case). More 
specifically, the widespread application of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) in food production constitutes a field where, the EU is not on a par 
with the US, so that ‘unfair’ competition is likely to be bemoaned here. Doing 
so would constitute an instance of protectionist framing, if and only if this is 
done in terms of the harm it does to the EU’s agricultural industry. 
Noteworthy, there is a thin – and mainly analytical – line here between GMO-
opposition for protectionist reasons and the rejection of GMO-food as such, 
which would be part of the anti-globalisation frame(s) to be discussed in the 
of the UK NHS are part of F3 
 
Support for geographic indications, ‘made in’ 
etc.; origin of goods needs to be clear 
gescheut, in Wirtschaftsfragen europäische 
Interessen, // etwa durch Verhängung von 
Schutzzöllen, // zu verteidigen.“ 
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F2 pol 
next subsection.  
Tariffs may constitute the most obvious form of protectionism, while 
regulatory standards as in the case of GMOs may constitute a hidden but 
factual form of protectionism. ‘Hidden’ protectionism, however, implies that 
the insistence on certain regulatory standards is framed in non-protectionist 
terms and thus by definition is not considered to be part of the protectionist 
frame just outlined. In between the open protectionism in terms of tariffs and 
hidden, regulatory protectionism the – at least in the EU – increasingly popular 
practice of geographical indications (GIs) is situated, a well-known example 
being Parmesan cheese from the Italian region of Parma (cf. Congressional 
research service, 2014, p. 9). While such labels are used in the US might just be 
common food names, their usage is regulated in the EU (cf. ibid). At a national 
level, ‘made in’ labels perform a similar function: they do not financially 
discourage consumers from buying cheaper, imported products, as tariffs 
would, but constitute a justification for potentially higher prices in terms of an 
appeal to patriotism or, at least, to non-rational images and connotations (cf. 
Husted & Melvin, 2007, p. 197). Husted and Melvin count such labels among 
protectionist policies (ibid.), and this be extended to GIs here. 
It is true, of course, that GIs share some features with regulatory standards. 
Moreover, they are commonly justified as bits of information to the consumer. 
Nonetheless, they should be counted as protectionist policies for two reasons. 
Firstly, the actual benefit arising from them to consumers is itself debatable, 
since they do not necessarily imply better quality or safety, while their benefit 
to the existing domestic industry is beyond doubt (cf. Congressional research 
service, 2014, p. 9). Yet, in contrast to hidden protectionism, it is not only their 
effect that justifies their categorization as protectionist. It is, secondly, their 
link to nationalist-protectionist norms that makes work: the individual is 
implicitly asked to forgo a cheaper price in the short run for the greater good 
of the nation, just as List would have postulated. 
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Normative 
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As with the notion of ‘neoliberalism’, the label ‘anti-globalisation movement’ 
was put on the participants by others rather than the name they chose for 
themselves (references). The imposed label is misleading, as in fact the anti-
globalisation movement and those who take up its ideas in representative 
politics are not against globalisation in principle (Ayres, year, p. 22). Moreover, 
as the ‘anti-globalisation’ label stresses the opposition of the movement to 
something, it has a pejorative and slightly negative touch to it. It may indeed be 
true that the policy dimension of the frame(s) going under this label here is 
mainly defined by its opposition to, in this case, TTIP. Yet, the discussion of 
the normative dimension shared by both the moderate and the radical version 
of the frame shows that proponents of the frame are certainly in favour of 
something. 
As Ayres (2004) notes by analyzing how the movement frames its critique of 
globalisation, which in fact is a critique of neoliberalism, what the movement 
turns against is “the current WTO-dominated rules-based system that focused 
mostly on promoting trade and investment liberalisation, while remaining 
silent on consumer, labor, environmental or human rights concerns” (ibid, p. 
22). Similarly, Sporer (2009) notes that key actors within the movement such as 
Attac call for “a global trade regime that prioritizes the interests of developing 
countries, socially disadvantaged and the environment” (ibid., p. 44). Much 
rather than constituting direct policy suggestions, these statements summarise 
the values of the movement. 
These values can now be contrasted with those of the preceding frames: in 
contrast to protectionism, on the one hand, the focus is not on the well-being 
of one particular nation here, as in fact the well-being of e.g. developing 
countries is explicitly included. Moreover, priority is clearly given to 
consumers, whose interests are clearly ranked above those of domestic 
producers even, while protectionism may involve short-term sacrifices on the 
part of consumers. Neoliberalism, on the other hand, aims for consumer 
benefits just as much as for the well-being of producers (‘harmony of 
interests’), yet it is limited to the economic, material well-being in terms of 
cheap prices and product choice. 
This is not to say that the anti-globalisation movement totally disregards 
material conditions. Yet, for the case of TTIP, post-material aspects such as 
consumer safety and human rights are likely to take centre stage for 
National and European regulatory standards 
(“NTBs”), including public ownership 
Environmental protection 
Consumer safety 
Human rights / fundamental rights 
 
Culture and cultural diversity as such 
NB: the producers of cultural goods, i.e. the 
respective sector, industry, artists etc. are not 
named under F3 norm; if they are, the 
statement should be coded F2 norm 
 
Consumers’/citizens’ well-being first, priority 
over producers/industry/’the economy’) 
 
US: Stressing distinctiveness of European 
values/ differences between EU and US 
standards 
NB: European interests or conflicting EU/US 
interests – as countries, not as producers vs. 
consumers – should be coded F2 
„Essenziell für ein Freihandelsabkommen der 
Europäischen Union mit den USA sei, dass 
die europäischen Standards vor allem bei 
der Produktsicherheit sowie beim 
Verbraucher- und Tierschutz gesichert 
sein müssen.“ 
 
„But I have strong demands including the 
protection of public services and EU 
environmental and food safety standards.” 
 
“Wir [Partei] waren und sind Garant dafür, 
dass sich die BürgerInnen-Interessen 
gegenüber jenen der Konzerne durchsetzen.“ 
 
“It will be crucial that we bring prosperity 
back to Europe, ensure new prospects for 
both workers and consumers, // whilst 
simultaneously preserving our European values.” 
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F3 norm 
proponents of the anti-globalisation frame, where current standards will 
determine the perceptions of potential costs of liberlisation (Congressional 
Research Service, 2014, p. 10): With regard to consumer safety standards, 
proponents of this frame will stress the European distinctiveness in terms of 
the so-called precautionary principle, which for instance is behind the 
widespread rejection of GMOs in Europe. Stretching the concept of human 
rights, proponents of the frame will stress differences in attitudes on data 
protection, using the ‘prism’-affair as an illustration. Similarly, rights to 
provision of certain public services, such as water supply as in the ‘Right to 
water’ campaign might be evoked. That said, it is of course possible that other 
standards are invoked as well, whether they are actually higher than the US 
counterparts or not. 
Constitutive 
 
F3 cons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F3 cons 
In general, of course, any threat to the aforementioned standards (and 
obviously the values these standards are meant to protect) or to the future 
capacity of setting such standards constitutes a problem. Such a problem might 
be referred to as a ‘democratic deficit’ (cf. Ayres, 2004, Sporer, 2009). As was 
already noted, globalisation and even free trade may not necessarily be a 
problem in this sense, but the current way most trade agreements are 
conceptualized (including the WTO regime) is (cf. Ayres, 2004, p. ?). A 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is not a problem as such 
either. They are potentially problematic inasmuch as they disregard importance 
of social, environmental, consumer safety and human rights concerns, which is 
the reason why – a certain general heterogeneity within the movement 
notwithstanding – ‘neoliberalism’ is univocally considered problematic from an 
anti-globalisation perspective (Ayres, 2004, pp. 15-18; Schröder, 2015, pp. 21-
23). Indeed, the above discussion of neoliberalism as a policy frame on free 
trade in general and TTIP in particular helps to understand this opposition: 
not only are these values at best secondary from a neoliberal perspective, but 
what may constitute a valuable regulatory standard for critics of globalisation is 
precisely what for neoliberals may constitute a ‘non-tariff barrier’ to trade 
(NTB). The removal of such NTBs is what, in fact, is the core of TTIP, much 
rather than the abolition of the few remaining tariffs (Congressional Research 
Service, 2014; Swedish study). Those who particularly appreciate the regulatory 
status quo are likely to perceive this as a risk: At best, they lose the kind of 
standard they consider ideal and are used to (such as, for instance, the 
Critique of current free trade practice, 
including WTO rules 
 
Declaring removal of standards as the ‘real’ 
purpose of TTIP 
 
TTIP as a threat for the environment / 
environmental standards 
 e.g. it brings fracking to Europe 
 
TTIP as a threat to consumer safety 
 e.g. it brings Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs) to Europe 
NB: here, the simple fact that GMOs will be 
allowed is enough; if however this is specified 
as a problem for agricultural producers, it is 
to be coded F2! 
 
TTIP as a threat to human/fundamental 
rights 
 e.g. data protection 
 UK: threat to NHS (National Health 
“This treaty would remove those 
protections.” 
 
“In reality, these negotiations are not about free 
trade, but they are about removing and 
undermining much-needed regulations, 
// which serves public policy goals // and 
corrects market failures.” 
 
“Jobs could be lost as a result of these 
proposals // and the environmental impact 
could be devastating,” said the Deputy Chair of 
the Assembly’s Enterprise, Trade & Investment 
Committee. //” 
 
“Another worrying aspects of this agreement, 
would be to allow the European market to be 
flooded with genetically modified (GM) foods 
imported from the US.” 
 
„Das geplante transatlantische 
Freihandelsabkommen bringt enorme 
Risiken mit sich – und nützt letztlich 
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 Logic Observable Instances Examples 
precautionary principle). This, of course, is a judgement that is independent of 
the factual effectiveness of standards. At worst, they face a lower level of 
standards as a kind of lowest common denominator. Any such risk will be 
denied by neoliberals, as they might not consider the same issues as valuable 
standards, but simply as non-tariff barriers to trade. 
 
To be added: threat to the UK’s National Health Service (privatization 
pressures); the NHS is a public health care system that guarantees free medical 
treatment to everyone within the UK; this is about a right/social standard 
much more than keeping a health industry within the UK, hence F3 rather 
than F2 
 
Service) 
 
TTIP as a threat to cultural diversity / as 
cultural homogenization 
 
TTIP only good for producers 
 
TTIP as an economic version of NATO, 
directed against the rest of the world 
 to the detriment of less developed 
countries 
 
US: complains about neoliberal/US - 
hegemony in global economics / international 
politics 
 
US: Prism/Snowden affair as a threat to 
European values (fundamental rights) is 
related to TTIP 
ausschließlich den Konzernen.“ 
 
“[Person] said: “Today’s talks were deigned to 
cement further the role of US firms in 
providing public services across the EU – // 
and help develop a deal that could mean an 
end to most environmental, health, and 
safety regulations across the EU. //” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
„Washington geht es darum, das Modell einer 
globalisierten Wirtschaft nach US-
Vorstellungen auch in Europa 
durchzusetzen.“ 
 
Cognitive 
 
F3A cogn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For judging whether a problem arises in the context of the TTIP negotiations, 
two lines of argument from an anti-globalisation perspective are thinkable, a 
moderate and a radical one. The distinction between the two hinges on the 
question, in how far the representative institutions of nation-states or even the 
supranational EU in combination with civil society are capable of securing 
such regulatory standards in a globalised economy or not. This categorization 
reflects earlier analyses of the anti-globalisation movement that have pointed 
to varying degrees of radicalism within the movement (Ayres, 2004, p. 27; 
Eschle, year; Starr & Adams, year, p. 20) and related variation in the degree of 
optimism and pessimism concerning the capacity of the state and politics more 
generally to control globalised capitalism (Ayres, 2004, p. 27; Hay & 
Rosamond, year; Sporer, 2009, pp. 10-52). The shared causal narrative is that a 
democratic deficit leads to the aforementioned problem of lower regulatory 
standards. 
Yet, from a moderate perspective, a democratic deficit in the context of TTIP 
exists if a. representative institutions such as the EP and civil society are not 
A: 
 the nation state or other, supranational 
institutions of representative democracy –
parliaments in particular – are or (with TTIP) 
will be hampered in their regulatory activity 
 e.g. because US rules apply to EU 
automatically 
 
Belief in democratic institutions 
 
Secretive, intergovernmental bargaining leads 
to the problem during the negotiation; 
complaints about secrecy 
NB: the call/strife for transparency instead is 
F3A pol! 
 
A: 
 
“This agreement would stipulate that any US 
regulations would be sufficient for the 
European market and as such, // any 
additional European regulations would be 
sidestepped. //” 
 
Allein schon die Tatsache, daß die 
Verhandlungen zwischen US-Regierung 
und EU-Kommission hinter 
verschlossenen Türen wenig transparent 
durchgeführt wurden, // läßt den Verdacht 
wachsen, daß hier europäische Standards im 
Verbraucher- und Umweltschutz, im Bereich 
der Lebensmittelsicherheit sowie bei 
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 Logic Observable Instances Examples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F3B cogn 
sufficiently involved in the process of negotiation, for if they were, they would 
represent consumer interests and consequently would keep regulatory 
standards safe and b. if the agreement itself provided for a future weakening of 
democratic institutions, e.g. by installing a non-democratic, private Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). From a radical perspective, a democratic 
deficit in the context of TTIP exists even if producers cannot prevent Member 
States or the EU from regulating on legal grounds. It is simply the idea that 
free trade agreements are always disadvantageous to consumers, as standards 
are definitely lost along the way and since a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ 
follows afterwards anyway. 
ISDS lead to the problem after the 
negotiation 
 they would allow firms to sue 
governments, thereby limiting the range of 
possible regulation/new standards 
 
Optimism: if formal representative 
institutions are involved, there is no problem 
– not for consumers, not for investors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B: 
Problem is caused even if formal institutions 
are involved  
The reason is that even TTIP itself, by its 
own nature, will remove standards (NTBs) 
due to US and corporate supremacy. 
Once TTIP is concluded, there will be a race 
to the bottom in terms of regulation that is 
driven by market forces and cannot be 
stopped. 
Arbeitnehmerrechten gekippt werden sollen. 
// 
 
„Es würde sich um ein System handeln, 
welches Unternehmen ermöglicht, den Staat 
auf Schadensersatz zu verklagen, wenn dieser 
zum Beispiel aufgrund gesundheitspolitischer 
Gegebenheiten gesetzliche 
Rahmenbedingungen verändert und dadurch 
dem besagten Unternehmen Einbußen 
entstehen.“ 
 
„"Wir haben bisher in keinem 
Freihandelsabkommen eine solche Regelung 
gebraucht, wir werden es auch hier nicht 
benötigen", so [Person],// "denn wir haben 
einen Rechtsstaat".“ 
 
 
 
 
 
B: 
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Policy 
 
F3A pol 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F3B pol 
Both moderate and radical critics of globalisation would agree that the existing 
standards as well as the capacity of setting new ones must be upheld – but as I 
already argued, this is essentially a value commitment without any particular 
policy implication concerning TTIP. Given the difference in terms of the 
causal narratives just presented, the concrete policy suggestions from 
moderates and radicals also differ. Moderates will oppose certain aspects of 
TTIP such as secret Commission mandates, private ISDS or the abolition of a 
particular standard but will conditionally support it (logically, if e.g. there are 
no private ISDS). Radicals, by contrast, sure of the loss it involves, will 
unconditionally oppose TTIP. 
The fact that TTIP is not about any FTA but about an FTA with the US is 
likely to be of particular relevance to critics of globalisation, since they 
consider the US as a hegemonic power in global politics and economics, 
spreading and enforcing neoliberal policies globally (Schröder, 2015, pp. 23-
24). In general, TTIP may thus be considered as an attempt to further impose 
neoliberal policies on Europe, first by directly addressing certain standards and 
by impeding future regulation by means of private ISDS, before which 
powerful US companies might outperform European states. As was already 
mentioned, the ‘prism’ scandal might not only be considered as a proof of 
differing values on the other side of Atlantic. For radicals, it will constitute 
another argument for stopping the negotiations on TTIP immediately. 
Moderates, by contrast, might want to use TTIP to achieve general 
concessions in the realm of data protection. As economic growth is not their 
value priority but standards such as data protection are, the link is easily made, 
as both the scandal and TTIP – the latter at least potentially – are problematic 
for similar reasons. 
General: change WTO practice and rules 
 
A: 
Conditional support for TTIP depending on 
the procedure (incl.: not now/ like this) 
 
No to (private) ISDS 
 
Call for parliamentary involvement early on 
 
Calls for involvement of citizens and civil 
society 
 
Call for transparency and publication of 
mandate 
 
Insisting on negotiations on equal par (“auf 
Augenhöhe”) 
 
US: use TTIP negotiation as a tool in order to 
achieve e.g. data protection more generally 
 
 
 
B: 
No to TTIP 
 
US: stop TTIP anyway, but definitely now 
that yet another scandal (Snowden, Prism) has 
become public 
A: 
 
Das bedeutet auch, dass die [Partei] im 
Europaparlament einem 
Freihandelsabkommen mit den USA nur 
dann zustimmen wird, wenn unsere 
Bedingungen erfüllt sind", betont der 
Vizepräsident des Europaparlaments, 
[Person]. 
 
„Das sind unsere klaren roten Linien, die 
nicht überschritten werden dürfen", stellt 
[Person] klar, // der sich für transparente 
Verhandlungen einsetzt.“ 
 
“Ein Schiedsgericht für Investor-Staats-
Klagen ist für ein Freihandelsabkommen 
zwischen der EU und den USA nicht 
notwendig", betont der [Partei]-
Spitzenkandidat und Vizepräsident des 
Europaparlaments, [Person].“ 
 
„Ein Freihandelsabkommen mit den USA 
muss aber auf Augenhöhe passieren“ 
 
„Derzeit kann es daher für das geplante 
Freihandelsabkommen von [Ajd.Partei] Seite 
keine Zustimmung geben”, so der [Partei]-
Europaabgeordnete.“ 
 
B: 
„Mit uns [Partei] ist dieses 
Freihandelsabkommen nicht zu machen!“ 
 362 
Off-topic: 
- UK: remarks on costs/benefits of EU membership that do not involve a position on TTIP as good or bad 
 Example (statements to be coded in bold):  
“With such benefits on offer, // this is hardly the time for the UK to exclude itself from EU leadership.”// “The Obama administration has already been c lear that it wants 
to see a strong British voice in the EU. // Now is the time for maximum British influence in the EU// , to ensure openness and resist protectionism.” 
 the passages that are not bold only deal with UK-EU relations, but do not include any information on free trade or TTIP 
- Remarks on US spying regarding the spying scandal itself and how to deal with it if this is not set in a direct relation to TTIP 
 
Short version: 
frame  What sort of values do you need in 
order to see this as a problem? 
(Normative dimension)  
What is the problem? 
(Constitutive dimension)  
What has led to the problem? 
 
(Cognitive dimension)  
What should be done about the 
problem? 
(Policy dimension)  
Neoliberalism, 
Frame 1  
Economic growth, job creation  Double crisis: economic stagnation 
and public deficits  
Protectionism makes economic recovery 
harder, while free  trade is the only policy 
that does not increase debt  
TTIP as soon and as ‚ambitious‘ as 
possible  
Protectionism, 
Frame2  
Existing jobs in domestic industries; 
patriotism and national/European 
interests  
Unlimited free trade threatens 
certain domestic industries  
Unfair competition  Exemption of certain sectors; 
geographical indications  
Anti-Globalisation, 
Frame 3(A&B)  
High standards for environmental 
protection, consumer safety and human 
rights  
TTIP might reduce the level of 
standards  
A: secret negotiations inhibit democratic 
control needed to protect standards; ISDS 
inhibit future regulation  
B: TTIP negotiations are beyond 
democratic control anyway; once it is 
there, race to the bottom  
A: conditional approval of TTIP – EP 
and civil society involvement, no 
ISDS 
B: no TTIP!  
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III.1 Detailed results on Europeanised welfare 
Austria 
Code A SPÖ % A SPÖ A ÖVP % A ÖVP A FPÖ % A FPÖ A Grüne % A Grüne 
Frame 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Frame 2 8.0 57.1 3.0 23.1 0.0 0.0 5.0 31.3 
F2 norm 4.0 28.6 3.0 23.1 0.0 0.0 2.0 12.5 
F2 cons 1.0 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 18.8 
F2 pol 3.0 21.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Frame 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F3 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F3 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F3 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F3 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Frame 4 0.0 0.0 5.0 38.5 58.0 100.0 1.0 6.3 
F4 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 
F4 cons 0.0 0.0 2.0 15.4 33.0 56.9 0.0 0.0 
F4 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 17.2 0.0 0.0 
F4 pol 0.0 0.0 3.0 23.1 9.0 15.5 1.0 6.3 
Frame 5 6.0 42.9 5.0 38.5 0.0 0.0 10.0 62.5 
F5 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F5 cons 2.0 14.3 5.0 38.5 0.0 0.0 7.0 43.8 
F5 cogn 2.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 12.5 
F5 pol 2.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 6.3 
total 14.0 100.0 13.0 100.0 58.0 100.0 16.0 100.0 
No. of texts 1 1 14 2 
source delegation delegation Indiv.MEPs MEPvianational 
Germany 
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Code D SPD % D SPD 
D CDU/ 
CSU 
% D 
CDU/ 
CSU 
D NPD 
% D 
NPD 
D AfD % D AfD 
D 
LINKE 
% D 
LINKE 
D B90 % D B90 D FDP % D FDP 
Frame 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54.0 50.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.0 27.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.0 15.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Frame 2 7.0 17.9 5.0 17.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 93.3 8.0 61.5 5.0 15.6 
F2 norm 3.0 7.7 3.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 26.7 2.0 15.4 0.0 0.0 
F2 cons 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 33.3 3.0 23.1 0.0 0.0 
F2 cogn 1.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 6.7 1.0 7.7 5.0 15.6 
F2 pol 3.0 7.7 1.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 26.7 2.0 15.4 0.0 0.0 
Frame 3 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.4 22.0 20.6 23.0 51.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.0 84.4 
F3 norm 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.4 1.0 0.9 3.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 31.3 
F3 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 13.1 2.0 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 15.6 
F3 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 6.5 7.0 15.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 15.6 
F3 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 24.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 21.9 
Frame 4 2.0 5.1 19.0 65.5 31.0 29.0 22.0 48.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 norm 0.0 0.0 2.0 6.9 0.0 0.0 2.0 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 cons 0.0 0.0 7.0 24.1 26.0 24.3 8.0 17.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 cogn 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.4 3.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 pol 2.0 5.1 9.0 31.0 2.0 1.9 12.0 26.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Frame 5 30.0 76.9 4.0 13.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 6.7 5.0 38.5 0.0 0.0 
F5 norm 1.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F5 cons 24.0 61.5 2.0 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 6.7 2.0 15.4 0.0 0.0 
F5 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 
F5 pol 5.0 12.8 2.0 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 15.4 0.0 0.0 
total 39.0 100.0 29.0 100.0 107.0 100.0 45.0 100.0 15.0 100.0 13.0 100.0 32.0 100.0 
No. texts 2 2 5 6 2 1 4 
Source: 
delegation delegation nationalbydef nationalbydef delegation delegation 
delegation (expert in 
practice) 
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France 
Code F PS % F PS F UMP % F UMP F FdG % F FdG F Verts % F Verts F FN % F FN F MoDem 
%F 
MoDem 
Frame 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.0 11.9   0.0 
F1 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 1.5   0.0 
F1 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 3.0   0.0 
F1 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 4.0   0.0 
F1 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 3.5   0.0 
Frame 2 4.0 30.8 0.0 0.0 88.0 366.7 12.0 27.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 16.7 
F2 norm 2.0 15.4 0.0 0.0 12.0 50.0 1.0 2.3 0.0 0.0   0.0 
F2 cons 2.0 15.4 0.0 0.0 44.0 183.3 6.0 13.6 0.0 0.0   0.0 
F2 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 62.5 5.0 11.4 0.0 0.0   0.0 
F2 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.0 70.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 16.7 
Frame 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 83.3 
F3 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 16.7 
F3 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 
F3 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 
F3 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 66.7 
Frame 4 1.0 7.7 30.0 93.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 3.5   0.0 
F4 norm 0.0 0.0 5.0 15.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 
F4 cons 0.0 0.0 10.0 31.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.5   0.0 
F4 cogn 0.0 0.0 3.0 9.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.0   0.0 
F4 pol 1.0 7.7 12.0 37.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 2.0   0.0 
Frame 5 15.0 115.4 0.0 0.0 2.0 8.3 1.0 2.3 0.0 0.0   0.0 
F5 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 
F5 cons 10.0 76.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 
F5 cogn 3.0 23.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   0.0 
F5 pol 2.0 15.4 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.2 1.0 2.3 0.0 0.0   0.0 
total 20.0 153.8 30.0 93.8 90.0 375.0 13.0 29.5 31.0 15.4 6.0 100.0 
No. of texts 1 1 9 1 4 0 
source 
delegation quasi-delegation expertMEP delegation indivMEPs 
2 only on: travailleurs 
détachés; Suisse 
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Ireland and Italy67 
Code I AN % I AN IRE Greens %IRE Greens 
Frame 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Frame 2 0.0 0.0 5.0 83.3 
F2 norm 0.0 0.0 1.0 16.7 
F2 cons 0.0 0.0 1.0 16.7 
F2 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 pol 0.0 0.0 3.0 50.0 
Frame 3 0.0 0.0 1.0 16.7 
F3 norm 0.0 0.0 1.0 16.7 
F3 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F3 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F3 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Frame 4 1.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 pol 1.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
Frame 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F5 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F5 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F5 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F5 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
total 1.0 100.0 6.0 100.0 
number of press releases / texts 1 1 
source manifesto manifesto 
 
                                                     
67 Most parties from these countries did not issue statements on the issue. 
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United Kingdom 
Code UK Lab % UK Lab UK Cons % UK Cons UK Lib % UK Lib UK Greens 
% UK 
Greens 
UKIP % UKIP UK BNP % UK BNP 
Frame 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.0 25.0 29.0 100.0 
F1 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 
F1 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.9 13.0 44.8 
F1 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.4 5.0 17.2 
F1 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 6.5 11.0 37.9 
Frame 2 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.3 15.0 7.5 40.0 67.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 norm 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.3 3.0 1.5 6.0 10.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 4.5 21.0 35.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 8.0 13.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 5.0 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Frame 3 0.0 0.0 2.0 4.5 64.0 31.8 0.0 0.0 29.0 31.5 0.0 0.0 
F3 norm 0.0 0.0 2.0 4.5 32.0 15.9 0.0 0.0 6.0 6.5 0.0 0.0 
F3 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 
F3 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 19.0 20.7 0.0 0.0 
F3 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Frame 4 0.0 0.0 41.0 93.2 75.0 37.3 0.0 0.0 40.0 43.5 0.0 0.0 
F4 norm 0.0 0.0 6.0 13.6 17.0 8.5 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 
F4 cons 0.0 0.0 10.0 22.7 12.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 15.2 0.0 0.0 
F4 cogn 0.0 0.0 10.0 22.7 18.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 7.6 0.0 0.0 
F4 pol 0.0 0.0 15.0 34.1 28.0 13.9 0.0 0.0 17.0 18.5 0.0 0.0 
Frame 5 24.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 47.0 23.4 19.0 32.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F5 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F5 cons 12.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 22.0 10.9 8.0 13.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F5 cogn 11.0 45.8 0.0 0.0 23.0 11.4 10.0 16.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F5 pol 1.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
total 24.0 100.0 44.0 100.0 201.0 100.0 59.0 100.0 92.0 100.0 29.0 100.0 
No. of texts 2 2 7 5 5 3 
source 
delegation delegation 
indivMEPs crosschecked 
with delegation indivMEPs delegation MEPviaNational 
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III.2 Detailed results on the 2013 Reform of the CAP 
Austria 
Code ÖVP %ÖVP SPÖ %SPÖ A Grüne %A Grüne A FPÖ %A FPÖ A NEOs %A NEOs 
classic (F1) 6.0 33.3 3.0 3.4 2.0 6.1 5.0 19.2 0.0 0.0 
F1 norm 2.0 11.1 3.0 3.4 2.0 6.1 1.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 
F1 cons 3.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 11.5 0.0 0.0 
F1 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 
F1 pol 1.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
liberalisation (F2) 1.0 5.6 6.0 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 75.0 
F2 norm 1.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 25.0 
F2 cons 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cogn 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 50.0 
multifunctionality (F3) 11.0 61.1 78.0 89.7 31.0 93.9 7.0 26.9 1.0 25.0 
F3 norm 5.0 27.8 22.0 25.3 3.0 9.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 25.0 
F3 cons 1.0 5.6 12.0 13.8 2.0 6.1 1.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 
F3 cogn 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.6 1.0 3.0 1.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 
F3 pol 5.0 27.8 40.0 46.0 25.0 75.8 5.0 19.2 0.0 0.0 
anti-centralisation (F4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 53.8 0.0 0.0 
F4 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 
F4 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 23.1 0.0 0.0 
F4 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 26.9 0.0 0.0 
total 18.0 100.0 87.0 100.0 33.0 100.0 26.0 100.0 4.0 100.0 
No. of texts 2 10 2 3 1 
source MEPviaNational national delegation MEPviaNational leaderMEP manifesto 
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Germany 
Code 
CDU/ 
CSU 
%CDU/ 
CSU SPD %SPD D B90 %D B90 D FDP 
%D 
FDP 
D 
LINKE 
%D 
LINKE D AfD 
%D 
AfD D NPD 
%D 
NPD 
classic (F1) 26.0 68.4 0.0 0.0 12.0 5.1 9.0 7.6 3.0 7.9 1.0 7.7 2.0 22.2 
F1 norm 7.0 18.4 0.0 0.0 9.0 3.8 8.0 6.8 1.0 2.6 1.0 7.7 1.0 11.1 
F1 cons 2.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 11.1 
F1 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 pol 17.0 44.7 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 2.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
liberalisation (F2) 1.0 2.6 16.0 11.9 0.0 0.0 88.0 74.6 1.0 2.6 6.0 46.2 0.0 0.0 
F2 norm 1.0 2.6 4.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 26.0 22.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cons 0.0 0.0 3.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 12.0 10.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cogn 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 17.0 14.4 0.0 0.0 1.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 
F2 pol 0.0 0.0 7.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 33.0 28.0 1.0 2.6 5.0 38.5 0.0 0.0 
multifunctionality (F3) 9.0 23.7 119.0 88.1 222.0 94.9 12.0 10.2 34.0 89.5 4.0 30.8 4.0 44.4 
F3 norm 2.0 5.3 22.0 16.3 49.0 20.9 4.0 3.4 11.0 28.9 2.0 15.4 2.0 22.2 
F3 cons 0.0 0.0 7.0 5.2 17.0 7.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 1.0 11.1 
F3 cogn 0.0 0.0 7.0 5.2 19.0 8.1 3.0 2.5 4.0 10.5 1.0 7.7 1.0 11.1 
F3 pol 7.0 18.4 83.0 61.5 137.0 58.5 5.0 4.2 18.0 47.4 1.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 
anti-centralisation (F4) 2.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 7.6 0.0 0.0 2.0 15.4 3.0 33.3 
F4 norm 1.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 11.1 
F4 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 11.1 
F4 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 pol 1.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 15.4 1.0 11.1 
total 38.0 100.0 135.0 100.0 234.0 100.0 118.0 100.0 38.0 100.0 13.0 100.0 9.0 100.0 
No. of texts 6 8 15 16 3 1 2 
source national delegation national delegation national delegation expertMEP national delegation manifesto nationalbydef 
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France 
Code 
UMP %UMP PS %PS F MoDem 
%F 
MoDem F FN %F FN F Verts %F Verts F FdG %F FdG 
non-substantial 3.0 0.0  31.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
classic (F1) 4.0 100.0 64.0 32.0 7.0 87.5 5.0 100.0 6.0 5.3 328.0 69.9 
F1 norm 1.0 25.0 8.0 4.0 3.0 37.5 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.4 97.0 20.7 
F1 cons 0.0 0.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 12.5 3.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 77.0 16.4 
F1 cogn 0.0 0.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.0 6.2 
F1 pol 3.0 75.0 49.0 24.5 3.0 37.5 2.0 40.0 1.0 0.9 125.0 26.7 
liberalisation (F2) 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 
F2 norm 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 
F2 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
multifunctionality (F3) 0.0 0.0 131.0 65.5 1.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 107.0 93.9 138.0 29.4 
F3 norm 0.0 0.0 36.0 18.0 1.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 12.0 10.5 54.0 11.5 
F3 cons 0.0 0.0 3.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.0 20.2 6.0 1.3 
F3 cogn 0.0 0.0 3.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 8.8 5.0 1.1 
F3 pol 0.0 0.0 89.0 44.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 62.0 54.4 73.0 15.6 
anti-centralisation (F4) 0.0 0.0 3.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.6 
F4 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 cons 0.0 0.0 3.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.2 
F4 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.2 
F4 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.2 
total 4.0 100.0 200.0 100.0 8.0 100.0 5.0 100.0 114.0 100.0 469.0 100.0 
No. of  texts 2 13 2 1 8 14 
source 
national delegation national delegation national delegation 
(expert)MEP 
viaNational national delegation expertMEP 
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Ireland 
Code 
IRE FF %IRE FF IRE FG %IRE FG Labour IRE 
%Labour 
IRE IRE SF %IRE SF IRE Greens 
%IRE 
Greens 
classic (F1) 19.0 57.6 166.0 72.2 13.0 65.0 27.0 84.4 5.0 41.7 
F1 norm 10.0 30.3 68.0 29.6 8.0 40.0 13.0 40.6 2.0 16.7 
F1 cons 5.0 15.2 34.0 14.8 0.0 0.0 4.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 
F1 cogn 1.0 3.0 8.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 2.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 
F1 pol 3.0 9.1 56.0 24.3 5.0 25.0 8.0 25.0 3.0 25.0 
liberalisation (F2) 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.4 1.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 norm 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.4 1.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
multifunctionality (F3) 3.0 9.1 50.0 21.7 6.0 30.0 2.0 6.3 6.0 50.0 
F3 norm 1.0 3.0 29.0 12.6 6.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 8.3 
F3 cons 0.0 0.0 3.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F3 cogn 0.0 0.0 9.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 
F3 pol 2.0 6.1 9.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.1 5.0 41.7 
anti-centralisation (F4) 11.0 33.3 13.0 5.7 0.0 0.0 3.0 9.4 1.0 8.3 
F4 norm 6.0 18.2 3.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.0 6.3 1.0 8.3 
F4 cons 2.0 6.1 3.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 
F4 cogn 3.0 9.1 3.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 pol 0.0 0.0 4.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
total 33.0 100.0 230.0 100.0 20.0 100.0 32.0 100.0 12.0 100.0 
No. of  texts 3 9 1 2 1 
source MEPviaNational expertMEP manifesto MEPviaNational manifesto 
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Italy 
Code I FI %I FI I PD %I PD I FdI/AN %I FdI/AN I Verdi % I Verdi I Tspiras %I Tsipras 
classic (F1) 28.0 53.8 2.0 100.0 76.0 56.7 0.0 0.0 8.0 50.0 
F1 norm 14.0 26.9 2.0 100.0 16.0 11.9 0.0 0.0 7.0 43.8 
F1 cons 5.0 9.6 0.0 0.0 4.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 pol 9.0 17.3 0.0 0.0 56.0 41.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 6.3 
liberalisation (F2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
multifunctionality (F3) 22.0 42.3 0.0 0.0 8.0 6.0 6.0 100.0 8.0 50.0 
F3 norm 12.0 23.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 50.0 4.0 25.0 
F3 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 6.3 
F3 cogn 3.0 5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F3 pol 7.0 13.5 0.0 0.0 8.0 6.0 3.0 50.0 3.0 18.8 
anti-centralisation (F4) 2.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 49.0 36.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 norm 2.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 25.0 18.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
total 52.0 100.0 2.0 100.0 134.0 100.0 6.0 100.0 16.0 100.0 
No. of texts 4 1 13 1 2 
source expertMEP national delagation expertMEP manifesto manifesto-like 
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United Kingdom 
Code 
Cons %Cons 
Labour 
UK 
%Labour 
UK 
UK 
LibDem 
%UK 
LibDem UKIP %UKIP 
UK 
Greens 
%UK 
Greens UK BNP 
%UK 
BNP 
classic (F1) 7.0 5.4 0.0 0.0 2.0 25.0 1.0 3.8 2.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 norm 6.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cons 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 2.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 
liberalisation (F2) 89.0 69.0 9.0 47.4 1.0 12.5 1.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 25.0 
F2 norm 6.0 4.7 3.0 15.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cons 38.0 29.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 25.0 
F2 cogn 5.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 pol 40.0 31.0 6.0 31.6 1.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
multifunctionality (F3) 15.0 11.6 10.0 52.6 5.0 62.5 5.0 19.2 18.0 90.0 0.0 0.0 
F3 norm 8.0 6.2 3.0 15.8 3.0 37.5 1.0 3.8 8.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 
F3 cons 3.0 2.3 3.0 15.8 1.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F3 cogn 3.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 
F3 pol 1.0 0.8 4.0 21.1 1.0 12.5 4.0 15.4 9.0 45.0 0.0 0.0 
anti-centralisation (F4) 18.0 14.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0 73.1 0.0 0.0 3.0 75.0 
F4 norm 2.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 15.4 0.0 0.0 1.0 25.0 
F4 cons 6.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 1.0 25.0 
F4 cogn 4.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 23.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F4 pol 6.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 26.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 25.0 
total 129.0 100.0 19.0 100.0 8.0 100.0 26.0 100.0 20.0 100.0 4.0 100.0 
number of press releases / 
texts 5 1 1 1 2 1 
source national delegation leaderMEP national delegation national delegation allMEPs MEPviaNational 
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III.3 Detailed results on TTIP 
Austria 
code/party A SPÖ %A SPÖ A ÖVP %A ÖVP A NEOs %A NEOs A Grüne %A Grüne A FPÖ %A FPÖ 
F1: neoliberalism 3.0 4.8 39.0 32.7 6.0 20.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 norm 2.0 3.2 15.0 12.6 3.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cogn 1.0 1.6 12.0 10.0 2.0 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 pol 0.0 0.0 12.0 10.0 1.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2: protectionism 0.0 0.0 14.0 11.7 3.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 15.0 13.8 
F2 norm 0.0 0.0 7.0 5.8 3.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 6.0 5.5 
F2 cons 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.6 
F2 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.9 
F2 pol 0.0 0.0 6.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 2.7 
F3: anti-globalisation 59.0 95.1 66.0 55.4 20.0 68.9 102.0 100.0 93.0 86.1 
F3 norm 7.0 11.2 24.0 20.1 5.0 17.2 7.0 6.8 5.0 4.6 
F3 cons 9.0 14.5 9.0 7.5 0.0 0.0 16.0 15.6 22.0 20.3 
F3A cogn 12.0 19.3 9.0 7.5 2.0 6.9 29.0 28.4 27.0 25.0 
F3A pol 31.0 50.0 24.0 20.1 12.0 41.3 47.0 46.0 26.0 24.0 
F3B cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.9 6.0 5.5 
F3B pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.4 1.0 0.9 7.0 6.4 
total 62.0 100.0 119.0 100.0 29.0 100.0 102.0 100.0 108.0 100.0 
No. of texts 13 11 2 11 15 
source 
national delegation MEPviaNational 
national delegation (not yet 
elected at the time) national delegation MEPviaNational 
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Germany 
code/party D SPD %D SPD D NPD 
%D 
NPD 
D 
LINKE 
%D 
LINKE D FDP %D FDP 
D CDU/ 
CSU 
%D 
CDU/ 
CSU D B90 %D B90 D AfD %D AfD 
F1: neoliberalism 2.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 100.0 50.0 69.4 0.0 0.0 2.0 25.0 
F1 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 27.3 16.0 22.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 12.5 
F1 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 27.3 12.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cogn 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 9.1 9.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 12.5 
F1 pol 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 36.4 13.0 18.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2: protectionism 3.0 2.1 14.0 33.3 18.0 34.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 11.1 5.0 7.5 0.0 0.0 
F2 norm 1.0 0.7 3.0 7.1 1.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 4.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cons 0.0 0.0 7.0 16.7 8.0 15.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.4 2.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cogn 0.0 0.0 3.0 7.1 2.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 pol 2.0 1.4 1.0 2.4 7.0 13.2 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.2 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 
F3: anti-globalisation 140.0 96.6 28.0 66.7 35.0 66.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 19.4 62.0 92.5 6.0 75.0 
F3 norm 24.0 16.6 2.0 4.8 3.0 5.7 0.0 0.0 11.0 15.3 6.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 
F3 cons 14.0 9.7 17.0 40.5 20.0 37.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 9.0 2.0 25.0 
F3A cogn 31.0 21.4 5.0 11.9 6.0 11.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 17.9 3.0 37.5 
F3A pol 71.0 49.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 7.5 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.2 38.0 56.7 1.0 12.5 
F3B cogn 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F3B pol 0.0 0.0 3.0 7.1 2.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
total 145.0 100.0 42.0 100.0 53.0 100.0 11.0 100.0 72.0 100.0 67.0 100.0 8.0 100.0 
No. of texts 16 2 5 2 8 10 1 
source national delegation nationalpartybydef national delegation expertMEP national delegation national delegation manifesto 
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France 
code/party F Verts %F Verts F UMP %F UMP F PS %F PS F MoDem %F MoDem F FN %F FN F FdG %F FdG 
F1: neoliberalism 0.0 0.0 46.0 37.7 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 norm 0.0 0.0 25.0 20.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cons 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cogn 0.0 0.0 7.0 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 pol 0.0 0.0 13.0 10.7 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2: protectionism 14.0 15.4 61.0 50.0 41.0 58.6 16.0 44.4 21.0 75.0 5.0 6.9 
F2 norm 3.0 3.3 23.0 18.9 9.0 12.9 4.0 11.1 2.0 7.1 0.0 0.0 
F2 cons 5.0 5.5 9.0 7.4 1.0 1.4 3.0 8.3 5.0 17.9 1.0 1.4 
F2 cogn 2.0 2.2 5.0 4.1 1.0 1.4 4.0 11.1 3.0 10.7 3.0 4.2 
F2 pol 4.0 4.4 24.0 19.7 30.0 42.9 5.0 13.9 11.0 39.3 1.0 1.4 
F3: anti-globalisation 77.0 84.6 15.0 12.3 29.0 41.4 19.0 52.8 7.0 25.0 67.0 93.1 
F3 norm 2.0 2.2 12.0 9.8 11.0 15.7 7.0 19.4 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.8 
F3 cons 39.0 42.9 1.0 0.8 6.0 8.6 2.0 5.6 4.0 14.3 21.0 29.2 
F3A cogn 21.0 23.1 1.0 0.8 2.0 2.9 4.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 10.0 13.9 
F3A pol 3.0 3.3 1.0 0.8 10.0 14.3 6.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 4.0 5.6 
F3B cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 
F3B pol 12.0 13.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 7.1 30.0 41.7 
total 91.0 100.0 122.0 100.0 70.0 100.0 36.0 100.0 28.0 100.0 72.0 100.0 
No. of texts 8.0 8.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 11.0 
source national delegation national delegation national delegation national delegation expertMEP leaderMEP 
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Ireland 
code/party IRE SF %IRE SF IRE Lab %IRE Lab IRE Greens 
%IRE 
Greens IRE FG %IRE FG IRE FF %IRE FF 
F1: neoliberalism 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.3 49.0 94.2 13.0 65.0 
F1 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.3 19.0 36.5 10.0 50.0 
F1 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 5.8 0.0 0.0 
F1 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.0 32.7 2.0 10.0 
F1 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 19.2 1.0 5.0 
F2: protectionism 8.0 29.6 0.0 0.0 12.0 15.6 1.0 1.9 1.0 5.0 
F2 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cons 5.0 18.5 0.0 0.0 4.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cogn 3.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 4.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 5.0 
F2 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 
F3: anti-globalisation 19.0 70.4 2.0 100.0 64.0 83.1 2.0 3.8 6.0 30.0 
F3 norm 0.0 0.0 1.0 50.0 4.0 5.2 2.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 
F3 cons 8.0 29.6 0.0 0.0 25.0 32.5 0.0 0.0 2.0 10.0 
F3A cogn 7.0 25.9 0.0 0.0 11.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 2.0 10.0 
F3A pol 2.0 7.4 1.0 50.0 4.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 2.0 10.0 
F3B cogn 2.0 7.4 0.0 0.0 9.0 11.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F3B pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
total 27.0 100.0 2.0 100.0 77.0 100.0 52.0 100.0 20.0 100.0 
No. of texts 2 1 1 4 2 
source MEPviaNational MEPviaNational manifesto MEPviaNational MEPviaNational 
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Italy68 
code/party I Verdi %I Verdi I Tsipras %I Tsipras I PD %I PD I FI %I FI 
F1: neoliberalism 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 13.0 16.0 55.2 
F1 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 8.7 8.0 27.6 
F1 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.3 7.0 24.1 
F1 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.4 
F2: protectionism 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 8.7 13.0 44.8 
F2 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.3 2.0 6.9 
F2 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 6.9 
F2 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 4.3 9.0 31.0 
F3: anti-globalisation 3.0 100.0 20.0 100.0 18.0 78.3 0.0 0.0 
F3 norm 1.0 33.3 1.0 5.0 4.0 17.4 0.0 0.0 
F3 cons 1.0 33.3 8.0 40.0 2.0 8.7 0.0 0.0 
F3A cogn 0.0 0.0 4.0 20.0 4.0 17.4 0.0 0.0 
F3A pol 1.0 33.3 1.0 5.0 8.0 34.8 0.0 0.0 
F3B cogn 0.0 0.0 2.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F3B pol 0.0 0.0 4.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
total 3.0 100.0 20.0 100.0 23.0 100.0 29.0 100.0 
No. of texts 1 2 2 4 
source manifesto manifesto-like national delegation expertMEP 
 
  
                                                     
68 The Alleanza Nazionale did not issue statements on TTIP during the time frame observed. 
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United Kingdom 
code/party UKIP %UKIP 
UK 
LibDem 
%UK 
LibDem 
UK Lab 
post-
election 
%UK 
Lab post-
election 
UK Lab 
manifest
o 
%UK 
Lab 
manifesto 
UK 
Greens 
%UK 
Greens UK Cons 
% UK 
Cons UK BNP 
%UK 
BNP 
F1: neoliberalism 13.0 100.0 22.0 100.0 18.0 10.1 6.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 36.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 norm 1.0 7.7 8.0 36.4 9.0 5.1 4.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 
F1 cons 1.0 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 
F1 cogn 6.0 46.2 11.0 50.0 9.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 
F1 pol 5.0 38.5 3.0 13.6 0.0 0.0 2.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 38.9 0.0 0.0 
F2: protectionism 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F2 pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F3: anti-globalisation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 160.0 89.9 4.0 40.0 42.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 100.0 
F3 norm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.0 21.9 1.0 10.0 3.0 7.1 0.0 0.0 2.0 22.2 
F3 cons 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 7.3 2.0 20.0 14.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 3.0 33.3 
F3A cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.0 12.4 0.0 0.0 3.0 7.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 11.1 
F3A pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 86.0 48.3 1.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F3B cogn 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 31.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 33.3 
F3B pol 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 21.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
total 13.0 100.0 22.0 100.0 178.0 100.0 10.0 100.0 42.0 100.0 36.0 100.0 9.0 100.0 
No. of texts 2 2 15 1 5 4 1 
source 
national delegation national delegation 
expertMEP, 
leaderMEP manifesto allMEPs national delegation nationalparty 
 
Raw data can be provided upon request. 
